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   This	  dissertation	  offers	  a	  conceptual	  analysis	  of	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  religious	  
education	  in	  Palestine	  during	  the	  years	  of	  British	  military,	  civil	  and	  Mandatory	  
control	  (1917-­‐1948).	  It	  examines	  the	  policies	  toward	  religious	  education	  pursued	  
by	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine,	  as	  well	  as	  practices	  developed	  by	  Jewish	  and	  
Muslim	  educators	  for	  use	  within	  Zionist	  and	  private	  Arab	  schools.	  Based	  on	  a	  
combination	  of	  archival	  sources,	  school	  curricula,	  textbooks,	  memoirs	  and	  
newspapers,	  this	  dissertation	  elucidates	  the	  tensions	  that	  characterized	  attempts	  on	  
the	  part	  of	  colonial	  and	  “native”	  reformers	  to	  transform	  the	  structure,	  content	  and	  
purpose	  of	  religious	  education	  in	  pursuit	  of	  their	  respective	  political	  goals.	  
In	  order	  to	  situate	  the	  Department	  of	  Education’s	  policies	  within	  Palestine’s	  
sectarian	  context,	  I	  chart	  how	  an	  understanding	  of	  religion	  as	  an	  apolitical	  source	  of	  
individual	  ethics	  found	  reflection	  in	  a	  legal	  structure	  that	  tied	  educational	  freedom	  
to	  the	  religious	  community.	  I	  further	  argue	  that	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  
promoted	  a	  novel	  version	  of	  religious	  education	  within	  both	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  
communities	  as,	  somewhat	  paradoxically,	  a	  means	  of	  preserving	  the	  “traditional”	  
order	  in	  which	  religious	  knowledge	  was	  separated	  from	  national	  politics.	  Therefore	  
while	  secular	  studies	  were	  encouraged	  on	  an	  instrumental	  basis,	  administrators	  
vigorously	  opposed	  the	  development	  of	  secularism	  as	  an	  ideological	  framework	  
associated	  with	  moral	  discord	  and	  political	  upheaval.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  half	  of	  this	  project	  discusses	  educational	  initiatives	  among	  
Zionist	  and	  Palestinian	  Muslim	  leaders	  in	  order	  to	  highlight	  the	  points	  of	  overlap	  
and	  rupture	  with	  policies	  pursued	  by	  the	  Mandatory	  state.	  Notwithstanding	  a	  strong	  
impetus	  within	  both	  groups	  to	  vilify	  customary	  forms	  of	  communal	  schooling,	  
neither	  acquiesced	  to	  the	  colonial	  view	  of	  religious	  education	  as	  the	  source	  of	  
“universal”	  values	  that	  transcended	  the	  realm	  of	  mass	  politics.	  In	  contrast,	  Jewish	  
and	  Muslim	  leaders	  in	  Palestine	  offered	  alternative	  educational	  models	  in	  which	  
control	  over	  religious	  knowledge	  was	  innately	  linked	  to	  the	  goals	  of	  their	  respective	  
political	  movements.	  Rather	  than	  viewing	  religious	  education	  as	  a	  source	  of	  social	  
continuity,	  modernists	  placed	  the	  reform	  of	  religious	  education	  at	  the	  center	  of	  a	  
program	  that	  aimed	  at	  revolutionary	  change.	  
	   Finally,	  by	  adapting	  a	  theoretical	  model	  borrowed	  from	  Bruno	  Latour,	  this	  
project	  argues	  that	  the	  apparent	  differences	  between	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  
on	  one	  hand,	  and	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  educators	  on	  the	  other,	  were	  more	  discursive	  
than	  material.	  Education	  functioned	  as	  a	  political	  tool	  within	  the	  schools	  maintained	  
by	  each	  group;	  however,	  the	  link	  between	  pedagogy	  and	  politics	  was	  one	  that	  the	  
Mandatory	  government	  refused	  to	  recognize.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  Department	  of	  
Education	  accused	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  leaders	  of	  transgressing	  the	  boundary	  meant	  
to	  separate	  education	  as	  an	  exercise	  in	  character	  formation	  from	  education	  as	  a	  site	  
of	  social	  conditioning	  and	  political	  mobilization.	  Battles	  over	  the	  content	  and	  
purpose	  of	  religious	  education	  therefore	  constituted	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  conflict	  
regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  mass	  schooling	  and	  political	  engagement	  in	  
modern	  Palestine.
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Introduction	  
	  
Several	  years	  ago	  in	  Jerusalem,	  I	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  attend	  a	  chumash	  
mesibah,	  a	  celebration	  during	  which	  five-­‐year	  old	  boys	  in	  a	  Jewish	  ultra-­‐Orthodox	  
school,	  or	  ẖeder,	  received	  their	  individual	  copies	  of	  the	  Torah.	  The	  program	  was	  
conducted	  in	  Yiddish	  with	  a	  tall	  barrier	  separating	  excited	  mothers,	  grandmothers,	  
sisters	  and	  aunts	  from	  the	  men	  up	  front.	  Plates	  with	  the	  presiding	  rabbi’s	  kugel	  
circulated	  through	  the	  audience.	  For	  all	  these	  traces	  of	  Yiddishkeit,	  it	  would	  be	  hard	  
to	  characterize	  this	  as	  a	  traditional	  affair.	  To	  begin	  with,	  the	  rabbi	  was	  escorted	  into	  
the	  event	  by	  a	  security	  detail	  wearing	  Bluetooth	  headsets.	  A	  stage	  had	  been	  erected	  
whose	  level	  of	  set	  design	  would	  outshine	  many	  private	  school	  productions	  in	  the	  
United	  States.	  The	  young	  boys	  performed—in	  costume—a	  fully	  choreographed	  song	  
and	  dance	  routine	  before	  receiving	  their	  chumashim.	  Flat-­‐screen	  televisions	  
broadcast	  the	  performance	  throughout	  the	  audience,	  ensuring	  that	  even	  the	  women	  
seated	  in	  the	  back	  could	  get	  a	  close	  up	  view	  of	  their	  budding	  Torah	  scholars	  in	  
matching	  silver	  hats.	  	  
While	  Yiddish	  is	  not	  a	  language	  I	  speak,	  I	  was	  nonetheless	  able	  to	  deduce	  that	  
this	  “traditional”	  ceremony	  within	  the	  most	  “traditional”	  of	  Jewish	  communities	  was	  
a	  wholly	  modern	  affair,	  notwithstanding	  popular	  depictions	  of	  Israel’s	  ultra-­‐
Orthodox	  (ẖaredi)	  communities	  as	  the	  living	  embodiment	  of	  medieval	  Jewry.	  
Instead	  of	  somehow	  residing	  outside	  the	  experience	  of	  Modernity,	  this	  small	  
anecdote	  illustrates	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  “new”	  can	  facilitate—rather	  than	  
replace—the	  “old”.	  It	  is	  an	  observation	  to	  which	  I	  have	  continually	  returned	  in	  my	  
attempt	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  my	  multi-­‐faceted	  object	  of	  inquiry:	  the	  nature	  of	  Jewish	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and	  Islamic	  religious	  education	  in	  Palestine	  during	  the	  period	  of	  British	  Mandatory	  
rule,	  and	  the	  character	  of	  British	  policy	  toward	  religious	  education.	  It	  was	  precisely	  
during	  this	  period,	  perhaps	  more	  so	  than	  during	  any	  other	  in	  the	  history	  of	  modern	  
Palestine,	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  education	  underwent	  a	  seismic	  shift	  from	  a	  
decentralized	  practice	  managed	  largely	  by	  religious	  communities	  into	  a	  formalized	  
system	  of	  schooling	  centrally	  managed	  by	  state	  or	  quasi-­‐state	  institutions.1	  	  
This	  project	  began	  as	  a	  comparison	  of	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  communal	  
schooling—exemplified	  by	  the	  ẖeder	  and	  kuttāb—and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  
institutions	  evolved	  as	  they	  found	  themselves	  at	  the	  receiving	  end	  of	  overlapping	  
internal	  and	  colonial	  reform	  efforts.	  Generally	  speaking,	  reformers	  from	  both	  
traditions	  began,	  beginning	  in	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century,	  to	  identify	  these	  forms	  of	  
schooling	  as	  the	  root	  of	  intellectual	  stagnation,	  moral	  corruption	  and	  even	  political	  
decline.	  The	  logical	  conclusion	  was	  to	  transform	  customary	  forms	  of	  education	  as	  a	  
key	  step	  in	  reinvigorating	  the	  national	  spirit	  and	  joining	  modern	  civilization	  as	  full	  
members.	  I	  was	  interested	  in	  charting	  this	  transformation	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine,	  
where	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  reformers	  crossed	  paths	  not	  only	  with	  one	  another,	  but	  
also	  with	  a	  colonial	  regime	  wielding	  its	  own	  ideas	  regarding	  education.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  At	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  war,	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  Arab	  children	  who	  attended	  school	  were	  in	  private	  
communal	  institutions:	  approximately	  8705	  in	  private	  Muslim	  schools	  (predominately	  katātīb)	  and	  
thousands	  more	  in	  Christian	  (largely	  missionary)	  schools,	  versus	  8248	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  public	  schools.	  
Abdul	  Latif	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  
administration	  	  (London:	  Luzac,	  1956),	  20.	  Within	  the	  Jewish	  community,	  exact	  statistics	  of	  school	  
enrollment	  by	  administrative	  body	  are	  unavailable,	  but	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  number	  of	  students	  in	  
schools	  managed	  by	  the	  va’ad	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  approached	  the	  number	  in	  private	  ẖederim	  and	  talmudei-­‐
torah	  given	  the	  difference	  in	  population	  between	  the	  Old	  Yishuv	  (66,000)	  and	  the	  New	  Yishuv	  
(13,900)	  at	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  war.	  Rachel	  Elboim-­‐Dror,	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  ha-­‐ivri	  be-­‐Erets-­‐Yisrael,	  Sifriyah	  
le-­‐toldot	  ha-­‐yishuv	  ha-­‐Yehudi	  be-­‐Erets-­‐Yisrael	  (Jerusalem	  Yad	  Yitzhak	  Ben-­‐Tsevi,	  1986),	  Vol.	  2.	  21.	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The	  work	  quickly	  grew	  into	  something	  much	  more	  expansive,	  largely	  on	  
account	  of	  the	  dearth	  of	  scholarship	  that	  analyzed	  the	  critical	  role	  of	  religion	  in	  
structuring	  Palestine’s	  educational	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  As	  it	  turns	  out,	  governing	  
Palestine	  on	  sectarian	  lines	  generated	  a	  number	  of	  particular	  challenges	  and	  
contradictions	  when	  it	  came	  to	  defining	  the	  content	  and	  purpose	  of	  religious	  
education.	  Adding	  to	  the	  complexity,	  it	  quickly	  became	  evident	  that	  a	  project	  about	  
religious	  education	  during	  this	  transitional	  moment	  could	  not	  take	  its	  subject	  for	  
granted.	  The	  instability	  of	  religious	  education	  as	  an	  analytic	  category	  thereby	  gave	  
rise	  to	  two	  considerations	  that	  have	  helped	  frame	  this	  investigation.	  The	  first	  points	  
toward	  the	  novelty	  of	  “religious	  education”	  as	  a	  distinct	  conceptual	  object,	  a	  
development	  that	  hinged	  on	  a	  redefinition	  of	  the	  function	  of	  formalized	  learning	  on	  
one	  hand,	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  secular	  as	  a	  separate	  sphere	  of	  human	  
experience	  on	  the	  other.	  As	  such,	  religious	  education	  is	  an	  entirely	  modern	  
phenomenon	  within	  both	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  societies,	  though	  conventional	  wisdom	  
may	  paint	  it	  as	  old	  as	  these	  traditions	  themselves.	  As	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  Chapter	  One,	  we	  
must	  distinguish	  the	  transmission	  of	  sacred	  knowledge	  from	  the	  modern	  
development	  of	  religious	  education	  as	  a	  form	  of	  individual	  and	  social	  
transformation.	  
The	  second	  consideration	  stemmed	  from	  the	  difficulty	  in	  accounting	  for	  what	  
qualified	  as	  “religious”	  in	  the	  educational	  programs	  I	  surveyed.	  Because	  the	  
boundaries	  that	  distinguish	  the	  religious	  from	  the	  secular	  are	  porous,	  historically	  
contingent	  and	  ever-­‐shifting,	  it	  followed	  that	  a	  study	  of	  religious	  education	  in	  
Palestine	  should	  not	  limit	  its	  analysis	  to	  the	  educational	  endeavors	  of	  the	  religious	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Zionist	  (Mizrachi)	  party,2	  the	  Supreme	  Muslim	  Council,3	  or	  the	  Old	  Yishuv.4	  Yet	  for	  
the	  most	  part,	  the	  existing	  scholarship	  looks	  at	  religious	  schools	  and	  does	  not	  
account	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  religious	  education	  might	  take	  place	  outside	  of	  obviously	  
religious	  spaces—such	  as	  in	  general	  Zionist	  schools	  or	  in	  those	  maintained	  by	  the	  
Government	  of	  Palestine.	  My	  project	  thus	  attempts	  to	  move	  away	  from	  an	  
institutional	  analysis	  focused	  on	  the	  usual	  suspects	  to	  a	  genealogical	  one	  that	  
interrogates	  the	  criteria	  by	  which	  knowledge	  is	  labeled	  as	  “religious”	  in	  nature	  and	  
the	  consequences,	  both	  material	  and	  hermeneutic,	  of	  this	  designation.5	  	  
With	  these	  considerations	  in	  mind,	  this	  project	  asks	  a	  series	  of	  historical	  and	  
conceptual	  questions	  of	  archival	  records,	  school	  syllabi,	  textbooks,	  newspapers	  and	  
personal	  narratives.	  How	  did	  religious	  education	  function	  within	  the	  ideological	  and	  
administrative	  frameworks	  used	  to	  govern	  Palestine?	  What	  were	  the	  features	  of	  
“modern”	  religious	  education	  as	  outlined	  by	  Jewish,	  Muslim	  and	  colonial	  educators,	  
and	  in	  what	  ways	  did	  this	  education	  differ	  from	  customary	  forms?	  How	  did	  each	  
party	  conceive	  of	  the	  proper	  relationship	  between	  religious	  education	  and	  nation-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  David	  Shemesh,	  beit	  ha-­‐midrash	  le-­‐morim	  "Mizraẖi":	  masad	  la-­‐ẖinuch	  ha-­‐dati	  ha-­‐leumi	  	  (Jerusalem	  
Misrad	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  veha-­‐tarbut,	  Minhal	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  ha-­‐dati	  -­‐	  gaf	  hakhsharat	  morim	  :	  ha-­‐Mikhlalah	  ha-­‐
datit	  le-­‐morim	  `a.sh.	  R.A.M.	  Lifshits,	  1991).	  
3	  Ela	  Greenberg,	  Preparing	  the	  Mothers	  of	  Tomorrow:	  Education	  and	  Islam	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine	  	  
(Austin:	  University	  of	  Texas	  Press,	  2010).	  For	  a	  general	  overview	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Muslim	  Council’s	  
educational	  endeavors,	  see	  Uri	  M.	  Kupferschmidt,	  The	  Supreme	  Muslim	  Council	  :	  Islam	  under	  the	  
British	  mandate	  for	  Palestine	  	  (Leiden:	  New	  York,	  1987),	  139-­‐44.	  	  
4	  Scholarship	  of	  this	  sort	  remains	  extremely	  limited.	  See	  Deborah	  Weissman,	  "ẖinuch	  banot	  datiyot	  
bi-­‐Yerushalayim	  bi-­‐tekufat	  ha-­‐shilton	  ha-­‐Briti:	  hitmasdutan	  ve-­‐hitgabshutan	  shel	  hamesh	  ideologyot	  
ẖinuchiyot"	  (Thesis/dissertation	  (deg),	  Hebrew	  University,	  1993).	  For	  the	  pre-­‐Mandate	  period,	  and	  
particularly	  details	  about	  the	  Old	  Yishuv’s	  relations	  with	  the	  educational	  bodies	  of	  the	  Zionist	  
Organization,	  see	  Elboim-­‐Dror,	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  ha-­‐ivri	  be-­‐Erets-­‐Yisrael:	  Vol.	  2.	  
5	  In	  his	  authoritative	  study	  of	  British	  educational	  policies	  in	  Palestine,	  Abdul	  Latif	  Tibawi	  offers	  a	  
general	  overview	  of	  “religion,	  nationalism	  and	  education	  policy,”	  but	  ultimately	  demurs.	  “Here	  it	  is	  
not	  possible	  without	  disturbing	  the	  balance	  of	  emphasis	  in	  this	  study,	  to	  cover	  the	  whole	  field	  of	  the	  
interaction	  of	  religion	  and	  education.	  This	  field	  is	  so	  wide	  and	  crowded	  with	  events	  to	  merit	  a	  special	  
study.”	  See	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  
administration:	  Chapter	  VII.	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building	  projects?	  In	  short,	  what	  were	  the	  content,	  form	  and	  purpose	  of	  religious	  
education	  as	  it	  developed	  into	  a	  discrete	  type	  of	  schooling	  in	  modern	  Palestine?	  	  
The	  central	  argument	  of	  this	  study	  is	  that	  there	  was	  a	  broad	  degree	  of	  
overlap	  among	  Jewish,	  Muslim	  and	  British	  educators	  regarding	  the	  ineptitudes	  of	  
customary	  forms	  of	  religious	  learning—symbolized	  most	  poignantly	  by	  Palestine’s	  
ẖederim	  and	  katātīb	  —however	  this	  accord	  crumbled	  when	  tasked	  with	  articulating	  
the	  proper	  relationship	  between	  modern	  religious	  education	  and	  political	  activism.	  I	  
argue	  that	  the	  Mandate	  government	  promoted	  a	  novel	  form	  of	  schooling	  within	  both	  
Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  communities	  as,	  somewhat	  paradoxically,	  a	  means	  of	  preserving	  
the	  “traditional”	  order	  in	  which	  religious	  knowledge	  was	  separated	  from	  national	  
politics.	  This	  perception	  did	  not	  grow	  merely	  out	  of	  historical	  experiences	  in	  India	  
and	  Egypt,	  but	  out	  of	  a	  distinctly	  Protestant	  notion	  of	  religion	  as	  a	  code	  of	  ethics	  that	  
could	  be	  separated	  from	  politics,	  commerce	  and	  material	  life.	  	  
Against	  the	  British	  attempt	  to	  nurture	  religious	  education	  as	  an	  antidote	  to	  
nationalist	  passions,	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  communities	  offered	  competing	  educational	  
models	  in	  which	  religious	  knowledge	  was	  innately	  tied	  to	  Zionist	  and	  Arab	  political	  
goals.	  Colonial	  officials	  who	  associated	  religious	  education	  with	  the	  “traditional”	  
social	  status	  quo	  did	  not,	  by	  and	  large,	  detect	  the	  interpretive	  flexibility	  that	  gave	  
this	  form	  of	  education	  revolutionary	  potential.	  Rather,	  as	  I	  suggest,	  the	  
interconnected	  rise	  of	  mass	  politics	  and	  mass	  education	  produced	  opportunities	  to	  
link	  religious	  identity	  to	  political	  action	  in	  a	  novel	  fashion.	  Based	  on	  a	  case	  study	  of	  
al-­‐Najah	  National	  School	  and	  the	  writings	  of	  its	  former	  headmaster,	  Muhammad	  
‘Izzat	  Darwaza,	  I	  argue	  that	  one	  way	  to	  articulate	  this	  relationship	  was	  to	  stress	  the	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mutually	  constitutive	  nature	  of	  Islam	  and	  Arab	  identity,	  and	  moreover,	  to	  do	  so	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  did	  not	  alienate	  Palestinian	  Christians.	  I	  argue	  that	  Zionist	  schools,	  for	  their	  
part,	  displayed	  a	  marked	  tendency	  to	  blur	  the	  sacred	  and	  secular	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  
fashion	  a	  new	  form	  of	  Jewishness	  that	  challenged	  the	  modern	  definition	  of	  “religion”	  
itself.	  	  	  
However,	  these	  respective	  responses	  were	  far	  from	  one-­‐dimensional	  
rejections	  of	  the	  colonial	  order.	  This	  study	  illustrates	  that	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  
educators	  found	  points	  of	  agreement	  with	  the	  Mandatory	  government	  over	  the	  
content	  of	  religious	  education,	  often	  so	  far	  as	  to	  privilege	  those	  elements	  of	  their	  
traditions	  that	  seemed	  most	  compatible	  with	  the	  “universal”	  values	  championed	  by	  
British	  officials.	  As	  such,	  educators	  from	  both	  communities	  came	  to	  articulate	  a	  view	  
of	  religion	  that	  reflected	  central	  claims	  of	  secular	  modernity	  while,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  
rejected	  the	  colonial	  understanding	  of	  “religion”	  as	  a	  realm	  of	  experience	  distinct	  
from	  national	  politics.	  This	  case	  study	  therefore	  proffers	  a	  nuanced	  account	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  colonialism	  and	  “native”	  reform	  efforts	  that	  avoids	  treating	  
the	  latter	  as	  either	  beacons	  of	  resistance	  or	  mere	  imitations	  of	  the	  colonial	  order.	  	  
Finally,	  I	  will	  suggest	  that,	  examined	  closely,	  battles	  regarding	  the	  
politicization	  of	  religious	  education	  rested	  on	  a	  distinction	  that	  was	  more	  discursive	  
than	  material.	  The	  fact	  that	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  educators	  articulated	  positions	  in	  
which	  political	  power	  was	  inherently	  tied	  to	  “religious”	  identity	  should	  hardly	  be	  
surprising	  if	  we	  survey	  Britain’s	  own	  history.	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  was	  the	  invisibility	  of	  
Britain’s	  own	  political-­‐theological	  tradition,	  reconstituted	  as	  secular	  universalism,	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which	  generated	  a	  sense	  of	  difference	  between	  proper	  and	  improper	  uses	  of	  
religious	  education.	  	  
In	  fact,	  distinguishing	  between	  “correct”	  and	  “corrupt”	  approaches	  to	  
religious	  education	  constituted	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  colonial	  project.	  In	  trying	  to	  make	  
sense	  of	  this	  matrix	  of	  boundaries	  and	  transgressions,	  I	  have	  borrowed	  a	  conceptual	  
apparatus	  from	  Bruno	  Latour,	  namely,	  his	  idea	  of	  the	  modern	  constitution.	  In	  his	  
work,	  We	  Have	  Never	  Been	  Modern,	  Latour	  outlines	  the	  quintessential	  principles	  
that,	  he	  claims,	  constitute	  our	  modern	  disposition.	  His	  fundamental	  argument	  is	  that	  
Modernity	  is	  distinguished	  from	  other	  periods	  by	  its	  attempt	  to	  erect	  an	  absolute	  
barrier	  between	  nature	  (the	  natural	  realm	  of	  science,	  observable	  facts,	  physical	  
forces)	  and	  society	  (the	  constructed	  sphere	  of	  culture,	  religion,	  politics).	  However,	  
as	  he	  shows,	  attempts	  to	  differentiate	  these	  spheres—acts	  of	  purification	  in	  his	  
terms—are	  coterminous	  with	  a	  “proliferation	  of	  hybrids,”	  i.e.	  with	  acts,	  technologies	  
and	  mental	  frames	  that	  transgress	  that	  very	  boundary.	  Modernity,	  in	  sum,	  is	  not	  
distinguished	  by	  its	  success	  in	  separating	  the	  natural	  from	  the	  socially	  constructed,	  
but	  by	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  does	  so.	  Thus	  “the	  modern	  world,”	  Latour	  argues,	  “has	  never	  
happened,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  has	  never	  functioned	  according	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  its	  
official	  Constitution	  alone.”6	  
The	  idea	  of	  absolute	  division	  and	  inevitable	  transgression	  is	  one	  that	  I	  have	  
returned	  to	  in	  clarifying	  educational	  practices	  in	  Palestine.	  Importantly,	  this	  
framework	  enables	  us	  to	  avoid	  both	  the	  language	  of	  intentionality	  and	  the	  
anachronistic	  projection	  of	  our	  own	  sensibility	  upon	  the	  past.	  For	  instance,	  rather	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Bruno	  Latour,	  We	  Have	  Never	  Been	  Modern	  	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  39.	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than	  finding	  it	  contradictory	  that	  colonial	  administrators	  could	  possibly	  overlook	  the	  
political	  dimension	  of	  educational	  practice	  (and	  ascribe	  their	  policies	  to	  pedagogic	  
need,	  for	  instance),	  we	  should	  instead	  ask,	  “How	  was	  it	  possible	  for	  these	  ideas	  to	  
exist	  harmoniously?”	  When	  posing	  the	  question	  in	  these	  terms,	  we	  can	  discern	  the	  
outlines	  of	  what	  might	  be	  called	  the	  “modern	  educational	  constitution”	  wherein	  
“correct”	  practices	  (represented	  below	  on	  the	  left	  side	  of	  the	  chart)	  are	  held	  apart	  
from	  their	  corrupt	  forms	  (on	  the	  right).	  As	  true	  Moderns,	  British	  educators	  
scrupulously	  upheld	  the	  distinction	  between	  “healthy”	  national	  pride	  and	  national	  
chauvinism,	  civic	  engagement	  and	  mass	  politics,	  pedagogic	  necessity	  and	  social	  
engineering,	  and	  religious	  values	  and	  political	  action:	  
Correct	  Practices	   Corrupt	  Practices	  
National	  Pride	   Nationalism	  
Public	  service	   Mass	  politics	  
Religious-­‐moral	  education	   Religious-­‐political	  education	  
Pedagogic	  Necessity	   Social	  Engineering	  
	  
In	  each	  instance,	  the	  “purification”	  of	  these	  categories	  marched	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  
the	  “proliferation	  of	  hybrids”	  that	  violated	  the	  boundary	  meant	  to	  preserve	  their	  
separation.	  Following	  Latour,	  transgressions	  of	  this	  kind	  must	  be	  diligently	  denied,	  a	  
fact	  that	  becomes	  most	  evident	  in	  (my	  concluding	  remarks	  about)	  Christian	  schools	  
in	  Palestine.	  This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  final	  point	  of	  contrast	  between	  the	  Mandatory	  
government	  and	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  modernists:	  for	  the	  latter	  two,	  transgressions	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across	  this	  boundary	  were	  not	  denied,	  but	  rather	  embraced	  as	  the	  key	  to	  
revolutionary	  transformation.	  	  	  
	  
Review	  of	  Existing	  Scholarship	  
	  
It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  in	  the	  overcrowded	  field	  of	  scholarship	  that	  branded	  as	  
Palestine	  studies,	  relatively	  little	  has	  been	  written	  on	  education	  during	  the	  
formative	  period	  of	  the	  British	  Mandate.	  Among	  the	  most	  important	  exceptions	  is	  
Abdul	  Latif	  Tibawi’s	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine,	  a	  study	  of	  government	  
public	  schools	  that	  remains	  the	  authoritative	  account	  of	  education	  under	  the	  
Mandate	  despite	  being	  published	  nearly	  sixty	  years	  ago.7	  The	  study	  was	  based	  on	  
Tibawi’s	  own	  experience	  as	  an	  employee	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine’s	  
Department	  of	  Education	  and	  offers	  an	  account	  of	  the	  administration’s	  policies	  that	  
remains	  unparalleled.8	  That	  said,	  a	  work	  based	  on	  personal	  experience	  inevitably	  
has	  its	  own	  limitations.	  The	  first	  such	  limitation	  is	  that	  Tibawi	  wrote	  almost	  
exclusively	  about	  the	  Government	  system	  of	  Arab	  public	  schools	  that	  he	  knew	  best.	  
He	  had	  far	  less	  to	  say	  about	  developments	  within	  Zionist,	  Christian	  or	  other	  private	  
schools,	  and	  thus	  there’s	  no	  sense	  of	  the	  synthetic	  forces	  that	  bound	  these	  different	  
types	  of	  education	  together.	  The	  second,	  more	  serious,	  limitation	  is	  that	  he	  wrote	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration.	  —
——,	  "Religion	  and	  Educational	  Administration	  in	  Palestine	  of	  the	  British	  Mandate,"	  Die	  Welt	  des	  
Islams	  3,	  no.	  1	  (1953).	  An	  important	  survey	  of	  educational	  institutions	  across	  the	  Middle	  East	  as	  they	  
appeared	  in	  the	  late	  1940s	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Roderic	  D.	  Matthews	  and	  Matta	  Akrawi,	  Education	  in	  Arab	  
countries	  of	  the	  Near	  East:	  Egypt,	  Iraq,	  Palestine,	  Transjordan,	  Syria,	  Lebanon	  (Washington:	  American	  
Council	  on	  Education,	  1949).	  	  
8	  Perhaps	  the	  best	  indication	  of	  Tibawi’s	  dominance	  in	  the	  field	  is	  that	  later	  scholars	  who	  have	  taken	  
up	  the	  topic	  of	  education	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine	  have	  largely	  restated	  his	  central	  arguments.	  See	  Judith	  
L.	  Wolf,	  "Selected	  aspects	  in	  the	  development	  of	  public	  education	  in	  Palestine	  1920-­‐1946"	  
(Dissertation,	  Boston	  College,	  1981).	  Nabil	  Badran,	  Ta`lim	  wa-­‐al-­‐tahdith	  fi	  al-­‐mujtama`	  al-­‐`Arabi	  al-­‐
Filastini	  	  (Bayrut:	  Munazzamat	  al-­‐Tahrir	  al-­‐Filastiniyah,	  Markaz	  al-­‐Abhath,	  1969).	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about	  the	  subject	  prior	  to	  the	  declassification	  of	  vital	  documents	  related	  to	  
educational	  policy,	  some	  of	  which	  were	  not	  released	  until	  the	  1990s.	  	  
Writing	  is	  far	  more	  voluminous	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Zionist	  school	  system,	  
though	  much	  of	  this	  scholarship	  has	  only	  been	  published	  in	  Hebrew	  and	  it	  is	  mainly	  
attentive	  to	  the	  internal	  struggles	  and	  developments	  of	  Jewish	  education	  in	  
Palestine.	  The	  two	  most	  valuable	  accounts	  of	  this	  type	  include	  Yuval	  Deror	  and	  
Shimon	  Reshef’s	  Hebrew	  Education	  during	  the	  days	  of	  the	  National	  Home,	  1919-­‐1948,	  
and	  Rachel	  Elboim-­‐Dror’s	  extensive	  study	  of	  the	  years	  immediately	  following	  World	  
War	  One.9	  Limited	  attention	  is	  given	  in	  these	  studies	  to	  the	  Mandate	  government	  or	  
its	  relationship	  with	  Zionist	  education;	  indeed,	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  is	  
usually	  considered	  in	  these	  accounts	  solely	  to	  criticize	  its	  supposed	  underfunding	  of	  
Zionist	  schools.	  In	  addition,	  there	  is	  a	  remarkable	  tendency	  to	  treat	  Jewish	  
education	  as	  a	  field	  that	  developed	  autonomously	  and	  in	  near	  isolation	  from	  either	  
the	  colonial	  government	  or	  Palestinian	  Arabs.	  My	  study	  directly	  challenges	  this	  
prevalent	  assumption	  and	  calls	  more	  generally	  for	  accounts	  of	  the	  yishuv’s	  history	  
that	  do	  not	  reify	  the	  myth	  of	  Zionist	  self-­‐sufficiency.	  Equally	  problematic	  from	  the	  
perspective	  of	  this	  study	  is	  a	  proclivity	  (in	  this	  body	  of	  scholarship)	  to	  treat	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Yuval	  Deror	  and	  Shimon	  Reshef,	  ha-­‐ẖinukh	  ha-­‐ivri	  bi-­‐yamei	  ha-­‐bayit	  ha-­‐leumi,	  1919-­‐1948	  	  
(Yerushalayim:	  Mosad	  Byalik,	  1999).	  Elboim-­‐Dror,	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  ha-­‐ivri	  be-­‐Erets-­‐Yisrael:	  Vol.	  2.	  For	  the	  
English	  reader,	  Joseph	  Bentwich	  (himself	  a	  former	  employee	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  under	  
the	  Mandatory	  Government)	  wrote	  about	  Jewish	  education	  during	  both	  the	  Mandate	  and	  State	  
periods.	  Joseph	  S.	  Bentwich,	  Education	  in	  Israel	  	  (Philadelphia:	  The	  Jewish	  Publication	  Society	  of	  
America,	  1965).	  Other	  works	  on	  education	  in	  English	  include	  Reuven	  Porat,	  The	  history	  of	  the	  kibbutz:	  
communal	  education,	  1904-­‐1929,	  Kibbutz	  studies	  book	  series	  (Norwood,	  PA	  :	  Norwood	  Editions:	  
Ramat	  Efal,	  Israel,	  1985).	  Older	  studies,	  often	  published	  as	  government	  reports	  or	  Zionist	  polemics	  
also	  exist.	  See	  Hebrew	  education	  in	  Erez	  Israel,	  	  	  (Jerusalem:	  Keren	  Hayesod,	  1930);	  Noah	  Nardi,	  
Education	  in	  Palestine,	  1920-­‐1945	  	  ([Washington]	  Zionist	  organization	  of	  America,	  1945);	  The	  system	  
of	  education	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community	  in	  Palestine:	  Report	  of	  the	  commission	  of	  enquiry	  appointed	  by	  the	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies	  in	  1945,	  	  	  (London:	  H.M.	  Stationery	  Office	  1946);	  ibid.	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“religious”	  and	  “secular”	  as	  fixed	  categories	  whose	  content	  is	  self-­‐evident	  rather	  
than	  discourses	  still	  in	  the	  process	  of	  formation.	  
More	  recently,	  scholars	  have	  investigated	  select	  elements	  of	  education	  
during	  this	  period	  in	  light	  of	  newly	  available	  archival	  materials	  and	  theoretical	  
models.10	  My	  account	  is	  meant	  to	  strengthen	  these	  approaches	  by	  adding	  an	  
important,	  though	  still	  missing,	  narrative:	  the	  place	  of	  religious	  education,	  
theoretically,	  materially	  and	  politically	  amidst	  a	  flurry	  of	  colonial	  and	  nationalist	  
efforts	  to	  transform	  traditional	  forms	  of	  schooling.	  It	  is	  my	  hope	  that	  using	  religious	  
education	  as	  a	  category	  of	  analysis—albeit	  one	  whose	  boundaries	  were	  unstable—
will	  allow	  my	  account	  to	  speak	  in	  a	  synthetic	  fashion	  across	  school	  systems	  that	  are	  
usually	  studied	  in	  isolation.	  As	  I	  will	  argue,	  accounting	  for	  the	  connections	  between	  
these	  schools	  is	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  understanding	  the	  financial,	  administrative,	  and	  
even	  pedagogic	  codependency	  of	  educational	  systems	  that	  were,	  at	  first	  glance,	  
totally	  separate.	  
Beyond	  the	  narrower	  scope	  of	  religious	  education,	  this	  work	  engages	  more	  
broadly	  with	  scholarship	  from	  three	  different	  fields.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  political	  history	  
of	  Mandate	  Palestine,	  and	  in	  particular,	  the	  sectarian	  policies	  pursued	  by	  the	  British	  
administration.11	  Secondly,	  this	  project	  has	  learned	  much	  from,	  and	  hopes	  to	  further	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Liora	  Halperin’s	  work	  on	  language	  pluralism	  within	  the	  yishuv	  and	  Ela	  Greenberg’s	  study	  of	  Islamic	  
education	  are	  both	  noteworthy	  contributions	  to	  the	  field.	  Liora	  Halperin,	  Babel	  in	  Zion:	  Hebrew	  and	  
the	  Politics	  of	  Language	  in	  Palestine	  	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2014);	  Greenberg,	  Preparing	  
the	  Mothers	  of	  Tomorrow:	  Education	  and	  Islam	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine.	  Also	  of	  note	  is	  Laura	  Schor’s	  
excellent	  study	  of	  the	  Evelina	  de	  Rothschild	  School	  for	  girls	  and	  its	  principal,	  Annie	  Landau.	  Laura	  
Schor,	  The	  Best	  School	  in	  Jerusalem:	  Annie	  Landau's	  School	  for	  Girls,	  1900-­‐1960	  	  (Waltham,	  MA:	  
Brandeis	  University	  Press	  2013).	  
11	  Bernard	  Wasserstein,	  The	  British	  in	  Palestine:	  the	  mandatory	  government	  and	  the	  Arab-­‐Jewish	  
conflict	  1917-­‐1929,	  Royal	  Historical	  Society	  studies	  in	  history	  series	  (London:	  Royal	  Historical	  
Society,	  1978).	  More	  recent	  accounts	  have	  helped	  advance	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  sectarian	  nature	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contribute	  to,	  the	  body	  of	  Jewish	  studies	  scholarship	  on	  the	  Haskalah	  (the	  Jewish	  
Enlightenment)	  and	  the	  Zionist	  movement.12	  That	  being	  said,	  there	  are	  two	  
assumptions	  frequently	  found	  within	  this	  body	  of	  work	  that	  I	  hope	  to	  question.	  The	  
first,	  which	  has	  colored	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  Haskalah,	  is	  the	  celebration	  of	  the	  
Jewish	  Enlightenment	  as	  the	  embrace	  of	  “universal”	  values,	  represented	  by	  a	  move	  
from	  dogmatic	  parochialism	  to	  intellectual	  freedom,	  religious	  particularism	  to	  
common	  humanism.13	  The	  second	  is	  an	  uncritical	  acceptance	  of	  Zionism	  as	  a	  
predominately	  secular	  movement,	  with	  little	  theoretical	  engagement	  as	  to	  what	  is	  
meant	  by	  “secular”	  and	  “religious”	  as	  descriptive	  labels	  or	  political	  models.	  	  
Finally,	  mindful	  of	  these	  complexities,	  this	  work	  also	  engages	  with	  the	  
growing	  body	  of	  critical	  scholarship	  on	  secularism	  both	  as	  a	  unique	  historical	  
phenomenon	  (as	  opposed	  to	  a	  universal	  model	  of	  Modernity)	  and	  epistemic	  frame	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of	  British	  rule	  and	  the	  difficulties	  it	  generated.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Laura	  Robson,	  Colonialism	  and	  
Christianity	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine,	  1st	  ed.,	  Jamal	  and	  Rania	  Daniel	  series	  in	  contemporary	  history,	  
politics,	  culture,	  and	  religion	  of	  the	  Levant.	  (Austin:	  University	  of	  Texas	  Press,	  2011).	  In	  this	  regard,	  
Rashid	  Khalidi’s	  treatment	  of	  “traditional”	  Islamic	  power	  structures	  also	  deserves	  mention.	  Rashid	  
Khalidi,	  The	  Iron	  Cage	  :	  the	  story	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  struggle	  for	  statehood,	  1st	  ed.	  (Boston:	  Beacon	  
Press,	  2006).	  
12	  Among	  the	  most	  important	  works	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  are	  those	  related	  to	  the	  educational	  
projects	  of	  the	  Haskalah.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Shmuel	  Feiner,	  "Programot	  ẖinuchiot	  v'idialim	  ẖevratiyim:	  
beit	  ha-­‐sefer	  'ẖinuch	  ne'arim'	  b'berlin	  1778-­‐1825,"	  Zion	  60,	  no.	  4	  (1995).	  ———,	  Haskalah	  and	  
History:	  The	  Emergence	  of	  a	  Modern	  Jewish	  Historical	  Consciousness	  	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
2002).	  David	  Assaf	  and	  Emmanuel	  Etkes’	  compilation	  of	  scholarly	  essays	  and	  primary	  sources	  
regarding	  the	  ẖeder	  has	  proved	  immensely	  useful.	  David	  Assaf	  and	  Immanuel	  Etkes,	  ed.	  ha-­‐ẖeder:	  
meẖkarim,	  te'udot,	  pirkei	  sifrut	  v'zichronot	  (Tel	  Aviv:	  Institute	  for	  Polish	  Jewry,	  Tel	  Aviv	  University,	  
2010).	  Scholarship	  on	  the	  Zionist	  movement,	  as	  both	  an	  ideological	  construct	  and	  material	  reality,	  is	  
vast	  and	  ever	  expanding.	  Some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  contributions	  available	  in	  English	  includes	  
Gideon	  Shimoni,	  The	  Zionist	  Ideology	  	  (Hanover:	  Brandeis	  University	  Press	  1995);	  Arieh	  Bruce	  
Saposnik,	  Becoming	  Hebrew	  :	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Jewish	  national	  culture	  in	  Ottoman	  Palestine	  	  (New	  
York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008);	  Yael	  Zerubavel,	  Recovered	  roots	  :	  collective	  memory	  and	  the	  
making	  of	  Israeli	  national	  tradition	  	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1995);	  Eric	  Stephen	  Zakim,	  
To	  build	  and	  be	  built:	  landscape,	  literature,	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  Zionist	  identity	  (Philadelphia:	  
University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press	  2006);	  Gershon	  Shafir,	  Land,	  labor,	  and	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  Israeli-­‐
Palestinian	  conflict,	  1882-­‐1914,	  Updated	  ed.	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1996).	  
13	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Shmuel	  Feiner’s	  description	  of	  the	  maskilim’s	  assault	  on	  the	  talmid	  ẖacham	  “in	  
favor	  of	  a	  universal	  and	  secular	  ideal:	  the	  ethical	  individual.”	  Feiner,	  "Programot	  ẖinuchiot	  v'idialim	  
ẖevratiyim:	  beit	  ha-­‐sefer	  'ẖinuch	  ne'arim'	  b'berlin	  1778-­‐1825,"	  7.	  
	  13	  
with	  material	  consequences	  for	  colonial	  and	  post-­‐colonial	  societies.	  Ever	  since	  Jose	  
Casanova’s	  important	  intervention,	  Public	  Religions	  in	  the	  Modern	  World,14	  which	  
challenged	  social	  science	  models	  that	  linked	  secularization	  with	  modernization,	  
scholars	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  disciplines	  have	  questioned	  the	  universality	  of	  secular	  
reason	  as	  well	  as	  its	  alleged	  purging	  of	  religion	  from	  the	  public	  space.	  Of	  particular	  
note	  here	  are	  recent	  works	  by	  Jürgen	  Habermas,15	  Charles	  Taylor,16	  and	  Timothy	  
Fitzgerald,17	  as	  well	  as	  the	  excellent	  compilations	  edited	  by	  Craig	  Calhoun,	  Mark	  
Juergensmeyer,	  and	  Jonathan	  VanAntwerpen.18	  	  
While	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  growing	  body	  of	  work	  should	  not	  be	  
understated,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  it	  remains	  focused	  on	  Euro-­‐American	  contexts.	  Yet,	  
as	  a	  phenomenon	  with	  universal	  pretenses,	  secularism	  has	  historically	  traveled	  far	  
outside	  this	  particular	  geography	  via	  the	  wings	  of	  imperialism.	  The	  history	  of	  
secularism	  in	  the	  colonies	  is	  one	  that	  necessarily	  differs	  from	  the	  European	  or	  
American	  experiences,	  and	  yet	  it	  remains	  the	  most	  under-­‐explored.	  Talal	  Asad’s	  
unmasking	  of	  the	  secular	  as	  Christian	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  law	  courts	  in	  colonial	  Egypt	  
remains	  the	  most	  important	  work	  in	  this	  regard.19	  Following	  Asad,	  Gil	  Anidjar’s	  
writing	  about	  secularism	  in	  the	  thought	  of	  Edward	  Said	  has	  contributed	  significantly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  José	  Casanova,	  Public	  Religions	  in	  the	  Modern	  World	  	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1994).	  
15	  Jürgen	  Habermas,	  "Notes	  on	  Post-­‐Secular	  Society,"	  New	  Perspectives	  Quaterly	  25,	  no.	  4	  (2008);	  ——
—,	  An	  Awareness	  of	  What	  is	  Missing:	  Faith	  and	  Reason	  in	  a	  Post-­‐secular	  Age	  	  (Cambridge,	  UK:	  Polity	  
Press,	  2010).	  
16	  Charles	  Taylor,	  A	  Secular	  Age	  	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2007).	  
17	  Timothy	  Fitzgerald,	  The	  Ideology	  of	  Religious	  Studies	  	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000);	  ——
—,	  ed.	  Religion	  and	  the	  secular:	  historical	  and	  colonial	  formations	  (London:	  Equinox,	  2007);	  ———,	  
Religion	  and	  Politics	  in	  International	  Relations:	  The	  Modern	  Myth	  	  (London:	  Continuum	  2011).	  
18	  Craig	  Calhoun,	  "Secularism,	  citizenship	  and	  the	  public	  sphere,"	  in	  Rethinking	  Secularism,	  ed.	  Craig	  
Calhoun,	  Juergensmeyer,	  Mark	  and	  VanAntwerpen,	  Jonathan	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  2011);	  
Eduardo	  Mendieta	  and	  Jonathan	  VanAntwerpen	  	  Craig	  Calhoun,	  ed.	  Habermas	  and	  Religion	  
(Cambridge,	  UK:	  Polity	  Press	  2013).	  
19	  Talal	  Asad,	  Formations	  of	  the	  Secular:	  Christianity,	  Islam,	  Modernity	  	  (Stanford,	  Calif.:	  Stanford	  
University	  Press,	  2003).	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to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  links	  between	  Orientalism,	  secularism	  and	  “religion”	  as	  
“an	  object	  of	  criticism	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  no	  less	  than	  transcended	  (italics	  
original).”20	  	  
Despite	  this	  growing	  body	  of	  scholarship,	  historians	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  have	  
not,	  on	  the	  whole,	  taken	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  interventions	  into	  serious	  
consideration.	  How,	  for	  example,	  does	  our	  understanding	  of	  Arab	  political	  
movements	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  shift	  if	  we	  take	  a	  critical	  stance	  toward	  the	  
avowed	  secularism	  of	  many	  of	  its	  leaders?	  In	  what	  way	  were	  they	  secular?	  Which	  
intellectual	  positions	  are	  assumed	  within	  (and	  concealed	  by)	  this	  claim?	  This	  project	  
aims	  to	  offer	  a	  concrete	  historical	  case	  study	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  colonial	  
secularism	  affected	  the	  transformation	  of	  education	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine.	  It	  is	  my	  
hope	  that	  this	  may	  constitute	  a	  modest	  example	  of	  how	  our	  historical	  understanding	  
can	  be	  enriched	  through	  an	  engagement	  with	  debates	  stemming	  from	  social	  theory	  
that	  challenge	  the	  very	  terms	  of	  our	  analysis.	  
	  
Theorizing	  Separatism	  	  
Writing	  about	  education	  in	  Palestine	  has	  been	  colored	  by	  similar	  
historiographical	  trends	  that	  characterize	  histories	  of	  Mandate	  period	  more	  broadly,	  
that	  is	  to	  say,	  most	  accounts	  take	  for	  granted	  the	  separateness	  of	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  
societies.	  For	  scholars	  of	  the	  yishuv,	  the	  “dual	  society”	  model	  pioneered	  decades	  ago	  
by	  Moshe	  Lissak	  and	  Dan	  Horowitz	  still	  exerts	  considerable	  influence	  over	  the	  study	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Gil	  Anidjar,	  "Secularism,"	  Critical	  Inquiry	  Vol.	  33,	  no.	  1	  (2006	  ):	  62.	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of	  Palestine	  during	  this	  formative	  period,	  and	  not	  without	  good	  reason.21	  However	  it	  
is	  also	  evident	  that	  this	  model,	  which	  treats	  the	  yishuv	  as	  an	  autonomous	  society	  
that	  existed	  in	  isolation	  from	  its	  surroundings,	  is	  one	  of	  Zionist	  historiography’s	  
most	  important	  myths.	  Scholars	  who	  have	  worked	  on	  Jewish	  education	  during	  this	  
period	  have	  reified	  the	  image	  of	  Zionist	  self-­‐sufficiency	  by	  largely	  neglecting	  the	  
legitimate	  points	  of	  dependence	  and	  influence	  that	  linked	  education	  within	  the	  
yishuv	  to	  practices	  pursued	  by	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine,	  missionary	  bodies	  and	  
Palestinian	  Arabs.22	  	  
At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  historiographical	  spectrum,	  scholars	  of	  Palestine	  have	  
endeavored	  to	  showcase	  the	  history	  of	  Palestinian	  Arab	  society	  as	  a	  
multidimensional	  entity	  that	  existed	  prior	  to	  and	  independently	  of	  its	  conflict	  with	  
Zionism.23	  There	  is	  much	  to	  say	  in	  favor	  of	  this	  method	  given	  that	  comparisons	  of	  
Palestinian	  Arab	  society	  to	  the	  yishuv	  are	  fraught	  with	  methodological	  difficulties	  
due	  to	  radical	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  populations	  in	  terms	  of	  literacy,	  
educational	  level	  and	  occupation.24	  However,	  despite	  their	  merits,	  such	  studies	  
nonetheless	  tend	  to	  reinforce	  the	  dual	  society	  narrative	  that,	  particularly	  when	  
dealing	  with	  the	  Mandate	  period,	  obfuscates	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  forces	  that	  
bound	  Palestinian	  and	  Jewish	  communities	  together,	  however	  unhappily.	  Is	  there	  a	  
compelling	  alterative	  to	  isolationist	  and	  comparative	  approaches?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Dan	  Horowitz	  and	  Moshe	  Lissak,	  Origins	  of	  the	  Israeli	  Polity:	  Palestine	  under	  the	  mandate	  	  (Chicago:	  
University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1978).	  
22	  It	  is	  noteworthy,	  for	  example,	  that	  in	  the	  leading	  study	  of	  Jewish	  education	  during	  the	  Mandate	  
Period,	  only	  13	  pages	  is	  devoted	  to	  describing	  the	  relationship	  between	  Zionist	  education	  and	  the	  
Government	  of	  Palestine.	  See	  Reshef,	  ha-­‐ẖinukh	  ha-­‐ivri	  bi-­‐yamei	  ha-­‐bayit	  ha-­‐leumi,	  1919-­‐1948.	  
23	  See,	  for	  example,	  Beshara	  Doumani,	  Rediscovering	  Palestine	  	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  
Press	  1995).	  
24	  Khalidi,	  The	  Iron	  Cage:	  the	  story	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  struggle	  for	  statehood:	  Chp.	  1.	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Historians	  of	  modern	  Palestine	  have	  offered	  two	  counter-­‐models,	  though	  it	  is	  
still	  remarkable	  that	  the	  dominant	  trend	  within	  scholarship	  on	  the	  Mandate	  Period	  
is	  to	  focus	  on	  either	  Jewish	  or	  Arab	  societies.	  One	  approach	  stresses	  the	  points	  of	  
mixture	  and	  interchange	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  everyday	  life.	  Such	  is	  the	  effort	  Moshe	  
Naor	  and	  Tammy	  Razi	  are	  currently	  undertaking,	  and	  while	  I	  am	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  
political	  position	  from	  which	  it	  stems,	  I	  am	  also	  wary	  of	  it	  as	  a	  historical	  method	  
given	  the	  myriad	  political,	  legal,	  linguistic	  and	  cultural	  divisions	  that	  existed.	  It	  
should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  historian	  who	  sets	  out	  to	  uncover	  instances	  of	  
cooperation,	  mutual	  exchange	  and	  friendship	  between	  Palestinian	  Arabs	  and	  Jews	  
during	  the	  Mandate	  Period	  will	  find	  them,	  and	  this	  reality	  certainly	  should	  challenge	  
the	  prevalent	  isolationist	  narrative.	  
More	  promising	  though	  is	  the	  sociological	  model	  pioneered	  by	  Gershon	  
Shafir	  that	  looks	  at	  the	  formative	  (though	  often	  unstated)	  impact	  of	  Jewish-­‐Arab	  
relations	  on	  Israeli	  state	  and	  society.	  As	  Shafir	  points	  out,	  “those	  aspects	  of	  their	  
society	  which	  Israelis	  pride	  themselves	  on	  being	  the	  most	  typically	  Israeli,”	  
including	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  labor	  movement	  and	  kibbutz	  farming,	  are	  in	  fact	  
consequences	  of	  Zionism’s	  early	  struggles	  with	  the	  Arab	  economy	  in	  Palestine.25	  In	  a	  
similar	  vein,	  Zachary	  Lockman	  has	  argued	  the	  merits	  of	  a	  relational	  approach	  to	  the	  
history	  of	  Mandate	  Palestine	  that	  posits	  that	  “the	  histories	  of	  Arabs	  and	  Jews	  in	  
modern	  Palestine	  can	  only	  be	  grasped	  by	  studying	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  both	  these	  
communities	  were	  to	  a	  significant	  extent	  constituted	  and	  shaped	  within	  a	  complex	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Shafir,	  Land,	  Labor,	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  the	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  Conflict,	  1882-­‐1914.	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matrix	  of	  economic,	  political,	  social	  and	  cultural	  interactions.”26	  Though	  the	  
difficulties	  embarking	  on	  this	  course	  of	  historical	  study—	  starting	  with	  a	  necessary	  
command	  of	  both	  Hebrew	  and	  Arabic—cannot	  be	  understated,	  some	  of	  the	  most	  
compelling	  studies	  of	  modern	  Palestine	  have	  adopted	  such	  a	  relational	  frame.27	  	  
This	  project	  adopts	  a	  similar	  approach	  in	  attempting	  to	  account	  for	  the	  
transformation	  of	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  religious	  education	  during	  the	  Mandate	  period.	  
As	  such,	  my	  research	  stresses	  the	  discursive,	  administrative	  and	  financial	  structures	  
that	  caused	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  education	  to	  develop	  relationally.	  While	  accounting	  for	  
the	  distinctiveness	  of	  Arab	  and	  Jewish	  education,	  I	  attempt	  to	  show	  that	  treating	  
these	  systems	  in	  isolation	  presumes	  certain	  social	  structures	  that	  were	  still	  in	  the	  
process	  of	  formation.	  To	  again	  borrow	  from	  Bruno	  Latour,	  I	  have	  approached	  
educational	  separatism	  as	  a	  “black	  box”	  whose	  development	  was	  contingent	  on	  the	  
actions	  of	  various	  colonial	  and	  local	  agents.28	  In	  this	  respect,	  my	  project	  differs	  from	  
the	  work	  of	  historians	  who	  have	  assumed	  that	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  school	  systems	  
merely	  continued	  to	  develop	  the	  way	  they	  had	  in	  the	  immediate	  Ottoman	  past,	  in	  
which	  Palestine’s	  population	  frequented	  schools	  in	  a	  largely	  sectarian	  fashion.	  In	  
fact,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  complete	  separation	  of	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  school	  systems	  was,	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Zachary	  Lockman,	  Comrades	  and	  Enemies:	  Arab	  and	  Jewish	  Workers	  in	  Palestine,	  1906-­‐1948	  	  
(Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1996),	  8.	  
27	  See,	  for	  example,	  Abigail	  Jacobson’s	  study	  of	  late	  Ottoman	  Jerusalem,	  Abigail	  Jacobson,	  From	  
Empire	  to	  Empire:	  Jerusalem	  Between	  Ottoman	  and	  British	  Rule	  (Syracuse,	  NY:	  Syracuse	  University	  
Press,	  2011).	  Also	  of	  note	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  Jonathan	  Gribetz’s	  Defining	  Neighbors:	  Religion,	  Race,	  and	  
the	  Early	  Zionist-­‐Arab	  Encounter,	  which	  is	  forthcoming	  by	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  	  
28	  In	  Latour’s	  usage,	  a	  “black	  box”	  is	  an	  object	  or	  practice	  whose	  internal	  complexities	  and	  contingent	  
nature	  of	  their	  development	  become	  concealed	  after	  it	  becomes	  widely	  accepted	  by	  the	  scientific	  
community.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  the	  steam	  engine	  is	  a	  black	  box,	  as	  we	  are	  no	  longer	  cognizant	  of	  the	  
forces	  (i.e.	  the	  behavior	  of	  human	  actors,	  the	  availability	  of	  certain	  types	  of	  materials,	  laboratory	  
accidents)	  that	  produced	  it	  or	  its	  internal	  workings;	  it	  rather	  appears	  to	  us	  to	  have	  been	  designed	  
precisely	  the	  way	  we	  encounter	  it,	  and	  we	  can	  use	  it	  without	  understanding	  it.	  See	  Bruno	  Latour,	  
Science	  in	  Action:	  How	  to	  Follow	  Scientists	  and	  Engineers	  Through	  Society	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  
University	  Press	  1988).	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one	  hand,	  very	  much	  a	  product	  of	  political	  and	  pedagogic	  concerns	  pursued	  by	  the	  
Mandatory	  government,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  never	  fully	  realized.	  	  	  
A	  few	  concrete	  examples	  are	  useful	  in	  demonstrating	  these	  points	  of	  
connectivity.	  For	  instance,	  initiatives	  within	  government	  public	  schools	  were	  often	  
adopted	  with	  a	  view	  of	  equalizing	  Arab	  and	  Jewish	  education.	  Thus	  a	  public	  school	  
building	  campaign	  that	  aimed	  to	  meet	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  demand	  for	  schooling	  
among	  Palestinian	  Arabs—this	  at	  a	  time	  when	  over	  half	  of	  the	  annual	  applicants	  to	  
schools	  were	  rejected	  based	  on	  lack	  of	  accommodation—would	  have	  to	  be	  offset	  by	  
a	  proportional	  grant	  to	  Jewish	  Public	  System,	  even	  though	  this	  latter	  system	  was	  
nearly	  universal	  in	  scope	  and	  generally	  benefited	  from	  better	  school	  buildings.29	  
When	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  proposed	  to	  spend	  LP	  40,000	  to	  create	  a	  public	  trade	  
school	  in	  Haifa,	  he	  acknowledged	  that	  in	  practice	  no	  Jews	  would	  attend	  it	  because	  
the	  language	  of	  instruction	  was	  Arabic,	  and	  the	  Zionist	  movement	  already	  
maintained	  a	  number	  or	  technical	  and	  vocational	  schools.	  He	  therefore	  offered	  to	  
offset	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Arab	  school	  with	  a	  LP	  20,000	  grant	  to	  Jewish	  trade	  
schools.30	  Zionist	  schools,	  conversely,	  were	  locked	  in	  constant	  competition	  
regarding	  public	  funding	  with	  the	  Arab	  school	  sector,	  with	  the	  state’s	  annual	  
contribution	  determined	  proportionally,	  based	  on	  the	  number	  of	  school-­‐age	  
children	  in	  each	  community.	  	  
Rather	  than	  projecting	  separatism	  onto	  the	  past	  as	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  reality,	  I	  
have	  tried	  to	  examine	  how	  divisions	  were	  concretized	  (administratively,	  financially,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Education	  in	  the	  Colonies,	  Palestine	  Sub-­‐Committee,	  Chapter	  VI.	  MEC,	  
Humphrey	  Bowman	  collection,	  Box	  2,	  File	  2.	  
30	  Sir	  Arthur	  Wauchope,	  “Trades	  School	  Address,”	  June	  25,	  1934.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/264/16.	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legally),	  being	  mindful	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  not	  all	  forms	  of	  separation	  are	  created	  equal.	  
Secondly,	  by	  examining	  the	  tensions	  inherent	  in	  the	  sectarian	  management	  of	  
education	  in	  Palestine,	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  lasting	  significance	  of	  these	  
policies—which	  set	  the	  stage	  (however	  unwittingly)	  for	  new	  articulations	  of	  the	  
links	  between	  mass	  education,	  religious	  knowledge	  and	  political	  action—for	  
thinking	  about	  political	  identity	  in	  the	  broader	  Middle	  East.	  	  
	  
Secularism	  and	  Religious	  Modernism:	  A	  word	  on	  terminology	  
	  
	   A	  note	  is	  here	  required	  about	  my	  use	  of	  secular/secularism	  and	  religious	  
modernism	  as	  descriptive	  terms.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  scholars	  in	  recent	  years	  have	  
launched	  a	  sustained	  attack	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  secularism	  as	  a	  form	  of	  universal	  
reason,	  purged	  of	  non-­‐rational,	  superstitious	  or	  theological	  influences.	  A	  number	  of	  
scholars	  have	  criticized	  Habermas’	  unstated	  assumption	  that	  secular	  reason	  is	  
inherently	  rational	  and	  potentially	  universal,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  parochialism	  of	  
religious	  reason.	  As	  Craig	  Calhoun	  has	  written,	  “Both	  religious	  orientations	  to	  the	  
world	  and	  secular,	  ‘Enlightenment’	  orientations	  depend	  on	  strong	  epistemic	  and	  
moral	  commitments	  made	  at	  least	  partially	  pre-­‐rationally.”31	  As	  such,	  it	  becomes	  
harder	  to	  theoretically	  sustain	  distinctions	  that	  juxtapose	  reasonable	  secularists	  
with	  religious	  (read:	  irrational,	  fanatical)	  traditionalists,	  an	  observation	  with	  
considerable	  importance	  for	  how	  we	  approach	  the	  history	  of	  the	  modern	  Middle	  
East.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Calhoun,	  "Secularism,	  citizenship	  and	  the	  public	  sphere,"	  83.	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   Perhaps	  then	  we	  should	  leave	  aside	  the	  value	  judgment	  attached	  to	  secular	  
and	  religious	  outlooks,	  but	  preserve	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  secular	  as	  the	  desacralized	  
or	  profane?	  There	  are	  certain	  advantages	  to	  this	  approach	  for	  our	  purposes,	  for	  
instance,	  in	  describing	  school	  curricula	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  religious	  and	  secular	  
components.	  At	  first	  glance,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  little	  at	  stake	  in	  labeling	  mathematics	  
a	  secular	  subject	  and	  the	  study	  of	  the	  Qur’an,	  for	  instance,	  a	  religious	  one.	  Yet,	  as	  I	  
explore	  in	  Chapters	  Four	  and	  Five,	  the	  criteria	  by	  which	  we	  judge	  a	  type	  of	  
knowledge	  “religious”	  or	  “secular”	  is	  far	  from	  clear	  and	  rarely	  uniform.	  Rather	  than	  
representing	  neutral	  designations,	  the	  practical	  difficulties	  in	  defining	  the	  religious	  
and	  the	  secular	  seems	  to	  echo	  Antonio	  Gramsci’s	  question	  as	  to	  why	  we	  term	  “a	  
unity	  of	  faith	  between	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  world	  and	  a	  corresponding	  norm	  of	  
conduct”	  religion	  rather	  than	  ideology	  “or	  even	  frankly	  ‘politics’.”32	  
	   Adding	  to	  our	  challenge,	  secular	  is	  but	  one	  half	  of	  a	  pair,	  and	  the	  other	  term	  
in	  this	  duo,	  “religion”,	  is	  no	  less	  problematic.	  Timothy	  Fitzgerald	  has	  questioned	  the	  
academic	  attempt	  to	  treat	  religion	  as	  a	  coherent	  object	  of	  study,	  arguing	  “religion	  
cannot	  reasonably	  be	  taken	  to	  be	  a	  valid	  analytical	  category	  since	  it	  does	  not	  pick	  
out	  any	  distinctive	  cross-­‐cultural	  aspect	  of	  human	  life.”33	  Beyond	  representing	  a	  
poor	  category	  of	  analysis,	  religion	  also	  constitutes	  “one	  pole	  of	  the	  religious-­‐secular	  
dichotomy”	  whose	  epistemic	  dominance	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  history	  of	  
modern	  colonialism.	  To	  quote	  Fitzgerald	  at	  length:	  	  	  	  
…the	  search	   for	  (or	   the	   invention	  of)	  religions	   in	  all	  societies	  by	  colonizing	  
Europeans	  and	  Americans	  was	  proceeding	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  the	  search	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Antonio	  Gramsci,	  "On	  Hegemony	  "	  in	  Contemporary	  Sociological	  Theory,	  ed.	  Joseph	  Gerteis	  Craig	  
Calhoun,	  James	  Moody,	  Steven	  Pfaff,	  and	  Indermohan	  Virk	  (Malden,	  MA:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  2012),	  237.	  
33	  Fitzgerald,	  The	  Ideology	  of	  Religious	  Studies:	  4.	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principles	  of	  natural	   rights,	   laws	  and	  markets.	  The	  discovery	  of	   religion	  as	  
either	   the	   special	   repository	  of	   traditional	  values	  or	  alternatively	  a	  private	  
realm	  of	   individual,	  non-­‐political,	  otherworldly	  commitment	  made	  possible	  
the	  construction	  of	  this-­‐worldy	  individual	  freedoms,	  laws,	  and	  markets	  that	  
were	   assumed	   to	   correspond	   to	   natural	   reason.	   One	   can	   see	   this	   process	  
especially	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  changed	  meaning	  of	  the	  ‘secular’	  from	  a	  division	  
within	   a	   totality	   of	   Christendom	   combining	   all	   created	   beings	   in	   a	   cosmic	  
hierarchy	  to	  a	  fundamentally	  distinct	  and	  neutral	  (factual)	  sphere	  of	  nature:	  
natural	   individuals,	   freedoms,	   civil	   society,	  markets,	   and	   rationally	  defined	  
in	   terms	   of	   natural	   science	   and	   contrasted	   with	   the	   supernatural,	  
otherworldly	   sphere	   of	   private	   soteriological	   commitment.	   In	   reality	   the	  
neutral,	   factual	   space,	   ‘the	   secular’—the	   arena	   of	   scientific	   knowledge,	  
modern	   politics,	   civil	   society,	   and	   Individuals	   maximizing	   natural	   self-­‐
interest—is	   itself	   an	   ideological	   construction,	   and	   it	   is	   the	   location	   of	  
fundamental	   western	   values.	   But	   it	   is	   presented	   as	   a	   universal	   given	   to	  
which	  all	  cultures	  (if	  they	  are	  fully	  rational)	  should	  conform.34	  
	  
That	  secularism	  bears	  deep	  traces	  of	  “fundamental	  western	  values”	  masquerading	  
as	  universal	  standards	  is	  an	  argument	  of	  significant	  importance	  for	  scholars	  of	  
colonial	  and	  post-­‐colonial	  societies,	  and	  few	  have	  showcased	  this	  better	  than	  Talal	  
Asad	  in	  his	  study	  of	  legal	  reform	  in	  colonial	  Egypt.	  There	  he	  identifies	  the	  embrace	  
by	  Muslim	  jurists	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  conscience	  as	  the	  site	  of	  individual	  self-­‐governance	  
as	  “something	  at	  once	  modern	  and	  Christian.”35	  The	  restriction	  of	  shari’a	  court	  
jurisdiction	  to	  laws	  of	  personal	  status	  thereby	  hinged	  on	  a	  novel	  sense	  of	  separation	  
between	  external	  and	  internal,	  public	  and	  private,	  family	  and	  citizen,	  that	  developed	  
during	  the	  British	  occupation	  of	  Egypt.	  	  
	   In	  short,	  “religion”	  and	  “secular”	  form	  a	  mutually	  constitutive	  modern	  couple	  
whose	  members	  can	  only	  derive	  meaning	  through	  the	  negation	  of	  the	  other	  partner.	  
Pre-­‐modern	  thinkers	  in	  Jewish	  or	  Islamic	  contexts	  had	  no	  term	  for	  either	  concept.	  
The	  modern	  usage	  of	  dat	  in	  Hebrew	  and	  dīn	  in	  Arabic	  to	  mean	  “religion”	  was,	  in	  
both	  instances,	  a	  modification	  of	  a	  term	  whose	  original	  meaning	  is	  “judgment”	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Ibid.,	  6.	  
35	  Asad,	  Formations	  of	  the	  Secular:	  Christianity,	  Islam,	  Modernity:	  245.	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“law”.	  In	  the	  Qur’an,	  dīn	  can	  also	  connote	  the	  path	  which	  one	  follows	  to	  live	  in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  shari’a.	  All	  of	  these	  usages	  are	  quite	  distinct	  from	  
the	  modern	  idea	  of	  religion	  as	  a	  set	  of	  defined	  beliefs	  or	  symbolic	  gestures.	  Speaking	  
about	  the	  “religious”	  aspects	  of	  Jewish	  or	  Islamic	  education	  means,	  by	  definition,	  
that	  one	  is	  speaking	  about	  Modernity,	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  about	  how	  
Christianity’s	  pre-­‐eminent	  Others	  came	  to	  assimilate	  a	  worldview	  that	  was	  
decidedly	  foreign.	  	  
Having	  stated	  these	  theoretical	  considerations,	  we	  are	  still	  left	  with	  the	  
problem	  of	  how	  to	  practically	  speak	  (and	  write)	  about	  institutions,	  practices	  and	  
individuals	  in	  a	  way	  that	  does	  not	  reify	  the	  uncritical	  acceptance	  of	  terminology	  
with	  limited	  analytical	  value.	  In	  my	  own	  usage,	  secularization	  is	  descriptive	  of	  the	  
attempt	  to	  demarcate	  boundaries	  between	  distinct	  religious	  and	  secular	  spheres	  of	  
human	  behavior,	  not	  the	  success	  in	  actually	  doing	  so.	  Religious	  and	  secular	  often	  
appear	  in	  quotations	  in	  instances	  where	  I	  wish	  to	  highlight	  the	  difficulty	  of	  these	  
designations	  for	  the	  immediate	  subject.	  There	  are	  other	  times	  when	  they	  are	  used	  in	  
a	  more	  common	  way,	  though	  my	  preference	  has	  been,	  when	  not	  too	  clumsy,	  to	  use	  
proper	  adjectives	  (Jewish	  or	  Islamic/Muslim)	  in	  lieu	  of	  “religious”	  to	  describe	  
educators,	  schools	  and	  subject	  matter.	  As	  a	  whole,	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  reach	  some	  
workable	  compromise	  between	  writing	  that	  is	  theoretically	  informed	  and	  that	  
which	  is	  readily	  accessible.	  	  
Finally,	  a	  word	  is	  also	  required	  about	  a	  term	  that	  I	  use	  with	  some	  frequency,	  
namely	  religious	  modernism	  and	  its	  derivative,	  religious	  modernists	  –	  though,	  in	  
keeping	  with	  what	  was	  said	  above,	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  use	  proper	  adjectives	  (i.e.	  Jewish	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or	  Muslim	  modernists)	  in	  these	  instances	  as	  well.	  I	  use	  the	  term	  to	  speak	  generally	  
about	  the	  “enlightenment”	  or	  “renaissance”	  movements	  that	  occurred	  within	  Jewish	  
(predominately	  European,	  though	  this	  was	  not	  always	  the	  case36)	  and	  Arab-­‐Islamic	  
societies	  as	  thinkers	  from	  both	  traditions	  tried	  to	  formulate	  responses—cultural,	  
theological,	  linguistic,	  political—to	  the	  overwhelming	  power	  of	  European	  modernity	  
and	  its	  secular	  order.	  In	  many,	  though	  not	  all,	  instances,	  the	  agents	  of	  religious	  
modernism	  displayed	  a	  profound	  unease	  about	  the	  value	  of	  their	  respective	  
“religions”	  (cultures?	  lives?)	  relative	  to	  the	  universalizing	  claims	  of	  Western—and	  
specifically	  Christian—models.	  This	  was	  true	  not	  merely	  of	  education,	  but	  for	  
institutional	  and	  intellectual	  practices	  ranging	  from	  ritual	  practice,	  modes	  of	  dress	  
and	  structures	  of	  communal	  authority.	  Religious	  modernists	  were	  therefore	  linked	  
by	  their	  negative	  sense	  of	  cultural	  inadequacy	  rather	  than	  by	  their	  positive	  
proposals	  for	  addressing	  the	  “problem”	  of	  Jewish	  or	  Islamic	  societies.	  	  
The	  term	  religious	  modernism,	  consequently,	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  connote	  
a	  singular	  phenomenon;	  for	  instance,	  I	  consider	  maskilim	  (proponents	  of	  the	  Jewish	  
enlightenment)	  who	  favored	  full	  Jewish	  participation	  in	  the	  European	  nation-­‐state	  
and	  Zionists	  who	  opposed	  to	  such	  efforts	  both	  religious	  modernists	  who—despite	  
their	  significant	  differences—were	  joined	  in	  the	  apprehension	  that	  “traditional”	  
Jewish	  society	  was	  ill-­‐equipped	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  challenges	  and	  opportunities	  
presented	  by	  modern	  times.	  Similarly,	  this	  category	  encompasses	  not	  only	  members	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Lital	  Levy	  has	  argued	  the	  case	  for	  a	  “global	  Haskalah”	  that	  is	  attentive	  to	  the	  contributions	  of	  non-­‐
Ashkenazi	  Jewries	  to	  the	  Jewish	  Enlightenment.	  See	  Lital	  Levy,	  "Reorienting	  Hebrew	  Literary	  History:	  
The	  View	  from	  the	  East,"	  Prooftexts	  29,	  no.	  2	  (2009).	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of	  the	  ‘ulema	  who	  advocated	  shari’a	  reform,	  but	  Arab	  nationalists	  who	  viewed	  Islam	  
in	  civilizational	  rather	  than	  legal	  terms.	  	  
Yet,	  was	  it	  not	  the	  differences	  between	  these	  thinkers	  and	  the	  traditionalists	  
ensconced	  in	  the	  institutional	  hierarchies	  of	  their	  respective	  religions	  that	  marked	  
the	  former	  as	  “modern”?	  And	  did	  not	  many	  of	  the	  individuals	  in	  question	  self-­‐
identity	  as	  secularists,	  a	  designation	  that	  has	  been	  strengthened	  by	  
historiographical	  representations	  of	  Arab	  nationalism	  and	  Zionism	  as	  
fundamentally	  “secular”	  movements?	  While	  I	  will	  be	  the	  first	  to	  admit	  that	  all	  of	  
these	  labels	  are	  fraught	  in	  their	  own	  ways,	  I	  have	  nevertheless	  used	  the	  terminology	  
of	  religious	  modernism	  as	  an	  intervention	  of	  sorts	  against	  the	  uncritical	  acceptance	  
of	  secularism	  as	  an	  actor’s	  category.	  If	  taken	  in	  any	  of	  its	  commonplace	  meanings—
as	  either	  the	  separation	  of	  supernatural	  religion	  from	  the	  naturalistic	  realms	  of	  
science,	  law	  or	  politics	  or	  the	  freeing	  of	  secular	  reason	  from	  the	  constraints	  of	  
religious	  discourse—no	  one	  described	  in	  this	  work	  was	  ever	  secular.	  These	  
individuals	  were	  closer	  to	  secular	  in	  Talal	  Asad’s	  very	  specific	  usage,	  meaning	  they	  
embraced	  a	  reorientation	  of	  Islamic	  (and	  Jewish)	  juridical	  and	  ethical	  heritage	  that	  
was	  fundamentally	  Christian.	  However,	  as	  I	  argue,	  the	  educational	  efforts	  of	  both	  
Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  modernism	  display	  more	  complexity	  than	  is	  suggested	  by	  the	  
paradigm	  of	  colonial	  mimicry.	  	  
In	  sum,	  religious	  modernism,	  while	  admittedly	  an	  imperfect	  term,	  has	  two	  
advantages	  that	  recommend	  it:	  first,	  it	  challenges	  the	  tendency	  to	  treat	  religion	  as	  
the	  prerogative	  of	  the	  usual	  suspects	  (old	  men	  with	  beards)	  and	  showcases	  novel	  
approaches	  to	  texts	  and	  practices	  that,	  while	  undoubtedly	  new,	  were	  not	  necessarily	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less	  Jewish	  or	  Islamic	  as	  a	  result;	  and	  second,	  it	  alludes	  to	  the	  negotiation	  of	  an	  
identity	  that	  had,	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  colonial	  modernity,	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  religious	  
in	  nature.	  It	  is	  the	  ambiguities	  involved	  in	  defining	  the	  content	  of	  this	  category,	  and	  
the	  purpose	  of	  religious	  knowledge,	  that	  sit	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  present	  inquiry.	  	  
	   	  
Chapter	  Outline	  	  
In	  choosing	  religious	  education	  as	  a	  category	  of	  analysis	  I	  hope	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
speak	  synthetically	  about	  the	  role	  of	  religion	  in	  structuring	  Palestine’s	  education	  
administration	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  about	  the	  significance	  of	  debates	  regarding	  the	  
definition	  and	  purpose	  of	  religious	  knowledge	  on	  the	  other.	  Because	  this	  is	  not	  an	  
institutional	  analysis,	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  organize	  chapters	  thematically	  rather	  than	  
chronologically.	  I	  should	  underscore	  that	  my	  intent	  was	  not	  to	  write	  a	  
comprehensive	  history	  of	  religious	  education	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine,	  but	  rather	  to	  
explore	  those	  elements	  that	  were	  the	  most	  conceptually	  rich	  and	  which	  link	  discrete	  
issues	  like	  pedagogy	  and	  school	  funding	  to	  broader	  questions	  of	  secularism,	  
sectarianism	  and	  colonialism.	  	  
While	  the	  bulk	  of	  this	  study	  concerns	  the	  concrete	  interactions	  between	  
Jewish,	  Muslim	  and	  British	  educators	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine,	  some	  historical	  context	  
is	  required	  to	  situate	  these	  interactions	  within	  a	  longer	  continuum.	  Chapter	  One	  
begins	  this	  task	  by	  charting	  the	  transformation	  of	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  education	  
during	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  and	  nineteenth	  centuries	  in	  response	  to	  both	  internal	  
criticism	  and	  external	  threats.	  I	  distinguish	  between	  the	  transmission	  of	  sacred	  
knowledge	  and	  modern	  systems	  of	  religious	  education	  to	  highlight	  the	  novelty	  of	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the	  latter,	  which	  developed	  only	  with	  the	  invention	  of	  “religion”	  as	  a	  category	  
distinct	  from	  everyday	  life.	  This	  development	  was	  coterminous	  with	  the	  extension	  
of	  colonial	  or	  quasi-­‐colonial	  power	  relations	  over	  both	  Arab	  Muslim	  and	  European	  
Jewish	  communities	  wherein	  joining	  the	  consort	  of	  the	  “civilized”	  hinged	  in	  part	  on	  
the	  emulation	  of	  European	  models	  of	  education	  and	  religious	  practice.	  	  
By	  revisiting	  two	  important	  documents	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  
education	  reform,	  respectively	  written	  by	  the	  German	  maskil	  Naftali	  Herz	  Wessely	  
and	  the	  Egyptian	  jurist,	  Muhammad	  ‘Abduh,	  I	  chart	  the	  variety	  of	  strategies	  that	  
modernists	  adopted	  in	  their	  quest	  to	  harmonize	  their	  traditions	  with	  a	  European	  
commercial	  and	  moral	  order.	  This	  chapter	  highlights	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  number	  of	  
discursive	  tendencies—ranging	  from	  concerns	  over	  scriptural	  authenticity,	  disdain	  
for	  mysticism	  and	  attempts	  to	  standardize	  religious	  instruction—that	  would	  
continue	  to	  influence	  educational	  debates	  in	  early	  twentieth	  century	  Palestine.	  
Furthermore,	  this	  chapter	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  historical	  contingency	  of	  new,	  
standardized	  forms	  of	  religious	  education	  on	  the	  state	  apparatus,	  and	  thereby	  
invites	  consideration	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  pedagogic	  practices	  are	  linked	  to	  the	  
administrative	  practices	  and	  coercive	  power	  of	  the	  modern	  state.	  	  	  
Chapter	  Two	  pivots	  this	  discussion	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  particular	  time	  and	  place	  
of	  Mandate	  Palestine.	  Here	  I	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  British	  educational	  policies	  in	  
Palestine,	  which	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  seasoned	  colonial	  administrators,	  offered	  an	  
opportunity	  to	  “get	  it	  right”	  following	  missteps	  in	  both	  India	  and	  Egypt.	  Generally	  
speaking,	  the	  Mandatory	  government	  pursued	  a	  number	  of	  goals	  that	  practically	  
undermined	  one	  another:	  the	  expansion	  of	  primary	  education	  at	  the	  expense	  of	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secondary	  school	  (which	  were	  supposed	  to	  provide	  teachers	  for	  said	  primary	  
schools),	  the	  design	  of	  village	  school	  curriculum	  on	  a	  “rural	  bias”	  and	  a	  preference	  
for	  monolingualism	  (to	  keep	  the	  fellah	  on	  the	  land),	  and	  the	  belief	  that	  education	  
policy	  should	  act	  to	  equalize	  the	  cultural	  and	  economic	  rifts	  that	  separated	  Jews	  
from	  Arabs	  (which	  would	  have	  drastically	  changed	  the	  fellah’s	  status).	  	  
Most	  importantly,	  this	  chapter	  challenges	  the	  narrative	  of	  educational	  
separatism	  that	  views	  distinct	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  school	  systems	  under	  the	  Mandate	  
as	  the	  natural	  extension	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  millet	  system	  in	  which	  minorities	  retained	  a	  
great	  deal	  of	  autonomy	  in	  communal	  matters.	  Rather,	  I	  argue	  that	  a	  novel	  form	  of	  
educational	  separatism	  came	  into	  being	  during	  this	  period	  as	  a	  result	  of	  distinct	  
policies	  related	  to	  education	  financing,	  supervision	  and	  pedagogic	  practices.	  On	  the	  
educational	  front,	  dual	  societies	  were	  produced	  during	  this	  period,	  and	  done	  so	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  was	  hardly	  incidental.	  
The	  next	  crucial	  piece	  in	  this	  story,	  then,	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  type	  of	  divisions	  
that	  Palestine’s	  education	  administration	  nurtured,	  and	  the	  formative	  role	  of	  
“religion”	  in	  structuring	  those	  divides.	  Based	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  debates	  surrounding	  
the	  Palestine	  Education	  Ordinance	  of	  1933,	  Chapter	  Three	  argues	  that	  the	  
Mandatory	  government	  created	  a	  category	  of	  exception	  for	  religious	  schools	  and	  
those	  managed	  by	  “religious”	  communities.	  This	  administrative	  structure	  functioned	  
to	  the	  advantage	  of	  schools	  managed	  by	  the	  Zionist	  Organization,	  and	  later,	  the	  
Va’ad	  Leumi,	  which	  were	  given	  a	  large	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  based	  on	  their	  status	  as	  
the	  educational	  system	  of	  Palestine’s	  official	  Jewish	  community	  –	  a	  designation,	  
which,	  as	  I	  explore	  in	  Chapter	  Five,	  generated	  no	  shortage	  of	  contradictions.	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Conversely,	  linking	  educational	  autonomy	  to	  religious	  community	  weakened	  
Palestinian	  attempts	  to	  create	  a	  national	  school	  system	  that	  united	  children	  from	  
different	  confessional	  backgrounds.	  	  
Moving	  from	  the	  Education	  Ordinance	  to	  the	  worldview	  reflected	  therein,	  
Chapter	  Four	  offers	  a	  close	  analysis	  of	  the	  foundational	  assumptions	  of	  British	  
education	  policy:	  first,	  that	  education	  constituted	  an	  apolitical	  practice	  whose	  aim	  
was	  character	  formation	  and	  whose	  procedures	  were	  dictated	  by	  pedagogic	  
necessity;	  and	  second,	  that	  religious	  education	  functioned	  as	  the	  apolitical	  
cornerstone	  of	  moral	  fashioning.	  Through	  an	  extended	  discussion	  of	  the	  curriculum	  
used	  in	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System,	  I	  argue	  that	  government	  schools	  promoted	  a	  
Protestant	  view	  of	  religion	  in	  which	  Islam,	  as	  an	  ontological	  category,	  was	  largely	  
restricted	  to	  the	  text	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  ritual	  instruction.	  Based	  on	  a	  closer	  reading	  
of	  the	  unstable	  boundary	  between	  sacred	  and	  secular	  time,	  this	  section	  further	  
demonstrates	  where	  the	  real	  danger	  lie	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  colonial	  educators,	  not	  with	  
the	  teaching	  of	  transcendent	  religion,	  but	  that	  of	  national	  history.	  	  
This	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System	  to	  al-­‐
Najah	  National	  School	  in	  Nablus,	  which,	  I	  argue,	  offers	  an	  instructive	  example	  of	  the	  
ways	  in	  which	  Muslim	  modernists	  negotiated	  colonial	  secularism.	  Here	  I	  argue	  that	  
al-­‐Najah	  approached	  religious	  education	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  Government	  
of	  Palestine.	  However,	  while	  they	  largely	  agreed	  on	  the	  content	  of	  Islam,	  they	  
differed	  on	  its	  role	  within	  the	  Arab	  political	  project.	  These	  differing	  articulations	  of	  
the	  relationship	  between	  Islam,	  education	  and	  national	  politics	  reveal	  much	  about	  
British	  notions	  of	  “proper”	  nationalism	  and	  religious	  affiliation	  on	  one	  hand,	  and,	  on	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the	  other,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Muslim	  modernists	  forged	  their	  own	  models	  in	  the	  
colonial	  shadow.	  	  
	   Chapter	  Five	  continues	  this	  discussion	  by	  looking	  closely	  at	  the	  relationship	  
between	  the	  Mandatory	  government	  and	  Zionist	  schools.	  I	  argue	  that	  divergent	  
understandings	  of	  Jewishness	  stood	  at	  the	  center	  of	  tensions	  between	  the	  
Department	  of	  Education	  and	  the	  Zionist	  Organization,	  which	  here	  manifest	  as	  
disagreements	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  “religious”	  education.	  Here	  too,	  British	  
administrators	  pinned	  their	  hopes	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  religious	  content	  of	  
education	  to	  restrain	  Zionism’s	  “national	  chauvinism.”	  Yet	  this	  position	  was	  rife	  
with	  tension	  due	  to	  the	  very	  sectarian	  nature	  of	  Palestine;	  while	  Jews	  were	  officially	  
recognized	  as	  a	  nation,	  Judaism	  was	  supposed	  to	  rise	  above	  the	  political	  fray.	  	  
	   Conversely,	  through	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  Zionist	  school	  curricula,	  I	  argue	  that	  
the	  essential	  novelty	  in	  this	  educational	  program	  lies	  in	  its	  attempt	  to	  blur	  the	  
boundaries	  between	  holy	  and	  profane	  and	  thereby	  challenge	  the	  modern	  concept	  of	  
“religion”	  itself.	  Labeling	  this	  schooling	  secular—in	  either	  the	  sense	  of	  denoting	  a	  
non-­‐religious	  outlook	  or	  in	  adopting	  an	  epistemic	  model	  that	  is	  essentially	  
Christian—only	  functions	  to	  obscure	  what	  was	  radical	  about	  a	  mode	  of	  social	  
conditioning	  that	  was,	  and	  continues	  to	  be,	  the	  source	  of	  Zionism’s	  strength.	  	  	  
	   In	  closing,	  I	  suggest	  that,	  despite	  all	  the	  energy	  that	  was	  poured	  into	  attempts	  
to	  divide	  education	  into	  sacred	  and	  secular	  components,	  here	  too	  the	  “modern	  
constitution”	  could	  not	  be	  actualized.	  Rather,	  it	  seems	  that	  religious	  education	  can	  
accommodate	  an	  endless	  variety	  of	  messages;	  perhaps	  the	  only	  thing	  it	  cannot	  do	  is	  
stand	  outside	  of	  politics.	  We	  should	  not	  be	  surprised,	  therefore,	  to	  find	  religious	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education	  complicit	  in	  the	  most	  rabid	  racism	  and	  most	  radical	  peace	  efforts	  in	  
contemporary	  Israel,	  for	  example.	  Nor	  should	  we	  assume	  that	  religious	  education	  is	  
the	  problem	  while	  secular	  education	  is	  necessarily	  linked	  to	  humanism	  or	  political	  
freedom	  –	  as	  is	  often	  the	  case	  when	  commentators	  speak	  about	  education	  reform	  in	  
Muslim	  countries.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  era	  of	  public	  education	  and	  mass	  politics	  
gave	  rise	  to	  a	  new	  type	  of	  relationship	  between	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  discursive	  
traditions	  and	  political	  activism	  –	  a	  reorientation	  that,	  not	  incidentally,	  occurred	  
under	  the	  auspices	  of	  colonial	  modernity.	  The	  very	  interpretive	  flexibility	  that	  has	  
allowed	  both	  Muhammad	  ‘Abduh	  and	  Osama	  bin	  Laden	  to	  claim	  the	  mantel	  of	  “true”	  
Islam,	  for	  instance,	  points	  to	  the	  instability	  inherent	  in	  this	  process.	  How	  adherents	  





Educational	  Secularization	  and	  the	  Colonial	  Project	  
	  
The	  secular	  is	  itself	  a	  sphere	  of	  transcendental	  values,	  but	  the	  invention	  of	  religion	  
as	   the	   locus	  of	   the	  transcendent	  serves	  to	  disguise	  this	  and	  strengthen	  the	   illusion	  
that	  the	  secular	  is	  simply	  the	  real	  world	  seen	  aright	  in	  its	  self-­‐evident	  factuality.1	  
	  
Most	   importantly,	   moveover,	   secularism	   is	   a	   name	   Christianity	   gave	   itself	   when	  	  
it	  invented	  religion,	  when	  it	  named	  its	  other	  or	  others	  as	  religions.2	  
	  
	  
While	  this	  project	  is	  chiefly	  concerned	  with	  the	  history	  of	  religious	  education	  
in	  Mandate	  Palestine,	  we	  must	  appreciate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  
communities	  there	  were	  heirs	  to	  debates	  and	  processes	  that	  began	  several	  decades	  
earlier	  in	  places	  like	  Berlin,	  Cairo	  and	  Beirut.	  It	  was	  no	  mere	  accident	  that	  education	  
reform	  became	  a	  key	  tenet	  of	  the	  modernist	  platform	  propagated	  first	  by	  European	  
maskilim	  in	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century,	  and,	  beginning	  in	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  
century,	  by	  Muslim	  reformers	  spread	  from	  India	  to	  North	  Africa.3	  While	  the	  
establishment	  of	  new	  public	  schools	  has	  often	  been	  linked	  with	  the	  development	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Fitzgerald,	  The	  Ideology	  of	  Religious	  Studies:	  73.	  
2	  Anidjar,	  "Secularism,"	  62.	  
3	  The	  more	  comprehensive	  overview	  of	  these	  trends	  within	  the	  Arab	  context	  is	  Albert	  Hourani’s	  
work,	  Albert	  Hourani,	  Arabic	  Thought	  in	  the	  Liberal	  Age,	  1798-­‐1939	  	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1983).	  Other	  accounts,	  such	  as	  Ibrahim	  Abu-­‐Lughod’s	  Arab	  Rediscovery	  of	  Europe:	  a	  
Study	  in	  Cultural	  Encounters	  and	  George	  Antonius’s	  classic,	  The	  Arab	  Awakening,	  remain	  informative	  
even	  if	  their	  theoretical	  frameworks	  are	  no	  longer	  as	  compelling.	  See	  Ibrahim	  A.	  Abu-­‐Lughod,	  Arab	  
Rediscovery	  of	  Europe	  :	  A	  Study	  in	  Cultural	  Encounters,	  Oriental	  studies	  series	  (Princeton,	  N.J.:	  
Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1963);	  George	  Antonius,	  The	  Arab	  Awakening:	  the	  Story	  of	  the	  Arab	  
National	  Movement	  	  (Philadelphia:	  J.B.	  Lippincott,	  1939).	  Similar	  dynamics	  were	  at	  work	  in	  
contemporary	  Islamic	  reform	  efforts	  in	  South	  Asia.	  Sayyid	  Ahmed	  Khan,	  for	  instance,	  was	  well	  known	  
for	  his	  attempts	  to	  develop	  the	  empirical	  sciences	  in	  India.	  “Today	  we	  need,	  as	  in	  former	  days,	  a	  
modern	  ‘ilm	  al-­‐kalam	  by	  which	  we	  either	  render	  futile	  the	  tenets	  of	  modern	  sciences	  or	  [show	  them	  
to	  be]	  doubtful,	  or	  bring	  them	  into	  harmony	  with	  the	  doctrines	  of	  Islam.”	  See:	  Sayyid	  Ahmad	  Khan,	  
"Sir	  Sayyid	  Ahmad	  Khan	  on	  Islam	  and	  Science,"	  in	  Textual	  Sources	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Islam,	  ed.	  Andrew	  
Ruppin	  and	  Jan	  Knappert	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1990),	  177.	  Scholarship	  devoted	  to	  
the	  Haskalah	  and	  Zionism	  is	  too	  numerous	  to	  enumerate.	  Among	  the	  more	  useful	  texts	  regarding	  
each	  movement’s	  education	  programs,	  see	  Shmuel	  Feiner	  and	  David	  Sorkin,	  ed.	  New	  Perspectives	  on	  
the	  Haskalah	  (London:	  Littman	  Library	  of	  Jewish	  Civilization	  2001).	  Etkes,	  ha-­‐ẖeder:	  meẖkarim,	  
te'udot,	  pirkei	  sifrut	  v'zichronot;	  Feiner,	  "Programot	  ẖinuchiot	  v'idialim	  ẖevratiyim:	  beit	  ha-­‐sefer	  
'ẖinuch	  ne'arim'	  b'berlin	  1778-­‐1825.";	  Elboim-­‐Dror,	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  ha-­‐ivri	  be-­‐Erets-­‐Yisrael.	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nationalism	  in	  European	  states,4	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  modernists	  confronted	  a	  
slightly	  different	  educational	  context.	  Because	  reformers	  from	  both	  camps	  were	  
confronted	  with	  long	  traditions	  of	  lay	  education,	  their	  efforts	  were	  often	  directed	  at	  
the	  transformation	  of	  existing	  systems	  of	  communal	  education—which	  were	  
increasingly	  viewed	  as	  the	  source	  of	  moral	  corruption	  and	  cultural	  decay—rather	  
than	  the	  ab	  initio	  creation	  of	  secular	  schools.	  
In	  general	  terms,	  modern	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  reform	  movements	  sprang	  from	  
a	  sense	  of	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  existing	  religious	  and	  social	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  
challenges	  of	  the	  modern	  world—the	  latter	  being	  represented	  by	  the	  cultural,	  
economic	  and	  political	  might	  of	  Western	  Europe.	  Certain	  common	  features	  
characterized	  the	  reformist	  agenda,	  at	  least	  within	  Jewish	  and	  Arab-­‐Islamic	  
contexts:	  a	  heightened	  emphasis	  on	  a	  pure	  language	  (Arabic	  or	  Hebrew)	  as	  a	  vessel	  
of	  national	  heritage;	  a	  tendency	  to	  minimize	  exegetical	  traditions	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  
unmediated	  approach	  to	  the	  sacred	  text;	  a	  desire	  to	  diversify	  the	  curricula	  studied	  
within	  communal	  schools	  to	  include	  European	  languages	  and	  modern	  sciences;	  and	  
an	  insistence	  on	  schools’	  hygienic	  and	  pedagogic	  improvement.	  	  
Despite	  their	  notable	  differences,	  both	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  modernist	  
movements	  singled	  out	  education	  as	  the	  key	  driver	  of	  social	  transformation	  and	  tied	  
the	  attainment	  of	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  goals	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  modern	  forms	  of	  schooling	  
being	  pioneered	  in	  European	  contexts.	  Understanding	  the	  later	  history	  of	  religious	  
education	  in	  Palestine	  requires	  taking	  stock	  of	  this	  modernist	  legacy,	  and	  crucially,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Ernest	  Gellner,	  Nations	  and	  Nationalism	  	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1983);	  Eugen	  Weber,	  
Peasants	  into	  Frenchmen:	  the	  modernization	  of	  rural	  France,	  1870-­‐1914	  	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  
University	  Press,	  1976).	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the	  power	  disparities	  under	  which	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  intellectuals	  toiled.	  That	  is	  to	  
say,	  these	  reformist	  platforms	  emerged	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  European	  
domination	  –	  not	  merely	  in	  commercial	  or	  territorial	  terms,	  but	  in	  epistemic	  ones	  as	  
well.	  We	  shall	  see	  that	  joining	  the	  club	  of	  the	  civilized—either	  as	  full	  citizens	  or	  
international	  peers—imposed	  no	  shortage	  of	  demands	  on	  the	  petitioners	  in	  
question.	  In	  short,	  the	  modernization	  of	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  education	  occurred	  
within	  the	  context	  of	  European	  colonialism,	  which	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  imply	  that	  
these	  movements	  were	  somehow	  less	  “authentic”	  because	  of	  this	  fact.	  There	  is	  no	  
historical	  period	  devoid	  of	  its	  power	  imbalances.	  This	  is	  merely	  to	  say	  that	  we	  
cannot	  approach	  the	  transformation	  of	  educational	  practices	  as	  if	  they	  were	  the	  
mere	  products	  of	  internal	  disquiet.	  Rather,	  respect	  for	  historical	  nuance	  requires	  
accounting	  for	  the	  multi-­‐dimensional	  contexts	  in	  which	  these	  transformations	  
occurred.	  	  	  	  
Addressing	  Islamic	  modernism	  within	  the	  context	  of	  European	  colonialism	  is	  
a	  well-­‐established	  historiographical	  trend.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  however,	  for	  the	  study	  
of	  Jewish	  communities,	  and	  a	  word	  is	  needed	  here	  as	  to	  why	  I	  favor	  this	  interpretive	  
framework.	  Scholars	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  particularly	  of	  Palestine	  may	  chafe	  at	  
the	  suggestion	  that	  European	  Jews—long	  associated	  with	  the	  Zionist	  conqueror—
were	  in	  some	  way	  also	  colonial	  subjects.	  However	  counterintuitive	  in	  light	  of	  our	  
contemporary	  political	  moment,	  I	  would	  nevertheless	  like	  to	  suggest	  that	  many	  
aspects	  of	  Jewish	  modernism	  can	  only	  be	  grasped	  by	  appreciating	  the	  quasi-­‐colonial	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position	  of	  European	  Jews	  as	  the	  internal	  Other.5	  This	  historical	  experience	  formed	  
the	  necessary	  (but	  not	  sufficient)	  foundation	  for	  Zionism’s	  emergence	  in	  the	  late	  
nineteenth	  century,	  and	  as	  I	  argue,	  the	  legacy	  against	  which	  Zionist	  educators	  in	  
Palestine	  would	  react	  in	  their	  attempt	  to	  forge	  new	  connections	  between	  Jewish	  
identity,	  communal	  education	  and	  mass	  politics.	  That	  Zionism	  chose	  colonialism	  as	  
its	  mode	  of	  anti-­‐colonial	  resistance—offering	  “a	  redemptive	  nationalist	  narrative	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Europe	  and	  anti-­‐Semitism	  and	  a	  colonialist	  narrative	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  Arab	  
people	  who	  ‘happened’	  to	  reside	  in	  the	  place	  designated	  the	  Jewish	  homeland”6—
makes	  this	  case	  both	  endlessly	  contentious	  and	  historically	  rich.	  	  
Conversely,	  within	  Jewish	  Studies,	  there	  has	  been	  an	  under-­‐utilization	  of	  
post-­‐colonial	  theory	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  approaching	  the	  Jewish	  past.7	  This	  is	  no	  doubt	  a	  
byproduct	  of	  broader	  cultural	  discourses	  through	  which	  Jews	  attempt	  to	  establish	  
their	  proper	  place	  as	  children	  of	  the	  “West”.	  Within	  such	  a	  context,	  the	  history	  of	  
European	  Jewry’s	  “enlightenment”	  is	  often	  a	  celebratory	  tale	  of	  joining	  European	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  In	  his	  treatment	  of	  “the	  Jewish	  question”	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Muslim	  identity	  in	  the	  Indian	  
subcontinent,	  Aamir	  Mufti	  has	  offered	  an	  exceptional	  example	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  thinking	  about	  
these	  “Others”	  in	  tandem	  can	  produce	  new	  insights.	  Aamir	  Mufti,	  Enlightenment	  in	  the	  Colony	  	  
(Princeton	  Princeton	  University	  Press	  2007).	  
6	  Ella	  Shohat,	  Taboo	  Memories,	  Diasporic	  Voices,	  Next	  wave	  (Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  
369.	  
7	  For	  a	  review	  of	  the	  strange	  place	  of	  Jewish	  Studies	  within	  the	  Academy,	  see	  Michael	  Galchinsky	  
David	  Biale,	  and	  Susannah	  Heschel	  Insider/outsider:	  American	  Jews	  and	  Multiculturalism	  	  (University	  
of	  California	  Press,	  1998).	  Important	  exceptions	  to	  the	  celebratory	  trend	  exist,	  for	  example	  Daniel	  
Boyarin,	  Unheroic	  Conduct:	  the	  Rise	  of	  Heterosexuality	  and	  the	  Invention	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Man,	  
Contraversions	  8	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1997).	  Derek	  Penslar	  has	  noted	  the	  
striking	  parallels	  that	  link	  Jewish	  modernism	  in	  Europe	  to	  anti-­‐colonial	  and	  post-­‐colonial	  movements	  
in	  India	  and	  elsewhere.	  See	  Derek	  Penslar,	  "Zionism,	  Colonialism,	  Post-­‐Colonialism,"	  in	  Israeli	  
Historical	  Revisionism:	  From	  Left	  to	  Right,	  ed.	  Anita	  Penslar	  Derek	  Jonathan	  Shapira	  (Frank	  Cass,	  
2003).	  For	  an	  extended	  discussion	  of	  the	  peculiar	  position	  of	  Jewish	  studies	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  post-­‐colonial	  
theory,	  see	  Derek	  J.	  Penslar	  and	  Ivan	  Davidson	  Kalmar,	  ed.	  Orientalism	  and	  the	  Jews	  (Hanover:	  
University	  Press	  of	  New	  England,	  2005),	  Introduction.	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civilization.8	  Within	  the	  work	  on	  Jewish	  education	  reform,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  little	  
question	  in	  much	  of	  the	  existing	  scholarship	  that	  the	  new	  “universal”	  ideas	  adopted	  
by	  maskilim	  were	  actually	  so.	  Historians,	  however,	  should	  do	  more	  than	  uncritically	  
reproduce	  categories	  such	  as	  “universal”	  and	  “particular”	  and	  rather	  question	  the	  
contents	  and	  boundaries	  of	  these	  categories,	  ask	  who	  produced	  them,	  and	  
investigate	  the	  processes	  through	  which	  they	  gained	  their	  epistemic	  power.	  
As	  a	  final	  introductory	  comment,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  establish	  the	  relevance	  of	  
educational	  debates	  that	  took	  place	  in	  Berlin	  or	  Cairo	  by	  noting	  that	  Palestine	  was	  
not	  self-­‐sufficient	  in	  generating	  its	  own	  intellectual	  discourses.	  It	  was	  above	  all	  a	  site	  
of	  circulation	  characterized	  by	  porous	  borders	  and	  the	  migration	  of	  people	  and	  
ideas.	  Leaving	  aside	  the	  obvious	  fact	  that	  the	  political	  boundaries	  separating	  
Palestine	  from	  neighboring	  Arab	  territories	  are	  themselves	  early	  twentieth	  century	  
inventions,	  residents	  of	  Palestine	  had	  ample	  exposure	  to	  the	  flurry	  of	  writing	  about	  
religious,	  political	  and	  social	  reform	  that	  originated	  in	  other	  Arab	  cities.	  It	  was	  
customary	  for	  notable	  Muslim	  families	  to	  send	  their	  children	  to	  learn	  at	  al-­‐Azhar	  in	  
Cairo,	  and	  Palestine	  was	  of	  course	  a	  continuous	  site	  of	  pilgrimage	  for	  religious	  
scholars.	  During	  the	  period	  of	  the	  British	  Mandate,	  and	  due	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  
Arab	  university	  in	  Palestine,	  students	  seeking	  higher	  education	  were	  most	  likely	  to	  
do	  so	  in	  Cairo	  or	  Beirut.9	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Amnon	  Rav-­‐Krakotzkin,	  "The	  Zionist	  Return	  to	  the	  West	  and	  the	  Mizrachi	  Jewish	  Perspective,"	  in	  
Orientalism	  and	  the	  Jews,	  ed.	  Ivan	  Davidson	  Kalmar	  and	  Derek	  J.	  Penslar	  (Waltham,	  Massachusetts:	  
Brandeis	  University	  Press,	  2005).	  
9	  “In	  1931	  there	  were	  284	  Palestinian	  students	  at	  Beirut	  and	  30	  at	  Cairo,”	  wrote	  the	  educator	  Khalil	  
Totah	  in	  a	  special	  edition	  on	  Palestine	  published	  by	  the	  American	  Academy	  of	  Political	  and	  Social	  
Science.	  See	  Khalil	  Totah,	  "Education	  in	  Palestine,"	  Annals	  of	  the	  American	  Academy	  of	  Political	  and	  
Social	  Science	  Vol.	  164,	  Palestine:	  A	  Decade	  of	  Development	  (Nov.	  1932):	  161.	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The	  emergence	  of	  Zionism	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  marked	  an	  extreme	  
version	  of	  the	  migration	  of	  individuals	  and	  knowledge	  that	  were	  common	  
phenomena	  in	  this	  land	  of	  pilgrimage.	  While	  communal	  schools,	  the	  ẖeder	  (plural:	  
ẖederim)	  and	  talmud	  torah,	  were	  commonplace	  in	  the	  urban	  centers	  of	  the	  Old	  
Yishuv	  (and	  indeed,	  were	  still	  the	  dominant	  form	  of	  Jewish	  education	  in	  much	  of	  
Europe),	  modern	  educational	  models	  found	  a	  foothold	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  
in	  both	  cities	  and	  new	  agricultural	  settlements.	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  educators	  were	  
also	  well	  acquainted	  with	  the	  myriad	  missionary	  schools	  that	  operated	  in	  Palestine	  
and	  that	  tried	  to	  lure	  children	  into	  the	  faith	  through	  the	  prospect	  of	  food,	  shelter	  and	  
a	  free	  education.	  While	  broadly	  perceived	  as	  communal	  threats,	  these	  schools	  
nonetheless	  offered	  a	  model	  of	  modern	  education	  that	  was	  largely	  adopted	  by	  
Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  communities	  as	  they	  founded	  new	  schools	  to	  compete	  with	  
missionary	  establishments.10	  In	  sum,	  there	  are	  compelling	  reasons	  to	  situate	  the	  
educational	  history	  of	  Palestine	  within	  the	  broader	  intellectual	  frameworks	  that	  
rendered	  possible	  certain	  types	  of	  education—“religious”	  and	  otherwise—while	  
closing	  the	  door	  on	  others.	  Doing	  so	  demands	  an	  appreciation	  of	  debates	  that	  were	  
unfolding	  outside	  Palestine,	  but	  whose	  later	  influence	  can	  hardly	  be	  overstated.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  There	  is	  still	  much	  work	  to	  be	  done	  on	  the	  schools	  created	  by	  missionaries	  in	  19th	  century	  
Palestine.	  A	  few	  recent	  works	  gesture	  at	  the	  contentious—and	  competitive—relations	  between	  
missionaries	  and	  local	  communities,	  for	  example,	  Charlotte	  van	  der	  Leest,	  "Conversion	  and	  conflict	  in	  
Palestine:	  the	  missions	  of	  the	  Church	  Missionary	  Society	  and	  the	  Protestant	  bishop	  Samuel	  Gobat"	  
(Leiden	  University,	  2008).	  For	  a	  broader	  geographic	  treatment,	  see	  Heather	  Sharkey	  and	  Mehmet	  Ali	  
Dogan,	  ed.	  American	  Missionaries	  and	  the	  Middle	  East:	  Foundational	  Encounters	  (Salt	  Lake	  City:	  
University	  of	  Utah	  Press,	  2011);	  Samir	  Khalaf,	  Protestant	  Missionaries	  in	  the	  Levant:	  Ungodly	  Puritans,	  
1820-­‐1860,	  Routledge	  Studies	  in	  Middle	  Eastern	  History	  (Oxford,	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2012).	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The	  Case	  for	  Rupture	  
In	  his	  1965	  book,	  Education	  in	  Israel,	  Joseph	  Bentwich,	  a	  former	  Assistant	  
Director	  of	  Education	  for	  the	  Mandate	  Government,	  offered	  a	  conventional	  view	  of	  
Jewish	  education	  through	  the	  ages:	  the	  medieval	  ẖeder	  gave	  way	  to	  modern	  schools	  
founded	  by	  European	  maskilim,	  which	  in	  turn	  yielded	  to	  the	  Zionist	  school	  system	  
created	  in	  early	  twentieth	  century	  Palestine.11	  Extending	  the	  historical	  arc	  back	  in	  
time,	  Bentwich	  explained	  that	  Jewish	  education	  for	  boys	  already	  existed	  on	  a	  
widespread,	  if	  not	  universal,	  level	  by	  the	  4th	  century	  CE,	  and	  presented	  the	  following	  
passage	  from	  the	  Babylonian	  Talmud	  as	  evidence:	  “Formerly	  he	  who	  had	  a	  father	  
was	  taught	  by	  him	  the	  Torah,	  but	  he	  who	  had	  no	  father	  did	  not	  learn	  it…until	  Joshua	  
ben	  Gamala	  came	  and	  ordained	  that	  teachers	  should	  be	  set	  up	  in	  every	  province	  and	  
every	  city,	  and	  that	  pupils	  should	  be	  admitted	  at	  the	  age	  of	  six	  or	  seven.”12	  
A	  parallel	  account	  of	  the	  history	  of	  Islamic	  education	  by	  Abdul	  Latif	  Tibawi—
who	  was,	  incidentally,	  one	  of	  Bentwich’s	  colleagues	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  
during	  the	  Mandate	  period—appeared	  in	  1972.13	  Though	  in	  many	  ways	  a	  thoughtful	  
and	  nuanced	  account,	  the	  text	  nonetheless	  presents	  a	  similar	  evolutionary	  
trajectory	  that	  links	  the	  medieval	  madrasa	  of	  al-­‐Ghazali’s	  time	  to	  the	  educational	  
reforms	  of	  Muhammad	  ‘Ali	  and	  the	  eventual	  founding	  of	  national	  school	  systems	  in	  
post-­‐colonial	  Arab	  states.	  	  	  
	  	   I	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  devalue	  these	  two	  accounts	  or	  to	  diminish	  their	  
contributions,	  but	  rather	  to	  question	  the	  continuity	  that	  each	  presumes	  between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Bentwich,	  Education	  in	  Israel.	  
12	  Babylonian	  Talmud,	  Bava	  Batra	  21a.	  	  
13	  Abdul	  Latif	  Tibawi,	  Islamic	  Education:	  Its	  Traditions	  and	  Modernization	  into	  the	  Arab	  National	  
Systems	  	  (London:	  Luzac,	  1972).	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classical,	  medieval	  and	  modern	  forms	  of	  schooling.	  Certain	  features,	  such	  as	  the	  
texts	  studied,	  seem	  to	  support	  the	  argument	  that	  contemporary	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  
schools	  are	  the	  natural	  progeny	  of	  those	  that	  preceded	  them.	  And	  yet,	  these	  
narratives	  seem	  to	  take	  for	  granted	  what	  are,	  in	  my	  interpretation,	  radical	  
differences	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  purpose,	  structure	  and	  content	  of	  education	  that	  render	  
the	  modern	  religious	  school	  something	  very	  different	  from	  the	  medieval	  ẖeder	  or	  
kuttāb.	  As	  an	  alternative	  approach,	  I	  suggest	  we	  must	  start	  by	  distinguishing	  
learning	  as	  a	  means	  of	  transmitting	  sacred	  knowledge	  from	  education	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  
social	  disciplining,	  communal	  reform	  or	  individual	  transformation.	  As	  Jonathan	  
Berkey	  has	  argued	  in	  his	  study	  of	  the	  madrasa,	  education	  in	  the	  pre-­‐modern	  world	  
was	  conceived	  of	  as	  “a	  pillar	  of	  stability	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  force	  for	  change”	  (original	  
emphasis).14	  Thus	  while	  institutionalized	  learning	  had	  a	  long	  history	  in	  both	  Jewish	  
and	  Islamic	  contexts,	  it	  is	  doubtful	  whether	  what	  occurred	  in	  these	  places	  was	  
“education”	  in	  the	  modern	  sense	  of	  the	  term.	  
At	  the	  conceptual	  level,	  these	  changes	  corresponded	  with—and	  indeed,	  were	  
dependent	  on—the	  universalization	  of	  the	  Protestant	  definition	  of	  religion	  as	  a	  
private,	  individualistic	  and	  faith-­‐based	  enterprise.15	  Correspondingly,	  it	  is	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Jonathan	  P.	  Berkey,	  "Madrasas	  Medieval	  and	  Modern:	  Politics,	  Education,	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  
Muslim	  Identity,"	  in	  Schooling	  Islam:	  the	  Culture	  and	  Politics	  of	  Modern	  Muslim	  Education	  ed.	  Robert	  
W.	  Hefner	  and	  Muhammad	  Qasim	  Zaman	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  46.	  
15	  Numerous	  works	  on	  the	  invention	  of	  the	  category	  of	  religion	  as	  a	  distinct	  space	  of	  human	  
experience	  have	  been	  published	  in	  recent	  years.	  Of	  special	  importance	  is	  the	  work	  of	  Talal	  Asad,	  who	  
has	  traced	  the	  origins	  of	  secularism	  in	  early	  modern	  Europe	  and	  its	  migration	  to	  Egypt	  under	  colonial	  
auspices.	  Talal	  Asad,	  Genealogies	  of	  Religion:	  Discipline	  and	  Reasons	  of	  Power	  in	  Christianity	  and	  Islam	  	  
(Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1993);	  ———,	  Formations	  of	  the	  Secular:	  Christianity,	  
Islam,	  Modernity;	  ibid.	  For	  a	  broader	  examination	  of	  religious	  and	  secular	  as	  categories	  linked	  to	  
colonial	  politics,	  see	  Fitzgerald,	  Religion	  and	  the	  Secular:	  Historical	  and	  Colonial	  Formations.	  Jewish	  
studies	  scholars	  are	  beginning	  to	  appreciate	  the	  relevance	  of	  post-­‐colonial	  criticism	  to	  the	  history	  of	  
modern	  Jewish	  life	  in	  Europe	  and	  beyond.	  For	  example,	  Leora	  Batnitzky	  charts	  the	  invention	  of	  
“Judaism”	  by	  maskilim	  and	  the	  scholars	  of	  Wissenschaft	  des	  Judentums	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  Jewish	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somewhat	  anachronistic	  to	  speak	  of	  religious	  education	  in	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  
communities	  prior	  to	  the	  invention	  of	  “the	  religious”	  as	  a	  distinct	  component	  of	  
social	  experience.	  It	  is	  therefore	  of	  no	  surprise	  to	  find	  that	  schools	  featuring	  
religious	  instruction	  as	  discrete	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  curriculum	  did	  not	  emerge	  until	  
the	  late	  18th	  century	  in	  European	  Jewish	  communities,	  and	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  
century	  among	  Muslim	  communities	  in	  Arab	  lands.	  
In	  his	  study	  of	  colonial	  Egypt,	  Timothy	  Mitchell	  has	  argued	  that,	  “Education,	  
as	  an	  isolated	  process	  in	  which	  children	  acquire	  a	  set	  of	  instructions	  and	  self-­‐
discipline,	  was	  born	  in	  Egypt	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Before	  that,	  there	  was	  no	  
distinct	  location	  or	  institution	  where	  such	  a	  process	  was	  carried	  on,	  no	  body	  of	  
adults	  for	  whom	  it	  was	  a	  profession,	  and	  no	  word	  for	  it	  in	  the	  language.”16	  Mitchell	  
highlights	  that	  education	  in	  this	  modern	  sense	  (tarbiyya,	  which	  as	  he	  notes,	  only	  
acquired	  its	  contemporary	  meaning	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century)17	  must	  be	  
differentiated	  from	  learning,	  which	  “occurred	  within	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  particular	  
profession.”	  18	  Like	  its	  Arabic	  counterpart,	  the	  Hebrew	  term	  ẖinuch	  (education)	  is	  of	  
modern	  vintage.	  By	  contrast,	  one	  “learns”	  Torah	  (from	  lilmod),	  and	  even	  in	  
contemporary	  usage	  the	  act	  of	  studying	  sacred	  texts	  is	  referring	  to	  as	  “learning.”	  
Thus,	  in	  approaching	  the	  history	  of	  religious	  education	  as	  a	  category,	  we	  must	  first	  
appreciate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  represented	  a	  modern	  innovation	  despite	  certain	  
points	  of	  continuity	  with	  pre-­‐modern	  practices.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
emancipation	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  European	  nation	  state.	  Leora	  Batnitzky,	  How	  Judaism	  Became	  a	  
Religion	  	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2011).	  	  
16	  Timothy	  Mitchell,	  Colonizing	  Egypt	  	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1991),	  85.	  
17	  Ibid.,	  88-­‐89.	  
18	  Ibid.,	  85.	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A	  further	  point	  of	  Mitchell’s	  analysis	  is	  helpful	  for	  situating	  contemporary	  
debates	  regarding	  the	  newly	  emergent	  “secular”	  knowledge	  and	  the	  struggle	  over	  its	  
presence	  or	  absence	  in	  schools.	  In	  his	  interpretation,	  religious	  education—
particularly	  as	  it	  occurred	  at	  the	  higher	  levels—was	  akin	  to	  an	  apprenticeship	  
process	  through	  which	  a	  tradesman	  learned	  his	  craft.	  Acquiring	  knowledge	  of	  the	  
texts,	  modes	  of	  argumentation	  and	  commentaries	  encompassed	  by	  shari‘a	  
constituted	  the	  training	  process	  through	  which	  individuals	  became	  qualified	  to	  act	  
as	  religious	  functionaries.	  While	  this	  interpretation	  points	  to	  a	  fundamental	  
attribute	  of	  pre-­‐modern	  learning—namely	  that	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  were	  acquired	  
“on	  the	  job”	  rather	  than	  within	  distinct	  institutional	  settings—there	  are	  two	  
qualifications	  we	  must	  consider.	  First,	  this	  explanation	  does	  not	  account	  for	  the	  
prevalence	  of	  religious	  learning	  at	  the	  rudimentary	  level.	  Most	  children	  who	  
attended	  a	  kuttāb	  would	  never	  become	  clerics	  or	  judges,	  yet	  the	  basic	  instruction	  
they	  received—the	  only	  formal	  one	  they	  would	  receive,	  in	  most	  cases—was	  still	  
centered	  around	  the	  acquisition	  of	  “religious”	  knowledge.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  that	  such	  
knowledge	  was	  regarded	  as	  substantively	  different	  than,	  for	  example,	  that	  required	  
to	  perform	  a	  trade.	  	  
Secondly,	  religious	  knowledge	  was	  in	  the	  privileged	  position	  of	  being	  taught	  
in	  quasi-­‐institutional	  settings	  such	  as	  the	  kuttāb	  and	  madrasa.	  While	  such	  
instruction	  was	  arguably	  not	  truly	  “education”	  in	  the	  modern	  sense	  of	  the	  term,	  we	  
might	  also	  posit	  that	  the	  only	  education	  that	  existed	  was	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  sacred	  
realm.	  It	  was	  not	  merely	  that	  learning	  had	  a	  religious	  component,	  but	  rather	  that	  
schools	  were	  created	  and	  maintained	  to	  perpetuate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  words,	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behaviors	  and	  texts	  that	  structured	  daily	  life	  (which	  we	  anachronistically	  call	  
“religion”).	  Other	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  were	  in	  circulation,	  but	  the	  goals	  of	  education	  
were	  loftier	  than	  occupational	  training.	  Had	  the	  kuttāb	  offered	  something	  else,	  it	  
would	  no	  longer	  have	  been	  providing	  a	  genuine	  education.	  
In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  make	  the	  case	  for	  approaching	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  
religious	  education	  as	  modern	  phenomena	  that	  must	  be	  differentiated	  from	  older	  
forms	  of	  textual	  study.	  Though	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  two	  formative	  documents	  in	  the	  
history	  of	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  education,	  I	  will	  show	  that	  the	  modernization	  of	  
communal	  schooling	  depended	  on	  new	  educational	  models	  that	  embraced	  
“universal”	  values,	  disparaged	  popular	  and	  local	  forms	  of	  piety	  and	  sought	  alliances	  
with	  the	  state	  to	  advance	  the	  “proper”	  type	  of	  religious	  thought.	  That	  such	  actions—
today	  associated	  with	  ultra-­‐conservative	  forces	  within	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  




An	  imperative	  to	  know	  
	  
In	  the	  Jewish	  context,	  the	  catalyst	  for	  education	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  biblical	  
commandment	  for	  a	  father	  to	  instruct	  his	  children	  in	  the	  laws	  of	  Israel.	  The	  modern	  
Hebrew	  term	  for	  education,	  ẖinuch,	  does	  not	  carry	  the	  same	  meaning	  in	  the	  Hebrew	  
Bible,	  wherein	  l’ẖanech	  (the	  verb	  from	  which	  ẖinuch	  is	  derived)	  means	  “to	  dedicate”	  
or	  “to	  initiate.”	  The	  word	  shares	  the	  same	  root	  as	  ẖ’nicah,	  initiation,	  suggesting	  it	  
was	  through	  ẖinuch	  that	  the	  child	  assumed	  his	  full	  role	  in	  the	  community.	  If	  one	  
remembers	  that	  learning	  to	  publicly	  read	  the	  Torah	  was	  a	  necessary	  stage	  of	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preparation	  for	  the	  bar	  mitzvah	  (literally,	  one	  who	  has	  reached	  the	  age	  of	  obligation	  
for	  religious	  commandments,	  i.e.	  adulthood),	  the	  notion	  of	  ẖinuch	  as	  a	  form	  of	  
initiation	  is	  indeed	  compelling.	  	  
The	  system	  of	  learning	  that	  Jewish	  modernists	  would	  later	  denounce—with	  
the	  ẖeder	  and	  talmud	  torah	  at	  its	  base	  and	  the	  yeshiva	  at	  its	  apex—was	  already	  well	  
established	  by	  the	  medieval	  period.19	  The	  ẖeder	  (literally	  “room”)	  was	  a	  private	  
school,	  run	  by	  an	  individual	  teacher	  to	  whom	  parents	  paid	  a	  fee.	  Children	  
traditionally	  began	  at	  age	  three	  by	  studying	  the	  alphabet,	  and	  quickly	  moved	  onto	  
the	  Torah,	  the	  Mishnah	  (the	  basis	  of	  the	  oral	  law)	  and	  the	  practical	  halachot	  
(religious	  laws)	  that	  they	  would	  need	  to	  function	  in	  the	  community	  in	  which	  they	  
lived.	  The	  talmud	  torah	  was	  identical	  to	  the	  ẖeder	  in	  terms	  of	  subject	  matter,	  but	  
was	  maintained	  by	  the	  community	  at	  large	  to	  serve	  children	  whose	  parents	  could	  
not	  afford	  the	  fees	  associated	  with	  the	  latter.20	  Only	  the	  most	  gifted	  students	  
continued	  their	  studies	  beyond	  the	  elementary	  stage	  in	  the	  yeshiva,	  where	  learning	  
and	  debating	  the	  legal	  minutia	  contained	  in	  the	  Talmud	  consumed	  the	  bulk	  of	  their	  
energy.	  	  
	   In	  the	  Islamic	  context,	  one	  can	  point	  to	  numerous	  hadiths	  that	  implore	  the	  
believer	  to	  educate	  him	  or	  herself.	  Famously	  included	  among	  the	  sayings	  of	  
Muhammad	  are	  “The	  quest	  for	  learning	  is	  a	  duty	  incumbent	  upon	  every	  Muslim,	  
male	  and	  female,”	  “Wisdom	  is	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  believer	  and	  he	  must	  seek	  it	  
irrespective	  of	  its	  source,”	  and,	  “Seek	  knowledge	  even	  if	  it	  be	  in	  China.”	  The	  maktab	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Chavah	  Turniansky,	  "Heder	  learning	  in	  the	  early	  modern	  period	  (limud	  ba'ẖeder	  b'et	  ha-­‐ẖadasha	  
ha-­‐mukdemet),"	  in	  ha-­‐ẖeder:	  meẖkarim,	  te'udot,	  pirkei	  sifrut	  v'zichronot,	  ed.	  David	  Assaf	  and	  
Immaneul	  Etkes	  (Tel	  Aviv:	  The	  Institute	  for	  the	  History	  of	  Polish	  Jewry,	  Tel	  Aviv	  University	  	  	  2010).	  
20	  Bentwich,	  Education	  in	  Israel:	  6-­‐7.	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or	  kuttāb	  (plural:	  katātīb)	  were	  sites	  in	  which	  the	  child	  learned	  to	  read,	  recite	  and	  
write	  the	  Qur’an,	  the	  terms	  maktab	  and	  kuttāb	  being	  related	  to	  Arabic	  verb	  “to	  
write”	  or	  “to	  inscribe.”	  Conducted	  by	  a	  local	  sheikh	  or	  imam,	  basic	  arithmetic	  was	  
sometimes	  part	  of	  the	  curriculum	  as	  well.	  	  
Until	  the	  early	  modern	  period,	  learning	  in	  most	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  
communities	  focused	  around	  acquiring	  literacy	  through	  the	  study	  of	  sacred	  texts,	  
coupled	  with	  a	  practical	  understanding	  of	  the	  codes	  of	  conduct	  that	  ensured	  moral	  
behavior	  in	  this	  world	  and	  happiness	  in	  the	  world	  to	  come.	  In	  its	  idealized	  form,	  
education	  of	  this	  type	  was	  an	  inquiry	  into	  the	  sublime,	  and	  practically,	  it	  served	  as	  a	  
process	  of	  socialization	  into	  the	  community	  in	  which	  the	  child	  lived.	  For	  example,	  no	  
business	  partnership	  or	  marriage	  would	  be	  arranged	  without	  the	  parties	  reciting	  al-­‐
fātiḥah,	  the	  opening	  sūra	  of	  the	  Qur’an.	  Similarly,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  classify	  familiarity	  
with	  the	  laws	  of	  kashrut	  or	  Sabbath	  observance	  as	  merely	  intellectual	  exercises—or	  
worse	  yet,	  “religious”	  duties—within	  the	  corporate	  structure	  of	  the	  medieval	  Jewish	  
community.	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  these	  schools	  were	  useful	  to	  the	  communities	  they	  served	  was	  
often	  overlooked	  in	  the	  modern	  period	  as	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  reformers	  echoed	  
colonial	  administrators	  distain	  for	  “literary”	  knowledge	  and	  advocated	  an	  expansion	  
of	  the	  traditional	  curriculum	  to	  include	  “practical”	  subjects.	  While	  the	  absence	  of	  
secular	  subjects	  in	  schools	  remains	  something	  of	  an	  ideological	  position	  among	  
certain	  contemporary	  circles,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  narrow	  curriculum	  in	  pre-­‐modern	  
Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  schools	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  an	  innate	  opposition	  to	  “practical”	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subjects	  than	  with	  a	  unique	  understanding	  of	  what	  education	  as	  a	  practice	  actually	  
entailed.	  	  
As	  referenced	  above,	  medieval	  Islamic	  philosophers	  such	  as	  al-­‐Namari,	  al-­‐
Zarnuji	  and	  most	  importantly,	  al-­‐Ghazali,	  articulated	  the	  classical	  expression	  of	  
education	  as	  a	  form	  of	  ethics	  that	  was	  “essential	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  virtuous	  
subjects	  and	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  common	  good.”21	  This	  did	  not	  necessarily	  entail	  
opposition	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  per	  se,	  but	  an	  attempt	  to	  preserve	  formal	  
education	  as	  a	  system	  for	  developing	  the	  moral	  conduct	  that	  governed	  the	  
individual’s	  relationship	  with	  his	  fellow	  man	  and	  the	  piety	  that	  assured	  his	  devotion	  
to	  God.	  As	  often	  occurred,	  the	  gifted	  student	  was	  able	  to	  study	  history,	  geography,	  or	  
the	  empirical	  sciences	  in	  non-­‐institutional	  settings;	  the	  average	  child	  would	  surely	  
acquire	  much	  “practical”	  knowledge	  through	  apprenticeships	  or	  work	  with	  family	  
members	  in	  agriculture,	  trade	  or	  commerce.	  Formal	  education,	  however,	  was	  to	  be	  
reserved	  for	  something	  more	  dignified	  than	  learning	  a	  vocation.22	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Robert	  W.	  Hefner	  and	  Muhammad	  Qasim	  Zaman,	  ed.	  Schooling	  Islam:	  the	  Culture	  and	  Politics	  of	  
Modern	  Education	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  Introduction,	  5.	  Numerous	  works	  
exist	  on	  Islamic	  education	  in	  the	  classical	  period,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  valuable	  not	  merely	  as	  secondary	  
sources	  but	  as	  examples	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Arab	  modernists	  approached	  their	  heritage.	  See	  for	  
example,	  Khalil	  Totah,	  "The	  Contribution	  of	  the	  Arabs	  to	  Education"	  (Columbia	  University,	  1926),	  
Chp.	  VII.	  For	  a	  more	  recent	  and	  comprehensive	  history,	  see	  Tibawi,	  Islamic	  Education:	  Its	  Traditions	  
and	  Modernization	  into	  the	  Arab	  National	  Systems.	  Two	  contemporary	  essay	  collections	  have	  recently	  
appeared,	  both	  of	  which	  critique	  certain	  elements	  of	  the	  modernist	  paradigm	  in	  addition	  to	  dispelling	  
popular	  depictions	  of	  Islamic	  schools	  as	  incubators	  of	  religious	  fundamentalism.	  See:	  Zaman,	  
Schooling	  Islam:	  the	  Culture	  and	  Politics	  of	  Modern	  Education.	  Wadad	  Kadi	  and	  Victor	  Billeh,	  ed.	  Islam	  
and	  Education:	  Myths	  and	  Truths	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2007).	  
22	  According	  to	  one	  historian	  of	  Ottoman	  education	  reform,	  “It	  did	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  ultimate	  
educational	  goal	  of	  the	  traditional	  Islamic	  school	  system	  to	  transmit	  utilitarian-­‐practical	  knowledge.”	  
We	  must	  question	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  religious	  knowledge	  was	  not	  useful	  or	  practical	  to	  the	  societies	  
in	  which	  it	  served,	  but	  the	  point	  here	  is	  rather	  that	  the	  knowledge	  required	  for	  one’s	  trade	  or	  
vocation	  was	  not	  part	  of	  the	  traditional	  school.	  Selcuk	  Aksin	  Somel,	  The	  Modernization	  of	  Public	  
Education	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  1839-­‐1908:	  Islamization,	  Autocracy,	  and	  Discipline,	  The	  Ottoman	  
Empire	  and	  its	  heritage,;	  v.	  22.	  (Leiden:	  Boston,	  2001),	  19.	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For	  their	  part,	  Jewish	  thinkers	  held	  that	  education	  was	  not	  only	  a	  form	  of	  
socialization	  required	  to	  ensure	  the	  continuity	  of	  tradition	  (mesorah,	  literally	  
meaning	  that	  which	  is	  passed	  down	  or	  handed	  over),	  but	  represented	  an	  act	  of	  
worship	  itself.	  The	  act	  of	  “learning	  Torah”	  (talmud	  torah)—which	  encompassed	  not	  
just	  the	  five	  books	  of	  Moses,	  but	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  Bible,	  the	  Mishnah	  and	  
Talmud	  (in	  which	  the	  “oral	  law”	  was	  recorded	  and	  expanded	  upon),	  as	  well	  as	  later	  
commentaries—constitutes	  a	  central	  religious	  commandment,	  and	  significantly,	  one	  
that	  is	  regarded	  as	  encompassing	  all	  others.	  As	  the	  Talmud	  famously	  states,	  “These	  
are	  the	  things	  for	  which	  man	  eats	  the	  fruit	  of	  them	  in	  this	  world	  but	  their	  bounty	  is	  
fulfilled	  in	  the	  world	  to	  come:	  honoring	  one’s	  father	  and	  mother,	  acts	  of	  kindness	  
and	  bringing	  peace	  between	  men.	  Learning	  Torah	  is	  the	  equivalent	  to	  all	  of	  them.”23	  
Again,	  the	  reverence	  for	  education	  as	  a	  practice	  of	  transmitting	  sacred	  knowledge	  
was	  not	  necessarily	  accompanied	  by	  the	  eschewing	  of	  practical	  skills	  within	  pre-­‐
modern	  Jewish	  communities.	  Such	  knowledge	  was	  learned	  through	  private	  tutors,	  
during	  apprenticeships	  or	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  family	  businesses.	  The	  emergence	  of	  a	  
large	  ultra-­‐Orthodox	  bloc	  in	  Israel	  that	  fiercely	  opposes	  the	  inclusion	  of	  secular	  
subjects	  within	  school	  curricula	  partially	  obscures	  this	  fact,	  and	  yet,	  one	  need	  only	  
scratch	  the	  surface	  to	  uncover	  the	  modern	  providence	  of	  this	  “traditional”	  revolt.	  
	  
Musty	  Rooms	  and	  Medieval	  Masters	  	  
If	  education	  was	  to	  become	  the	  germ	  of	  social	  transformation,	  as	  Jewish	  and	  
Muslim	  modernists	  argued	  it	  should,	  it	  hinged	  on	  discrediting	  existing	  modes	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Babylonian	  Talmud,	  Shabbat,	  127a.	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religious	  learning	  as	  backward	  and	  socially	  debilitating.	  Literature	  was	  the	  
preferred	  vehicle	  for	  advancing	  such	  critiques,	  and	  depictions	  of	  the	  ẖeder,	  talmud	  
torah	  and	  kuttāb	  assumed	  a	  remarkably	  similar	  form	  in	  reformist	  writings:	  the	  
schoolroom	  is	  dark,	  musty	  and	  dirty,	  lacking	  in	  the	  necessary	  furnishings;	  the	  
teacher	  is	  foolish	  and	  abusive;	  rote	  memorization	  is	  promoted	  over	  real	  
understanding,	  the	  texts	  studied	  are	  inappropriate	  for	  young	  children;	  the	  language	  
is	  corrupted,	  either	  by	  the	  Yiddish	  of	  the	  teacher	  (melamed)	  or	  the	  vulgarities	  of	  
colloquial	  Arabic.	  	  
The	  portrayal	  of	  the	  ẖeder	  as	  a	  “schoolroom	  of	  hell”	  was	  a	  recurring	  trope	  in	  
Haskalah	  literature	  aimed	  at	  discrediting	  the	  old	  social	  order,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  any	  
positive	  aspect	  of	  this	  education	  was	  forcibly	  repressed	  in	  furtherance	  of	  the	  
maskilim’s	  ideological	  agenda.24	  The	  paradigmatic	  condemnation	  of	  the	  ẖeder	  came	  
in	  Shelomo	  Maimon’s	  autobiography,	  in	  which,	  “the	  defective	  approach	  to	  teaching,	  
deriving	  from	  the	  ignorance	  of	  the	  teacher,	  prevented	  the	  student	  from	  attaining	  
systematic	  knowledge	  of	  either	  the	  Hebrew	  language	  or	  the	  Bible.”25	  In	  other	  words,	  
the	  deficiencies	  of	  the	  ẖeder	  were	  responsible	  for	  depriving	  the	  child	  of	  an	  intimate	  
connection	  to	  his	  “authentic”	  Jewish	  heritage.	  In	  addition	  to	  its	  pedagogic	  
deficiencies,	  the	  ẖeder	  was	  depicted	  as	  a	  place	  of	  physical	  violence	  directed	  against	  
young	  children	  by	  the	  teacher	  and	  his	  assistant.	  In	  Avraham	  Bar	  Gottlober’s	  
memoirs,	  for	  instance,	  the	  ozer	  (assistant)	  is	  so	  abusive	  that	  children	  perish	  from	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  For	  a	  review	  of	  literary	  and	  autobiographical	  depictions	  of	  the	  ẖeder,	  see	  Avner	  Holtzman,	  "ben	  
hoka’ah	  l’hitrafkut:	  ha-­‐ẖeder	  b’sifrut	  ha-­‐zichronot	  u’v’sifrut	  ha-­‐ivrit,"	  in	  ha-­‐ẖeder,	  ed.	  David	  Assaf	  and	  
Immanuel	  Etkes	  (Tel	  Aviv:	  The	  Institute	  for	  the	  History	  of	  Polish	  Jewry,	  Tel	  Aviv	  University,	  2010).	  	  	  
25	  Ibid.,	  78-­‐79.	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beatings.26	  Similarly,	  In	  Yehuda	  Lieb	  Levine’s	  autobiography,	  a	  stick-­‐wielding	  
melamed	  kills	  the	  writer’s	  brother	  at	  the	  tender	  age	  of	  six.	  Even	  more	  astoundingly,	  
the	  author	  recounts	  how	  he	  himself	  is	  nonetheless	  sent	  to	  the	  same	  ẖeder	  with	  the	  
same	  savage	  teacher,	  until	  his	  father	  relents	  and	  agrees	  to	  hire	  private	  tutors	  
instead.27	  Within	  this	  literature,	  the	  abuses	  of	  the	  teacher	  are	  mirrored	  by	  the	  filthy	  
conditions	  of	  the	  school,	  which	  is	  almost	  without	  exception	  portrayed	  as	  dark,	  dirty	  
and	  lacking	  space—both	  physical	  and	  pedagogical—for	  children	  to	  play.	  	  
Yet,	  as	  Avraham	  Holtzman	  has	  shown,	  the	  ẖeder	  was	  not	  without	  possible	  
redemption.	  Rather,	  for	  Zionist	  writers,	  it	  could	  serve	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  the	  
preservation	  and	  further	  development	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  language	  and	  culture	  –	  but	  
only	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  it	  be	  drastically	  reformed.	  The	  clearest	  articulation	  of	  this	  
latent	  potential	  appears	  in	  Hayyim	  Nahman	  Bialik’s	  short	  story,	  “Safiaẖ”	  
(Aftergrowth),	  in	  which	  the	  protagonist	  attends	  two	  different	  ẖederim.	  The	  first	  is	  
characterized	  by	  the	  usual	  darkness,	  Yiddishkite	  and	  physical	  filth,	  while	  the	  second	  
offers	  a	  manifestation	  of	  what	  the	  ẖeder	  could	  be:	  still	  seeped	  in	  classical	  Jewish	  
texts,	  but	  now	  conducted	  in	  Hebrew,	  often	  outdoors,	  and	  absorbed	  in	  tales	  of	  
Biblical	  heroism	  rather	  than	  with	  the	  ritual	  laws	  stemming	  from	  Leviticus.28	  	  
Likewise,	  critiques	  of	  the	  kuttāb	  appeared	  frequently	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  Arab	  
intellectuals	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  centuries.	  This	  was	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Avraham	  Bar	  Gottlober,	  Zichronot	  me	  yamei	  ne'uri,	  ed.	  Ruven	  Goldberg	  (Jerusalem1976).	  Originally	  
published	  as	  a	  serial	  in	  the	  Hebrew	  Journal	  Boker	  Ore	  between	  1879-­‐1886.	  
27	  Yehuda	  Lieb	  Levine,	  "Zichron	  ba'sefer	  -­‐	  Rishumim	  m'toldodti	  v'koroti	  (1910),"	  in	  Zichronot	  
v'higayonot,	  ed.	  Yehuda	  Slotzky	  (Jerusalem:	  1968).	  Holtzman,	  "ben	  hoka’ah	  l’hitrafkut:	  ha-­‐ẖeder	  
b’sifrut	  ha-­‐zichronot	  u’v’sifrut	  ha-­‐ivrit,"	  81-­‐82.	  
28	  Hayyim	  Nahman	  Bialik,	  "Aftergrowth	  (Safiah),"	  in	  Aftergrowth	  and	  Other	  Stories	  (Philadelphia	  The	  
Jewish	  Publication	  Society	  of	  America,	  1939).	  For	  an	  expanded	  analysis	  of	  the	  story,	  see	  Holtzman,	  
"ben	  hoka’ah	  l’hitrafkut:	  ha-­‐ẖeder	  b’sifrut	  ha-­‐zichronot	  u’v’sifrut	  ha-­‐ivrit,"	  108-­‐10.	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necessarily	  a	  modernist	  trope,	  as	  the	  Arabic	  language	  has	  no	  shortage	  of	  proverbs	  
dedicated	  to	  the	  supposed	  foolishness	  of	  the	  kuttāb	  teacher—“stupider	  than	  a	  
kuttāb	  teacher”	  being	  a	  frequent	  insult.	  Such	  claims	  were	  already	  being	  countered	  in	  
the	  ninth	  century	  C.E.	  when	  the	  famed	  writer	  al-­‐Jahith	  defended	  the	  lowly	  kuttāb	  
teachers,	  who	  “like	  any	  other	  class	  of	  men”	  included	  “the	  superior	  and	  the	  inferior”	  
alike.29	  Yet	  these	  critiques	  assumed	  a	  sharper	  quality	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  nahḍa	  (Arab	  
renaissance)	  intellectuals,	  many	  of	  whom	  began	  their	  education	  within	  katātīb,	  
pursued	  advanced	  studies	  in	  European	  cities,	  and	  returned	  to	  their	  native	  lands	  
with	  a	  passion	  for	  political	  and	  social	  reform.30	  These	  writers	  were	  not	  just	  
criticizing	  the	  kuttāb	  in	  the	  abstract,	  but	  measuring	  its	  deficiencies	  in	  comparison	  to	  
contemporary	  European	  models	  and	  linking	  its	  shortcomings	  to	  the	  political	  and	  
cultural	  status	  of	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  modernist	  critique	  of	  the	  
kuttāb	  was	  not	  a	  mere	  continuation	  of	  medieval	  jesting.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  more	  famous—and	  entertaining—treatments	  of	  the	  subject	  can	  be	  
found	  in	  al-­‐Ayyam	  (The	  Days),	  the	  autobiography	  of	  Taha	  Hussein.	  His	  account	  
makes	  reference	  to	  the	  physical	  violence	  found	  within	  the	  kuttāb,	  but	  the	  primary	  
faults	  of	  the	  teacher	  (mockingly	  referred	  to	  as	  “Our	  Master”)	  and	  his	  assistant	  (“the	  
‘Arif”	  or	  “knowing	  one”)	  are	  their	  dishonesty,	  corruption	  and	  blatant	  opportunism.	  
The	  teachers	  are	  seen	  as	  benefiting	  from	  an	  established	  bribery	  ring,	  wherein	  
children	  offer	  dates,	  sugar	  and	  money	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  their	  teachers’	  favor,	  or	  at	  
the	  very	  least,	  to	  mitigate	  their	  blows.	  The	  kuttāb	  teacher	  treats	  Taha	  with	  benign	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Tibawi,	  Islamic	  Education:	  Its	  Traditions	  and	  Modernization	  into	  the	  Arab	  National	  Systems:	  36.	  
30	  Muhsin	  Jasim	  Musawi,	  Islam	  on	  the	  Street:	  Religion	  in	  Modern	  Arabic	  Literature	  	  (Lanham,	  MD:	  
Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  Publishers,	  2009).	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neglect—	  purchased	  through	  such	  bribes—and	  allows	  him	  the	  freedom	  to	  play	  and	  
converse	  with	  other	  children	  while	  almost	  completely	  ignoring	  his	  studies.	  His	  
abiding	  interest	  remains	  his	  own	  financial	  gain	  in	  the	  form	  of	  school	  fees,	  food,	  
drinks,	  clothing	  and	  other	  gifts	  given	  upon	  a	  child’s	  memorization	  of	  the	  Qur’an.	  This	  
“capacity	  for	  falsehood”	  is	  what	  remains	  with	  the	  young	  child	  even	  after	  the	  Qur’anic	  
verses	  dim	  from	  his	  memory.31	  	  
During	  the	  Mandate	  period,	  Taha	  Hussein’s	  autobiography	  would	  became	  
required	  reading	  in	  one	  of	  Palestine’s	  most	  prominent	  nationalist	  schools,	  al-­‐Najah	  
in	  Nablus.	  The	  modernist	  critique	  of	  the	  kuttāb	  reached	  a	  fevered	  pitch	  within	  
institutions	  like	  al-­‐Najah,	  which	  positioned	  itself	  as	  the	  enlightened	  antithesis	  of	  the	  
“vile	  kuttāb.”	  Textbooks	  authored	  by	  the	  school’s	  headmaster,	  Muhammad	  ‘Izzat	  
Darwaza,	  reflected	  a	  heightened	  awareness	  of	  the	  link	  between	  traditional	  
schooling,	  public	  ignorance	  and	  political	  weakness.	  Writing	  of	  the	  waning	  days	  of	  
the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  Darwaza	  singled	  out	  its	  educational	  failures	  as	  one	  of	  the	  
government’s	  key	  offences:	  
The	   (Ottoman)	   government	   was	   not	   interested	   in	   opening	   schools	   and	  
educating	   the	   country’s	   children,	   because	   education	   opens	   the	   people’s	  
minds,	  makes	  them	  aware	  of	  their	  rights,	  and	  causes	  them	  to	  demand	  them.	  
Pupils	   would	   learn	   reading	   and	   writing	   in	   the	   vile	   katātīb	   …sitting	   on	   the	  
earth,	   and	   the	   teachers	   that	   taught	   them	   did	   not	   know	  much	   of	   anything.	  
And	   their	   salaries	   did	   not	   come	   from	   the	   government,	   but	   [they]	   would	  
rather	  take	  bread	  from	  every	  child.	  
	  
The	   situation	   of	   governments	   in	   Europe	   was	   much	   better	   than	   this	   state.	  
Because	   they	   convened	   representatives	   of	   the	   people,	   created	   assemblies	  
out	  of	   them,	  and	  consulted	  (tashāwara)	  them	  in	  everything	  they	  wanted	  to	  
do.	  They	   took	  an	   interest	   in	   the	  country’s	   condition,	  and	   improved	  schools	  
and	   roads,	  while	   no	   citizen	   dared	   to	   accept	   a	   bribe.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   this	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Taha	  Hussein,	  The	  Days	  	  (Cairo:	  The	  American	  University	  in	  Cairo	  Press,	  1997),	  38.	  Originally	  
published	  in	  Arabic	  in	  1929.	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countries	   of	   Europe	   progressed,	   while	   the	   Ottoman	   countries	   became	  
degenerate	  and	  weak.32	  
	  
A	  further	  element	  of	  the	  modernist	  critique	  sprang	  from	  the	  association	  of	  
communal	  schools	  with	  popular	  forms	  of	  religiosity,	  and	  particularly,	  with	  
mysticism.	  Anxiety	  over	  the	  influence	  of	  Hasidism	  in	  European	  Jewish	  communities	  
was	  widespread	  among	  the	  rationalist	  members	  of	  the	  Haskalah,	  who	  charged	  
Hasidism	  with	  fostering	  a	  culture	  of	  illogic	  and	  superstition.33	  Eager	  to	  find	  a	  place	  
for	  Jews	  within	  the	  emerging	  social	  and	  political	  order	  promised	  by	  the	  
Enlightenment,	  Hasidism	  represented	  a	  major	  obstacle	  that	  threatened	  the	  
attainment	  of	  a	  pluralistic	  accord	  founded	  on	  reason.	  Conversely,	  it	  was	  the	  
medieval	  figure	  Maimonides	  and	  his	  famed	  adoption	  of	  Aristotelian	  logic	  that	  
maskilim	  looked	  to	  as	  a	  source	  of	  inspiration	  for	  the	  modern	  Jewish	  renaissance.34	  	  
Within	  the	  spectrum	  of	  communal	  figures	  that	  undermined	  the	  
Enlightenment	  sensibility,	  the	  ẖeder	  teacher	  was	  among	  the	  worst	  offenders.	  A	  
recurring	  trop	  in	  maskilic	  literature	  charged	  him	  with	  provoking	  superstition	  and	  
anxiety	  within	  children	  who,	  so	  afraid	  of	  ghosts,	  would	  recoil	  from	  their	  own	  
shadows.	  Furthermore,	  this	  educational	  culture	  of	  irrationalism	  was	  thought	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Muhammad	  'Izzat	  Darwaza,	  durūs	  al-­‐tārikh	  al-­‐'arabi	  min	  aqdam	  al-­‐azmina	  ila	  al-­‐ān	  (Cairo:	  al-­‐
mutba’a	  al-­‐salfiya,	  1929),	  292.	  
33	  The	  classical	  account	  of	  this	  fraught	  relationship	  appears	  in	  Raphael	  Mahler’s	  Hasidism	  and	  the	  
Jewish	  Enlightenment,	  which,	  despite	  its	  ideological	  commitment	  to	  advancing	  a	  Marxist	  and	  Zionist	  
view	  of	  Jewish	  history,	  reviews	  many	  important	  sources	  related	  to	  the	  conflict	  between	  maskilim	  and	  
Hasidism.	  Raphael	  Mahler,	  Hasidism	  and	  the	  Jewish	  Enlightenment:	  Their	  Confrontation	  in	  Galicia	  and	  
Poland	  in	  the	  First	  Half	  of	  the	  Nineteenth	  Century	  	  (Philadelphia:	  JPS,	  1984).	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  
account	  of	  these	  battles,	  many	  of	  which	  appeared	  at	  the	  communal	  level,	  see	  Marcin	  Wodziński,	  
Haskalah	  and	  Hasidism	  in	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Poland:	  a	  history	  of	  conflict	  	  (Oxford;	  Portland,	  Or.:	  Littman	  
Library	  of	  Jewish	  Civilization,	  2005).	  
34	  Moshe	  Pelli,	  The	  Age	  of	  Haskalah	  (Berlin:	  Leiden,	  1979),	  133;	  n.	  5.	  As	  Yaakob	  Dweck	  has	  shown,	  the	  
embrace	  of	  Maimonides	  as	  a	  bulwark	  against	  mysticism	  was	  already	  apparent	  in	  17th	  century	  Venice.	  
See	  Yaakob	  Dweck,	  The	  Scandal	  of	  Kabbalah:	  Leon	  Modena,	  Jewish	  Mysticism,	  Early	  Modern	  Venice	  	  
(Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2011).	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represent	  the	  source	  of	  the	  (male)	  Jew’s	  supposed	  physical	  and	  spiritual	  
degeneration.	  It	  is	  within	  its	  walls	  and	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  its	  cruel	  teachers	  that	  the	  Jew	  
emerges	  as	  weak,	  uncultured,	  and	  disconnected	  from	  nature.35	  
In	  a	  similar	  fashion,	  Sufism	  functioned	  within	  the	  metanarrative	  of	  Islamic	  
modernism	  as	  a	  barrier	  that	  separated	  Arab	  Muslims	  from	  “authentic”	  Islam.	  Sufism	  
and	  popular	  customs	  like	  visits	  to	  the	  tombs	  of	  local	  saints	  were	  derided	  as	  sources	  
of	  unlawful	  innovation	  (bida‘)	  that	  had	  corrupted	  Islam’s	  rationalistic	  foundations.	  
The	  fact	  that	  Sufi	  practices	  were	  closely	  tied	  to	  local	  and	  popular	  forms	  of	  piety	  
similarly	  undermined	  the	  idea	  that	  “true”	  Islam	  existed	  in	  a	  singular	  form	  that	  was	  
textually	  determined.	  Reformers	  held	  that	  mysticism	  must	  be	  forcibly	  rooted	  out	  
from	  Muslim	  communities—beginning,	  of	  course,	  with	  schoolteachers—in	  order	  to	  
combat	  the	  inter-­‐connected	  slides	  toward	  popular	  ignorance	  and	  political	  
subjugation.	  In	  his	  autobiography,	  for	  instance,	  Taha	  Hussein	  explicitly	  identified	  
Sufism	  as	  the	  premier	  source	  of	  social	  backwardness,	  noting	  that,	  “the	  country	  
people,	  including	  their	  old	  men,	  youths,	  lads	  and	  women,	  have	  a	  particular	  mentality	  
in	  which	  is	  simplicity,	  mysticism	  and	  ignorance.	  And	  those	  who	  have	  had	  the	  
greatest	  share	  in	  producing	  this	  mentality	  are	  the	  Sufis.”36	  
Despite	  these	  failings,	  the	  old	  and	  corrupt	  could	  become	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  new	  
and	  noble	  if	  “tradition”	  could	  be	  stripped	  down	  to	  its	  elemental	  core.	  But	  how	  could	  
such	  a	  transformation	  be	  enacted?	  As	  I	  will	  argue,	  the	  reform—and	  indeed,	  creation	  
of—modern	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  religious	  education	  operated	  on	  three	  levels.	  First,	  
reformers	  decried	  the	  inauthenticity	  of	  contemporary	  religious	  practices,	  which	  had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Holtzman,	  "ben	  hoka’ah	  l’hitrafkut:	  ha-­‐ẖeder	  b’sifrut	  ha-­‐zichronot	  u’v’sifrut	  ha-­‐ivrit,"	  79.	  
36	  Hussein,	  The	  Days:	  57.	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seemingly	  corrupted	  the	  genuine	  essence	  of	  each	  religious	  system—the	  existence	  of	  
which,	  it	  is	  worth	  adding,	  was	  a	  wholly	  modern	  discovery.	  Second,	  they	  argued	  for	  
the	  inherent	  compatibility	  of	  this	  essence	  with	  “universal”	  (i.e.	  European)	  epistemic	  
and	  pedagogic	  models.	  Finally,	  they	  sought	  a	  union	  with	  the	  bureaucratic	  and	  
administrative	  capacities	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  to	  centralize	  control	  over	  religious	  
knowledge	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  reformers.	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  chart	  these	  interlocking	  
efforts	  through	  a	  close	  analysis	  of	  two	  formative	  articulations	  of	  the	  modernist	  
agenda.	  	  
	  
The	  Haskalah	  and	  the	  new	  Jewish	  school	  
Modern	  Jewish	  attempts	  to	  transform	  the	  nature	  of	  communal	  education	  can	  
actually	  be	  traced	  to	  early	  modern	  Amsterdam,	  where	  Marrano	  refugees	  from	  
Portugal	  “sought	  to	  the	  merge	  values,	  contents,	  behaviors	  and	  patterns	  of	  Western	  
life,	  that	  they	  absorbed	  from	  the	  foreign	  environment	  to	  which	  they	  belonged	  in	  the	  
past,	  with	  the	  traditional	  Jewish	  heritage	  to	  which	  they	  returned.”37	  This	  attempted	  
synthesis	  was	  reflected	  in	  the	  curriculum	  of	  Talmud	  Torah	  Etz	  Haim,	  which	  taught	  
Bible	  and	  Hebrew	  (including	  grammar)	  alongside	  the	  language	  of	  the	  state	  and	  
“general	  subjects.”	  The	  school	  served	  as	  a	  model	  for	  maskilim	  as	  they	  launched	  their	  
own	  reform	  projects	  in	  late	  eighteenth	  century	  Germany.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Rachel	  Elboim-­‐Dror,	  "Cycles	  of	  modernization	  in	  education:	  from	  the	  ẖeder	  to	  the	  school	  (maslulei	  
modernizatsia	  b'ẖinuch:	  me	  ha-­‐ẖeder	  l'vait	  ha-­‐sefer),"	  in	  ha-­‐ẖeder:	  meẖkarim,	  te'udot,	  pirkei	  sifrut	  
v'zichronot,	  ed.	  David	  Assaf	  and	  Immanuel	  Etkes	  (Tel	  Aviv:	  The	  Institute	  for	  the	  History	  of	  Polish	  
Jewry,	  Tel	  Aviv	  University,	  2010),	  60.	  For	  a	  more	  extensive	  treatment	  of	  the	  school	  and	  the	  opening	  
of	  similar	  institutions	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  see:	  Haim	  Beinart,	  "The	  exodus	  of	  Marranos	  from	  the	  
Iberian	  penninsula	  in	  the	  15th	  and	  16th	  centuries	  (Hebrew),"	  in	  Sefer	  zichron	  l'Shelomo	  Umberto	  
Nachon,	  ed.	  Roberto	  Bonfil	  (Jerusalem:	  Mosad	  Shelomoh	  Meʼir,	  Mosad	  Refaʼel	  Ḳanṭoni,	  1978),	  63-­‐106.	  
Arthur	  Hertzberg,	  The	  French	  Enlightenment	  and	  the	  Jews	  	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  
1968),	  204-­‐06.	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While	  is	  was	  certainly	  not	  unknown	  for	  Jews	  to	  study	  European	  languages	  or	  
other	  “secular	  studies”	  prior	  to	  this	  point,	  doing	  so	  was	  usually	  economically	  driven,	  
required	  for	  a	  career	  in	  trade,	  for	  example,	  and	  such	  activity	  was	  not	  tied	  to	  any	  
ideological	  program.	  The	  novelty	  introduced	  by	  the	  maskilim,	  particularly	  in	  
Germany,	  was	  the	  suggestion	  that	  such	  studies	  were	  of	  value	  in	  and	  of	  themselves.38	  
Knowledge	  for	  its	  own	  sake	  (lishma)	  was	  most	  immediately	  associated	  with	  the	  
study	  of	  Torah.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  it	  was	  not	  merely	  the	  maskilim’s	  suggestion	  that	  
secular	  studies	  had	  inherent	  value	  that	  represented	  a	  contentious	  claim,	  but	  rather,	  
the	  exact	  content	  of	  the	  secular	  that	  animated	  much	  of	  the	  debate.	  
Jewish	  thinkers	  grappling	  with	  the	  challenges	  presented	  by	  European	  
modernity—represented	  most	  acutely	  in	  the	  political	  emancipation	  of	  the	  Jewish	  
subject	  and	  the	  processes	  of	  secularization	  on	  which	  it	  depended—devoted	  much	  
attention	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  different	  types	  of	  knowledge.	  Beginning	  with	  Moses	  
Mendelssohn’s	  argument	  that	  Jewish	  law	  was	  harmonious	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  
Enlightenment	  and	  continuing	  to	  Hermann	  Cohen’s	  German-­‐Jewish	  symbiosis,	  
Jewish	  thinkers	  often	  presented	  their	  attempts	  to	  facilitate	  the	  inclusion	  of	  Jews	  into	  
European	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  intellectual	  synthesis.	  Yet	  the	  argument	  in	  
support	  of	  a	  natural	  symbiosis	  between	  Enlightenment	  principles	  and	  Jewish	  law	  
(or	  “Judaism”	  after	  the	  term’s	  nineteenth	  century	  invention)	  had	  to	  contend	  with	  a	  
novel	  form	  of	  separation	  on	  which	  the	  desired	  political	  and	  intellectual	  harmony	  
hinged.	  This	  was	  the	  division	  of	  man	  into	  his	  political	  and	  religious	  components,	  the	  
former	  representing	  the	  rational	  realm	  of	  the	  state	  wherein	  all	  were	  equal	  before	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Feiner,	  "Programot	  ẖinuchiot	  v'idialim	  ẖevratiyim:	  beit	  ha-­‐sefer	  'ẖinuch	  ne'arim'	  b'berlin	  1778-­‐
1825."	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common	  law,	  and	  the	  latter	  corresponding	  to	  the	  supposedly	  private	  realm	  of	  
faith.39	  	  
It	  was	  within	  this	  context,	  and	  upon	  the	  aforementioned	  assumptions,	  that	  
the	  emancipation	  of	  European	  Jews	  spread	  across	  the	  continent.	  Following	  the	  Edict	  
of	  Tolerance	  issued	  by	  the	  Emperor	  Joseph	  II	  in	  1781,	  Jewish	  intellectuals	  debated	  
the	  practical	  steps	  that	  were	  necessary	  to	  enable	  the	  inclusion	  of	  Jews	  into	  broader	  
civil	  society.	  In	  an	  infamous	  open	  letter	  to	  the	  Jewish	  community	  published	  the	  
following	  year,	  entitled	  divrei	  shalom	  v’emet	  (Words	  of	  Peace	  and	  Truth),	  Naphtali	  
Herz	  Wessely	  fired	  one	  of	  the	  opening	  shots	  of	  the	  Haskalah	  by	  disputing	  the	  
adequacy	  of	  Torah	  study	  to	  meet	  the	  challenges	  and	  opportunities	  posed	  by	  
emancipation.40	  As	  was	  the	  case	  with	  many	  “enlightenment”	  thinkers,	  Wessely	  quite	  
strategically	  placed	  education	  reform	  at	  the	  core	  of	  his	  letter,	  writing,	  “One	  should	  
be	  educated	  in	  his	  youth,	  when	  his	  heart	  is	  unsullied	  by	  the	  vanities	  of	  the	  world	  and	  
by	  the	  perversities	  of	  strange	  ideas.	  For	  when	  his	  heart	  is	  like	  clean	  and	  smooth	  
paper	  it	  shall	  be	  easiest	  to	  write	  words	  of	  truth	  upon	  it,	  and	  they	  shall	  be	  well	  
inscribed.”41	  	  
Wessely’s	  letter	  called	  for	  the	  radical	  transformation	  of	  Jewish	  learning	  into	  a	  
system	  of	  education	  that	  would	  propel	  large-­‐scale	  social	  integration.	  The	  main	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  As	  Leora	  Batnitzky	  has	  recently	  highlighted,	  this	  synthesis	  was	  never	  without	  points	  of	  tension.	  
“Mendelssohn	  wants	  to	  have	  it	  both	  ways:	  Judaism	  is	  a	  religion	  of	  law	  requiring	  action	  and	  
stimulating	  contemplation.	  But	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  questions	  of	  universal	  action—that	  is,	  state	  law—
and	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  universal	  contemplation—that	  is,	  the	  eternal	  truths	  of	  philosophy—Judaism	  
remains	  separate	  and	  dispensable,	  except	  insofar	  as	  Judaism	  calls	  for	  obedience	  to	  the	  state’s	  law.”	  
See	  Batnitzky,	  How	  Judaism	  Became	  a	  Religion:	  27.	  
40	  Naphtali	  Herz	  Wessely,	  Divre	  shalom	  ṿe-­‐emet	  :	  li-­‐ḳehal	  ʻadat	  Yiśraʾel	  ha-­‐garim	  be-­‐artsot	  
(Vienna1826).	  Translation	  throughout	  taken	  from	  ———,	  "Divrei	  Shalom	  v'Emet,"	  in	  The	  Jew	  in	  the	  
Modern	  World,	  ed.	  Paul	  R.	  Mendes-­‐Flohr	  and	  Jehuda	  Reinharz	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
1980).	  
41	  ———,	  "Divrei	  Shalom	  v'Emet,"	  63.	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thrust	  of	  Wessely’s	  argument	  regarded	  the	  ethical	  necessity	  to	  teach	  “torat	  ha-­‐
adam”	  (the	  Torah	  of	  man,	  loosely	  translated	  as	  “human	  knowledge”)	  alongside	  “the	  
Torah	  of	  God,	  that	  is,	  God’s	  laws	  and	  teachings.”	  Wessely	  defined	  torat	  ha-­‐adam	  as	  
follows:	  
In	   general,	   ‘human	   knowledge’	   is	   comprised	   of	   etiquette,	   the	   ways	   of	  
morality	   and	   good	   character,	   civility	   and	   clear,	   graceful	   expression;	   these	  
matters	   and	   their	   like	   are	   implanted	   in	   man’s	   reason.	   He	   who	   possesses	  
‘human	  knowledge’	  will	  gain	  much	  from	  the	  poetic	  expression	  of	  the	  divine	  
Torah	  and	  from	  the	  ways	  of	  God	  that	  are	  written	  therein…Similarly,	  history,	  
geography,	  astronomy	  and	  the	  like—which	  are	  inscribed	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  man	  
as	   innate	   ‘primary	   ideas’	   whose	   foundation	   is	   reason—produce	   truths	   in	  
every	   matter	   of	   wisdom.	   Included	   in	   this	   category	   of	   knowledge	   are	   the	  
natural	   sciences,	   which	   provide	   genuine	   knowledge	   about	   all	   things:	  
animals,	   plants,	   minerals,	   the	   elements,	   meteorology	   (clouds	   and	   their	  
effects),	   botany,	   anatomy,	  medicine,	   chemistry,	   etc.	   It	   is	   in	  man’s	   power	   to	  
study	  all	  of	  these	  phenomena	  by	  means	  of	  his	  senses	  and	  reason;	  he	  does	  not	  
need	  anything	  divine	  to	  comprehend	  them.42	  
	  
As	  hinted	  in	  this	  passage,	  one	  novelty	  of	  Wessely’s	  classification	  was	  the	  association	  
of	  reason	  with	  torat	  ha-­‐adam,	  and	  the	  implicit	  suggestion	  that	  God’s	  teachings	  were	  
the	  realm	  of	  non-­‐rational	  revelation.	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  sharp	  division	  between	  those	  
areas	  of	  knowledge	  one	  approaches	  through	  the	  use	  of	  reason	  and	  those	  that	  are	  
dictated	  through	  the	  (non-­‐rational)	  apparatus	  of	  revelation	  is	  not	  a	  classical	  idea	  in	  
Jewish	  thought.	  Maimonides	  was	  the	  most	  forceful	  voice	  in	  arguing	  that	  reason	  and	  
revelation	  were	  complementary	  ways	  to	  access	  the	  same	  divine	  truth,	  and	  that	  the	  
highest	  level	  of	  truth	  contained	  in	  the	  Torah	  could	  only	  be	  accessed	  through	  the	  use	  
of	  human	  reason.43	  In	  contrast,	  Wessely’s	  distinction	  reflects	  two	  tenets	  of	  the	  
emerging	  secular	  order:	  that	  of	  “religion”	  as	  the	  home	  of	  non-­‐rational	  faith,	  and	  that	  
of	  a	  distinct	  secular	  realm	  governed	  by	  reason	  alone.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Ibid.	  
43	  Moses	  Maimonides,	  The	  Guide	  of	  the	  Perplexed,	  trans.	  Shlomo	  Pines	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  
Press,	  1963),	  Chp.	  54.	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Wessely	  called	  for	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  traditional	  curriculum	  to	  include	  
subjects—like	  European	  languages	  and	  modern	  sciences—that	  were	  deemed	  crucial	  
for	  any	  emancipated	  Jew	  to	  possess.	  Yet,	  within	  the	  category	  of	  torat	  ha-­‐adam,	  he	  
also	  included	  subjects	  like	  etiquette,	  graceful	  expression	  and	  “the	  ways	  of	  morality.”	  	  
Wessely’s	  critique	  was	  not,	  therefore,	  merely	  directed	  at	  the	  narrowness	  of	  Jewish	  
learning,	  but	  at	  modes	  of	  Jewish	  behavior	  that	  were	  regarded	  as	  crude	  in	  contrast	  to	  
(Christian)	  European	  civility.	  	  
Wessely’s	  division	  of	  knowledge	  into	  torat	  ha-­‐adam	  and	  torat-­‐elohim	  could	  
be	  (and	  was)	  read	  in	  a	  contentious	  and	  even	  blasphemous	  way,	  namely	  as	  positing	  
the	  existence	  of	  a	  second	  Torah	  that	  competes	  with	  the	  divine	  one.	  Most	  
controversially,	  Wessely	  went	  as	  far	  as	  to	  suggest	  that	  “he	  who	  is	  ignorant	  of	  the	  
laws	  of	  God,	  but	  is	  versed	  in	  ‘human	  knowledge’	  (torat	  ha-­‐adam),	  even	  though	  the	  
sages	  of	  Israel	  will	  not	  benefit	  from	  his	  light	  in	  the	  study	  of	  the	  Torah,	  he	  will	  benefit	  
the	  remainder	  of	  humanity.”	  In	  contrast,	  the	  person	  learned	  in	  the	  Torah	  of	  God	  but	  
ignorant	  of	  torat	  ha-­‐adam	  “gladdens	  neither	  the	  wise	  of	  his	  own	  people	  nor	  the	  
remainder	  of	  humanity.”44	  In	  other	  words,	  an	  education	  restricted	  to	  the	  Torah	  of	  
God	  was	  insufficient,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  the	  scholar	  lacking	  “human	  knowledge”	  was	  a	  
burden	  on	  his	  people	  and	  humanity	  as	  a	  whole.	  Moreover,	  he	  was	  inferior	  to	  
someone	  ignorant	  of	  God’s	  ways	  but	  schooled	  in	  those	  of	  man.	  	  
	   It	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  such	  a	  radical	  upending	  of	  the	  traditional	  regard	  for	  
sacred	  knowledge	  and	  those	  who	  possessed	  it	  generated	  a	  slew	  of	  scathing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Wessely,	  "Divrei	  Shalom	  v'Emet,"	  63-­‐64.	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rebuttals.45	  Interestingly	  though,	  the	  rebuke	  was	  not	  necessarily	  aimed	  at	  the	  
suggested	  expansion	  of	  the	  curriculum	  to	  include	  foreign	  languages	  and	  other	  
subjects	  alongside	  the	  religious	  core.	  Writing	  in	  response	  to	  Wessely,	  Rabbi	  David	  
ben	  Nathan	  of	  Lissa	  (Leszno	  in	  modern-­‐day	  Poland)	  conceded	  that	  “our	  children	  
shall	  study	  the	  sciences	  as	  an	  adornment”	  and	  that	  there	  was	  no	  conflict	  with	  the	  
Emperor’s	  wish	  “to	  teach	  our	  children	  an	  hour	  or	  two	  a	  day	  to	  speak	  and	  read	  the	  
German	  language.”	  However	  these	  concerns	  were	  to	  remain	  subordinate	  to	  the	  
curriculum,	  the	  foundations	  of	  which	  should	  remain	  “in	  accordance	  with	  the	  
command	  of	  our	  ancient	  sages	  of	  the	  Talmud.”46	  Thus	  the	  introduction	  of	  new	  
subjects	  into	  the	  curriculum	  represented	  no	  inherent	  threat	  insofar	  as	  they	  did	  not	  
challenge	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  Torah,	  “for	  what	  is	  primary	  remains	  primary	  and	  what	  
is	  secondary	  remains	  secondary.”47	  Rather,	  it	  was	  Wessely’s	  suggestion	  that	  the	  
Torah	  constituted	  an	  inadequate	  foundation	  for	  moral	  fashioning	  that	  drew	  the	  ire	  
of	  Rabbi	  ben	  Nathan,	  who	  characterized	  his	  opponent	  as	  an	  “impious	  man,”	  “foolish	  
and	  wicked,”	  and	  an	  “imposter,”	  adding	  that	  even	  “a	  carcass	  is	  better	  than	  he!”	  48	  	  
Rabbi	  ben	  Nathan	  detected	  an	  assimilationist	  thrust	  in	  Wessely’s	  letter,	  
particularly	  in	  his	  assertion	  that	  ethics,	  civility	  and	  modes	  of	  proper	  conduct	  fell	  
within	  the	  realm	  of	  torat	  ha-­‐adam.	  Were	  these	  subjects	  not	  within	  the	  purview	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  It	  is	  no	  coincidence	  that	  the	  sages	  whose	  debates	  are	  recorded	  in	  the	  Talmud,	  and	  whose	  authority	  
continues	  to	  be	  felt	  to	  this	  day,	  crowned	  themselves	  as	  the	  undisputed	  leaders	  of	  the	  post-­‐exilic	  
Jewish	  community.	  As	  the	  Talmud	  famously	  states,	  “Mahn	  malchei	  rabannan”	  (Who	  are	  the	  kings?	  
The	  rabbis.)	  Talmud	  Bavli,	  Gittin	  62a.	  
46	  David	  ben	  Nathan,	  "A	  Sermon	  Contra	  Wessely,"	  in	  The	  Jew	  in	  the	  Modern	  World,	  ed.	  Paul	  R.	  Mendes-­‐
Flohr	  and	  Jehuda	  Reinharz	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  1980),	  68.	  
47	  Ibid.	  
48	  Ibid.,	  67.	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the	  Torah	  of	  God?	  How	  could	  a	  man	  learned	  in	  Torah	  possibly	  be	  lacking	  in	  such	  
knowledge?	  	  
Who	  of	  the	  pious	  students	  of	  God’s	  laws—assuming	  that	  he	  is	  an	  intelligent,	  
honest	   and	   understanding	   student	   of	   the	   Torah—is	   not	   a	   tribute	   to	  
humanity,	   even	   if	   he	   has	   not	   learned	   etiquette	   and	   languages?	   Can	   such	   a	  
man	   be	   lacking	   in	   ‘human	   knowledge’?	   The	   moral	   instruction	   of	   the	  
Scriptures	  and	  the	  words	  of	  the	  holy	  sages	  of	  the	  Talmud	  teach	  [one]	  how	  to	  
behave	  and	  converse	  [with	  his	  fellow	  men.]	  	  Indeed,	  does	  not	  the	  student	  of	  
Torah	   study	   the	   words	   of	   Maimonides	   in	   the	   Book	   of	   Knowledge	   and	   the	  
codes	  of	  other	  masters	  which	  teach	  the	  path	  of	  righteous	  conduct,	  the	  path	  
which	  is	  a	  holy	  path?	  Does	  not	  the	  student	  of	  Torah	  also	  study	  Duties	  of	  the	  
Heart	  and	  other	  books	  of	  ethical	  teaching?	  …Even	  if	  one	  knows	  but	  a	  fraction	  
of	  these	  laws	  he	  is	  awed	  by	  the	  depth	  of	  their	  ethical	  wisdom.49	  
	  
By	  severing	  certain	  types	  of	  knowledge	  from	  the	  Torah	  of	  God	  and	  locating	  them	  
within	  the	  newly-­‐formed	  secular	  realm	  of	  torat	  ha-­‐adam,	  Wessely	  implied	  that	  
“etiquette,	  the	  ways	  of	  morality	  and	  good	  character,	  civility	  and	  clear,	  graceful	  
expression”	  were	  qualities	  acquired	  only	  from	  outside	  the	  boundaries	  of	  Jewish	  
thought.	  As	  such,	  Wessely	  and	  Rabbi	  ben	  Nathan’s	  dispute	  offers	  a	  real-­‐time	  
demonstration	  of	  how	  modern	  Protestant	  notions	  of	  secular	  universalism	  and	  
religious	  particularism	  migrated	  to	  European	  Jewish	  society.	  	  
As	  Gil	  Anidjar	  has	  observed,	  the	  “religious”	  has	  not	  historically	  fared	  well	  in	  
its	  battles	  against	  secularism,	  but	  rather,	  religion	  has	  become	  “the	  problem…an	  
object	  of	  criticism	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  no	  less	  than	  transcended	  (original	  emphasis).50	  
Rabbi	  ben	  Nathan’s	  rebuttal	  of	  Wessely	  is	  directed	  precisely	  at	  this	  attempt	  to	  
render	  “religion”	  a	  social	  problem	  in	  need	  of	  solving.	  As	  one	  who	  had	  “shorn	  his	  
beard,”	  Wessely	  subsequently	  held	  that	  “all	  who	  have	  beards	  and	  sidecurls	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Ibid.,	  68-­‐69.	  
50	  Anidjar,	  "Secularism,"	  62.	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deemed…to	  lack	  ‘human	  knowledge’	  and	  to	  deviate	  from	  the	  ways	  of	  humanity.”51	  
Echoing	  Mendelssohn’s	  division	  of	  law	  into	  the	  realms	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  
individual,	  Wessely	  stressed	  the	  universal	  nature	  of	  human	  knowledge/torat	  ha-­‐
adam	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  particularistic	  character	  of	  the	  Torah	  of	  God.	  Yet	  the	  
manners	  of	  speech,	  modes	  of	  behavior	  and	  ethical	  standards	  he	  aspired	  toward	  
were	  in	  fact	  the	  quite	  particular	  characteristics	  of	  contemporary	  non-­‐Jewish	  society.	  
To	  make	  the	  point	  more	  explicit,	  if	  religious	  particularism	  was	  to	  be	  transcended	  in	  
favor	  of	  universal	  humanism,	  we	  might	  ask	  to	  which	  group	  of	  humans	  Wessely’s	  
torat	  ha-­‐adam	  belonged.	  We	  have	  every	  reason	  to	  question	  his	  assumption	  that	  any	  
property	  of	  “the	  human”	  belongs	  to	  humanity	  as	  a	  whole.52	  Moreover,	  secular	  
knowledge	  in	  the	  form	  of	  torat	  ha-­‐adam,	  having	  been	  removed	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  
“religion”,	  is	  freed	  to	  present	  itself	  as	  uniquely	  lacking	  in	  irrational	  or	  subjective	  
features.	  	  
In	  sum,	  Wessely’s	  letter	  reflects	  two	  interlocking	  secularist	  turns.	  The	  first	  is	  
that,	  through	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  Protestant	  idea	  of	  religion	  as	  an	  individualistic,	  
faith-­‐based	  and	  private	  affair,	  the	  maskilim	  invented	  “Judaism”	  as	  a	  category	  distinct	  
from	  other	  realms	  of	  experience.	  This	  development	  marks	  the	  origin	  of	  Jewish	  
religious	  education	  in	  its	  modern-­‐day	  form	  as	  a	  single	  component	  of	  a	  child’s	  
education,	  distinct	  from	  both	  other	  types	  of	  knowledge	  (i.e.	  of	  the	  past,	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Nathan,	  "A	  Sermon	  Contra	  Wessely,"	  69.	  
52	  Hannah	  Arendt	  issued	  one	  of	  the	  early	  critique	  of	  the	  universalist	  pretenses,	  but	  ultimate	  failure,	  of	  
concepts	  such	  as	  humanism	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  The	  Origins	  of	  Totalitarianism,	  writing,	  “The	  
conception	  of	  human	  rights,	  based	  upon	  the	  assumed	  existence	  of	  a	  human	  being	  as	  such,	  broke	  
down	  at	  the	  very	  moment	  when	  those	  who	  professed	  to	  believe	  in	  it	  were	  for	  the	  first	  time	  
confronted	  with	  people	  who	  had	  indeed	  lost	  all	  other	  qualities	  and	  specific	  relationships—except	  
that	  they	  were	  still	  human.	  The	  world	  found	  nothing	  sacred	  in	  the	  abstract	  nakedness	  of	  being	  
human.”	  As	  quoted	  (and	  elaborated	  on)	  in	  Asad,	  Formations	  of	  the	  Secular:	  Christianity,	  Islam,	  
Modernity:	  143.	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sciences,	  of	  language)	  and	  from	  the	  pre-­‐modern	  learning	  it	  replaced.	  Second,	  the	  
substance	  of	  Wessely’s	  educational	  reforms	  represented,	  as	  I	  have	  argued,	  not	  
merely	  the	  addition	  of	  scientific	  subjects	  or	  the	  teaching	  of	  foreign	  languages,	  nor	  
simply	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  rabbinic	  leaders	  or	  the	  professionalization	  of	  
teaching.	  It	  surely	  was	  all	  of	  these	  things	  and	  more.	  What	  lies	  beneath	  them—and	  
indeed,	  what	  I	  am	  most	  interested	  in—is	  the	  severance	  of	  types	  of	  knowledge	  and	  
modes	  of	  conduct	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  all-­‐encompassing	  whole	  with	  the	  Torah	  as	  its	  
foundation.	  As	  I	  will	  argue	  later	  in	  this	  project,	  it	  is	  against	  this	  historical	  
background	  that	  we	  must	  approach	  the	  Zionist	  attempt	  to	  remake	  the	  nature	  of	  
Jewish	  education	  in	  Palestine.	  
Wessely’s	  letter	  was	  published	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  first	  
modern	  Jewish	  school	  in	  Berlin,	  ẖinuch	  ne’arim,	  which	  was	  founded	  in	  1778	  by	  the	  
wealthy	  maskil	  David	  Friedlander.53	  Its	  innovation	  did	  not	  lie	  in	  alleviating	  a	  
shortage	  of	  instruction	  in	  secular	  subjects	  (limudei	  ẖol),	  but	  rather	  “in	  transforming	  
these	  subjects	  into	  communal	  property”	  with	  their	  own	  ideological	  heft.54	  As	  Shmuel	  
Feiner	  has	  noted,	  schools	  founded	  by	  the	  German	  maskilim	  sought	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  
alternative	  to	  the	  ẖeder	  and	  talmud-­‐torah,	  and	  included	  not	  only	  secular	  or	  general	  
subjects,	  but	  a	  “reformed”	  mix	  of	  religious	  ones	  that	  were	  to	  be	  taught	  in	  a	  manner	  
that	  differentiated	  them	  from	  existing	  forms	  of	  Jewish	  schooling.	  In	  this,	  ẖinuch	  
ne’arim	  attempted	  to	  “create	  a	  complete	  balance	  between	  Jewish	  subjects	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Feiner,	  "Programot	  ẖinuchiot	  v'idialim	  ẖevratiyim:	  beit	  ha-­‐sefer	  'ẖinuch	  ne'arim'	  b'berlin	  1778-­‐
1825."	  
54	  Ibid.,	  396.	  See	  also:	  Elboim-­‐Dror,	  "Cycles	  of	  modernization	  in	  education:	  from	  the	  ẖeder	  to	  the	  
school	  (maslulei	  modernizatsia	  b'ẖinuch:	  me	  ha-­‐ẖeder	  l'vait	  ha-­‐sefer),"	  61-­‐63.	  
	  61	  
universal	  ones,”	  further	  demanding	  its	  teachers	  embody	  this	  attempted	  harmony	  by	  
being	  “ba’alei	  sekel	  v’yirat	  hashem”	  (men	  of	  intellect	  and	  fearful	  of	  God).55	  
The	  new	  school	  quickly	  gained	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Prussian	  state,	  which	  quite	  
clearly	  viewed	  it	  as	  a	  vehicle	  to	  propel	  the	  large-­‐scale	  transformation	  and	  “reform”	  
of	  the	  region’s	  Jews	  into	  productive	  citizens.	  This	  support	  also	  extended	  to	  the	  
creation	  of	  a	  publishing	  house	  from	  which	  the	  message	  of	  enlightenment	  would	  be	  
spread,	  not	  in	  the	  vulgar	  Yiddish	  vernacular,	  but	  the	  noble	  Hebrew	  language.56	  As	  
the	  waves	  of	  the	  haskalah	  reached	  Eastern	  Europe	  in	  the	  early	  19th	  century,	  
maskilim	  established	  schools	  on	  the	  model	  provided	  by	  ẖinuch	  ne’arim.	  As	  was	  the	  
case	  in	  Berlin,	  such	  schools	  began	  as	  private	  enterprises	  but	  were	  quickly	  granted	  
state	  support	  as	  authorities	  recognized	  their	  social	  utility.57	  	  
Like	  Wessely,	  those	  active	  in	  Jewish	  educational	  reform	  embraced,	  and	  
indeed	  depended,	  on	  the	  separation	  of	  intellectual	  realms	  into	  religious	  and	  non,	  
Jewish	  and	  “universal”,	  “traditional”	  and	  “modern.”	  Into	  “limudei	  kodesh”	  (literally,	  
studies	  of	  that	  which	  is	  holy)	  fled	  the	  spirit,	  the	  sacred	  text	  and	  the	  law.	  From	  the	  
early	  nineteenth	  century	  onward,	  these	  subjects	  would	  have	  to	  compete	  with	  
“limudei	  ẖol”	  –	  which	  encompassed	  foreign	  languages,	  the	  sciences	  and	  liberal	  arts,	  
or	  increasingly	  (particularly	  in	  poor	  communities),	  vocational	  training.58	  In	  this	  way	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  The	  description	  of	  teachers	  is	  taken	  from	  Wessely’s	  letter,	  as	  quoted	  by	  Shmuel	  Feiner.	  See:	  
Wessely,	  "Divrei	  Shalom	  v'Emet,"	  Chp.	  8.	  Feiner,	  "Programot	  ẖinuchiot	  v'idialim	  ẖevratiyim:	  beit	  ha-­‐
sefer	  'ẖinuch	  ne'arim'	  b'berlin	  1778-­‐1825,"	  398.	  The	  uncritical	  ease	  with	  which	  Feiner	  speaks	  of	  
Jewish	  and	  universal	  values	  offers	  a	  good	  example	  of	  the	  theoretical	  pitfalls	  discussed	  earlier.	  
56	  Elboim-­‐Dror,	  "Cycles	  of	  modernization	  in	  education:	  from	  the	  ẖeder	  to	  the	  school	  (maslulei	  
modernizatsia	  b'ẖinuch:	  me	  ha-­‐ẖeder	  l'vait	  ha-­‐sefer),"	  61-­‐62.	  
57	  Ibid.,	  63-­‐64.	  
58	  Pre-­‐modern	  Jewish	  thought	  did	  speak	  of	  the	  ẖol	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  kodesh	  (holy),	  but	  ẖol	  did	  not	  
mean	  secular	  in	  our	  contemporary	  understanding	  of	  the	  term.	  For	  example,	  ẖol	  ha’moed	  refers	  to	  the	  
middle	  days	  of	  Passover,	  during	  which	  it	  is	  permissible	  to	  do	  certain	  forms	  of	  work	  not	  permitted	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“practical”	  and	  “useful”	  knowledge	  became	  synonymous	  with	  something	  other	  than	  
“religious”	  studies,	  something	  that	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  learned	  through	  
apprenticeships	  or	  private	  tutoring,	  and	  which	  approached	  a	  level	  of	  parity	  with	  the	  
receding	  core	  of	  the	  Torah.	  	  
	  
Renaissance	  and	  Defiance:	  the	  origins	  of	  Islamic	  education	  reform	  
We	  must	  now	  consider	  a	  process	  of	  educational	  change	  that	  took	  part	  not	  
within	  Europe	  itself,	  but	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  European	  colonial	  expansion	  into	  Asia,	  
Africa	  and	  elsewhere.	  Timothy	  Fitzgerald	  has	  argued	  this	  colonial	  encounter	  was	  
crucial	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  secular	  state,	  in	  that	  “the	  need	  to	  describe	  and	  
control	  non-­‐European	  peoples,	  the	  emergence	  of	  empirical	  science,	  and	  new	  
demands	  for	  toleration	  by	  non-­‐conformists,	  all	  combined	  to	  redefine	  the	  meaning	  of	  
‘religion’	  as	  an	  essentially	  inner	  form	  of	  belief	  separated	  from	  the	  public	  rationality	  
of	  the	  secular	  state.”59	  We	  have	  thus	  far	  located	  traces	  of	  this	  process	  in	  the	  
secularization	  of	  Jewish	  education	  in	  18th	  and	  19th	  century	  Europe.	  We	  now	  must	  
consider	  a	  more	  familiar	  colonial	  terrain,	  namely	  late	  19th	  century	  Egypt,	  wherein	  
scholars	  associated	  with	  the	  Islamic	  reform	  movement	  undertook	  to	  transform	  
education	  at	  all	  levels.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
during	  the	  first	  and	  final	  days	  of	  the	  holiday,	  but	  which	  are	  in	  no	  way	  devoid	  of	  the	  obligations	  that	  
apply	  to	  the	  holiday	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  observant	  Jew	  does	  not,	  for	  example,	  does	  not	  resume	  eating	  
bread	  on	  ẖol	  ha’moed	  Passover.	  
59	  Fitzgerald,	  Religion	  and	  the	  Secular:	  Historical	  and	  Colonial	  Formations,	  Introduction,	  19;	  ibid.	  For	  
more	  on	  the	  mutually	  constitutive	  nature	  of	  secularism	  and	  colonialism,	  see	  in	  the	  same	  volume,	  
David	  Chidester,	  “Real	  and	  Imagined:	  imperial	  inventions	  of	  religion	  in	  colonial	  southern	  Africa;”	  Will	  
Sweetman,	  “Colonialism	  all	  the	  way	  down?	  Religion	  and	  the	  secular	  in	  early	  modern	  writing	  on	  south	  
India;”	  and	  Gregory	  D.	  Alles,	  “Rudolf	  Otto,	  cultural	  colonialism	  and	  the	  ‘discovery’	  of	  the	  holy.”	  	  	  
	  63	  
Scholars	  of	  Arab	  Modernism	  often	  speak	  of	  it	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  composed	  of	  
three	  overlapping	  currents:	  first,	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  literary	  nahḍa	  in	  which	  
Lebanese	  Christians	  played	  a	  prominent	  role;	  second,	  the	  Islamic	  reform	  effort	  
associated	  with	  Jamal	  al-­‐Din	  al-­‐Afghani,	  Muhammad	  ‘Abduh	  and	  Rashid	  Rida,	  among	  
others;	  and	  finally,	  the	  adoption	  of	  Arab	  nationalism	  by	  a	  broad	  spectrum	  of	  secular	  
intellectuals	  and	  political	  activists.60	  Yet	  the	  roots	  of	  educational	  reform	  in	  Arab	  
lands	  pre-­‐dated	  these	  currents	  and	  in	  fact	  originated	  in	  Ottoman	  administrators’	  
anxieties	  regarding	  the	  Empire’s	  ability	  to	  counter	  mounting	  European	  military	  and	  
technological	  superiority.	  The	  military	  impetus	  for	  educational	  reform	  is	  significant,	  
and	  certainly	  distinguishes	  this	  history	  from	  contemporary	  reform	  efforts	  occurring	  
within	  European	  Jewish	  communities.	  Yet	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  when	  Muslim	  modernists	  
came	  to	  grapple	  with	  existing	  forms	  of	  education,	  their	  arguments	  shared	  certain	  
discursive	  parallels	  with	  those	  articulated	  by	  maskilim	  a	  few	  decades	  earlier.	  
Historians	  generally	  attribute	  the	  first	  steps	  toward	  a	  modern	  system	  of	  
education	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  to	  the	  semi-­‐autonomous	  governor	  of	  Egypt,	  
Muhammad	  ‘Ali,	  who	  launched	  numerous	  initiatives	  to	  bring	  the	  best	  of	  European	  
sciences	  to	  Egypt	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Napoleonic	  retreat.	  He	  did	  so	  both	  out	  of	  
recognition	  of	  the	  superior	  military	  technologies	  and	  disciplines	  that	  enabled	  the	  
recent	  conquest,	  and	  to	  further	  challenge	  the	  authority	  of	  Ottoman	  rulers	  in	  
Istanbul.	  He	  famously	  dispatched	  student	  missions	  to	  European	  cities	  to	  study	  
foreign	  languages	  and	  translate	  textbooks	  into	  Arabic.	  In	  Egypt,	  he	  opened	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Hourani,	  Arabic	  Thought	  in	  the	  Liberal	  Age,	  1798-­‐1939.	  Chapter	  Four	  will	  question	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  we	  should	  characterize	  members	  of	  the	  latter	  group	  as	  “secular,”	  and	  if	  so,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  
their	  secularism	  departed	  from	  the	  European	  form.	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professional	  schools	  for	  Engineering	  (1816),	  Medicine	  (1827),	  Pharmaceutics	  
(1929),	  Mineralogy	  (1834),	  Agriculture	  (1836)	  and	  Translation	  (1836).	  61	  	  
Having	  erected	  such	  institutions,	  it	  quickly	  became	  apparent	  that	  a	  new	  
system	  of	  primary	  schools	  was	  required	  to	  prepare	  students	  for	  study	  within	  them.	  
As	  such,	  he	  opened	  government	  preparatory	  schools	  that	  provided	  stipends,	  free	  
clothing	  and	  food	  to	  lure	  students	  away	  from	  katātīb.	  He	  still	  encountered	  much	  
reluctance	  from	  parents	  who	  feared	  conscription,	  and	  eventually	  resorted	  to	  
recruiting	  by	  force.	  “It	  was	  obvious	  that	  all	  the	  new	  schools,	  whether	  military,	  
ancillary	  or	  even	  civil,	  were	  geared	  to	  serve	  a	  military	  machine.	  None	  of	  them	  was	  
for	  the	  purely	  intellectual	  of	  professional	  training	  of	  young	  Egyptians.”62	  
Similarly,	  the	  Sublime	  Porte	  first	  looked	  to	  appropriate	  European	  technical	  
and	  scientific	  expertise	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  modernize	  the	  Empire’s	  outmoded	  military.	  
In	  Istanbul	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Cairo,	  French	  advisors	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  proposing	  
educational	  reforms	  and	  managing	  newly	  created	  schools.63	  The	  Ottoman	  leadership	  
began	  the	  process	  of	  education	  reform	  slowly,	  in	  fits	  and	  starts	  over	  several	  decades	  
during	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century,	  and	  did	  not	  tackle	  the	  systematic	  reform	  of	  
primary	  education	  until	  the	  1860s.64	  Its	  first	  efforts	  were	  directed	  at	  integrating	  
existing	  communal	  schools,	  such	  as	  the	  kuttāb	  and	  those	  managed	  by	  non-­‐Muslim	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Ibrahim	  Abu-­‐Lughod,	  Arab	  Rediscovery	  of	  Europe:	  A	  Study	  in	  Cultural	  Encounters	  	  (Princeton:	  
Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1963),	  45-­‐47.	  
62	  Tibawi,	  Islamic	  Education:	  Its	  Traditions	  and	  Modernization	  into	  the	  Arab	  National	  Systems:	  53.	  
63	  Somel,	  The	  Modernization	  of	  Public	  Education	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  1839-­‐1908:	  Islamization,	  
Autocracy,	  and	  Discipline:	  51-­‐53.	  
64	  Benjamin	  Fortna	  has	  written	  a	  nuanced	  and	  highly	  readable	  survey	  of	  Ottoman	  education	  in	  the	  
Empire’s	  last	  years.	  See:	  Benjamin	  C.	  Fortna,	  Imperial	  Classroom:	  Islam,	  the	  State,	  and	  Education	  in	  the	  
Late	  Ottoman	  Empire	  	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002).	  For	  more	  detail	  about	  the	  distinct	  
pieces	  of	  legislation	  and	  bureaucratic	  divisions	  that	  facilitated	  education	  reform,	  see:	  Somel,	  The	  
Modernization	  of	  Public	  Education	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  1839-­‐1908:	  Islamization,	  Autocracy,	  and	  
Discipline.	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millets,	  into	  a	  single	  legal	  and	  administrative	  framework.	  However	  substantive	  
changes	  were	  limited	  in	  scope,	  with	  the	  primary	  goal	  being	  that	  these	  schools	  
produce	  literate	  candidates	  for	  the	  rushdiyye	  schools	  wherein	  government	  clerks	  
were	  trained.	  As	  such,	  the	  administrative	  structure	  attempted	  to	  build	  on	  existing	  
forms	  of	  communal	  education	  rather	  than	  supersede	  them.	  Primary	  education	  was	  
conceived	  of	  as	  properly	  belonging	  to	  the	  religious	  community,	  while	  secondary	  
schools	  would	  introduce	  mixed	  schooling	  between	  different	  population	  groups	  as	  
well	  as	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  subjects.	  65	  	  
In	  contrast	  to	  these	  earlier	  attempts	  to	  weave	  the	  reformist	  project	  into	  the	  
existing	  structures	  of	  communal	  education,	  by	  the	  late	  1860s,	  the	  “religious”	  nature	  
of	  primary	  education	  had	  transformed	  into	  a	  problem	  in	  need	  of	  solving.	  In	  1869,	  
the	  Regulation	  of	  Public	  Education	  was	  promulgated,	  prepared	  under	  the	  influence	  
of	  the	  French	  Minister	  of	  Education,	  Jean	  Victor	  Duruy.	  It	  reflected	  an	  ambitious	  plan	  
to	  introduce	  universal	  compulsory	  education	  and	  to	  transfer	  control	  of	  all	  schools	  to	  
the	  Ottoman	  state.	  The	  Regulation	  marked	  the	  abandonment	  of	  the	  policy	  that	  
attempted	  to	  strategically	  employ	  existing	  modes	  of	  religious	  learning;	  rather,	  it	  
envisioned	  a	  system	  of	  state	  primary	  schools	  with	  a	  utilitarian	  curriculum,	  
supervised	  by	  a	  centralized	  bureaucracy	  and	  overseen	  by	  a	  professional	  class	  of	  
teachers.66	  	  
While	  the	  Ottomans	  never	  achieved	  universal	  education	  as	  was	  hoped,	  they	  
did	  open	  and	  manage	  a	  number	  of	  schools	  in	  Palestine:	  the	  sanjak	  of	  Jerusalem	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Selcuk	  Aksin	  Somel,	  The	  Modernization	  of	  Public	  Education	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  1839-­‐1908	  :	  
Islamization,	  Autocracy,	  and	  Discipline	  	  (Leiden:	  Boston,	  2001),	  44.	  
66	  Ibid.,	  86-­‐90;	  108-­‐11.	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included	  158	  such	  schools	  in	  1885,	  and	  another	  35	  existed	  in	  the	  kaza	  of	  Jenin.67	  
However	  impressive	  this	  may	  appear,	  there	  are	  indications	  that	  some	  Palestinian	  
Muslims	  opposed	  the	  Ottoman	  government’s	  attempts	  to	  open	  state	  schools	  in	  the	  
late	  nineteenth	  century,	  fearing	  that	  “the	  distinctly	  religious	  basis	  of	  education	  
would	  be	  threatened,	  with	  consequent	  disturbances	  of	  the	  established	  social	  
order.”68	  Thus,	  it	  was	  in	  part	  because	  education	  was	  conceived	  of	  as	  an	  Islamic	  
practice	  that	  attempts	  to	  organize	  new	  types	  of	  schooling	  were	  poorly	  received	  by	  
the	  ‘ulema.	  Within	  this	  framework,	  the	  creation	  of	  government	  primary	  schools	  
served	  by	  a	  professional	  class	  of	  trained	  teachers	  represented	  yet	  another	  reduction	  
in	  the	  scope	  of	  activities	  under	  their	  direct	  control.	  	  
Far	  from	  representing	  the	  mere	  reform	  of	  communal	  schooling,	  the	  new	  
system	  of	  education	  attempted,	  though	  did	  not	  necessarily	  achieve,	  a	  revolutionary	  
break	  with	  the	  katātīb	  that	  preceded	  it.	  The	  Ottoman	  school	  system	  shared	  many	  
features	  with	  the	  Mandatory	  one	  that	  would	  replace	  it,	  including	  a	  secularized	  
curriculum	  (here	  meaning	  a	  curriculum	  divided	  into	  distinct	  religious	  and	  non-­‐
religious	  components),	  uniform	  textbooks	  and	  teachers	  that	  were—theoretically	  at	  
least—graduates	  of	  specialized	  professional	  schools.69	  Religious	  instruction	  formed	  
a	  separate	  and	  important	  component	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  public	  school	  curriculum,	  one	  
that	  arguably	  became	  even	  more	  pronounced	  during	  the	  era	  of	  Hamidian	  regime,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Ibid.,	  111.	  
68	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  
181.	  
69	  In	  practice	  this	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  the	  case.	  Memoirs	  of	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  
twentieth	  centuries	  often	  depicted	  “that	  the	  schoolmasters	  of	  the	  public	  ibtidai	  schools	  and	  most	  of	  
the	  instructors	  were	  wearing	  white	  turbans,	  i.e.	  were	  probably	  members	  of	  the	  ‘ulema.”	  See:	  Somel,	  
The	  Modernization	  of	  Public	  Education	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  1839-­‐1908	  :	  Islamization,	  Autocracy,	  
and	  Discipline:	  260.	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which	  “tried	  to	  combat	  nationalist	  secession	  by	  stressing	  religious	  and	  authoritarian	  
values	  in	  education.”70	  	  
Thus	  on	  one	  hand,	  the	  adoption	  of	  new	  types	  of	  schooling	  was	  conceived	  of	  
as	  a	  defensive	  move	  crucial	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  elite	  military	  
leaders	  and	  technocrats.	  Yet	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  a	  specifically	  Arab	  
effort	  was	  underway	  to	  reform	  modes	  of	  Islamic	  learning	  that	  was	  linked	  less	  to	  
bureaucratic	  and	  military	  necessity	  and	  more	  deeply	  concerned	  with	  the	  question	  of	  
cultural	  renaissance.	  This	  nahḍa	  (literally:	  rebirth	  or	  renaissance)	  of	  Arab	  thought	  
had	  multiple	  expressions	  and	  its	  participants	  represented	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  religious	  
backgrounds.71	  While	  there	  were	  points	  of	  disagreement,	  the	  movement	  stressed	  
the	  primacy	  of	  the	  Arabic	  language	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  national	  revival	  (particularly	  in	  
opposition	  to	  Ottoman	  Turkish),	  spoke	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  Islamic	  civilization	  system	  and	  
advocated	  religious	  reform	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  new	  interpretations	  of	  shari‘a	  that	  
attempted	  to	  reconcile	  it	  with	  the	  “needs	  of	  the	  time.”72	  	  
The	  immediate	  past	  and	  present	  were	  regarded	  as	  periods	  of	  spiritual	  
decline	  and	  intellectual	  stagnation	  brought	  on	  by	  the	  corruption	  of	  “true”	  Islam	  on	  
one	  hand,	  and	  the	  political	  subjugation	  of	  the	  Arab	  nation	  to	  the	  Turkish	  yoke	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Ibid.,	  180.	  
71	  While	  earlier	  historians	  tended	  to	  draw	  a	  direct	  line	  from	  the	  literary	  nahḍa	  of	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  
century	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  Arab	  nationalism	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth,	  more	  recent	  scholarship	  has	  
highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  Islamic	  reformists	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  full-­‐fledged	  Arab	  nationalism	  in	  
the	  first	  decades	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  See	  Rashid	  Khalidi,	  Lisa	  Anderson,	  Muhammad	  Muslih	  and	  
Reeva	  Simon’s	  The	  Origins	  of	  Arab	  Nationalism,	  	  	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1991).	  
72	  The	  idea	  that	  Islam	  is	  not	  principally	  a	  religion,	  but	  rather	  a	  civilization,	  was	  introduced	  into	  
Islamic	  Modernist	  circles	  by	  Jamal	  al-­‐Din	  al-­‐Afghani.	  Influenced	  by	  Guizot’s	  famous	  theory	  of	  
civilization,	  al-­‐Afghani	  argued	  that	  there	  had	  been	  a	  Golden	  Age	  of	  Islam	  wherein	  “the	  umma	  had	  all	  
the	  necessary	  attributes	  of	  a	  flourishing	  civilization,”	  and	  that	  a	  return	  to	  this	  civilizational	  glory	  was	  
possible	  by	  “accepting	  those	  fruits	  of	  reason,	  the	  sciences	  of	  Europe,	  but	  also,	  and	  more	  
fundamentally,	  by	  restoring	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  umma.”	  Hourani,	  Arabic	  Thought	  in	  the	  Liberal	  Age,	  1798-­‐
1939:	  115.	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other.73	  The	  latter	  narrative	  found	  wide	  acceptance	  among	  both	  Arab	  intellectuals	  
and	  audiences	  abroad.	  British	  officials	  in	  Palestine,	  for	  instance,	  made	  frequent	  
reference	  to	  this	  historical	  explanation	  in	  arguing	  that	  the	  Arabs	  of	  Palestine	  were	  
not	  inherently	  inferior	  to	  the	  Jews;	  rather,	  differences	  among	  the	  two	  were	  
conceived	  as	  a	  product	  of	  circumstance.	  Writing	  in	  January	  1937,	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  the	  
Director	  of	  Education	  for	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine,	  noted	  that	  “the	  Jews	  do	  no	  in	  
fact	  show	  any	  superior	  merit	  since	  the	  relative	  backwardness	  of	  the	  Arabs	  must	  be	  
attributable	  to	  the	  Turkish	  rulers	  while	  the	  recent	  cultural	  advance	  of	  the	  European	  
and	  American	  Jew	  derives	  from	  their	  emancipated	  position	  in	  liberal	  Western	  
society	  of	  the	  19th	  century.”74	  
Muslim	  modernists	  formed	  a	  crucial	  subset	  of	  the	  intellectuals	  who	  
participated	  in	  the	  Arab	  nahḍa,	  and	  are	  the	  most	  relevant	  to	  the	  current	  enquiry	  
because	  their	  writings	  often	  engaged	  with	  attempts	  to	  overthrow	  prevailing	  modes	  
of	  Islamic	  education.	  Defining	  the	  status	  of	  different	  ontological	  categories—such	  as	  
which	  subjects	  could	  be	  adopted,	  and	  for	  which	  purposes—formed	  the	  conceptual	  
foundation	  on	  which	  education	  reform	  was	  based.	  As	  I	  will	  argue,	  determining	  the	  
nature	  and	  origins	  of	  “secular”	  education,	  and	  specifically	  the	  modern	  sciences,	  was	  
inextricably	  linked	  to	  the	  greater	  project	  of	  defining	  the	  essence	  of	  Islam.	  	  
Depictions	  of	  that	  essence	  were	  of	  course	  being	  forwarded	  daily	  by	  
contemporary	  European	  thinkers	  and	  Orientalists	  ranging	  from	  Edward	  Lane	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Advocates	  of	  Islamic	  revival	  often	  argued	  that	  the	  return	  of	  the	  caliphate	  to	  Arab	  hands	  was	  crucial	  
to	  the	  movement’s	  success.	  The	  same	  point	  was	  famously	  made	  by	  Wilfred	  Scawen	  Blunt	  in	  his	  1882	  
work,	  The	  Future	  of	  Islam.	  Ibid.,	  268.	  	  
74	  Farrell,	  Jerome.	  “Note	  on	  the	  principles	  upon	  which	  the	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Public	  School	  
System	  should	  be	  estimated	  and	  applied.”	  January	  29,	  1937.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/346/17.	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Goethe	  and	  Ernst	  Renan.	  Islam	  was	  variously	  associated	  with	  cultural	  
backwardness,	  political	  despotism	  and	  intellectual	  stagnation;	  a	  fundamental	  
incompatibility	  of	  Islam	  with	  European	  modernity	  lay	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  these	  
assessments.75	  Against	  this	  flurry	  of	  Orientalist	  projections,	  Muslim	  modernists	  
sought	  to	  defend	  Islam	  not	  by	  rejecting	  the	  notion	  that	  it	  contained	  a	  single	  
“essence”,	  but	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  essence	  of	  Islam	  was	  something	  other	  than	  what	  
contemporary	  Muslims	  practiced.	  Muhammad	  ‘Abduh	  articulated	  this	  position	  upon	  
his	  return	  from	  France	  in	  the	  late	  1880s,	  famously	  stating,	  “I	  went	  to	  the	  West	  and	  
saw	  Islam,	  but	  no	  Muslims;	  I	  got	  back	  to	  the	  East	  and	  saw	  Muslims,	  but	  not	  Islam.”	  
The	  true	  essence	  of	  Islam,	  it	  was	  argued,	  was	  not	  incompatible	  with	  European	  
modernity	  and	  the	  wealth,	  technical	  progress	  and	  political	  institutions	  it	  had	  
generated.	  Rather,	  true	  Islam	  was	  incompatible	  with	  anything	  other	  than	  reason,	  
prosperity	  and	  justice;	  thus	  the	  capacity,	  in	  ‘Abduh’s	  analysis,	  of	  Islam	  to	  be	  present	  
where	  Muslims	  were	  not.	  	  
Modernists	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  only	  through	  deviating	  away	  from	  Islam’s	  
inherent	  rationalism	  that	  Muslims	  had	  fallen	  into	  centuries	  of	  cultural	  and	  political	  
degeneracy.	  Beginning	  with	  ‘Abduh’s	  mentor,	  Jamal	  al-­‐Din	  al-­‐Afghani,	  the	  major	  
thrust	  of	  this	  argument	  held	  that	  because	  of	  Islam’s	  rationalist	  core,	  there	  existed	  
within	  it	  a	  unique	  harmony	  between	  the	  religious	  and	  rational	  sciences.	  Thus,	  no	  
theological	  barriers	  stood	  before	  the	  adoption	  of	  modern	  sciences	  or	  technological	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Edward	  Said	  performed	  the	  monumental	  task	  of	  rendering	  these	  negative	  characterizations	  
familiar	  to	  scholars	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  disciples.	  See	  Edward	  Said,	  Orientalism	  	  (New	  York:	  Random	  
House,	  1979).	  Of	  particular	  note	  is	  Ernst	  Renan’s	  lecture	  entitled	  L’Islamisme	  et	  la	  Science,	  which	  
argued	  the	  fundamental	  incompatibility	  of	  Islam	  with	  modern	  scientific	  thought.	  Al-­‐Afghani	  devoted	  
much	  energy	  refuting	  this	  claim	  as	  part	  of	  his	  defense	  of	  Islam.	  Hourani,	  Arabic	  Thought	  in	  the	  Liberal	  
Age,	  1798-­‐1939:	  112-­‐14.	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innovations.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  harmony	  between	  religious	  and	  scientific	  knowledge	  
was	  the	  ideal	  state	  from	  which	  man	  had	  deviated.	  Writing	  in	  his	  first	  work,	  Risalat	  
al-­‐Taūḥid	  (The	  Theology	  of	  Unity),	  Muhammad	  ‘Abduh	  attributed	  part	  of	  the	  
corruption	  that	  characterized	  pre-­‐Islamic	  times	  to	  the	  unjustified	  alienation	  of	  
religious	  and	  scientific	  thought:	  
But	   in	   the	   course	   of	   a	   few	   generations	   the	   resolve	   of	  men	   grew	  weak	   and	  
weary	   of	   it	   [religion]…The	   custodians	   abandoned	   all	   its	   principles,	   except	  
one	   they	  mistakenly	   supposed	   to	   be	   its	   strongest	   pillar	   and	   chief	   ground,	  
namely	  the	  veto	  on	  intellectual	  enquiry	  into	  faith,	  or	  indeed	  into	  the	  details	  
of	   the	   universe	   and	   on	   the	   pursuit	   of	   the	   secret	   things	   of	   the	  mind.	   They	  
promulgated	  the	  principle	  that	  reason	  and	  religion	  had	  nothing	  in	  common,	  
but	   that	   rather	   religion	   was	   the	   inveterate	   enemy	   of	   science.	   It	   was	   not	  
simply	   that	   this	   view	   could	   be	   taken	   by	   anyone	   for	   himself:	   rather	   they	  
strenuously	   imposed	   it	   as	   the	   proper	   thing	   for	   all…Concord,	   co-­‐operation	  
and	  peace	  were	  ousted:	  schism,	  contention	  and	  strife	  reigned	  in	  their	  place.	  
And	  so	  men	  continued	  until	  the	  advent	  of	  Islam.76	  
	  
Islam’s	  unique	  contribution	  to	  mankind	  was	  consequently	  cast	  as	  restoring	  the	  
proper	  union	  between	  reason	  and	  religious	  belief.	  “Islam	  supervened,	  to	  present	  its	  
case	  for	  reason,	  to	  call	  on	  mind	  and	  intelligence	  for	  action,	  to	  take	  emotion	  and	  
feeling	  into	  partnership	  for	  man’s	  guidance	  to	  both	  earthy	  and	  heavenly	  
blessedness.”77	  In	  ways	  that	  echoed	  Moses	  Mendelsohn’s	  attempt	  to	  demonstrate	  
the	  fundamental	  compatibility	  of	  Jewish	  law	  and	  Enlightenment	  principles,	  the	  
essential	  harmony	  of	  Islam	  and	  “reason”—acting	  as	  a	  moniker	  for	  all	  types	  of	  
technical	  and	  social	  progress—became	  the	  central	  tenet	  of	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  
Islamic	  Modernism.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Muhammad	  ‘Abduh,	  Risalat	  al-­‐Tauhid,	  Cairo,	  1897.	  English	  translation	  prepared	  by	  Ishaq	  Musa’ad	  
and	  Kenneth	  Cragg,	  see	  Abduh	  Muhammad,	  The	  Theology	  of	  Unity	  	  (London:	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  1966),	  
133.	  
77	  Ibid.,	  134.	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The	  second	  front	  of	  the	  Modernist	  assault	  involved	  advocating	  a	  direct	  
relationship	  to	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith	  that	  was	  unmediated	  by	  centuries	  of	  medieval	  
commentary.	  In	  this,	  Muslim	  reformers	  echoed	  the	  haskalic	  (and	  later,	  Zionist)	  
contempt	  for	  the	  legalistic	  Talmud	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  Bible	  itself.	  Islam,	  it	  was	  
claimed,	  was	  in	  need	  of	  its	  own	  Luther,	  and	  calls	  for	  his	  emergence	  came	  not	  merely	  
from	  European	  observers,	  but	  from	  Muslim	  reformers	  themselves.78	  For	  the	  latter,	  
the	  most	  immediate	  challenge	  was	  to	  overcome	  what	  they	  viewed	  as	  slavish	  
adherence	  to	  juridical	  emulation,	  or	  taqlīd.	  The	  Syrian	  cleric	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Hamid	  al-­‐
Zahrawi	  famously	  attacked	  taqlīd	  in	  a	  1901	  essay	  entitled	  Jurisprudence	  and	  Sufism,	  
in	  which	  he	  granted	  no	  insurmountable	  credit	  to	  the	  twelve	  centuries	  of	  legal	  
interpretation	  and	  argued	  against	  necessary	  allegiance	  to	  one	  of	  the	  four	  Sunni	  law	  
schools.	  Rather,	  he	  went	  as	  far	  as	  to	  argue	  that	  juridical	  decisions	  based	  on	  these	  
precedents	  were	  actually	  un-­‐Islamic	  in	  spirit,	  dismissing	  them	  as	  acts	  of	  imitation	  
(the	  literal	  meaning	  of	  taqlīd)	  at	  a	  time	  when	  innovation	  was	  urgently	  required.79	  	  
New	  interpretations	  were	  to	  be	  generated	  through	  the	  use	  of	  ijtihad,	  
independent	  juridical	  reasoning.	  It	  is	  here	  that	  modernists’	  turn	  to	  “reason”	  (‘aql)	  as	  
the	  essence	  of	  Islam	  displayed	  the	  most	  marked	  contradictions.	  On	  one	  hand,	  
reformers’	  condemnation	  of	  local	  practices	  and	  Sufi	  customs	  clearly	  represented	  an	  
attempt	  to	  centralize	  control	  of	  religious	  knowledge	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  select	  members	  
of	  the	  ‘ulema,	  who	  alone	  claimed	  the	  capacity	  to	  understand	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Jamal	  al-­‐Din	  al-­‐Afghani.	  F.	  des	  Debats,	  May	  18-­‐19,	  1883.	  (reprinted	  in	  French	  translation	  of	  al-­‐Radd	  
‘ala’l-­‐Dhahriyyin).	  Quoted	  in	  Hourani,	  Arabic	  Thought	  in	  the	  Liberal	  Age,	  1798-­‐1939:	  120-­‐23.	  
79	  David	  Commins,	  Islamic	  Reform:	  Politics	  and	  Social	  Change	  in	  Late	  Ottoman	  Syria	  	  (New	  York:	  
Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1990),	  55-­‐59.	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Islam.80	  Yet	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  reformers	  embraced	  the	  use	  of	  ijtihad	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
accommodate	  Islamic	  practice	  with	  contemporary	  needs.	  In	  theory,	  ijtihad	  was	  
something	  that	  any	  educated	  individual	  could	  do	  for	  him	  or	  herself,	  effectively	  
meaning,	  “Legal	  authority	  on	  religious	  questions	  would	  no	  longer	  reside	  in	  the	  
hands	  of	  the	  scholars,	  but	  would	  be	  possessed	  by	  ordinary	  individuals.”81	  
Conservative	  members	  of	  the	  ‘ulema	  rightly	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  displacement	  of	  
legal	  rulings	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  each	  individual	  would	  mean	  the	  undermining	  of	  
judicial	  precedent	  and	  with	  it,	  the	  entire	  structure	  of	  shari‘a.	  Thus	  on	  one	  hand,	  the	  
individual	  should	  be	  able	  to	  arrive	  at	  his	  or	  her	  own	  legal	  judgments.	  On	  the	  other,	  
this	  privilege	  clearly	  should	  not	  be	  extended	  to	  the	  masses	  of	  clerics,	  Sufi	  sheikhs	  
and	  village	  imams	  to	  whom	  all	  social	  backwardness	  was	  attributed.	  Quite	  the	  
contrary,	  the	  latter	  groups	  were	  the	  most	  in	  need	  of	  centralized	  supervision	  in	  order	  
to	  purge	  them	  of	  irrational	  elements.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  the	  fact	  that	  communal	  
education	  was	  concentrated	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  latter	  groups	  posed	  an	  immediate	  







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Al-­‐Afghani	  in	  particular	  distinguished	  between	  religion	  of	  the	  “the	  few”	  who	  were	  able	  to	  grasp	  the	  
subtleties	  of	  religious	  truth	  and	  for	  whom	  reason	  was	  an	  essential	  tool,	  and	  “the	  masses”	  who	  were	  
satisfied	  by	  religious	  symbols.	  While	  the	  truth	  of	  philosophy	  and	  the	  truth	  of	  prophecy	  were	  one	  in	  
the	  same,	  only	  the	  few	  were	  capable	  of	  grasping	  the	  former,	  while	  prophecy	  was	  designed	  for	  the	  
masses.	  Hourani,	  Arabic	  Thought	  in	  the	  Liberal	  Age,	  1798-­‐1939:	  123.	  
81	  Indira	  Falk	  Gesink,	  "Islamic	  Reformation:	  A	  History	  of	  Madrasa	  Reform	  and	  Legal	  Change	  in	  Egypt,"	  
in	  Islam	  and	  Education:	  Myths	  and	  Truths,	  ed.	  Wadad	  Kadi	  and	  Victor	  Billeh	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  
of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2007),	  33-­‐34.	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The	  Educational	  Program	  of	  Sheikh	  Muhammad	  ‘Abduh	  	  
	  
Many	  of	  these	  strains	  of	  thought	  crystalized	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  Muhammad	  
‘Abduh,	  perhaps	  the	  best	  known	  among	  Muslim	  modernists	  and	  an	  intellectual	  
forefather	  of	  salafi	  movements.	  Significantly	  for	  our	  purposes,	  ‘Abduh	  wrote	  
extensively	  about	  education	  and	  the	  need	  for	  its	  administrative,	  bureaucratic	  and	  
curricular	  reform.	  His	  advocacy	  in	  this	  regard	  was	  not	  merely	  an	  intellectual	  
exercise;	  rather	  he	  was	  intimately	  involved	  in	  designing	  and	  implementing	  reform	  
plans	  for	  both	  the	  Ottoman	  and	  Egyptian	  states,	  in	  addition	  to	  his	  attempts	  to	  
transform	  al-­‐Azhar.	  	  
His	  influence	  was	  felt	  throughout	  modernist	  circles	  in	  Greater	  Syria,	  
particularly	  among	  educators	  and	  select	  members	  of	  the	  ‘ulema.82	  In	  his	  diary	  from	  
the	  First	  World	  War,	  for	  example,	  the	  Palestinian	  solider	  Ihsan	  Turjman	  recounts	  
discussing	  the	  works	  of	  Muhammad	  ‘Abduh	  and	  Qasim	  Amin	  at	  the	  home	  of	  the	  
Palestinian	  educator,	  Khalil	  Sakakini,	  with	  a	  group	  that	  included	  Is’af	  Nashashibi,	  
Haj	  Amin	  al-­‐Husseini	  and	  Ishaq	  Darwish.83	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  later	  in	  this	  study,	  one	  of	  
Sheikh	  ‘Abduh’s	  students	  would	  eventually	  become	  a	  high-­‐ranking	  official	  in	  the	  
Department	  of	  Education	  for	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  and	  assume	  control	  over	  
the	  syllabus	  for	  religious	  instruction.	  Given	  the	  porous	  political	  boundaries	  that	  
existed	  and	  the	  migration	  of	  knowledge	  and	  practices	  they	  encouraged,	  a	  closer	  
examination	  of	  ‘Abduh’s	  educational	  writings	  offers	  a	  way	  to	  anchor	  the	  discrete	  
educational	  history	  of	  Palestine	  in	  its	  larger	  intellectual	  context.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  Commins,	  Islamic	  Reform:	  Politics	  and	  Social	  Change	  in	  Late	  Ottoman	  Syria.	  
83	  From	  “The	  Diary	  of	  Ihsan	  Turjman”	  in	  Salim	  Tamari,	  The	  Year	  of	  the	  Locust	  	  (Berkeley	  University	  of	  
California	  Press,	  2011),	  110.	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‘Abduh’s	  view	  of	  education	  as	  a	  panacea	  for	  a	  range	  of	  political,	  social	  and	  
economic	  ills	  mirrored	  the	  optimism	  common	  in	  late	  Ottoman	  circles.84	  Further	  
influenced	  by	  the	  utilitarian	  element	  found	  in	  the	  earlier	  writings	  of	  Rifa‘	  al-­‐Tahtawi,	  
Muhammad	  ‘Abduh	  reportedly	  appreciated	  Spencer’s	  Education,	  Intellectual,	  Moral	  
and	  Physical	  and	  called	  on	  him	  during	  a	  1903	  visit	  to	  London.85	  Yet	  the	  greatest	  
influence	  on	  ‘Abduh’s	  thought	  was	  no	  doubt	  his	  teacher	  and	  mentor,	  Jamal	  al-­‐Din	  al-­‐
Afghani.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  ‘Abduh	  argued	  that	  Islam’s	  unique	  contribution	  lie	  in	  
reuniting	  religious	  truth	  with	  reason,	  thereby	  reconstituting	  a	  natural	  harmony	  that	  
had	  been	  wrongfully	  torn	  asunder	  by	  the	  Christian	  separation	  of	  reason	  from	  faith.	  
Broadly	  speaking,	  such	  logic	  functioned	  to	  render	  permissible	  certain	  bodies	  of	  
knowledge—ranging	  from	  philosophy	  to	  foreign	  languages	  and	  the	  empirical	  
sciences—that	  had	  once	  flourished	  under	  Islam,	  but	  which	  had	  ceased	  to	  be	  widely	  
studied	  in	  the	  madāris.	  
‘Abduh	  authored	  three	  extensive	  memorandums	  on	  education	  reform.	  In	  
1887	  he	  wrote	  to	  the	  Sheikh	  al-­‐Islam	  in	  Istanbul	  and	  argued	  that	  the	  reform	  of	  
religious	  education	  constituted	  a	  project	  of	  the	  utmost	  political	  importance.86	  
Secondly,	  he	  authored	  a	  report	  for	  the	  local	  Ottoman	  governor	  of	  Syria	  that	  
criticized	  the	  influence	  of	  foreign	  schools	  and	  called	  upon	  the	  state	  to	  found	  
competing	  institutions	  to	  foster	  a	  common	  Ottoman	  identity.87	  Finally,	  he	  presented	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  Benjamin	  C.	  Fortna,	  Imperial	  Classroom:	  Islam,	  the	  state,	  and	  education	  in	  the	  late	  Ottoman	  Empire	  	  
(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  Chp.	  2.	  
85	  Tibawi,	  Islamic	  Education:	  Its	  Traditions	  and	  Modernization	  into	  the	  Arab	  National	  Systems:	  70.	  
86	  Muhammad	  'Abduh,	  "lā'iḥa	  iṣlāḥ	  al-­‐ta'līm	  al-­‐'othmānī,"	  in	  al-­‐a'māl	  al-­‐kāmila	  lil-­‐Imam	  al-­‐Sheikh	  
Muhammad	  'Abduh,	  ed.	  Muhammad	  'Imarah	  (Beirut:	  Dar	  al-­‐Shuruq,	  1993),	  3:	  71-­‐85.	  
87———,	  "la'iha	  islah	  al-­‐qutr	  al-­‐suri,"	  in	  al-­‐a'māl	  al-­‐kāmila	  lil-­‐Imam	  al-­‐Sheikh	  Muhammad	  'Abduh,	  ed.	  
Muhammad	  'Imarah	  (Beirut:	  Dar	  al-­‐Shuruq,	  1993),	  3:	  93-­‐101.	  Writing	  on	  foreign	  schools,	  he	  
famously	  stated,	  “let	  parents	  refrain	  from	  sending	  their	  children	  to	  foreign	  schools	  that	  tend	  to	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yet	  another	  series	  of	  recommendations	  to	  the	  khedive	  Tawfiq	  and	  Lord	  Cromer	  
upon	  his	  return	  to	  Egypt	  in	  1889.88	  All	  three	  reports	  offer	  variations	  of	  the	  central	  
corpus	  of	  ideas	  for	  which	  ‘Abduh	  became	  famous.	  The	  fact	  that	  they	  were	  all	  
prepared	  for	  (but	  not	  always	  at	  the	  request	  of)	  the	  state	  does	  not	  necessarily	  
undermine	  their	  credibility	  as	  offering	  a	  genuine	  reflection	  of	  his	  views.	  It	  is	  true	  
that	  his	  prescriptions	  are	  articulated	  in	  a	  highly	  functionalist	  manner	  wherein	  it	  is	  
only	  through	  the	  proper	  type	  of	  religious	  schooling	  that	  the	  state	  can	  produce	  loyal,	  
efficient	  subjects	  willing	  to	  sacrifice	  on	  its	  behalf.	  While	  the	  linkage	  of	  education	  
reform	  to	  the	  health	  of	  the	  state	  may	  thus	  be	  exaggerated,	  it	  is	  not	  inconsistent	  with	  
his	  thought	  if	  one	  considers	  his	  faith	  in	  education	  as	  the	  key	  to	  successfully	  
confronting	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  challenges.	  	  
The	  report	  that	  ‘Abduh	  submitted	  to	  the	  Sheikh	  al-­‐Islam	  is	  particularly	  
significant	  and	  it	  is	  this	  series	  of	  recommendations	  that	  I	  will	  examine	  here.	  It	  was	  
sent,	  first	  of	  all,	  to	  the	  highest	  authority	  on	  Islamic	  legal	  matters	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  
Empire,	  and	  not	  to	  the	  Sultan,	  Grand	  Vizier	  or	  one	  of	  the	  officers	  who	  attended	  to	  
administrative	  affairs.	  Yet	  its	  principle	  argument	  was	  that	  that	  religious	  education	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
change	  their	  habits	  and	  religious	  faith,	  until	  God	  ordains	  that	  religious	  instruction	  be	  excluded	  from	  
all	  schools	  throughout	  the	  world,	  that	  it	  be	  given	  in	  special	  institutions	  only,	  and	  that	  the	  schools	  be	  
restricted	  to	  teaching	  subjects	  other	  than	  religion—an	  impossible	  development	  in	  our	  lands.”	  Quoted	  
in	  Tibawi,	  Islamic	  education:	  its	  traditions	  and	  modernization	  into	  the	  Arab	  national	  systems:	  71.	  
88	  Muhammad	  'Abduh,	  "Mashru'	  islah	  al-­‐tarbiya	  fi	  Misr,"	  in	  al-­‐a'māl	  al-­‐kāmila	  lil-­‐Imam	  al-­‐Sheikh	  
Muhammad	  'Abduh,	  ed.	  Muhammad	  'Imarah	  (Beirut:	  Dar	  al-­‐Shuruq,	  1993),	  3:106-­‐22.	  According	  to	  
‘Imarah,	  this	  report	  was	  written	  sometime	  prior	  to	  ‘Abduh’s	  return	  to	  Egypt	  in	  1889,	  not	  afterward,	  
as	  was	  claimed	  by	  Rashid	  Rida	  in	  his	  biography	  of	  ‘Abduh.	  Additionally,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  some	  
scholarly	  disagreement	  over	  how	  his	  recommendations	  were	  received.	  While	  Tibawi	  claims	  that	  Lord	  
Cromer	  rejected	  his	  proposals,	  a	  more	  recent	  articled	  by	  Indira	  Falk	  Gesink	  states	  that	  it	  was	  the	  
khedive	  Tawfiq	  who	  rejected	  his	  reforms	  and	  prevented	  him	  from	  attaining	  a	  teaching	  post	  due	  to	  
the	  fear	  of	  his	  influence	  over	  Egypt’s	  youth.	  Cromer,	  Gesink	  adds,	  actually	  helped	  ‘Abduh	  gain	  
employment	  as	  a	  civil	  court	  judge	  and	  as	  a	  member	  of	  a	  council	  of	  religious	  advisors.	  See:	  Tibawi,	  
Islamic	  Education:	  Its	  Traditions	  and	  Modernization	  into	  the	  Arab	  National	  Systems:	  77.	  Gesink,	  
"Islamic	  Reformation:	  A	  History	  of	  Madrasa	  Reform	  and	  Legal	  Change	  in	  Egypt,"	  29.	  
	  76	  
the	  Empire	  had	  failed	  and	  that	  the	  consequences	  of	  this	  fact	  were	  not	  primarily,	  as	  it	  
might	  have	  been	  in	  earlier	  times,	  the	  erosion	  of	  the	  general	  moral	  order	  or	  the	  
weakening	  of	  individual	  piety;	  rather,	  and	  far	  more	  dire,	  deficiencies	  in	  religious	  
education	  were	  gradually	  undermining	  the	  state	  itself.	  The	  timing	  was	  not	  
insignificant,	  as	  ‘Abduh	  submitted	  his	  recommendations	  in	  1887	  following	  a	  slew	  of	  
political	  and	  military	  defeats	  that	  stripped	  the	  Empire	  of	  several	  key	  provinces:	  
Serbia	  and	  Montenegro	  (gained	  independence	  in	  1878),	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	  
(occupied	  by	  Austria-­‐Hungary	  in	  1878),	  Cyprus	  (occupied	  by	  Britain	  in	  1878),	  
Tunisia	  (occupied	  by	  France	  in	  1881)	  and	  Egypt	  (occupied	  by	  Britain	  in	  1882).	  	  
‘Abduh’s	  recommendations	  also	  followed	  the	  decision	  to	  abandon	  attempts	  
to	  incorporate	  katātīb	  and	  other	  communal	  schools	  into	  a	  unified	  educational	  
system	  and	  to	  instead	  found	  new	  (and	  competing)	  primary	  schools.	  It	  is	  the	  latter	  
schools	  which	  were	  the	  subject	  of	  ‘Abduh’s	  report.	  As	  Benjamin	  Fortna	  has	  argued,	  
these	  state	  schools	  were	  not	  “secular”	  in	  any	  sense	  (and	  indeed	  the	  term	  itself	  is	  
rather	  misplaced	  in	  this	  context),	  and	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  the	  political	  crises	  and	  
territorial	  losses	  of	  the	  late	  Ottoman	  period	  led	  to	  a	  renewed	  emphasis	  on	  Islam	  
within	  schools,	  including	  the	  development	  of	  institutional	  supervision	  meant	  to	  
ensure	  students’	  proper	  behavior.89	  Within	  this	  framework,	  ‘Abduh’s	  memorandum	  
offers	  an	  instructive	  example	  of	  the	  practical	  means	  whereby	  historically	  diverse	  
patterns	  of	  religious	  learning	  were	  transformed	  into	  an	  educational	  system	  at	  the	  
hands	  of	  the	  state	  that	  aimed	  at,	  even	  if	  it	  did	  not	  achieve,	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  
bureaucratic	  standardization	  and	  curricular	  uniformity.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Fortna,	  Imperial	  Classroom:	  Islam,	  the	  state,	  and	  education	  in	  the	  late	  Ottoman	  Empire.	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In	  language	  that	  echoed	  contemporary	  statements	  regarding	  the	  upheaval	  in	  
Mount	  Lebanon,	  90	  ignorance	  (jahl)	  functions	  in	  ‘Abduh’s	  writings	  as	  social	  force	  that	  
undermines	  respect	  for	  Islam,	  enables	  foreign	  domination	  and	  weakens	  the	  
individual’s	  loyalty	  to	  the	  state.	  Ignorance	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  a	  disease	  of	  the	  
masses	  and	  the	  religious	  leaders	  that	  cater	  to	  their	  needs,	  characterized	  here	  as	  
“believers	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  ignorant	  [ones]	  that	  preceded	  us.”91	  His	  use	  of	  
ignorance	  (jahl)	  and	  its	  derivatives	  is	  highly	  suggestive	  of	  the	  period	  of	  Jahaliya	  (the	  
“age	  of	  ignorance”	  prior	  to	  Islam),	  and	  corresponds	  with	  the	  overall	  sense	  that	  
contemporary	  Muslims	  have	  deviated	  from	  the	  proper	  path:	  	  
The	  passage	  of	   time	  has	   indeed	   injured	   the	  souls	  of	  Muslims,	  and	   the	  days	  
have	  harmed	  the	  tenets	  of	  their	  belief,	  and	  the	  bonds	  of	  their	  conviction	  have	  
weakened,	   which	   has	   enveloped	   them	   in	   the	   darkness	   of	   ignorance	  
[concerning]	   the	   foundations	   of	   their	   religion,	   and	   weakness	   has	   indeed	  
succeeded	   the	   decay	   in	   morals,	   the	   regression	   of	   character,	   and	  
degeneration	  in	  spirit,	  until	  most	  of	  the	  public	  has	  become	  similar	  to	  animals	  
of	  the	  field.92	  
	  
This	  “religious	  sickness,”	  ‘Abduh	  continued,	  “has	  already	  cleared	  the	  way	  for	  foreign	  
demons	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  hearts	  of	  many	  Muslims,”	  a	  fact	  that	  was	  most	  clearly	  
visible	  in	  the	  large	  number	  of	  Muslim	  children	  attending	  Christian	  missionary	  
schools.	  These	  schools,	  he	  claimed,	  disparaged	  Islam	  and	  thereby	  alienated	  pupils	  
both	  from	  their	  religious	  heritage	  and	  the	  Ottoman	  state.	  For	  children	  attending	  
missionary	  schools,	  “their	  education	  will	  not	  cease	  until	  their	  hearts	  are	  emptied	  of	  
every	  Islamic	  tie,”	  leading	  them	  to	  become	  Muslims	  in	  name	  alone.93	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Ussama	  Samir	  Makdisi,	  The	  Culture	  of	  Sectarianism:	  Community,	  History,	  and	  Violence	  in	  nineteenth-­‐
century	  Ottoman	  Lebanon	  	  (University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2000).	  
91	  'Abduh,	  "lā'iḥa	  iṣlāḥ	  al-­‐ta'līm	  al-­‐'othmānī,"	  75.	  
92	  Ibid.,	  72.	  
93	  Ibid.,	  73.	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   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  ‘Abduh	  condemned	  the	  communal	  forms	  learning—	  
katātīb	  and	  madāris—as	  completely	  devoid	  of	  meaningful	  religious	  instruction	  (al-­‐
ta‘līm	  al-­‐dīnī).	  So	  too	  were	  the	  state	  professional	  and	  military	  academies,	  wherein	  
‘Abduh	  suggested	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  proper	  religious	  instruction	  produced	  
graduates	  prone	  to	  disloyalty.	  “For	  if	  they	  are	  called	  upon	  to	  defend	  the	  nation	  
(milla)	  or	  the	  state	  (dawla),	  they	  will	  rely	  on	  leisure,	  be	  inclined	  toward	  betrayal,	  
and	  seek	  to	  save	  themselves	  by	  any	  means.”94	  There	  was	  “but	  one	  reason”	  for	  this	  
sorry	  state	  of	  affairs,	  namely,	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  religious	  instruction	  (al-­‐qusūr	  fi	  al-­‐
ta‘līm	  al-­‐dīnī).	  It	  follows	  from	  ‘Abduh’s	  discursive	  logic	  that	  the	  sole	  cure	  for	  this	  
sickness	  lies	  in	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  educational	  reform.	  
	   In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  report,	  ‘Abduh	  outlined	  a	  detailed	  and	  hierarchical	  
plan	  for	  Islamic	  education	  in	  Ottoman	  public	  schools.	  It	  is	  undeniably	  an	  elitist	  
structure	  wherein	  the	  pupil	  would	  be	  exposed	  only	  to	  the	  level	  of	  religious	  
knowledge	  deemed	  appropriate	  for	  his	  social	  position.	  “And	  thus	  we	  partition	  the	  
classes	  of	  people	  into	  three	  [categories],	  and	  determine	  for	  each	  one	  of	  them	  the	  
limit	  of	  these	  disciplines	  [of	  the	  religious	  sciences].”95	  He	  recommended	  three	  tracks	  
of	  religious	  education:	  first,	  in	  primary	  schools	  for	  “the	  children	  of	  Muslims	  who	  
stop	  at	  the	  principles	  of	  writing,	  reading	  and	  something	  of	  arithmetic”	  and	  who	  will	  
work	  in	  trade,	  agriculture	  or	  industry;	  second,	  in	  the	  sultaniyya	  schools	  
(professional	  and	  military	  academies	  for	  those	  who	  would	  serve	  the	  state	  in	  some	  
future	  capacity);	  and	  finally,	  in	  the	  madāris	  for	  “the	  sons	  of	  Muslims	  that	  grasped	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  Ibid.	  
95	  Ibid.,	  77.	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what	  was	  presented”	  prior	  to	  this	  point	  and	  “revealed	  excellence	  in	  their	  
understanding”	  of	  the	  Islamic	  sciences.	  	  
What	  is	  common	  within	  these	  three	  different	  levels	  of	  religious	  education	  is	  
the	  emphasis	  on	  a	  unified	  curricula	  and	  centralized	  supervision	  of	  both	  the	  teaching	  
staff	  and	  pupils.	  Indeed,	  ‘Abduh	  composed	  a	  list	  of	  the	  subjects	  that	  must	  be	  
included	  (and	  avoided)	  within	  each	  strata,	  adding,	  “It	  is	  necessary	  to	  establish	  [for	  
them]	  religious	  textbooks	  in	  accordance	  with	  this	  perspective.”	  For	  students	  in	  
primary	  schools,	  their	  religious	  education	  should	  mention	  nothing	  of	  Islamic	  
sectarian	  battles	  and	  rather	  focus	  on	  teaching	  a	  practical	  understanding	  of	  acts	  that	  
are	  ḥalāl	  and	  ḥarām.	  He	  also	  recommended	  an	  abridged	  textbook	  for	  history,	  which	  
should	  focus	  on	  the	  biography	  of	  Muhammad	  and	  his	  companions	  and	  the	  moral	  
virtues	  that	  facilitated	  the	  early	  Arab	  conquests.	  All	  this	  should	  be	  taught	  in	  a	  
fashion	  that	  is	  succinct	  and	  easy	  to	  comprehend.	  96	  
The	  prescriptions	  for	  the	  upper	  two	  levels	  of	  schooling	  introduced	  more	  
advanced	  topics	  and	  methods,	  such	  as	  the	  principles	  of	  jurisprudence	  and	  the	  
methods	  of	  disputation.	  Yet	  even	  at	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  madrasa	  study,	  ‘Abduh	  
attempted	  to	  establish	  a	  standardized	  series	  of	  topics	  and	  texts	  that	  would	  have	  
effectively	  overturned	  the	  prevailing	  style	  of	  learning,	  in	  which	  individual	  teachers	  
possessed	  a	  wide	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  in	  selecting	  the	  subject	  matter	  on	  which	  they	  
lectured.	  In	  ‘Abduh’s	  scheme,	  because	  these	  schools	  would	  produce	  future	  members	  
of	  the	  ‘ulema,	  they	  required	  the	  utmost	  supervision	  from	  the	  Ottoman	  state	  and	  the	  
Sheikh	  al-­‐Islam	  himself.	  Furthermore,	  a	  system	  of	  examinations	  and	  formal	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certification	  must	  be	  introduced	  within	  them,	  so	  that	  no	  one	  may	  attain	  a	  certificate	  
to	  teach	  except	  after	  “a	  difficult	  test	  in	  the	  advanced	  fields	  of	  knowledge.”97	  If	  the	  
dire	  state	  of	  contemporary	  conditions	  stemmed	  from	  deficiencies	  in	  religious	  
education,	  ‘Abduh	  argued	  that	  enacting	  his	  recommendations	  would	  facilitate	  the	  
overall	  rebirth	  of	  the	  nation	  through	  implanting	  in	  its	  subjects’	  hearts	  “a	  love	  of	  and	  
respect	  for	  religion.”	  Thereby	  the	  nation	  could	  finally	  become	  unified	  and	  able	  to	  
attain	  a	  “single	  aim	  toward	  which	  all	  [the	  peoples’]	  actions	  aspire.”98	  
As	  for	  the	  practical	  sciences,	  philosophy,	  foreign	  languages	  and	  other	  
subjects	  not	  usually	  considered	  “religious”	  in	  nature,	  these	  too	  must	  be	  embraced,	  as	  
“nothing	  in	  them	  damages	  religion,	  rather	  religion	  strengthens	  them	  as	  they	  
strengthen	  it.”99	  Beyond	  believing	  in	  this	  epistemic	  symbiosis,	  ‘Abduh	  most	  likely	  
had	  a	  more	  pragmatic	  goal	  in	  mind.	  The	  reality	  was	  that	  parents	  seeking	  their	  
children’s	  social	  or	  economic	  betterment	  would	  turn	  to	  missionary	  schools	  because	  
they	  taught	  foreign	  languages	  and	  modern	  sciences.	  Given	  the	  strong	  association	  
between	  these	  subjects	  and	  commercial	  gain,	  the	  only	  means	  through	  which	  to	  keep	  
the	  masses	  within	  the	  fold	  of	  Islam	  was	  to	  transform	  Islamic	  education.	  	  	  
Looking	  at	  ‘Abduh’s	  recommendations,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  grasp	  a	  central	  feature	  
that	  distinguished	  the	  modernist	  approach	  to	  religious	  schooling	  from	  that	  popular	  
in	  colonial	  circles.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  our	  analysis	  of	  British	  educational	  policies	  in	  
Palestine,	  the	  association	  of	  religious	  education	  with	  social	  conservatism	  and	  
political	  stability	  lay	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Mandatory	  government’s	  support	  for	  Jewish	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




and	  Islamic	  schooling.	  In	  contrast,	  modernists	  of	  both	  traditions	  looked	  to	  religious	  
education—of	  a	  transformed	  variety—as	  the	  vehicle	  through	  which	  to	  achieve	  
social	  and	  political	  change,	  even	  if,	  as	  in	  ‘Abduh’s	  case,	  that	  change	  was	  cast	  in	  terms	  
of	  a	  return	  to	  authentic	  Islamic	  principles.	  This	  analysis	  highlights	  the	  creative	  
interplay	  between	  “old”	  and	  “new”	  systems	  of	  schooling:	  it	  was	  arguably	  only	  
through	  revolutionary	  change—pedagogic,	  administrative,	  and	  curricular—that	  
religious	  education	  could	  preserve	  any	  traces	  of	  the	  old	  moral	  order.	  	  	  
Implementing	  those	  changes	  required	  nothing	  less	  than	  the	  administrative	  
machinery	  of	  the	  modern	  state,	  the	  only	  entity	  capable	  of	  unifying	  curricula,	  
establishing	  teaching	  credentials	  and	  supervising	  a	  diffuse	  network	  of	  schools.	  
‘Abduh’s	  entreaties	  to	  the	  Sublime	  Porte	  to	  combat	  the	  seeds	  of	  religious	  ignorance	  
through	  a	  streamlined	  educational	  order	  should	  not	  then,	  be	  read	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  
pre-­‐modern	  sensibilities	  reacting	  against	  Ottoman	  Modernity.	  New	  and	  old,	  modern	  
and	  traditional,	  secular	  and	  religious	  –	  scholars	  shy	  away	  from	  these	  binaries	  with	  
good	  reason.	  Here	  we	  can	  see	  a	  practical	  illustration	  of	  how	  limited	  they	  are	  as	  
either	  descriptive	  terms	  or	  markers	  of	  eras.	  The	  new	  and	  old	  animate,	  rather	  than	  
replace,	  one	  another,	  just	  as	  modernity	  begets	  new	  ways	  of	  being	  traditional	  and	  
secular	  technologies	  produce	  mechanisms	  for	  nurturing	  religious	  life.	  	  
These	  debates	  were	  far	  from	  tangential	  to	  later	  events	  in	  Palestine.	  Egypt	  
served	  as	  the	  most	  immediate	  example	  for	  its	  education	  administrators,	  and	  the	  first	  
Director	  of	  Education	  for	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine,	  Humphrey	  Bowman,	  served	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in	  the	  Education	  Department	  in	  Egypt	  from	  1903-­‐1911.100	  	  The	  syllabus	  adopted	  for	  
government	  public	  schools	  in	  Palestine	  was	  modeled	  on	  the	  Egyptian	  one,	  and	  the	  
modernist	  sheikh	  who	  created	  the	  curriculum	  for	  religious	  education	  was	  himself	  a	  
former	  student	  of	  Muhammad	  ‘Abduh.101	  	  
Building	  on	  the	  observations	  and	  theoretical	  frames	  established	  in	  this	  
chapter,	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  study	  will	  trace	  these	  early	  stirrings	  of	  reform	  
through	  their	  incarnation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  modern	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  schools	  in	  
Mandate	  Palestine.	  There,	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  modernists	  crossed	  paths	  not	  only	  
with	  one	  another,	  but	  also	  with	  British	  colonial	  officials	  who	  came	  bearing	  definitive	  
notions	  regarding	  education	  and	  the	  role	  of	  religious	  instruction	  within	  it.	  The	  
chapters	  that	  follow	  will	  elucidate	  why	  Mandate	  Palestine	  offered	  a	  unique	  setting	  
for	  defining	  the	  modern	  relationship	  between	  religion,	  mass	  education	  and	  political	  
identity	  –	  the	  legacies	  of	  which,	  we	  might	  add,	  are	  still	  very	  much	  alive.	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  Humphrey	  Ernest	  Bowman,	  Middle-­‐East	  Window,	  1	  vols.	  (Lond.:	  Longmans,	  1942),	  Part	  II:	  Egypt	  
1903-­‐11.	  




The	  Foundations	  of	  British	  Education	  Policy	  in	  Palestine	  
	  
This	  chapter	  will	  offer	  an	  overview	  of	  British	  educational	  policies	  in	  Mandate	  
Palestine.	  While	  portions	  of	  this	  chapter	  offer	  a	  glimpse	  into	  issues	  beyond	  the	  
immediate	  scope	  of	  this	  project,	  this	  slightly	  expanded	  view	  is	  crucial	  in	  light	  of	  the	  
fact	  that	  the	  most	  authoritative	  account	  of	  education	  during	  the	  period	  remains	  
Abdul	  Latif	  Tibawi’s	  1956	  study.	  My	  goal	  here	  is	  not	  to	  rewrite	  this	  history	  but	  to	  
supplement	  it	  with	  details	  of	  central	  importance,	  largely	  drawn	  from	  archival	  
sources	  that	  were	  not	  accessible	  until	  relatively	  recently.	  	  
This	  chapter	  will	  argue	  that	  a	  significant	  disconnect	  existed	  between	  the	  
Government	  of	  Palestine’s	  stated	  political	  goals	  and	  the	  actual	  consequences	  of	  its	  
educational	  policies.	  In	  support	  of	  this	  claim,	  I	  will	  examine	  the	  linchpins	  of	  the	  
government’s	  educational	  order:	  the	  prioritization	  of	  primary	  education,	  the	  
development	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  rural	  schooling,	  the	  creation	  of	  separate	  Arab	  and	  
Jewish	  public	  school	  systems,	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  monolingual	  education.	  What	  
unites	  these	  disparate	  points	  of	  educational	  planning,	  I	  will	  suggest,	  was	  a	  failure	  to	  
appreciate	  the	  unintended—but	  in	  hindsight,	  almost	  inevitable—political	  
implications	  of	  what	  officials	  argued	  were	  policies	  adopted	  for	  purely	  pragmatic	  or	  
pedagogic	  reasons.	  The	  unwillingness	  to	  acknowledge	  education	  as	  an	  inherently	  
political	  practice—which	  would,	  we	  recall,	  violate	  the	  terms	  of	  what	  I	  have	  called	  
the	  “modern	  educational	  constitution”—seems	  most	  at	  fault	  in	  perpetrating	  this	  
disconnect	  between	  the	  government’s	  political	  aims	  and	  the	  discrete	  policies	  
adopted	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Education.	  As	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  the	  remaining	  chapters,	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the	  view	  of	  education	  as	  an	  apolitical	  practice	  was	  intimately	  connected	  with	  the	  
government’s	  stance	  toward	  religious	  instruction	  and	  its	  conflicts	  with	  Jewish	  and	  
Muslim	  communities	  over	  its	  proper	  form.	  However,	  prior	  to	  turning	  to	  this	  
conversation,	  we	  must	  gain	  some	  understanding	  of	  the	  history	  of	  education	  as	  a	  
whole	  during	  this	  formative	  period.	  
Upon	  assuming	  control	  of	  public	  education	  in	  Palestine,	  the	  Mandatory	  
Government	  articulated	  two	  interrelated	  goals:	  first,	  to	  expand	  access	  to	  primary	  
education	  among	  Palestinian	  Arabs,	  which	  officials	  hoped	  would	  increase	  literacy	  
rates,	  rationalize	  agricultural	  production,	  and	  introduce	  technical	  and	  vocational	  
training.	  This	  initiative	  was	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  second	  goal,	  namely	  the	  policy	  of	  
“equalization.”	  Effectively,	  this	  policy	  stated	  that	  it	  was	  undesirable	  for	  “two	  races”	  
of	  radically	  different	  educational	  levels	  to	  inhabit	  the	  same	  land.	  Whereas	  education	  
among	  Jews	  was	  nearly	  universal,	  only	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  Arab	  population	  received	  
any	  form	  of	  schooling.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  the	  Director	  of	  Education,	  “It	  would	  be	  
difficult	  to	  exaggerate	  the	  cumulative	  seriousness	  of	  the	  situation	  which	  has	  been	  
gradually	  created	  and	  is	  still	  being	  created	  by	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  educational	  
provision	  made	  by	  the	  Government	  since	  the	  Occupation…The	  natural	  result	  of	  this	  
disparity	  between	  the	  educational	  facilities	  offered	  to	  Arabs	  and	  Jews	  is	  to	  widen	  
the	  cultural	  gulf	  between	  the	  two	  races,	  to	  prevent	  social	  intermixture	  on	  equal	  
terms	  and	  to	  tend	  to	  reduce	  the	  Arabs	  to	  a	  position	  of	  permanent	  inferiority.”1	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  Jerome	  Farrell,	  “Note	  on	  the	  draft	  estimates	  of	  the	  Education	  Department	  for	  the	  financial	  year	  
1937-­‐1938,	  with	  special	  reference	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  urban	  education.”	  April	  10,	  1937.	  TNA,	  CO	  
733/329/13.	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However,	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  was	  forced	  to	  work	  within	  the	  
boundaries	  demarcated	  by	  the	  Mandate	  for	  Palestine	  and	  the	  financial	  stringency	  of	  
the	  British	  Treasury.	  As	  such,	  it	  was	  arguably	  impossible	  to	  achieve	  its	  stated	  goals.	  
For	  example,	  how	  were	  administrators	  to	  expand	  the	  system	  of	  public	  schools	  while	  
funds	  were	  continually	  diverted	  from	  social	  services	  to	  maintain	  security	  forces?	  At	  
other	  times,	  the	  government	  erected	  barriers	  that	  rendered	  achieving	  its	  stated	  
goals	  all	  but	  impossible.	  How	  were	  educational	  and	  cultural	  divisions	  between	  
Palestinian	  Arabs	  and	  Jews	  to	  be	  overcome	  when	  the	  Mandatory	  state	  gave	  legal	  
sanction	  to	  separate	  school	  systems,	  created	  new	  administrative	  barriers	  between	  
them	  and	  insisted	  on	  the	  pedagogic	  benefits	  of	  monolingualism?	  This	  chapter	  will	  
probe	  these	  and	  other	  questions	  more	  thoroughly.	  	  
Ottoman	  Palestine	  featured	  a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  schools,	  curricula	  and	  
pedagogical	  methods.	  In	  1914,	  ninety-­‐five	  public	  elementary	  schools	  and	  three	  
public	  secondary	  schools	  existed.2	  These	  schools	  were	  the	  fruits	  of	  the	  late	  19th	  
century	  Ottoman	  effort	  to	  make	  education	  universal	  and	  compulsory,	  though	  in	  
reality	  neither	  goal	  was	  ever	  attained.	  The	  Ottoman	  Empire	  intended	  to	  create	  a	  
system	  of	  public	  schools	  that	  would	  provide	  an	  alternative	  to	  religious	  communal	  
schools	  and	  presumably	  better	  prepare	  children	  for	  modern	  cultural,	  economic	  and	  
political	  life.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  prior	  chapter,	  officials	  looked	  to	  the	  new	  schools	  in	  
particular	  to	  produce	  a	  class	  of	  subjects	  able	  to	  assume	  military	  and	  bureaucratic	  
posts.	  After	  an	  aborted	  attempt	  to	  absorb	  communal	  schools	  into	  the	  network	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  20.	  
	  86	  
public	  education,	  Ottoman	  officials	  established	  a	  parallel	  network	  of	  primary	  
schools	  meant	  to	  eventually	  supersede	  those	  managed	  by	  religious	  communities.3	  
Religious	  minorities	  were	  free	  to	  maintain	  their	  own	  schools,	  though	  in	  
theory	  (but	  not	  in	  practice),	  the	  public	  schools	  were	  open	  to	  all	  Ottoman	  subjects.	  
Local	  Christian	  and	  Jewish	  bodies	  operated	  schools	  that	  competed	  with	  those	  
administered	  by	  missionary	  and	  philanthropic	  bodies	  abroad.4	  Schools	  maintained	  
by	  the	  latter	  entities	  were	  generally	  free	  or	  very	  inexpensive	  to	  attend,	  and	  
consequently,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Christian	  and	  Jewish	  children	  were	  able	  to	  obtain	  
some	  sort	  of	  education.	  Most	  of	  these	  schools	  featured	  a	  mixed	  syllabus	  laced	  with	  a	  
heavy	  dose	  of	  proselytism	  or,	  particularly	  in	  philanthropic	  schools,	  efforts	  to	  
“reform”	  the	  native	  population.	  The	  languages	  of	  instruction	  varied,	  and	  included	  
Arabic,	  Greek,	  Armenian,	  German,	  Italian,	  French	  and	  Yiddish.	  	  
Additionally,	  Zionist	  immigrants	  of	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  
century	  founded	  schools	  in	  agricultural	  colonies	  and	  cities.	  These	  schools	  were	  not	  
linked	  administratively	  though	  they	  shared	  many	  of	  the	  same	  educational	  goals	  and	  
were	  usually	  conducted	  (or	  at	  least	  attempted)	  in	  Hebrew.	  The	  impetus	  for	  
centralized	  control	  came	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  infamous	  “language	  wars”	  of	  1913,	  in	  
which	  numerous	  members	  of	  the	  Zionist	  Teachers	  Association	  resigned	  in	  protest	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  In	  reality,	  however,	  many	  public	  schools	  retained	  key	  characteristics	  of	  the	  kuttāb.	  For	  a	  more	  
thorough	  discussion,	  see	  Somel,	  The	  Modernization	  of	  Public	  Education	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  1839-­‐
1908:	  Islamization,	  Autocracy,	  and	  Discipline.	  
4	  A	  small	  sampling	  of	  private	  organizations	  that	  maintained	  schools	  includes	  the	  Alliance	  Israélite,	  
the	  Latin,	  Orthodox	  and	  Syrian	  Patriarchs,	  the	  Anglican	  Bishop,	  the	  Custode	  de	  Terra	  Santa,	  the	  Order	  
of	  the	  Friars,	  the	  Church	  Missionary	  Society,	  the	  Jerusalem	  and	  East	  Mission,	  the	  Church	  Mission	  to	  
the	  Jews,	  the	  Scots	  Mission,	  the	  Missionsgesellschaft	  fur	  das	  Heilige	  Land,	  the	  American	  Friends	  
Mission,	  the	  Swedish	  Mission	  and	  numerous	  Roman	  Catholic	  bodies.	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  
Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  21-­‐23.	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over	  the	  use	  of	  “foreign”	  languages	  in	  schools.5	  The	  Association	  created	  a	  va’ad	  ha-­‐
ẖinuch	  (Board	  of	  Education)	  and	  took	  control	  of	  twelve	  schools	  that	  were	  dedicated	  
to	  teaching	  all	  subjects	  in	  Hebrew.	  These	  schools	  formed	  the	  nucleus	  of	  the	  Zionist	  
school	  system,	  and	  by	  1918,	  they	  numbered	  nearly	  forty.	  After	  the	  British	  
occupation,	  supervision	  by	  the	  Teachers	  Association	  gave	  way	  to	  direct	  control	  by	  
the	  Zionist	  Executive’s	  newly-­‐formed	  Department	  of	  Education,	  with	  the	  former	  
head	  of	  the	  Teachers	  Association,	  Dr.	  Yosef	  Luria,	  as	  its	  Director.	  The	  schools	  
themselves	  were	  divided	  into	  three	  “trends,”	  each	  corresponding	  to	  a	  Zionist	  
political	  party—Labor,	  Mizrachi	  (religious),	  and	  General	  Zionists—and	  supervised	  
by	  an	  inspectorate	  drawn	  from	  party	  members.6	  
Despite	  the	  growth	  in	  Zionist	  education,	  a	  sizeable	  number	  of	  Jewish	  children	  
attended	  Orthodox	  communal	  schools	  (ẖederim,	  talmudei	  torah	  or	  katātīb)	  or	  those	  
maintained	  by	  philanthropic	  organizations,	  such	  as	  the	  Alliance	  Israélite	  
Universelle.	  Much	  to	  the	  chagrin	  of	  Zionist	  leaders,	  approximately	  one-­‐third	  to	  one-­‐
quarter	  of	  Jewish	  children	  continued	  to	  frequent	  non-­‐Zionist	  schools	  throughout	  the	  
Mandate	  period.7	  On	  the	  whole,	  Ashkenazi	  Jews	  of	  the	  Old	  Yishuv	  refused	  to	  send	  
their	  children	  to	  schools	  supervised	  by	  the	  Zionist	  Organization.	  Interestingly,	  
members	  of	  the	  Old	  Yishuv	  who	  were	  part	  of	  Sephardi	  or	  Middle	  Eastern	  Jewish	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Yaakov	  Ben-­‐Yosef,	  Milhemet	  ha-­‐safot	  :	  (ha-­‐maavak	  le-­‐`Ivrit,	  1914)	  	  (Tel	  Aviv:	  Otsar	  ha-­‐moreh,	  
Hotsaat	  ha-­‐sefarim	  shel	  Histadrut	  ha-­‐morim	  be-­‐Yisrael,	  1984).	  
6	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  Department	  of	  Education,	  "Note	  on	  Education	  in	  Palestine	  1920-­‐1929,"	  
(Jerusalem1929).	  The	  exact	  number	  of	  schools	  under	  Zionist	  control	  during	  this	  time	  is	  subject	  to	  
some	  debate.	  For	  alternate	  figures	  see	  Bentwich,	  Education	  in	  Israel:	  14-­‐15.	  For	  greater	  detail	  on	  the	  
early	  administrative	  structure	  of	  the	  Zionist	  schools,	  see	  Elboim-­‐Dror,	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  ha-­‐ivri	  be-­‐Erets-­‐
Yisrael:	  Vol.	  2,	  Sections	  1-­‐2.	  
7	  For	  the	  1944-­‐45	  school	  year,	  77,968	  children	  were	  enrolled	  in	  schools	  supervised	  by	  the	  Va’ad	  
Leumi	  while	  24,083	  attended	  those	  outside	  the	  Zionist	  system.	  See:	  Department	  of	  Education	  of	  the	  
Government	  of	  Palestine,	  Annual	  Report	  1945-­‐46	  	  (Jerusalem	  1947),	  5.	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communities	  were	  less	  opposed	  to	  the	  educational	  influence	  of	  the	  Zionist	  
Organization,	  and	  indeed	  frequently	  applied	  to	  it	  for	  financial	  assistance.	  As	  I	  
discuss	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  they	  never	  received	  it	  in	  the	  same	  measure	  as	  European	  Jewish	  
immigrants	  because	  their	  desire	  to	  maintain	  a	  distinct	  sense	  of	  edah	  (loosely	  
translated	  as	  an	  ethno-­‐religious	  faction)	  strained	  relations	  with	  the	  Zionist	  
Organization	  and	  its	  desire	  to	  promote	  a	  “universal”	  (i.e.	  European)	  Hebrew	  
identity.8	  
Adopting	  the	  status	  quo	  ante	  bellum,	  the	  nascent	  Department	  of	  Education	  of	  
the	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  assumed	  direct	  control	  of	  the	  former	  Ottoman	  public	  
schools	  and	  nominal	  control	  of	  schools	  maintained	  by	  Zionist	  and	  other	  private	  
organizations.	  Like	  their	  Ottoman	  predecessors,	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  would	  
never	  gain	  true	  supervisory	  powers	  over	  non-­‐government	  schools,	  which	  greatly	  
outnumbered	  public	  schools	  throughout	  the	  Mandate	  period.9	  As	  Director	  of	  
Education,	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  appointed	  Humphrey	  Bowman,	  a	  seasoned	  colonial	  
officer	  who	  attended	  Eton	  and	  Oxford	  before	  supervising	  education	  departments	  in	  
the	  Sudan,	  Egypt	  and	  Iraq.10	  Bowman	  was	  highly	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  Arab	  cause	  in	  
Palestine	  and	  wary	  of	  political	  Zionism,	  though	  he	  did	  not	  share	  in	  the	  outright	  anti-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Elboim-­‐Dror,	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  ha-­‐ivri	  be-­‐Erets-­‐Yisrael:	  228-­‐39.	  
9	  The	  1923	  Annual	  Report	  states	  that	  there	  were	  312	  government	  elementary	  and	  secondary	  schools	  
versus	  367	  maintained	  by	  private	  groups.	  By	  1945-­‐46,	  the	  last	  year	  for	  which	  there	  is	  complete	  data,	  
the	  Government	  maintained	  just	  over	  500	  schools	  in	  comparison	  to	  nearly	  1300	  under	  Zionist	  or	  
private	  auspices.	  See	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  Department	  of	  Education	  Annual	  Report	  1923	  and	  
Annual	  Report	  1945-­‐46.	  
10	  As	  an	  education	  officer	  in	  the	  colonial	  service,	  Bowman	  was	  treading	  a	  well-­‐worn	  path.	  It	  is	  
estimated	  that	  from	  the	  years	  1918-­‐1938,	  20-­‐30%	  of	  Oxford	  and	  Cambridge	  graduates	  served	  in	  the	  
colonial	  education	  administration.	  See	  R.	  Symonds,	  Oxford	  and	  Empire	  	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press,	  1986),	  307.	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Semitism	  expressed	  by	  some	  of	  his	  colleagues.	  He	  served	  from	  1920-­‐1936,	  when	  he	  
retired	  and	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  his	  longtime	  Assistant	  Director,	  assumed	  his	  post.	  	  
Farrell	  was	  more	  caustic	  than	  his	  predecessor	  and	  had	  little	  sympathy	  with	  
the	  national	  aspirations	  of	  either	  the	  Jews	  or	  Palestinian	  Arabs.	  He	  became	  famous	  
for	  his	  long,	  frank	  dispatches	  to	  the	  Colonial	  Office,	  which	  contain	  both	  considerable	  
insight	  into	  the	  problems	  that	  plagued	  educational	  planning	  and	  frequent	  displays	  
of	  antipathy	  toward	  Jews	  and	  Arabs	  alike.	  Bowman	  initially	  expressed	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  
reservation	  about	  Farrell’s	  suitability	  for	  the	  post,	  describing	  him	  as	  a	  man	  who	  
“rather	  despises	  Arabs,	  but	  works	  well	  with	  his	  colleagues	  (except	  G.A.),”	  [George	  
Antonius]	  whom	  he	  famously	  forced	  out	  of	  his	  high	  level	  post	  at	  the	  Department	  of	  
Education.11	  In	  Bowman’s	  words:	  
He	   [Farrell]	   likes	   to	   rule	   the	   roost	  and	  does	  not	   really	   take	  much	  notice	  of	  
any	  opinion	  offered	  him	  by	  anyone.	  He	  is	  too	  good	  for	  the	  job,	  he	  thinks,	  and	  
is	   too	   well	   qualified	   academically	   that	   he	   deserves	   a	   better	   post,	   but	   in	   a	  
country	   where	   the	   lack	   of	   sympathy	   for	   the	   ruled	   does	   not	   count	   for	   too	  
much.	  Here,	  sympathy	  and	  understanding	  is	  everything	  and	  that	  happens	  to	  
be	  one	  of	  my	  few	  qualifications	  for	  the	  job.12	  
	  
Though	  Bowman	  softened	  toward	  Farrell	  and	  admired	  his	  administrative	  efficiency,	  
there	  was	  no	  doubt	  he	  was	  felt	  that	  his	  junior	  colleague	  lacked	  the	  proper	  sensitivity	  
and	  disposition	  for	  the	  job,	  a	  verdict	  with	  which	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  disagree.	  For	  instance,	  
following	  the	  Wailing	  Wall	  riots	  in	  1929	  and	  the	  subsequent	  general	  strike	  called	  by	  
the	  Arab	  Executive,	  Bowman	  recounted	  with	  horror	  how	  Farrell	  dealt	  with	  the	  
political	  tension	  in	  Nablus.	  “Having	  heard	  that	  all	  boys	  in	  secondary	  classes	  of	  
Salahiyah	  [school]	  were	  absent	  on	  Wednesday,	  went	  there	  on	  Thursday	  with	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Susan	  Silsby	  Boyle,	  Betrayal	  of	  Palestine:	  The	  Story	  of	  George	  Antonius	  	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Westview	  
Press,	  2001).	  
12	  Humphrey	  Bowman,	  diary	  entry	  dated	  June	  1,	  1925.	  MEC,	  Humphrey	  Bowman	  collection,	  Box	  3B.	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British	  policeman	  and	  ordered	  50%	  of	  the	  boys	  caned	  by	  him.	  Result:	  boys	  left	  
school,	  joined	  general	  rabble,	  made	  a	  riot	  and	  were	  arrested.	  Beaten	  again	  by	  police	  
in	  barracks.	  Result:	  general	  strike	  in	  Nablus	  by	  parents	  against	  sending	  children	  to	  
school	  on	  Saturday.”13	  	  Farrell	  served	  until	  the	  end	  of	  1946	  when	  Bernard	  de	  
Bunsen,	  a	  former	  inspector,	  succeeded	  him.	  I	  will	  mainly	  discuss	  the	  views	  and	  
policies	  associated	  with	  the	  first	  two	  directors,	  as	  de	  Bunsen	  only	  filled	  the	  post	  for	  
eighteen	  months	  before	  the	  Mandate	  terminated.	  	  
Soon	  after	  the	  occupation	  of	  Palestine,	  the	  British	  military	  government	  
reopened	  Ottoman	  public	  schools	  that	  had	  been	  closed	  during	  the	  war	  and	  changed	  
the	  language	  of	  instruction	  to	  Arabic.	  They	  established	  teachers	  training	  colleges	  for	  
men	  and	  women	  and	  began	  a	  school	  expansion	  campaign	  in	  both	  towns	  and	  villages,	  
opening	  approximately	  75	  schools	  a	  year.	  The	  civilian	  government	  continued	  this	  
expansion	  program	  only	  through	  1922,	  when	  it	  was	  suspended	  due	  to	  financial	  
stringency.14	  Expansion	  moved	  at	  a	  much	  slower	  pace	  throughout	  the	  remainder	  of	  
the	  Mandate,	  leading	  Tibawi	  to	  argue,	  “Future	  historians…will	  not	  fail	  to	  observe	  
that	  a	  de	  facto	  military	  administration	  was	  able	  to	  open	  within	  two	  years,	  
comparatively	  more	  schools	  than	  a	  de	  jure	  government	  could	  open	  within	  more	  than	  
a	  quarter	  of	  a	  century,	  and	  that	  while	  the	  action	  of	  the	  former	  was	  guided	  by	  a	  well	  
conceived	  plan,	  the	  action	  of	  the	  latter	  was	  guided	  by	  little	  or	  no	  long-­‐range	  
planning.”15	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Humphrey	  Bowman,	  diary	  entry	  dated	  September	  26,	  1929.	  MEC,	  Humphrey	  Bowman	  collection,	  
Box	  3B.	  




While	  Tibawi	  was	  right	  that	  educational	  policy	  during	  this	  period	  was	  often	  
haphazard	  and	  disjointed,	  we	  can	  nonetheless	  identify	  a	  number	  of	  underlying	  
principles	  that	  guided	  its	  development.	  As	  a	  rule,	  colonies	  were	  expected	  to	  be	  self-­‐
sustaining	  and	  finance	  their	  own	  social	  services.	  As	  in	  other	  colonial	  settings,	  
because	  police	  and	  “security”	  spending	  was	  disproportionately	  high,	  few	  resources	  
remained	  for	  education.	  The	  immediate	  consequence	  was	  that	  public	  education	  was	  
consistently	  and	  dramatically	  underfinanced.	  Consequently,	  the	  Government	  was	  
unable	  to	  offer	  any	  educational	  services	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Arab	  population	  
throughout	  the	  Mandate	  period.	  In	  1936,	  the	  Peel	  Commission	  expressed	  dismay	  
that	  schools	  existed	  in	  only	  293	  out	  of	  Palestine’s	  780	  villages,	  and	  that	  the	  forty-­‐
two	  percent	  of	  applicants	  rejected	  annually	  from	  rural	  schools	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  
accommodation	  did	  “not	  include	  all	  the	  children	  in	  all	  the	  other	  villages	  where	  there	  
are	  no	  schools,	  who	  may	  be	  panting	  for	  education.”16	  In	  1945-­‐46,	  the	  last	  year	  for	  
which	  there	  are	  complete	  estimates,	  there	  were	  approximately	  124,000	  Arab	  
children	  in	  public	  or	  private	  schools	  out	  of	  an	  estimated	  school-­‐age	  population	  of	  
300,000.17	  Thus	  after	  twenty-­‐five	  years	  of	  British	  rule,	  nearly	  sixty	  percent	  of	  
Palestinian	  Arab	  children	  were	  still	  without	  access	  to	  public	  education.	  
The	  government	  education	  budget	  never	  reached	  more	  than	  seven	  percent	  of	  
annual	  expenditures,	  and	  for	  most	  years	  it	  was	  less	  than	  five	  percent.18	  The	  funds	  
available	  for	  education	  and	  other	  social	  services	  were	  destined	  to	  remain	  paltry	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  "Testimony	  of	  	  Mr.	  H.	  E.	  Bowman,	  C.M.G.,	  C.B.E.,	  Director	  of	  Education.	  November	  27,	  1936,"	  in	  
Palestine	  Royal	  Commission	  Minutes	  of	  Evidence	  Heard	  at	  Public	  Sessions	  (London:	  His	  Majesty's	  
Stationery	  Office,	  1937),	  48.	  
17	  Department	  of	  Education,	  Government	  of	  Palestine,	  Annual	  Report	  1945-­‐46:	  4.	  
18	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  
273.	  	  
	  92	  
long	  as	  the	  top	  financial	  priority	  was	  “security.”	  This	  spending	  category—which	  
financed	  the	  British	  colonial	  administration,	  the	  police	  force	  and	  the	  prison	  system,	  
i.e.	  all	  the	  tools	  necessary	  to	  overpower	  opposition	  to	  the	  Mandate	  by	  sheer	  force—
accounted	  for	  15-­‐20%	  of	  all	  government	  expenditure.19	  In	  sum,	  a	  vast	  amount	  of	  
funds	  available	  to	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine,	  derived	  primarily	  from	  local	  
taxation,	  went	  toward	  maintaining	  the	  British	  occupation.	  	  
Second,	  the	  meager	  funds	  earmarked	  for	  education	  went	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  
an	  attempt	  to	  decentralize	  school	  funding	  and	  “empower”	  local	  communities	  to	  
open	  and	  finance	  their	  own	  institutions.	  Decentralization	  only	  occurred	  in	  financial	  
terms	  though,	  and	  not	  in	  matters	  of	  administration	  or	  curriculum.	  Beginning	  in	  the	  
early	  1930s,	  Local	  Education	  Authorities	  were	  required	  to	  contribute	  toward	  the	  
opening	  and	  maintenance	  of	  schools,	  but	  were	  not	  consulted	  in	  matters	  concerning	  
the	  teaching	  staff,	  textbooks	  or	  syllabi.	  While	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  
consistently	  maintained	  that	  financial	  decentralization	  was	  a	  form	  of	  empowerment,	  
in	  reality	  it	  was	  too	  heavy	  a	  burden	  to	  bear	  for	  most	  fellahin,	  who	  were	  in	  an	  almost	  
permanent	  state	  of	  financial	  crisis.	  Unlike	  in	  towns,	  where	  the	  schools	  were	  built	  or	  
rented	  and	  maintained	  entirely	  by	  the	  government,	  villages	  were	  initially	  required	  
to	  provide	  the	  school	  building	  and	  furnishings,	  and	  later,	  to	  provide	  LP	  75	  toward	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  For	  the	  1921-­‐1922	  fiscal	  year,	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  spent	  LP	  210,398	  on	  Police	  and	  Prisons	  
out	  of	  a	  total	  annual	  expenditure	  of	  LP	  1,259,587,	  accounting	  for	  16.7%	  of	  annual	  expenditures,	  
versus	  4%	  (LP	  50,079)	  directed	  toward	  education.	  In	  1926-­‐27,	  Police	  and	  Prisons	  dropped	  slightly	  to	  
account	  for	  14.7%	  of	  annual	  expenditures,	  still	  outpacing	  education	  (5.5%).	  See:	  Annual	  Report	  for	  
Palestine	  and	  Transjordan	  for	  the	  year	  1928.	  (London:	  His	  Majesty’s	  Stationary	  Office,	  1929).	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the	  construction	  of	  the	  building.	  The	  government	  would	  then	  appoint	  a	  teacher	  and	  
pay	  his	  salary.20	  	  
Though	  the	  administration	  was	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  heavy	  indebtedness	  of	  
most	  villagers,	  they	  defended	  this	  policy	  before	  skeptical	  members	  of	  the	  Royal	  
Commission	  who	  asked	  if	  “in	  the	  expansion	  of	  your	  rural	  schools…villages	  have	  
found	  real	  difficulty	  in	  producing	  the	  money?”	  Bowman	  noted	  that	  “some	  villages	  
find	  difficulty	  in	  doing	  so;	  other	  villages	  are	  more	  ready	  to	  come	  forward	  with	  their	  
contribution,”	  thereby	  implying	  the	  education	  scheme	  was	  not	  hindered	  by	  the	  
ability	  of	  peasants	  to	  shoulder	  the	  cost	  of	  opening	  schools,	  but	  rather	  by	  their	  
unwillingness	  to	  do	  so.	  Still	  skeptical,	  the	  PRC	  again	  asked	  Bowman	  if	  it	  was	  “true	  to	  
say	  the	  expansion	  of	  rural	  schools	  has	  been	  checked	  by	  the	  incapacity	  of	  the	  villages	  
to	  do	  their	  share?”	  And	  yet	  again	  he	  denied	  any	  link	  between	  government	  frugality,	  
village	  indebtedness	  and	  the	  stalled	  expansion	  of	  rural	  education.21	  
Finally,	  the	  limited	  funds	  earmarked	  for	  education	  drove	  the	  Government	  of	  
Palestine	  to	  depend	  heavily	  on	  private,	  missionary	  and	  Zionist	  organizations	  to	  
supplement	  public	  social	  services,	  and	  schools	  in	  particular.	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  at	  
length	  in	  the	  following	  chapter,	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  conceived	  of	  an	  
educational	  structure	  wherein	  government	  and	  non-­‐government	  schools	  would	  
jointly	  constitute	  the	  public	  school	  system.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  British	  pursued	  a	  policy	  
that	  was	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  the	  French	  in	  Mandatory	  Lebanon	  and	  Syria,	  
also	  regions	  with	  a	  high	  concentration	  of	  foreign	  and	  missionary	  schools.	  As	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  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	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  study	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  three	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  of	  British	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156.	  	  
21	  "Testimony	  of	  	  Mr.	  H.	  E.	  Bowman,	  C.M.G.,	  C.B.E.,	  Director	  of	  Education.	  November	  27,	  1936,"	  47.	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Elizabeth	  Thompson	  has	  argued	  in	  her	  insightful	  study	  of	  gender	  and	  colonial	  
citizenship,	  “the	  highly	  privatized	  delivery	  of	  social	  services”	  mediated	  through	  
missionary	  and	  other	  private	  bodies	  was	  a	  direct	  byproduct	  of	  French	  budgetary	  
constraints	  throughout	  the	  Mandate	  period.22	  Such	  an	  administrative	  arrangement	  
took	  full	  advantage	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  missionary	  schools	  “where	  nuns	  worked	  for	  a	  
pittance”	  to	  minimize	  government	  expenditure	  on	  necessary	  social	  services.23	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  Arab	  education,	  the	  Department	  set	  two	  
goals,	  which	  were	  often	  at	  practical	  odds	  with	  one	  another:	  first,	  administrators	  
prioritized	  primary	  education	  and	  sought	  to	  provide	  the	  maximum	  number	  of	  
children	  with	  the	  minimum	  amount	  of	  schooling	  necessary	  to	  guarantee	  permanent	  
literacy.	  In	  towns	  the	  elementary	  cycle	  was	  five	  years	  and	  in	  villages	  four;	  limited	  
higher	  elementary	  or	  secondary	  opportunities	  existed,	  and	  indeed	  no	  publicly	  
funded	  secondary	  school	  offered	  a	  full	  four-­‐year	  course	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  
Government	  Arab	  College	  (the	  men’s	  teacher	  training	  school).	  Village	  schools	  were	  
designed	  around	  an	  “agricultural	  bias”—	  i.e.	  intended	  to	  provide	  enough	  knowledge	  
to	  improve	  cultivation	  techniques	  but	  not	  so	  much	  as	  to	  make	  the	  fellah	  discontent	  
with	  his	  lot.24	  Experience	  in	  Egypt	  and	  India	  had	  fueled	  British	  anxieties	  over	  the	  
destabilizing	  economic	  and	  political	  effects	  of	  “literary	  education,”	  and	  thus	  the	  
primary	  goal	  in	  Palestine	  was	  to	  keep	  the	  peasantry	  on	  the	  land	  and	  prevent	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Elizabeth	  Thompson,	  Colonial	  Citizens:	  Republican	  Rights,	  Paternal	  Privilege,	  and	  Gender	  in	  French	  
Syria	  and	  Lebanon	  	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  62-­‐66;	  73-­‐90.	  
23	  Ibid.,	  63.	  
24	  Whether	  or	  not	  these	  schools	  actually	  succeeded	  in	  rationalizing	  peasant	  agriculture	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  
dispute.	  Importantly	  for	  our	  purposes,	  education	  administrators	  viewed	  the	  acquisition	  of	  literacy	  as	  
a	  necessary	  prerequisite	  to	  implementing	  any	  type	  of	  agricultural	  reform.	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  
Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  42-­‐43.	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migration	  to	  urban	  areas,	  where	  it	  was	  feared	  they	  would	  become	  unemployable	  
vagabonds,	  or	  worse	  yet,	  communists.	  	  
Village	  schools	  were	  thus	  quite	  distinct	  from	  those	  in	  urban	  areas,	  in	  which	  
the	  period	  of	  schooling	  was	  longer,	  and	  the	  curriculum	  broadened	  to	  include	  
subjects	  like	  foreign	  languages.	  The	  two-­‐tiered	  school	  system	  was	  primarily	  
designed	  to	  keep	  the	  social	  classes	  in	  their	  proper	  places.	  Yet	  the	  average	  
Palestinian	  schoolboy’s	  prospects	  for	  securing	  an	  education	  in	  urban	  areas	  were	  
also	  quite	  dim.	  Due	  to	  the	  high	  level	  of	  demand,	  lack	  of	  teachers	  and	  insufficient	  
accommodations,	  the	  rejection	  rate	  for	  applicants	  to	  public	  schools	  in	  urban	  areas	  
averaged	  over	  50%.	  For	  the	  1929-­‐30	  school	  year,	  the	  rejection	  rate	  for	  boys	  
applying	  to	  Jerusalem	  public	  schools	  was	  63%.	  The	  situation	  improved	  only	  slightly	  
throughout	  the	  Mandate	  and	  the	  average	  rejection	  rate	  for	  town	  schools	  remained	  
above	  50%	  for	  the	  1945-­‐1946	  school	  year.25	  The	  contrast	  with	  Jewish	  education	  
draws	  these	  figures	  into	  even	  sharper	  relief.	  For	  instance,	  in	  1943	  the	  city	  of	  Haifa	  
had	  approximately	  9000	  Jewish	  and	  7200	  Arab	  children	  enrolled	  in	  schools;	  
conversely,	  there	  were	  between	  500-­‐1000	  Jewish	  and	  7000	  Arab	  children	  without	  
access	  to	  formal	  schooling.26	  	  
Faced	  with	  the	  reality	  of	  a	  limited	  education	  budget,	  administrators	  
prioritized	  primary	  education	  to	  the	  almost	  complete	  neglect	  of	  secondary	  schools.	  
As	  I	  will	  discuss	  at	  length	  in	  my	  case	  study	  of	  the	  rural	  school,	  they	  did	  so	  mindful	  of	  
the	  dangers	  associated	  with	  the	  more	  common	  colonial	  pattern	  of	  first	  establishing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Department	  of	  Education,	  Annual	  Report	  1929-­‐1930	  and	  Annual	  Report	  1945-­‐46.	  
26	  “Protocols	  of	  the	  joint	  meeting	  of	  the	  local	  Arab	  and	  Jewish	  school	  committee	  of	  Haifa,”	  July	  26,	  
1943.	  ISA	  RG8	  1056/35-­‐mem.	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secondary	  schools	  and	  colleges,	  and	  in	  fact,	  regarded	  their	  “progressive”	  policy	  with	  
a	  great	  deal	  of	  satisfaction.27	  Outside	  of	  the	  Government	  Arab	  College	  and	  a	  few	  
secondary	  classes	  attached	  to	  select	  public	  boys’	  schools,	  a	  handful	  of	  private	  
secondary	  schools	  existed	  in	  urban	  areas	  and	  primarily	  served	  the	  upper	  social	  
classes	  who	  were	  able	  to	  pay	  their	  fees.	  In	  his	  testimony	  before	  the	  PRC,	  Bowman	  
explained	  the	  policy	  as	  one	  designed	  to	  maximize	  access	  to	  minimal	  education—
“with	  a	  limited	  budget	  it	  has	  always	  seemed	  to	  me	  much	  more	  necessary	  to	  provide	  
elementary	  education	  as	  far	  as	  one	  could	  rather	  than	  provide	  secondary	  schools”—
while	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  providing	  for	  a	  small	  number	  of	  exceptional	  students	  to	  
continue	  their	  studies	  at	  the	  secondary	  and	  post-­‐secondary	  levels	  at	  government	  
expense.28	  	  
There	  were	  two	  immediate	  consequences	  of	  this	  policy:	  first,	  secondary	  
education	  was	  much	  more	  widespread	  among	  Jews,	  particularly	  Zionist	  immigrants,	  
which	  could	  only	  exacerbate	  the	  gulf	  between	  them	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  Arabs;29	  
second,	  limited	  access	  to	  secondary	  education	  meant	  a	  permanent	  shortage	  of	  
teachers	  and	  consequently,	  yet	  another	  limitation	  on	  the	  pace	  at	  which	  new	  schools	  
could	  be	  opened.	  Though	  the	  Men	  and	  Women’s	  training	  colleges	  remained	  the	  
primary	  source	  of	  new	  teachers	  throughout	  the	  Mandate,	  little	  was	  done	  to	  expand	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  See,	  for	  example,	  Humphrey	  Bowman,	  "Rural	  Education	  in	  the	  Near	  and	  Middle	  East,"	  in	  Journal	  of	  
the	  Royal	  Central	  Asian	  Society	  Volume	  XXVI,	  ed.	  The	  Royal	  Central	  Asian	  Society	  (London1939).	  
28	  "Testimony	  of	  	  Mr.	  H.	  E.	  Bowman,	  C.M.G.,	  C.B.E.,	  Director	  of	  Education.	  November	  27,	  1936,"	  48.	  
29	  For	  example,	  for	  the	  1929-­‐1930	  school	  year,	  there	  were	  353	  pupils	  enrolled	  in	  Government	  
secondary	  schools.	  By	  contrast,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  Jews	  represented	  less	  than	  20%	  of	  the	  population,	  the	  
Hebrew	  Public	  System	  included	  1,465	  pupils	  in	  secondary	  and	  approximately	  1200	  more	  in	  training	  
or	  commercial	  schools.	  The	  Department	  of	  Education	  was	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  Jewish	  system	  of	  
secondary	  schools,	  which	  it	  viewed	  as	  both	  too	  restrictive	  (accessible	  chiefly	  to	  fee-­‐paying	  students)	  
and	  too	  extensive	  in	  size.	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  Department	  of	  Education,	  Annual	  Report	  1929-­‐
1930	  	  (Jerusalem1931),	  26,	  34.	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their	  class	  sizes.	  Thus	  the	  number	  of	  pupils	  in	  the	  Government	  Arab	  College	  in	  1945-­‐
46	  was	  barely	  larger	  than	  the	  number	  in	  1925-­‐26,	  though	  the	  population	  had	  nearly	  
doubled.30	  Approximately	  twenty	  men	  entered	  the	  teaching	  field	  annually,	  which	  
was	  hardly	  adequate	  to	  replace	  retiring	  teachers,	  to	  say	  nothing	  of	  providing	  
personnel	  for	  new	  schools.	  	  
It	  is	  unclear	  whether	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  grasped	  the	  degree	  to	  
which	  primary	  and	  secondary	  education	  were	  co-­‐dependent	  operations.	  When	  the	  
Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Education	  in	  the	  Colonies,	  together	  with	  the	  Department	  of	  
Education,	  drafted	  a	  plan	  in	  the	  early	  1940s	  to	  extend	  elementary	  schooling	  to	  all	  
Palestinian	  Arab	  children	  living	  in	  villages	  of	  more	  than	  300,	  they	  did	  not	  account	  
for	  this	  mutual	  dependency.	  This	  incongruity	  prompted	  the	  Education	  Adviser	  to	  the	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies	  to	  state	  he	  was	  “at	  a	  loss”	  to	  understand	  how	  an	  
additional	  700	  schools	  were	  to	  be	  opened	  without	  any	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  the	  
number	  of	  graduates	  from	  the	  teaching	  training	  colleges.	  Moreover,	  he	  wrote,	  the	  
extremely	  restrictive	  nature	  of	  secondary	  education	  provided	  by	  the	  Government	  
could	  in	  no	  way	  prepare	  Palestinian	  Arabs	  for	  the	  future:	  
The	  Committee’s	  Report	  appears	  to	  envisage	  that,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  ten	  year	  
period,	  the	  annual	  output	  of	  Arab	  boys	  with	  a	  full	  secondary	  education	  will	  
still	   only	   be	   about	   25,	   of	   whom	   about	   15	   will	   be	   earmarked	   as	   future	  
teachers.	   I	   very	   much	   doubt	   whether	   the	   Arab	   will	   have	   been	   given	   a	  
reasonable	  chance	  of	  holding	  his	  own	  in	  the	  proposed	  independent	  state	   if,	  
apart	  from	  teachers,	  only	  10	  young	  men	  are	  to	  be	  turned	  out	  annually	  with	  a	  
full	  secondary	  education.31	  
	  
The	  situation	  was	  even	  direr	  with	  regard	  to	  female	  education.	  Bowman	  
agreed	  with	  members	  of	  the	  PRC	  that	  “in	  these	  days	  particularly,	  the	  education	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  80	  pupils	  were	  enrolled	  in	  the	  Government	  Arab	  College	  in	  1925-­‐26	  vs.	  88	  in	  1945-­‐46.	  Department	  
of	  Education,	  Annual	  Report	  1925-­‐26	  and	  Annual	  Report	  1945-­‐46.	  	  
31	  C.W.M.	  Cox,	  January	  27,	  1942.	  MEC,	  Humphrey	  Bowman	  collection,	  Box	  2,	  File	  2.	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girls	  is	  almost,	  if	  not	  quite,	  as	  important	  as	  the	  education	  of	  boys,”32	  and	  yet	  the	  
majority	  of	  Arab	  girls	  remained	  illiterate	  throughout	  the	  Mandate	  Period.	  During	  the	  
1945-­‐46	  school	  year,	  thirty-­‐five	  town	  schools	  and	  fifty-­‐five	  village	  schools	  were	  
open	  to	  girls,	  in	  contrast	  with	  forty-­‐seven	  town	  and	  377	  village	  schools	  for	  boys.33	  
The	  curriculum	  in	  girls’	  schools	  was	  specifically	  tailored	  to	  the	  presumed	  
educational	  needs	  of	  women	  inside	  the	  home.	  A	  typical	  syllabus	  would	  include	  
subjects	  like	  “housewifery,”	  infant	  welfare	  and	  sewing.	  British	  educationalists	  laid	  
special	  emphasis	  on	  the	  development	  of	  “domestic	  science”	  in	  schools,	  generally	  
reflected	  the	  professionalization	  of	  household	  work	  that	  occurred	  in	  early	  twentieth	  
century	  England.	  Purely	  academic	  subjects	  were	  thought	  to	  be	  of	  little	  value	  in	  girls’	  
schools,	  as	  the	  proper	  educational	  goals	  for	  Palestinian	  girls	  should	  be	  to	  
“understand	  the	  value	  of	  a	  good	  home,	  where	  cleanliness,	  sanitation	  and	  above	  all	  
the	  care	  of	  children	  are	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  aim	  of	  every	  woman.”34	  The	  dreaded	  
“literary	  education”	  was	  to	  be	  avoided	  if	  possible,	  and	  administrators	  therefore	  
stipulated	  that	  little	  time	  should	  be	  “wasted”	  on	  subjects	  like	  history,	  geography	  and	  
Classical	  Arabic.35	  	  
The	  Department	  of	  Education	  frequently	  noted	  that	  the	  demand	  for	  female	  
education	  was	  strong,	  but	  that	  it	  was	  unable	  to	  meet	  this	  need	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  
qualified	  female	  teachers.	  The	  Government	  maintained	  a	  women	  teachers	  training	  
college	  in	  Jerusalem	  and	  opened	  a	  rural	  training	  center	  in	  Ramallah	  in	  1935,	  but	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  "Testimony	  of	  	  Mr.	  H.	  E.	  Bowman,	  C.M.G.,	  C.B.E.,	  Director	  of	  Education.	  November	  27,	  1936,"	  48.	  
33	  Department	  of	  Education,	  Government	  of	  Palestine,	  Annual	  Report	  1945-­‐46:	  7.	  
34	  Humphrey	  Bowman,	  “The	  Education	  of	  Girls	  in	  Palestine,”	  The	  Palestine	  Bulletin,	  Feb.	  6,	  1927.	  
Quoted	  in	  Ellen	  Fleischmann,	  The	  Nation	  and	  its	  "New"	  Women:	  the	  Palestinian	  Women's	  Movement,	  
1920-­‐1948	  	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2003),	  39.	  
35	  Ibid.,	  36-­‐48.	  
	  99	  
combined	  annual	  graduates	  from	  these	  institutions	  only	  numbered	  approximately	  
twenty-­‐five.	  Administrators	  did	  not	  entertain	  the	  possibility	  of	  male	  teachers	  
working	  in	  a	  girls’	  school,	  though	  the	  practice	  of	  male	  sheikhs	  teaching	  girls	  in	  
katātīb	  was	  not	  unknown	  prior	  to	  the	  British	  occupation.	  Furthermore,	  the	  
Government	  required	  female	  teachers	  to	  resign	  their	  posts	  upon	  marriage,	  thus	  the	  
replacement	  rate	  for	  female	  teachers	  was	  much	  higher	  than	  that	  for	  their	  male	  
counterparts.36	  “The	  trained	  women	  teachers	  are	  apt	  to	  marry	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  may,	  
since	  they	  are	  specially	  prized	  by	  Arab	  husbands	  who	  want	  educated	  wives,	  and	  the	  
result	  is	  we	  have	  a	  continual	  wastage	  of	  trained	  teachers,”37	  Bowman	  explained.	  The	  
prohibition	  of	  married	  women	  continuing	  their	  work	  in	  the	  civil	  service,	  according	  
to	  another	  high-­‐ranking	  official,	  stemmed	  from	  the	  greater	  amount	  of	  sick	  leave	  
(presumably,	  maternity	  leave)	  required,	  and	  “the	  embarrassment	  caused	  to	  other	  
members	  of	  the	  staff	  and	  to	  the	  members	  of	  the	  public	  by	  their	  presence	  in	  a	  certain	  
condition.”38	  The	  presumed	  unacceptability	  of	  married	  women	  in	  the	  work	  force	  
seems	  to	  be	  yet	  another	  example	  of	  the	  enforcement	  of	  “harem	  conditions”	  by	  a	  
colonial	  power	  eager	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  commitment	  to	  “tradition,”	  whether	  real	  or	  
invented.39	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Ibid.,	  38.	  	  
37	  "Testimony	  of	  	  Mr.	  H.	  E.	  Bowman,	  C.M.G.,	  C.B.E.,	  Director	  of	  Education.	  November	  27,	  1936,"	  48.	  
38	  Quoted	  in	  ———,	  The	  Nation	  and	  its	  "New"	  Women:	  the	  Palestinian	  Women's	  Movement,	  1920-­‐
1948:	  53.	  
39	  For	  an	  extended	  case	  study	  of	  British	  colonialism	  and	  the	  preservation/invention	  of	  tradition,	  see	  
Nicholas	  Dirk’s	  seminal	  work	  on	  caste	  and	  governance	  in	  colonial	  India,	  Nicholas	  B.	  Dirks,	  Castes	  of	  
Mind:	  Colonialism	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  Modern	  India	  	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  Chapter	  8.	  
However	  as	  Ellen	  Fleischmann	  has	  argued,	  the	  preservation	  of	  “tradition”	  could	  be	  a	  double-­‐edged	  
sword.	  Palestinian	  women	  effectively	  exploited	  British	  sensitivities	  to	  upsetting	  “traditional”	  norms	  
in	  an	  attempt	  to	  shame	  the	  Mandatory	  Government	  and	  influence	  its	  policies.	  See	  Fleischmann,	  The	  
Nation	  and	  its	  "New"	  Women:	  the	  Palestinian	  Women's	  Movement,	  1920-­‐1948:	  Chapter	  6,	  The	  Politics	  
of	  the	  Women's	  Movement.	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Not	  surprisingly,	  these	  policies	  led	  to	  a	  permanent	  shortage	  of	  teachers	  in	  
girls’	  schools	  and	  an	  ongoing	  lament	  within	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  that	  the	  
expansion	  of	  female	  education	  was	  therefore	  delayed.	  This	  excuse	  appears,	  upon	  an	  
examination	  of	  the	  archival	  record,	  completely	  baseless.	  Despite	  its	  rhetorical	  
support	  for	  female	  education	  and	  lament	  over	  the	  shortage	  of	  qualified	  teachers,	  the	  
Government	  of	  Palestine	  consistently	  pursued	  policies	  that	  dramatically	  limited	  the	  
applicant	  pool.	  As	  in	  other	  realms	  of	  educational	  planning,	  a	  disconnect	  existed	  
between	  officials’	  stated	  goals	  and	  the	  reality	  engendered	  by	  the	  policies	  they	  
pursued.	  
For	  instance,	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  narrowed	  the	  pool	  of	  qualified	  
female	  teachers	  by	  severely	  restricting	  class	  sizes	  at	  the	  training	  colleges.	  Out	  of	  
1022	  applicants	  to	  the	  Women’s	  Teacher	  College	  (WTC)	  from	  1925-­‐1936,	  the	  school	  
accepted	  only	  209	  women.40	  The	  small	  number	  of	  applicants	  accepted	  to	  the	  WTC	  
annually	  meant	  no	  substantive	  expansion	  of	  girls’	  education	  could	  occur.	  The	  dearth	  
of	  female	  teachers	  was	  sometimes	  blamed	  on	  Muslims	  cultural	  biases,	  though	  even	  
administrators	  were	  forced	  to	  admit	  that	  this	  explanation	  was	  lacking.	  Writing	  in	  
1927,	  the	  Principal	  of	  the	  WTC	  noted:	  
When	  we	  began	  in	  1919,	  we	  could	  obtain	  Christian	  girls	  in	  numbers,	  for	  they	  
led	  freer	  lives,	  and	  the	  attendance	  at	  mission	  schools	  had	  accustomed	  them	  
to	   leave	   the	   seclusion	   of	   the	   home.	   Moslem	   girls,	   however,	   were	   very	  
difficult	   to	   secure,	   only	   the	   daughters	   of	   the	   poorest	   classes	   or	   destitute	  
orphans	  could	  be	  persuaded	  to	  enter	  a	  boarding	  school,	  and	  trained	  to	  earn	  
their	  own	  living	  by	  teaching.	  In	  such	  cases	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  salary	  was	  the	  
deciding	   factor,	   and	   no	   call	   to	   a	   vocation.	   This	   prejudice	   is	   gradually	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  ———,	  The	  Nation	  and	  its	  "New"	  Women:	  the	  Palestinian	  Women's	  Movement,	  1920-­‐1948:	  38.	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weakening,	   and	   in	   the	   entrance	   examination	  held	   a	  month	   ago,	  we	  had	  96	  
applications	  for	  21	  vacant	  places,	  nearly	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  these	  from	  Moslems.41	  
	  
Reading	  between	  the	  lines,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  the	  over-­‐representation	  of	  Christian	  
pupils	  in	  the	  WTC	  stemmed	  not	  merely	  from	  an	  Islamic	  cultural	  bias	  against	  women	  
working	  outside	  the	  home,	  but	  also,	  as	  the	  report	  clearly	  notes,	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  
“Government	  secondary	  schooling	  for	  girls	  does	  not	  exist.”42	  Thus	  most	  applicants	  
to	  the	  WTC	  were	  almost	  inevitably	  graduates	  from	  Christian	  missionary	  schools	  that	  
offered	  higher	  primary	  and	  some	  secondary	  education	  to	  girls.	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  Government	  actually	  decreased	  the	  number	  of	  female	  
teachers	  by	  suspending	  scholarships	  to	  girls	  entering	  the	  WTC.	  Thus	  the	  school’s	  
enrollment	  during	  the	  1920’s	  was	  on	  average	  double	  that	  of	  the	  1930’s.	  The	  “fall	  off	  
in	  the	  number	  of	  entries	  after	  1930,”	  explained	  the	  Principal	  of	  the	  College,	  “is	  due	  
to	  the	  fact	  that	  no	  scholarships	  are	  now	  given	  until	  the	  first	  two	  years	  have	  been	  
completed,	  i.e.	  all	  pay	  the	  boarding	  fee	  of	  LP	  24	  p.a.”43	  Here,	  as	  elsewhere,	  the	  
desirability	  of	  certain	  educational	  policies	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  maintain	  even	  the	  
most	  meager	  streams	  of	  funding.	  It	  is	  indeed	  difficult	  to	  escape	  the	  rather	  cynical	  
conclusion	  that	  education	  for	  girls	  was	  systematically	  neglected	  based	  on	  gendered	  
and	  colonial	  assumptions	  about	  the	  superfluous	  nature	  of	  education	  for	  Palestinian	  
woman.	  That	  this	  occurred	  precisely	  at	  the	  time	  that	  an	  Arab	  women’s	  movement	  
had	  emerged	  and	  that	  female	  education	  had	  gained	  widespread	  acceptance	  even	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  See	  “Special	  problems	  in	  the	  training	  of	  women	  teachers	  in	  the	  Near	  East”	  by	  Miss	  H.	  Ridler	  in	  
Government	  of	  Palestine	  Department	  of	  Education,	  "Annual	  Report,	  1926-­‐27,"	  (Jerusalem1928),	  28-­‐
30.	  	  
42	  Ibid.,	  28.	  
43	  “Table	  showing	  the	  number	  of	  applications	  for	  entrance	  into	  the	  Government	  Women’s	  Training	  
College,	  Jerusalem.”	  January	  3,	  1937.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/346/17.	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Palestinian	  villages	  is	  but	  one	  of	  the	  many	  ironies	  that	  characterized	  Britain’s	  
supposedly	  enlightened	  rule.44	  
	  
The	  right	  kind	  of	  knowledge:	  New	  schooling	  for	  an	  old	  order	  
Palestine,	  being	  at	  the	  tail	  end	  of	  a	  long	  British	  colonial	  experience,	  offered	  
administrators	  an	  opportunity	  to	  apply	  the	  lessons	  learned	  from	  previous	  
educational	  debacles	  in	  India,	  Egypt	  and	  elsewhere.	  The	  private	  diaries	  of	  the	  first	  
Director	  of	  Education,	  Humphrey	  Bowman,	  are	  replete	  with	  the	  self-­‐assurance	  that	  
he	  was	  managing	  education	  differently	  (and	  better)	  than	  was	  done	  in	  other	  places.	  
And	  while	  their	  personality	  types	  differed	  drastically,	  Bowman’s	  successor,	  Jerome	  
Farrell,	  articulated	  a	  very	  similar	  vision	  regarding	  Palestine’s	  educational	  priorities.	  
In	  part,	  they	  represented	  a	  new	  type	  of	  colonial	  educator	  whose	  regard	  for	  
“tradition”—represented	  by	  the	  triumvirate	  of	  Arabic,	  Islam	  and	  agriculture—
distinguished	  them	  from	  an	  earlier	  generation	  of	  administrators.	  Indeed,	  one	  of	  the	  
peculiarities	  of	  British	  education	  policy	  in	  Palestine	  was	  that	  officials	  understood	  
their	  cultivation	  of	  tradition	  as	  representing	  a	  modern,	  progressive	  departure	  from	  
older	  forms	  of	  rule.	  Understanding	  these	  departures	  from	  the	  “old”	  approach	  is	  
crucial	  to	  grasping	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  modernized	  education	  came	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  
paradoxical	  guarantor	  of	  the	  traditional	  order.	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  briefly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  women’s	  movement,	  see:	  Fleischmann,	  
The	  Nation	  and	  its	  "New"	  Women:	  the	  Palestinian	  Women's	  Movement,	  1920-­‐1948.	  There	  are	  
numerous	  sources	  that	  testify	  to	  the	  demand	  for	  female	  education	  among	  the	  Arab	  population.	  For	  
example,	  petitions	  from	  villages	  requesting	  the	  government	  open	  a	  girls’	  school	  became	  a	  common	  
occurrence.	  See:	  Greenberg,	  Preparing	  the	  Mothers	  of	  Tomorrow:	  Education	  and	  Islam	  in	  Mandate	  
Palestine.	  Ylana	  N.	  Miller,	  Government	  and	  Society	  in	  Rural	  Palestine	  1920-­‐1948,	  Modern	  Middle	  East	  
Series	  (Austin:	  University	  of	  Texas	  Press,	  1985),	  Chapter	  6,	  Rural	  Education.	  
	  103	  
consider	  the	  Government’s	  policy	  toward	  rural	  schooling	  and	  begin	  to	  examine	  the	  
function	  of	  religious	  education	  within	  this	  old/new	  framework.	  	  
There	  were	  two	  shadows	  that	  lurked	  in	  the	  background	  of	  much	  of	  Bowman	  
and	  Farrell’s	  discussions	  of	  their	  educational	  philosophies,	  namely,	  Lord	  Macaulay	  
and	  Lord	  Lugard.	  Lord	  Macaulay	  was	  a	  Whig	  politician	  and	  colonial	  administrator	  
who	  is	  well-­‐known	  for	  his	  role	  in	  education	  reform	  in	  India.	  Undoubtedly,	  his	  most	  
influential	  act	  was	  to	  advocate	  that	  English,	  rather	  than	  Persian	  or	  Sanskrit,	  should	  
be	  the	  medium	  of	  instruction	  in	  secondary	  schools.	  In	  his	  Minute	  on	  Indian	  
Education	  of	  1835,	  Macaulay	  stated	  that	  the	  goal	  of	  education	  in	  India	  was	  to	  create	  
“a	  class	  who	  may	  be	  interpreters	  between	  us	  and	  the	  millions	  whom	  we	  govern;	  a	  
class	  of	  persons,	  Indian	  in	  blood	  and	  colour,	  but	  English	  in	  taste,	  in	  opinions,	  in	  
morals,	  and	  in	  intellect.”45	  Little	  attention,	  therefore,	  should	  be	  devoted	  to	  
expanding	  the	  system	  of	  primary	  schools,	  as	  the	  government	  operated	  on	  the	  
assumption	  that	  a	  newly	  formed	  hybrid	  class	  of	  Indian	  civil	  servants	  would	  serve	  as	  
intermediaries	  between	  it	  and	  the	  uneducated	  masses.	  	  
However,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  Indian	  Mutiny	  in	  1857	  and	  later	  experience	  in	  Egypt,	  
a	  new	  educational	  orthodoxy	  began	  to	  emerge.	  Henry	  Maine’s	  late	  nineteenth	  
century	  writings	  on	  customary	  law	  bore	  practical	  fruit	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Thomas	  Babington	  Macaulay,	  "Minute	  on	  Education,	  1835,"	  in	  Selections	  from	  Educational	  Records,	  
Part	  I	  (1781-­‐1839),	  ed.	  H.	  Sharp	  (Delhi:	  National	  Archives	  of	  India,	  1965).	  Scholars	  of	  Palestine	  have	  
sometimes	  failed	  to	  apprehend	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  Mandatory	  Government’s	  educational	  policies	  
diverged	  from	  those	  developed	  in	  India	  by	  Lord	  Macaulay.	  Thus	  in	  her	  otherwise	  excellent	  book	  on	  
the	  Palestinian	  women’s	  movement,	  Ellen	  Flieschmann	  conflates	  the	  two	  approaches	  and	  argues	  that	  
British	  officials	  strove	  to	  create	  a	  class	  of	  upper	  class	  civil	  servants	  to	  serve	  as	  “interpreters”	  between	  
the	  Government	  and	  the	  masses.	  Such	  “interpreters”	  were	  in	  fact	  wholly	  out	  of	  place	  in	  a	  colony	  
under	  direct	  rule	  within	  which	  administrators	  devoted	  almost	  all	  of	  their	  meager	  resources	  toward	  
maximizing	  access	  to	  primary	  education.	  For	  more	  on	  Fleischmann’s	  argument,	  see	  Fleischmann,	  The	  
Nation	  and	  its	  "New"	  Women:	  the	  Palestinian	  Women's	  Movement,	  1920-­‐1948:	  36-­‐40.	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century	  doctrine	  of	  development	  “along	  native	  lines,”	  which	  argued	  that	  an	  over-­‐
emphasis	  on	  “literary	  education”	  would	  only	  lead	  the	  natives	  into	  revolt.46	  Rather	  
than	  trying	  to	  re-­‐form	  the	  natives	  in	  the	  likeness	  of	  their	  British	  overlords,	  the	  
emphasis	  shifted	  to	  the	  preservation	  of	  “traditional”	  structures	  of	  authority	  that	  
could	  be	  ruled	  through	  indirectly.47	  The	  gospel	  of	  indirect	  rule	  was	  articulated	  most	  
forcefully	  by	  Lord	  Lugard,	  the	  former	  Governor	  of	  Nigeria	  who	  held	  “the	  education	  
afforded	  to	  that	  section	  of	  the	  population	  who	  intend	  to	  lead	  the	  lives	  which	  their	  
forefathers	  led	  should	  enlarge	  their	  outlook,	  increase	  their	  efficiency	  and	  standard	  
of	  comfort,	  and	  bring	  them	  into	  closer	  sympathy	  with	  the	  Government,	  instead	  of	  
making	  them	  unsuited	  to	  and	  ill-­‐contented	  with	  their	  mode	  of	  life.”48	  	  
Lord	  Lugard	  later	  served	  as	  Britain’s	  representative	  to	  the	  League	  of	  Nation’s	  
Permanent	  Mandates	  Commission	  and	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Advisory	  Committee	  on	  
Education	  in	  the	  Colonies,	  which	  convened	  numerous	  meetings	  to	  discuss	  
educational	  affairs	  in	  Palestine.	  Education	  administrators	  in	  Palestine	  were	  
therefore	  well	  acquainted	  with	  Lugard’s	  approach	  and	  elaborated	  on	  it	  in	  several	  
key	  ways.	  For	  instance,	  in	  a	  speech	  before	  the	  Royal	  Central	  Asian	  Society	  soon	  after	  
his	  retirement,	  Humphey	  Bowman	  acknowledged	  the	  wariness	  toward	  native	  
education	  that	  had	  hardened	  into	  downright	  cynicism:	  	  
There	  are	  those	  who	  say:	  ‘Why	  teach	  the	  agriculturalist	  at	  all?	  You	  will	  only	  
spoil	  him,	  make	  him	  discontented	  with	  his	  lot,	  and	  turn	  him	  into	  an	  agitator.’	  
These	  critics	  may	  speak	  the	  truth	   if	   the	  schooling	  provided	   is	  of	   the	  wrong	  
kind.	  But	   if	   it	   is	  of	   the	  right	  kind	  you	  will	  make	  the	  peasant	  more,	  not	   less,	  
contented;	  you	  will	  save	  him	  from	  his	  eternal	  enemy,	  the	  moneylender;	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Henry	  Sumner	  	  Maine,	  Ancient	  Law:	  its	  connection	  with	  the	  early	  history	  of	  society	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  
modern	  ideas	  	  (London:	  J.	  Murray,	  1887).	  
47	  Frederick	  John	  Dealtry	  Baron	  Lugard,	  The	  Dual	  Mandate	  in	  British	  Tropical	  Africa,	  [5th	  ed.	  
(London]	  F.	  Cass,	  1965).	  
48	  Ibid.,	  425-­‐6.	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you	  will	  give	  him	  a	  new	  pride—a	  pride	  in	  himself	  and	  in	  his	  village.	  And	  you	  
will	  keep	  him	  on	  the	  land.49	  
	  
While	  the	  first	  lines	  of	  this	  quote	  seem	  to	  legitimize	  restricted	  access	  to	  education	  so	  
that	  the	  native	  agriculturalist	  is	  not	  “spoiled”	  as	  a	  result,	  Bowman	  continues	  to	  offer	  
a	  different	  solution	  that	  nonetheless	  fulfills	  the	  same	  political	  function	  of	  keeping	  
the	  peasant	  on	  the	  land.	  He	  argued	  that	  education	  on	  a	  rural,	  agricultural	  bias—i.e.	  
the	  right	  type	  of	  schooling—was	  crucially	  important	  to	  maintaining	  the	  structure	  of	  
“traditional”	  society	  and	  preventing	  the	  dreaded	  rural	  drift	  to	  urban	  areas.	  This	  was	  
explicitly	  opposed	  to	  the	  old	  way	  of	  doing	  things	  “in	  both	  Egypt	  and	  India”	  where	  
“we	  had	  colleges	  and	  universities	  before	  rural	  schools;	  in	  both	  education	  began	  at	  
the	  wrong	  end.”50	  Thus	  it	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  privileged	  
primary	  education	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  secondary	  schooling	  in	  Palestine	  and	  that	  the	  
institution	  charged	  with	  training	  primary	  school	  teachers	  offered	  the	  only	  complete	  
course	  of	  public	  secondary	  education	  throughout	  the	  Mandate	  period.	  	  
Within	  colonial	  and	  Orientalist	  circles,	  Bowman	  came	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  
education	  expert	  who	  had	  successfully	  avoided	  the	  pitfalls	  that	  undermined	  his	  
predecessors	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  Empire.	  For	  instance,	  commenting	  upon	  his	  career	  in	  
Palestine,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Royal	  Central	  Asian	  Society	  offered	  the	  following	  
words	  of	  praise:	  “Mr.	  Bowman	  arrived	  in	  Palestine	  before	  Lord	  Macaulay.	  That	  is	  the	  
point.	  In	  India	  it	  was	  not	  really	  Lord	  Macaulay	  but	  his	  followers	  who	  were	  at	  fault;	  
but	  Mr.	  Bowman	  was	  in	  Palestine	  first.	  Rural	  minds	  might	  have	  been	  there	  first	  in	  
India,	  but	  they	  were	  not,	  and	  consequently	  we	  have	  a	  hundred	  years	  of	  leeway	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Bowman,	  "Rural	  Education	  in	  the	  Near	  and	  Middle	  East,"	  402-­‐03.	  
50	  Ibid.	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make	  up.	  The	  minds	  of	  people	  are	  imbued	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  what	  you	  have	  to	  do	  is	  
to	  be	  a	  white-­‐collared	  clerk.”51	  
Bowman	  was	  precisely	  the	  type	  of	  “rural	  mind”	  that	  should	  have	  been	  in	  
India,	  but	  unfortunately	  was	  not.	  He	  offered	  an	  alternative	  vision	  that	  neither	  
promoted	  the	  potentially	  destabilizing	  “literary	  education”	  nor	  fell	  into	  the	  cynicism	  
that	  advocated	  restricting	  access	  to	  education	  to	  all	  but	  the	  most	  gifted.	  Instead,	  he	  
argued	  that	  something	  new	  was	  required	  to	  maintain	  the	  old,	  that	  only	  through	  the	  
proper	  type	  of	  modern	  education	  could	  traditional	  life	  remain	  viable.	  To	  better	  
illustrate	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  worth	  quoting	  at	  length	  Bowman’s	  description	  of	  his	  visit	  to	  
an	  idyllic	  rural	  school	  in	  southern	  Palestine:	  	  
I	  would	  invite	  you	  to	  visit	  with	  me	  in	  imagination	  a	  model	  rural	  school	  in	  the	  
wild	   hill-­‐country	   of	   Southern	   Palestine…The	   villagers,	   who	   are	   all	  
cultivators,	  paid	   themselves	   for	   the	  greater	  part	  of	   it,	  with	  some	  help	   from	  
the	   Government.	   The	   buildings	   are	   divided	   into	   three	   sections:	   one	   for	  
classroom	  work,	  one	  for	  carpentry,	  ironwork,	  and	  boot-­‐making,	  and	  one	  for	  
weaving....	  
	  
Below	   the	   buildings,	   which	   command	   a	   magnificent	   view	   over	   the	  
surrounding	   country,	   and	   from	  which	   the	  Mediterranean	   can	   be	   seen	   fifty	  
kilometers	   away,	   is	   the	   garden,	   where	   vegetables,	   flowers	   and	   fruit-­‐trees	  
grow,	  well	  watered	  by	   immigration	   from	  a	  cistern.	  Goats	  are	  kept	  out	  by	  a	  
stone	  wall.	  Poultry	  and	  rabbits	  of	  various	  kinds	  are	  kept,	  while	  bees	  provide	  
the	  best	  honey	  I	  have	  ever	  tasted.	  	  
	  
The	   time	   of	   the	   boys	   is	   divided	   between	   lessons	   in	   the	   classroom	   and	  
practical	   work	   in	   the	   garden	   or	   the	   workshops.	   One	   of	   the	   older	   boys	   is	  
responsible	   for	   the	   cleanliness	   and	   the	   feeding	   of	   the	   poultry,	   another	   for	  
that	  of	  the	  rabbits,	  a	  third	  looks	  after	  the	  beehives.	  Others	  are	  engaged	  in	  the	  
cultivation	   of	   the	   garden,	   the	   pruning	   of	   fruit-­‐trees,	   or	   the	   irrigation	   of	  
plants.	   There	   is	   a	   radio	   in	   the	   teachers’	   room,	   and	   the	   clock,	   which	   is	  
regulated	  daily	  by	  wireless,	  gives	  the	  correct	  time	  to	  the	  village.52	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Ibid.,	  411.	  
52	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  
235.	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Bowman’s	  rural	  school	  has	  all	  the	  features	  of	  an	  ideal	  type:	  it	  was	  built	  by	  
empowered	  villagers	  with	  little	  government	  help;	  it	  introduces	  the	  child	  into	  
modern	  agricultural	  practices	  and	  teaches	  them	  to	  tend	  a	  range	  of	  domestic	  animals,	  
who	  presumably	  produced	  the	  best	  meat	  and	  eggs	  alongside	  the	  sweetest	  of	  honey.	  
And	  finally,	  a	  clock	  regulated	  daily	  ensures	  that	  villagers	  conduct	  their	  lives	  
according	  to	  “correct	  time.”	  	  As	  such,	  the	  school	  was	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  modernizing	  agent	  
that	  would	  transform	  every	  element	  of	  village	  life	  through	  the	  production	  of	  
hygienic,	  literate	  and	  above	  all	  efficient	  children.	  	  	  
The	  village	  teacher	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Education’s	  
rural	  improvement	  scheme.	  Bowman	  often	  stressed	  that	  the	  village	  teacher’s	  duties	  
extended	  far	  beyond	  the	  school	  itself	  to	  tasks	  like	  adult	  education,	  agricultural	  
demonstrations	  and	  disease	  prevention.	  In	  his	  lecture	  before	  the	  Royal	  Central	  
Asian	  Society,	  he	  described	  the	  headmaster	  of	  the	  model	  school	  as	  “a	  Moselm	  Arab	  
wearing	  native	  dress,	  trained	  in	  agriculture	  and	  in	  several	  crafts,	  an	  excellent	  
teacher,	  though	  without	  a	  word	  of	  English,	  an	  enlightened,	  loyal	  and	  devoted	  
servant	  of	  his	  village	  and	  of	  his	  country.”	  He	  was	  a	  man	  of	  the	  village,	  still	  cloaked	  in	  
the	  familiar	  garb	  of	  tradition—signified	  here	  by	  the	  markers	  of	  Islam,	  the	  Arabic	  
language	  and	  agricultural	  knowledge—but	  nonetheless	  bearing	  all	  the	  tools	  
necessary	  to	  rationalize	  the	  economic	  basis	  of	  rural	  life.	  It	  was	  the	  latter	  skillset	  that	  
most	  distinguished	  this	  teacher	  from	  his	  predecessor	  in	  the	  kuttāb,	  who	  did	  not	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dispense	  any	  “practical”	  instruction	  and	  whose	  pedagogical	  standards	  remained	  
“rather	  low.”53	  Thus,	  Bowman	  continued:	  
With	   village	  welfare	   as	   a	   primary	   duty	   of	   the	   teacher,	   the	   enthusiasm	  will	  
spread	  to	  all	  who	  dwell	  there,	  and	  conditions	  will	  be	  so	  changed	  as	  to	  make	  
life	   not	   only	   bearable,	   but	   enviable.	   Improved	   cultivation	   will	   increase	  
prosperity;	  malaria	  and	  eye	  disease	  will	  diminish	  and	  gradually	  disappear;	  
infant	  mortality	  will	   decrease;	   literacy	  will	   spread;	   the	  burden	  of	  debt	  will	  
vanish.	   Livelihood	   and	   contentment	   will	   take	   the	   place	   of	   poverty	   and	  
misery;	   the	  peasant,	   instead	  of	  being	   lethargic	  and	  despairing,	  will	  become	  
active	  and	  hopeful.54	  	  
	  
Within	  the	  context	  of	  mobilizing	  the	  new	  to	  preserve	  the	  old,	  religious	  
education—albeit	  of	  a	  reformed	  variety—formed	  essential	  part	  of	  village	  education.	  
In	  rural	  schools,	  religious	  instruction	  commanded	  between	  17-­‐23%	  of	  the	  total	  
school	  hours,	  topped	  only	  by	  Arabic.	  55	  In	  contrast	  to	  schools	  in	  urban	  areas,	  which	  
devoted	  scarcely	  any	  attention	  to	  religious	  instruction,56	  rural	  schools	  were	  
anchored	  by	  subjects	  that	  were	  commonly	  found	  in	  the	  katātīb	  they	  were	  meant	  to	  
replace:	  namely,	  the	  Qur’an,	  Arabic,	  and	  basic	  arithmetic.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  not	  
surprising	  given	  that	  many	  rural	  public	  schools	  were	  in	  fact	  former	  katātīb	  that	  
were	  absorbed	  into	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System	  through	  the	  extension	  of	  grants-­‐in-­‐aid	  
during	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  Mandate.57	  Even	  with	  the	  growth	  in	  public	  schooling,	  
the	  number	  of	  katātīb	  actually	  increased	  throughout	  the	  Mandate	  period	  to	  peak	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  To	  quote	  the	  standard	  description	  of	  katātīb	  found	  within	  the	  Department	  of	  Education’s	  Annual	  
Reports,	  “A	  considerable	  number	  of	  Kuttabs	  exist	  all	  over	  the	  country.	  In	  these	  the	  Quran,	  reading	  
and	  writing	  are	  taught.	  The	  standard	  in	  most	  remains	  rather	  low.”	  This	  sentence	  was	  repeated	  
verbatim	  in	  most	  of	  the	  annual	  reports	  issued.	  For	  example,	  Department	  of	  Education,	  Government	  of	  
Palestine,	  Annual	  Report	  1925-­‐26.	  14.	  	  
54	  Bowman,	  "Rural	  Education	  in	  the	  Near	  and	  Middle	  East,"	  407.	  
55	  In	  rural	  schools,	  “Religion	  and	  Reading	  of	  Koran”	  was	  allotted	  6	  hours	  in	  the	  first	  year,	  7	  in	  the	  
second	  and	  9	  in	  the	  third	  (out	  of	  34,	  39,	  and	  39	  total	  hours,	  respectively).	  Arabic	  was	  given	  12	  hours	  
in	  the	  first	  and	  second	  classes	  and	  11	  hours	  in	  the	  third.	  See	  Totah,	  "Education	  in	  Palestine,"	  157.	  
56	  Town	  schools	  allocated	  3	  hours	  to	  “Religion”	  in	  the	  2nd	  year	  and	  only	  1	  hour	  (of	  29-­‐33	  total	  hours)	  
for	  the	  3rd	  through	  6th	  classes.	  Ibid.,	  158.	  
57	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  
27.	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during	  the	  1940-­‐41	  school	  year	  at	  191.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Mandate,	  over	  14,000	  
pupils	  were	  still	  educated	  in	  131	  private	  katātīb,	  the	  relative	  decline	  in	  their	  number	  
(from	  191	  in	  1940-­‐41)	  can	  be	  partially	  explained	  by	  the	  expansion	  of	  public	  
schooling	  over	  the	  same	  period	  (from	  402	  to	  478	  schools),	  “as	  some	  of	  the	  private	  
schools	  were	  taken	  over	  by	  the	  government.”58	  The	  government’s	  reliance	  on	  the	  
absorption	  of	  these	  schools	  into	  the	  Arab	  public	  system	  as	  part	  of	  school	  expansion	  
programs	  suggests	  that	  the	  total	  availability	  of	  educational	  opportunities	  was	  even	  
smaller	  than	  usually	  appreciated	  as	  many	  “new”	  schools	  were	  actually	  pre-­‐existing	  
katātīb.	  	  
One	  way	  of	  attempting	  to	  distinguish	  the	  new	  rural	  school	  from	  the	  kuttāb	  
was	  through	  the	  introduction	  subjects	  such	  as	  nature	  study,	  physical	  training,	  “hand	  
work”	  and	  agricultural	  instruction.	  Such	  “new”	  subjects	  in	  fact	  represented	  the	  
professionalization	  of	  everyday	  rural	  activities,	  so	  that	  farming,	  raising	  poultry—or	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  girls,	  children59—were	  transformed	  into	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  that	  
were	  only	  acquired	  by	  removing	  the	  child	  from	  the	  home	  in	  which	  they	  were	  usually	  
learned.60	  This	  is	  no	  doubt	  why	  Humphrey	  Bowman	  insisted	  that	  the	  village	  school	  
be	  physically	  separated	  from	  the	  village	  it	  was	  meant	  to	  serve,	  “away	  from	  the	  dust,	  
noise	  and	  (may	  I	  add?)	  smells,	  which	  are	  invariable	  concomitants	  to	  the	  Eastern	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  Department	  of	  Education.	  Annual	  Report,	  1940-­‐41	  and	  1945-­‐46.	  
59	  Ela	  Greenberg’s	  excellent	  study	  of	  the	  girls’	  schools	  maintained	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Muslim	  Council	  
notes	  a	  similar	  proclivity	  by	  the	  SMC	  to	  gear	  female	  education	  around	  motherhood	  and	  “domestic	  
science”.	  Greenberg,	  Preparing	  the	  Mothers	  of	  Tomorrow:	  Education	  and	  Islam	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine.	  
60	  Ellen	  Fleischmann	  points	  out	  that	  it	  was	  “rather	  odd”	  to	  teach	  subjects	  like	  gardening	  and	  poultry-­‐
keeping	  in	  the	  Rural	  Teachers	  College	  given	  that	  “most	  village	  women	  learned	  such	  skills	  from	  their	  
mothers	  or	  mothers-­‐in-­‐law	  without	  the	  need	  for	  special	  schooling.”	  Fleischmann,	  The	  Nation	  and	  its	  
"New"	  Women:	  the	  Palestinian	  Women's	  Movement,	  1920-­‐1948:	  40.	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village.”61	  In	  sum,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  only	  by	  shielding	  the	  next	  generation	  from	  
traditional	  modes	  of	  rural	  life	  could	  “tradition”	  be	  saved	  in	  Palestine.	  	  
Additionally,	  due	  to	  the	  shortage	  of	  trained	  teachers,	  village	  imams	  were	  
known	  to	  maintain	  their	  posts	  even	  after	  such	  schools	  became	  part	  of	  the	  Arab	  
Public	  System.	  The	  example	  of	  Hassan	  al-­‐Siba‘i,	  for	  instance,	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  
pragmatic	  compromises	  that	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  made	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
teacher	  shortage.	  He	  had	  no	  formal	  training	  as	  a	  teacher,	  but	  was	  rather	  a	  village	  
imam	  and	  kuttāb	  teacher	  in	  Majd	  al-­‐Kurum	  prior	  to	  the	  Mandate	  period.	  His	  
application	  for	  employment	  indicated	  he	  was	  able	  to	  teach	  Islamic	  religious	  
instruction,	  Arabic,	  History,	  Geography,	  Hygiene,	  Writing,	  Nature,	  and	  Physical	  
education,62	  though	  inspection	  reports	  were	  lukewarm	  at	  best.	  Inspectors	  noted	  
that	  he	  was	  hardworking,	  energetic	  and	  respected	  in	  the	  village,	  but	  described	  his	  
teaching	  methods	  as	  at	  best	  “fair”	  and	  at	  worst	  “primitive.”	  One	  report,	  from	  January	  
1926,	  made	  note	  of	  his	  limited	  knowledge	  but	  suggested	  he	  was	  fit	  to	  retain	  his	  post	  
in	  “a	  simple	  village	  school.”63	  He	  was	  urged	  to	  sit	  for	  the	  Teachers’	  Licensing	  
Certificate	  exam,	  which	  he	  failed	  twice,	  meaning	  he	  remained	  an	  “unclassified”	  (i.e.	  
uncertified)	  teacher	  throughout	  most	  of	  his	  tenure.	  
However,	  by	  the	  late	  1920s,	  inspectors	  began	  to	  lose	  patience	  with	  Hassan	  al-­‐
Siba‘i.	  Writing	  in	  February	  1928,	  the	  district	  inspector	  wrote,	  “This	  teacher	  is	  not	  fit	  
to	  be	  retained	  in	  the	  service.	  He	  has	  very	  limited	  knowledge	  and	  a	  very	  primitive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Bowman,	  "Rural	  Education	  in	  the	  Near	  and	  Middle	  East,"	  403.	  
62	  See	  Hasan	  al-­‐Siba’i	  application	  for	  employment,	  October	  24,	  1922.	  CZA	  J17\7295	  No.	  96/2.	  
63	  Inspection	  report	  for	  Sh.	  Hasan	  Seba‘i.	  January	  1,	  1926.	  CZA	  J17\7295	  No.	  16.	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method.	  His	  school	  has	  never	  been	  found	  progressing.”64	  Still	  employed	  in	  his	  post	  
in	  July	  1930,	  the	  inspector	  lamented,	  “His	  work	  is	  not	  so	  much	  satisfactory.”	  The	  
report	  continued	  by	  stating	  that,	  if	  he	  did	  not	  show	  improvement	  by	  the	  next	  term,	  
“he	  should	  be	  discharged	  from	  the	  service.”65	  The	  next	  term	  arrived,	  during	  which	  
al-­‐Siba‘i	  assumed	  a	  new	  post	  in	  the	  Tarbikha	  village	  school.	  Inspectors	  remained	  
underwhelmed	  by	  his	  performance,	  again	  denouncing	  his	  method	  of	  teaching	  as	  
“primitive”	  and	  noting	  he	  “had	  to	  be	  reprimanded	  for	  very	  bad	  work	  in	  arithmetic	  in	  
2nd	  class	  and	  for	  bad	  work	  in	  history	  in	  all	  classes.”	  The	  inspection	  reports	  for	  the	  
following	  two	  years	  observed	  that	  he	  “has	  not	  yet	  shown	  the	  desired	  improvement	  
in	  his	  work”	  and	  that	  “his	  appointment	  should	  be	  terminated	  unless	  he	  shows	  
improvement.”66	  However,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  that	  he	  was	  fired	  from	  his	  post,	  merely	  
transferred	  back	  to	  his	  old	  position	  at	  the	  Majd	  al-­‐Kurum	  village	  school	  in	  1933.	  
He	  retained	  this	  position	  until	  1938,	  when	  he	  was	  transferred	  to	  the	  Ja‘uneh	  
village	  school	  in	  the	  district	  of	  Sefad.	  Here	  his	  performance	  improved,	  at	  least	  
according	  to	  the	  headmaster	  of	  the	  school,	  who	  continually	  praised	  his	  method	  of	  
teaching	  as	  hasana	  wa	  ja’ida	  (good).67	  However	  this	  was	  not	  an	  assessment	  with	  
which	  the	  government	  inspector	  could	  agree.	  In	  a	  sternly	  worded	  letter	  to	  the	  
school’s	  headmaster,	  dated	  October	  30,	  1943,	  he	  wrote	  as	  follows:	  
The	   teaching	   situation	   in	   your	   school	   during	   its	   inspection	   on	  October	   20,	  
1943	   was	   not	   satisfactory	   in	   some	   of	   the	   lessons	   and	   classes	   that	   were	  
observed,	   and	   in	   particular	   the	   students	   in	   the	   fourth	   class	   are	   weak	   in	  
multiplication	   and	   long	   division,	   while	   the	   students	   in	   the	   third	   class	   are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Inspection	  report	  for	  Hassan	  Siba‘i.	  February	  2,	  1928.	  CZA	  J17\7295.	  	  
65	  Inspection	  report	  for	  Hassan	  Saba‘i.	  July	  15,	  1930.	  CZA	  J17\7295.	  No.	  45.	  
66	  Inspection	  reports	  for	  Hassan	  Saba‘i.	  CZA	  J	  17\7295.	  Nos.	  54,	  67.	  The	  documents	  are	  undated,	  but	  
judging	  on	  the	  other	  papers	  in	  the	  series,	  they	  most	  likely	  date	  from	  1931-­‐32.	  	  
67	  See,	  for	  example,	  “Confidential	  Report	  on	  Teachers”	  (in	  Arabic).	  May	  29,	  1944,	  May	  29,	  1945	  and	  
June	  19,	  1949.	  CZA	  J17\7295.	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weak	   in	   geography,	   subtraction,	   dictation	   and	  writing	   and	   their	  notebooks	  
are	  filthy	  and	  unorganized.	  Students	  in	  the	  second	  class	  are	  weak	  in	  spelling,	  
writing,	   subtraction	   and	   geography	   and	   they	   memorize	   their	   lessons	   by	  
heart	  without	  understanding.	  I	  therefore	  demand	  you	  and	  your	  assistant	  Mr.	  
Hassan	  al-­‐Saba‘i	  devote	  greater	  effort	  to	  raising	  the	  level	  of	  the	  school.68	  
	  
Subsequent	  reports	  showed	  more	  promise,	  and	  in	  March	  1947,	  the	  Department	  of	  
Education	  finally	  agreed	  to	  promote	  Hassan	  to	  the	  position	  of	  classified	  teacher.69	  	  
	   A	  number	  of	  points	  surface	  from	  these	  documents.	  First,	  they	  demonstrate	  
that	  not	  every	  teacher	  corresponded	  to	  Bowman’s	  ideal	  described	  above,	  but	  that	  
these	  teachers	  were	  nevertheless	  retained,	  transferred	  to	  different	  schools	  and	  even	  
promoted.	  Hassan	  al-­‐Siba‘i	  served	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  for	  twenty-­‐five	  
years	  despite	  his	  lukewarm	  performance	  and	  repeated	  recommendations	  that	  he	  be	  
dismissed.	  Moreover,	  the	  reports	  gesture	  at	  certain	  traces	  of	  his	  former	  life	  as	  a	  
kuttāb	  teacher,	  who	  “does	  not	  use	  the	  necessary	  apparatus	  for	  illustrations	  
sufficiently,”	  “does	  not	  take	  sufficient	  care	  of	  letters	  received	  by…as	  instructed	  by	  
the	  Department,”	  and	  “relies	  on	  memory	  work.”70	  Thus	  while	  the	  Department	  of	  
Education	  clearly	  intended	  rural	  schools	  to	  differ	  in	  substantive	  ways	  from	  the	  
katātīb	  they	  replaced,	  in	  practice	  certain	  vestiges	  of	  the	  “old”	  style	  inevitably	  
survived	  in	  teachers	  like	  Hassan	  al-­‐Siba‘i.	  
In	  concluding	  this	  brief	  discussion	  of	  rural	  schooling,	  I	  think	  it	  is	  productive	  
to	  suggest	  a	  few	  general	  comments	  that	  stem	  from	  the	  previous	  analysis.	  Modernity	  
functioned	  in	  this	  particular	  case	  as	  a	  series	  of	  methods	  and	  administrative	  practices	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Education	  inspector	  to	  Headmaster	  of	  the	  Ja‘uneh	  school,	  Sefad.	  “Subject:	  the	  teaching	  situation	  in	  
your	  school	  (al-­‐hala	  al-­‐‘almiya	  fi	  medresatikum)”	  October	  30,	  1943.	  CZA	  J17\7295	  No.	  192.	  My	  
translation.	  
69	  Director	  of	  Education	  to	  Chief	  Secretary,	  “Appointments	  –	  Hasan	  Eff.	  Siba’i”,	  March	  25,	  1947.	  CZA	  
J17\7295	  No.	  228.	  
70	  See	  “Confidential	  Report	  on	  Teachers”	  from	  January	  1,	  1926,	  July	  15,	  1930,	  and	  September	  4,	  1944.	  
CZA	  J17\7295.	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that	  were	  crucial	  components	  of	  ensuring	  the	  preservation	  of	  “traditional”	  life.	  Thus	  
it	  was	  only	  through	  access	  to	  modern	  agricultural	  training	  and	  courses	  on	  
“housewifery”	  that	  young	  boys	  and	  girls	  could	  battle	  the	  misery,	  poverty	  and	  
disease	  that	  fueled	  rural	  migration	  to	  the	  cities.	  In	  short,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  
modernity	  was	  required	  to	  make	  traditional	  life	  bearable	  and	  thus	  represented	  the	  
sole	  hope	  for	  its	  continuity.	  	  
This	  tradition,	  as	  we	  are	  no	  doubt	  familiar,	  had	  the	  tendency	  to	  crystalize	  
into	  less	  dynamic	  forms	  amid	  the	  state’s	  attempts	  to	  classify,	  codify	  and	  govern	  
through	  it.	  Post-­‐colonial	  scholars	  who	  have	  analyzed	  this	  turn	  to	  tradition	  have	  
often	  characterized	  it	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  transition	  in	  British	  colonial	  policy	  away	  
from	  liberal	  attempts	  to	  remake	  the	  native	  toward	  a	  conservative	  project	  that	  
created	  absolute	  boundaries	  between	  the	  colonizer	  and	  colonized.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  
much	  to	  be	  said	  in	  support	  of	  such	  a	  diagnosis,	  and	  yet,	  at	  least	  with	  regard	  to	  
education	  policies	  in	  Palestine,	  this	  explanation	  falls	  a	  bit	  short.	  On	  the	  most	  basic	  
level,	  it	  fails	  to	  capture	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  respect	  for	  “tradition”	  was	  self-­‐
consciously	  understood	  as	  a	  progressive	  departure	  from	  colonial	  norms,	  that	  is,	  as	  
doing	  something	  undeniably	  new	  that	  was	  justified	  not	  merely	  on	  political	  grounds,	  
but	  through	  arguments	  about	  pedagogic	  and	  psychological	  necessity.	  Of	  equal	  
importance,	  such	  an	  explanation	  does	  not	  account	  for	  the	  dynamic	  interplay	  
between	  the	  “old”	  and	  “new”	  that	  characterized	  the	  attempt	  to	  transform	  religious	  




Separate	  but	  Equal?	  Educational	  Separatism	  and	  the	  Mandate	  Government	  	  
Having	  reviewed	  the	  principles	  upon	  which	  educational	  planning	  was	  based	  
in	  government	  Arab	  schools,	  we	  must	  account	  for	  how	  administrators	  related	  to	  the	  
second	  public	  system,	  namely	  that	  maintained	  by	  the	  Zionist	  Organization.71	  Here	  I	  
will	  explore	  and	  ultimately	  question	  the	  traditional	  narrative	  of	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  
separatism,	  which	  generally	  assumes	  that	  the	  British	  inherited	  a	  divided	  
educational	  landscape	  from	  the	  Ottomans	  and	  did	  little	  to	  change	  it.	  My	  attempt	  to	  
complicate	  this	  narrative	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  an	  argument	  that	  Jewish	  and	  
Arab	  schools	  were	  not	  distinct	  entities	  during	  Ottoman	  times	  or	  that	  the	  divisions	  
between	  them	  were	  merely	  colonial	  creations.	  My	  argument	  is	  rather	  that	  the	  form	  
that	  this	  separation	  assumed	  changed	  drastically	  under	  the	  Mandatory	  government	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  distinct	  policies	  pursued	  by	  that	  government.	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  by	  
overlooking	  this	  key	  fact,	  we	  fail	  to	  register	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  wholesale	  
separation	  of	  Arab	  from	  Jew	  was	  linked	  to	  practices	  that	  only	  developed	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  British	  sectarian	  rule.	  	  
In	  particular,	  the	  elevation	  of	  a	  separate	  system	  of	  schools	  supervised	  by	  the	  
Zionist	  Organization/Va’ad	  Leumi	  to	  the	  same	  status	  as	  those	  maintained	  by	  the	  
Department	  of	  Education	  legitimized	  a	  view	  of	  Palestine	  divided	  into	  two	  distinct	  
public	  spaces,	  each	  with	  its	  own	  language,	  administrative	  system	  and	  official	  status.	  
This,	  I	  believe,	  represented	  a	  radical	  departure	  from	  the	  nature	  of	  educational	  
separatism	  under	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  where	  numerous	  private	  realms	  surrounded	  
and	  interacted	  with	  the	  recognized	  public	  space	  rather	  than	  attempting	  to	  usurp	  it.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  The	  Zionist	  school	  system	  was	  administered	  first	  by	  the	  Zionist	  Executive/Jewish	  Agency	  for	  
Palestine	  and,	  beginning	  in	  1932,	  by	  the	  Education	  Department	  of	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi.	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Additionally,	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  Mandate	  Government’s	  policies	  related	  to	  
educational	  financing	  solidified	  the	  boundaries	  between	  Arab	  and	  Jewish	  school	  
systems	  and	  created	  administrative	  hurdles	  that	  made	  any	  alternative	  arrangement	  
difficult	  to	  envision	  and	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  achieve.	  I	  will	  conclude	  this	  section	  
with	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  government’s	  promotion	  of	  monolingual	  education	  and	  the	  
unforeseen	  (though	  in	  hindsight,	  nearly	  inevitable)	  social	  implications	  of	  this	  policy.	  
No	  educational	  issue	  caused	  greater	  strain	  between	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  
and	  the	  Mandate	  Government	  than	  the	  notorious	  formula	  used	  to	  distribute	  public	  
funds	  between	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  schools,	  or	  the	  “Hebrew	  and	  Arab	  Public	  Systems”	  
as	  they	  became	  known.	  To	  understand	  the	  formula’s	  complicated	  history,	  it	  is	  
necessary	  to	  return	  to	  the	  early	  days	  of	  British	  rule.	  Offered	  the	  prospect	  of	  being	  
absorbed	  into	  the	  government	  public	  school	  system,	  with	  the	  corresponding	  level	  of	  
oversight,	  the	  Zionist	  Executive	  opted	  to	  safeguard	  its	  educational	  autonomy	  by	  
forgoing	  government	  funding.72	  When	  faced	  with	  a	  severe	  budgetary	  crisis	  during	  
the	  mid-­‐1920s,	  Zionist	  leaders	  appealed	  to	  the	  government	  for	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  
funding	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  Jewish	  community’s	  percentage	  of	  the	  total	  population.	  
The	  issue	  reached	  the	  Permanent	  Mandates	  Commission	  in	  1925,	  and	  in	  response	  
H.M.G.	  stated	  that	  it	  was	  “unable	  to	  accept	  the	  contention	  that	  the	  Palestine	  
government	  are	  under	  any	  obligation	  to	  ensure	  that	  in	  any	  head	  of	  expenditure	  of	  
the	  Palestine	  Estimates	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  devoted	  to	  the	  needs	  and	  services	  of	  a	  
particular	  part	  of	  the	  people	  in	  Palestine	  should	  be	  proportionate	  to	  the	  size	  of	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  Elboim-­‐Dror,	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  ha-­‐ivri	  be-­‐Erets-­‐Yisrael:	  134.	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part.”73	  The	  Permanent	  Mandates	  Commission	  deemed	  this	  response	  adequate,	  but	  
the	  Zionist	  Organization	  continued	  to	  press	  for	  a	  greater	  measure	  of	  government	  
support.	  	  
It	  found	  a	  friend	  in	  Lord	  Plumer	  (High	  Commissioner	  1925-­‐1928),	  who	  in	  
1927	  wrote	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies	  requesting	  to	  rectify	  a	  “long-­‐
standing	  grievance”	  of	  the	  Zionist	  Organization,	  namely	  “that	  it	  has	  not	  hitherto	  
received	  benefit	  from	  Government	  expenditures	  on	  Education	  commensurate	  with	  
its	  size	  and	  importance.”	  Until	  this	  point,	  the	  Zionist	  school	  system	  received	  the	  
same	  per	  capita	  grant	  for	  which	  all	  private	  schools	  were	  eligible.	  Plumer	  argued	  that	  
it	  was	  improper	  to	  treat	  Zionist	  schools	  as	  private	  institutions,	  as	  they	  in	  fact	  
represented	  a	  parallel	  public	  system.	  He	  echoed	  the	  opinion	  of	  officials	  in	  the	  
Department	  of	  Education	  in	  arguing	  that	  it	  was	  impossible	  for	  Jewish	  students	  to	  
attend	  government	  public	  schools	  because	  the	  latter	  employed	  Arabic	  as	  the	  
language	  of	  instruction.	  The	  conclusion,	  supported	  by	  a	  committee	  formed	  to	  
investigate	  the	  matter,	  was	  as	  follows:	  	  
…the	  Arabic	  system	  of	  schools	  established	  by	  the	  Government	  and	  the	  
Hebrew	  system	  supported	  by	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  should	  be	  promoted	  
along	  parallel	  lines	  and	  entitled	  to	  receive	  proportional	  assistance	  from	  
public	  funds,	  whether	  from	  general	  revenue	  or	  local	  rates.	  A	  new	  Education	  
Ordinance	  to	  make	  legal	  provision	  for	  the	  practical	  application	  of	  these	  
conclusions	  has	  been	  drafted	  and	  will	  be	  submitted	  to	  you	  at	  an	  early	  date.74	  
	  
Plumer	  was	  anxious	  to	  satisfy	  Zionist	  demands	  and	  proposed	  that	  the	  Government	  
provide	  an	  annual	  grant	  “proportionate	  to	  their	  numerical	  strength”	  to	  the	  Zionist	  
school	  system.	  Given	  that	  “the	  proportion	  at	  present	  between	  the	  Hebrew	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  T.I.K.	  Lloyd,	  untitled	  memo,	  May	  7,	  1927.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/139/5.	  
74	  Lord	  Plumer	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies	  Amery,	  April	  14,	  1927.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/139/5.	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Arabic	  sections	  of	  the	  population	  is	  one	  to	  five,”	  he	  proposed	  granting	  the	  Zionist	  
schools	  LP	  20,000	  annually,	  approximately	  one-­‐fifth	  of	  the	  sum	  spent	  on	  Arab	  
education	  after	  shared	  administrative	  expenses	  were	  deducted.75	  	  
Lord	  Plumer’s	  letter	  introduced	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  policy-­‐making	  a	  number	  of	  
assumptions	  that	  had	  never	  before	  received	  official	  sanction,	  and	  indeed,	  that	  had	  
been	  previously	  contested.	  The	  first	  was	  that	  the	  system	  of	  schools	  maintained	  by	  
the	  Zionist	  Organization	  for	  the	  exclusive	  use	  of	  Palestinian	  Jews	  should	  be	  regarded	  
as	  a	  public	  institution	  on	  par	  with	  that	  maintained	  by	  the	  government	  itself.	  Up	  until	  
the	  establishment	  of	  the	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  in	  1927,	  Zionist	  schools	  were	  regarded	  as	  
private	  institutions.	  Much	  to	  the	  chagrin	  of	  the	  Zionist	  Organization,	  this	  gave	  its	  
schools	  the	  same	  status	  as	  those	  funded	  and	  supervised	  by	  ecclesiastical,	  missionary	  
or	  philanthropic	  organizations	  that	  were	  eligible	  for	  a	  small	  per	  capita	  grant	  from	  
government	  funds	  so	  long	  as	  they	  met	  basic	  sanitary	  and	  curricular	  standards.76	  The	  
decision	  to	  institute	  an	  annual	  block	  grant	  to	  the	  Zionist	  school	  system	  went	  hand	  in	  
hand	  with	  the	  recognition	  of	  such	  schools	  as	  public	  entities.	  	  
Officials	  in	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  questioned	  how	  Lord	  Plumer	  had	  come	  to	  the	  
conclusion	  that	  “the	  Arabic	  system	  of	  schools	  established	  by	  the	  Government	  and	  
the	  Hebrew	  system	  supported	  by	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  was	  ‘entitled	  to	  receive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Ibid.	  
76	  Tibawi	  argues	  that	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  could	  have	  exercised	  far	  more	  control	  over	  
private	  schools	  under	  the	  pretext	  of	  maintaining	  status	  quo	  ante	  bellum.	  The	  Ottoman	  Education	  Act	  
of	  1913	  held	  that	  private	  institutions	  were	  subject	  to	  inspection	  in	  matters	  including	  “hygiene	  and	  
sanitary	  conditions,	  education	  (tarbiya)	  and	  instruction	  (tadris),	  religion	  and	  conduct	  and	  whether	  
there	  was	  any	  teaching	  that	  violated	  the	  Ottoman	  constitution”	  or	  disseminated	  ideas	  “likely	  to	  cause	  
dissention	  among	  Ottoman	  subjects.	  Ibid.	  pp.	  131.	  Though	  this	  was	  true	  in	  theory,	  in	  practice,	  the	  
Ottoman	  administration	  never	  exercised	  the	  full	  range	  of	  these	  powers	  with	  regard	  to	  non-­‐
government	  schools.	  Chapter	  Three	  of	  this	  study	  explores	  this	  question	  in	  greater	  detail.	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proportional	  assistance	  from	  public	  funds’.”77	  Nevertheless,	  such	  recognition	  was	  
granted.	  The	  1927-­‐28	  Department	  of	  Education	  Annual	  Report	  reflects	  this	  change,	  
by	  making	  reference	  to	  “the	  Zionist	  Public	  School	  System.”	  Soon	  after,	  the	  term	  
“Hebrew	  Public	  System”	  was	  adopted,	  and	  in	  1933,	  the	  Education	  Ordinance	  
formally	  recognized	  the	  schools	  maintained	  by	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  (the	  communal	  
assembly	  of	  Zionist	  Jews	  in	  Palestine)	  as	  non-­‐government	  public	  schools	  that	  were	  
also	  cross-­‐classified	  as	  community	  schools.78	  	  
Lord	  Plumer	  supported	  his	  position	  by	  arguing	  that	  language	  marked	  an	  
unbridgeable	  gap	  between	  Jews	  and	  Arabs	  in	  Palestine,	  a	  point	  augmented	  by	  
educational	  administrators’	  insistence	  that	  it	  was	  pedagogically	  unsound	  to	  employ	  
a	  foreign	  language	  as	  the	  language	  of	  instruction.	  The	  refusal	  to	  operate	  mixed	  
schools	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  children	  must	  be	  educated	  in	  their	  native	  tongue,	  even	  at	  
the	  secondary	  level,	  represented	  a	  novel	  argument	  in	  colonial	  circles.	  The	  facts	  that	  
Hebrew	  itself	  was	  a	  foreign	  language	  to	  most	  Zionist	  immigrants	  and	  their	  children,	  
or	  that	  the	  native	  language	  of	  many	  Jews	  in	  Palestine	  was	  Arabic	  or	  Yiddish,	  did	  not	  
seem	  to	  complicate	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  “Hebrew”	  became	  a	  moniker	  for	  Jew.	  	  
Additionally,	  neither	  the	  officials	  in	  Palestine	  nor	  those	  in	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  
drew	  any	  attention	  to	  the	  difficulties	  raised	  by	  equating	  the	  total	  Jewish	  
population—on	  which	  basis	  the	  block	  grant	  was	  calculated—with	  the	  Zionist	  
Organization,	  which	  would	  receive	  the	  entire	  sum.	  The	  theoretical	  eliding	  between	  
Zionist	  and	  Jew	  was	  widespread;	  however,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  comprehend	  how	  officials	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  E.J.	  Harding	  minute,	  May	  13,	  1927.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/139/5.	  
78	  Government	  of	  Palestine,	  Education	  Ordinance,	  1933.	  The	  cross-­‐classification	  of	  Zionist	  schools	  as	  
community	  schools	  made	  them	  eligible	  for	  a	  portion	  of	  rates	  collected	  by	  Local	  Education	  
Authorities.	  See	  Chapter	  Three	  of	  this	  study	  for	  an	  extended	  analysis.	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overcame	  the	  practical	  difficulties	  this	  conflation	  generated	  at	  a	  time	  when	  one-­‐
third	  of	  Jewish	  children	  did	  not	  attend	  Zionist	  schools.79	  Yet	  overcome	  it	  they	  did,	  
much	  to	  the	  chagrin	  of	  Orthodox	  parties	  that	  refused	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  Va’ad	  
Leumi	  and	  thus	  sacrificed	  their	  share	  of	  the	  educational	  pie.	  
These	  difficulties,	  both	  theoretical	  and	  practical,	  were	  just	  some	  of	  the	  
numerous	  complications	  that	  the	  division	  of	  funding	  on	  an	  enthno-­‐linguistic	  basis	  
entailed.	  In	  their	  discussion	  of	  Lord	  Plumer’s	  request,	  members	  of	  the	  Colonial	  
Office	  expressed	  their	  dismay	  at	  how	  far	  afield	  such	  calculations	  were	  from	  the	  
principles	  on	  which	  state	  services	  should	  be	  based.	  In	  a	  minute	  “that	  raises	  an	  
important	  issue	  of	  principle,”	  T.I.K.	  Lloyd	  of	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  summarized	  the	  
problem	  as	  follows:	  
	  The	  Jews	  have	  shown	  little	  desire	  to	  enter	  Government	  schools,	  or	  hospitals,	  
or	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  conditions	  on	  which	  Government	  grants	  are	  made	  to	  
private	   schools,	   with	   the	   result	   that	   the	   expenditure	   of	   the	   Palestine	  
Government	  on	   social	   services	  generally,	   and	  perhaps	  educational	   services	  
in	  particular,	   has	  hitherto	  been	  mainly	   for	   the	  benefit	   of	   the	  Arabs….	   Lord	  
Plumer	  now	  proposes	  a	  further	  increase	  to	  the	  grant	  bringing	  it	  to	  LP	  20,000	  
per	   anum,	   i.e.,	   an	   amount	   which	   bears	   the	   same	   proportion	   to	   other	  
Government	   expenditures	   on	   education	   (after	   deducting	   administrative	  
charges)	  as	  the	  Jewish	  population	  bears	  to	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  population	  
of	  Palestine.80	  
	  
Lloyd	  opposed	  Lord	  Plumer’s	  proposal	  for	  two	  reasons.	  The	  first	  was	  that	  the	  
increased	  grant	  represented	  an	  additional	  expense	  at	  a	  time	  of	  budget	  shortfalls,	  
making	  it	  “urgently	  necessary	  to	  restrict	  recurrent	  expenditure	  of	  all	  sorts.”	  But	  
more	  importantly,	  he	  reiterated	  the	  objection	  British	  officials	  voiced	  before	  the	  
Permanent	  Mandates	  Commission	  in	  1925.	  “If	  expenditure	  on	  education	  is	  to	  be	  
apportioned	  between	  Jews	  and	  Arabs,”	  Lloyd	  asked,	  “why	  should	  not	  expenditure	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  Department	  of	  Education,	  Annual	  Report	  1927-­‐28,	  Appendix	  A.	  	  
80	  T.I.K	  Lloyd,	  untitled	  memorandum,	  July	  1927.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/139/5.	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health,	  on	  police	  and	  on	  other	  Departments	  be	  similarly	  apportioned?	  Police	  
expenditure,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  incurred	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  Jewish	  
community	  out	  of	  all	  proportion	  to	  their	  numbers	  and	  the	  Zionist	  executive	  would	  
be	  the	  first	  to	  object	  if	  the	  Palestine	  Government	  decided	  to	  reduce	  police	  
expenditure	  in	  mixed	  population	  areas	  to	  what	  one	  may	  call	  ‘a	  proportionate	  
basis’.”81	  
He	  concluded	  by	  stating	  that	  while	  an	  increased	  grant	  to	  the	  Zionist	  schools	  
might	  be	  desirable	  for	  political	  reasons,	  “the	  contention	  cannot	  be	  accepted	  that	  the	  
Palestine	  Government	  are	  under	  any	  obligation	  to	  apportion	  between	  Jews	  and	  
Arabs,	  according	  to	  their	  population,	  Government	  expenditure	  on	  education	  or	  on	  
any	  other	  service,”	  adding	  that	  “this	  point	  of	  view	  was	  accepted	  by	  the	  Mandates	  
Commission	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1925.”82	  The	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies,	  Lord	  Amery,	  advised	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  to	  draft	  a	  
reply	  agreeing	  to	  the	  increased	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  without	  offering	  a	  position	  on	  the	  
principle	  of	  proportionality.	  He	  only	  stated	  that	  he	  “should	  prefer	  to	  abstain	  from	  
comment	  on	  the	  principles	  laid	  down	  in	  Lord	  Plumer’s	  dispatch	  until	  I	  receive	  the	  
proposals	  of	  the	  Palestine	  Government	  with	  regard	  to	  education.”83	  
	  The	  Colonial	  Office’s	  silence	  on	  this	  question	  of	  principle	  was	  interpreted	  by	  
all	  parties	  as	  tacit	  consent.	  	  After	  many	  years	  of	  administering	  the	  LP	  20,000	  block	  
grant,	  clearly	  based	  on	  the	  population	  ratio	  of	  Jews	  to	  Arabs,	  officials	  found	  
themselves	  committed	  to	  the	  policy	  of	  proportionate	  funding.	  Thus	  in	  1932-­‐33,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Ibid.	  
82	  Ibid.	  	  
83	  L.S.	  Amery	  minute,	  June	  1,	  1927.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/139/5.	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when	  the	  time	  arrived	  to	  adjust	  the	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  in	  light	  of	  the	  increase	  in	  Jewish	  
population,	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  wrote	  to	  the	  Treasury	  for	  approval	  of	  the	  additional	  
expenditure.	  In	  describing	  the	  1927	  debates	  regarding	  the	  existing	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid,	  
they	  wrote	  “the	  principle	  of	  calculating	  the	  grant	  on	  a	  population	  basis	  was	  not	  at	  
the	  time	  explicitly	  admitted,	  but	  this	  has	  since	  been	  publicly	  stated	  (at	  Geneva	  and	  
elsewhere)	  to	  be	  the	  practice,	  and	  the	  principle	  could	  hardly	  be	  repudiated,	  even	  if	  it	  
if	  should	  appear	  to	  lack	  justification.”84	  	  
For	  their	  part,	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  repeatedly	  insisted	  that	  the	  grant-­‐in-­‐
aid	  should	  not	  be	  based	  on	  proportionality,	  but	  on	  the	  number	  of	  Jews	  as	  a	  
percentage	  of	  children	  enrolled	  in	  school.85	  Due	  to	  the	  widespread	  system	  of	  Zionist	  
education—funded	  in	  large	  part	  by	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  and	  donors	  abroad—
and	  the	  fact	  that	  public	  schooling	  was	  only	  available	  to	  a	  minority	  of	  Palestinian	  
Arabs,	  a	  formula	  calculated	  on	  this	  basis	  would	  have	  entitled	  Zionist	  schools	  to	  claim	  
approximately	  42%	  of	  the	  education	  budget	  at	  a	  time	  when	  Jews	  represented	  less	  
than	  20%	  of	  the	  population.86	  The	  Mandate	  government	  rejected	  this	  proposal,	  and	  
used	  instead	  the	  Jewish	  percentage	  of	  the	  total	  school-­‐aged	  population,	  thereby	  
accounting	  for	  the	  thousands	  of	  Arab	  children	  for	  whom	  no	  educational	  services	  
were	  yet	  provided.	  Finally,	  the	  Treasurer	  suggested	  “an	  ingenious,	  but	  very	  
complicated	  scheme”	  based	  on	  “the	  extent	  of	  the	  potential	  liability	  for	  Government	  
for	  Jewish	  schools	  if	  private	  funds	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  such	  schools	  were	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  “CO	  attachment	  to	  letter	  to	  Treasury,”	  January	  30,	  1933.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/224/11.	  	  
85	  Haim	  Arlosoroff	  to	  High	  Commissioner	  Wauchope,	  February	  2,	  1932.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/224/11.	  	  
86	  For	  the	  1927-­‐28	  school	  year,	  estimates	  were	  that	  there	  were	  28,844	  Jewish	  children	  enrolled	  in	  
schools	  (Zionist	  and	  non),	  versus	  39,739	  Arab	  children.	  Department	  of	  Education	  Annual	  Report	  
1927-­‐28.	  Table	  24.	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available.”87	  The	  amount	  of	  the	  grant	  was	  therefore	  fixed	  at	  the	  amount	  that	  the	  
state	  would	  incur	  if	  it	  educated	  the	  same	  percentage	  of	  the	  Jewish	  population	  as	  it	  
did	  the	  Arab,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  price	  per	  pupil.	  	  
Confusion	  stemming	  from	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  Zionist	  schools	  and	  their	  access	  
to	  government	  financing	  reflected	  a	  larger	  set	  of	  questions	  regarding	  who	  exactly	  
constituted	  the	  public.	  The	  Zionist	  Organization	  could	  legitimately	  claim	  to	  be	  
administering	  a	  public	  school	  system	  so	  long	  as	  its	  view	  of	  the	  “the	  public”	  did	  not	  
extend	  beyond	  the	  boundary	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community.	  Within	  this	  zone,	  it	  desired	  
universal	  and	  compulsory	  education	  under	  strong	  centralized	  control,	  funded	  by	  tax	  
revenue	  distributed	  on	  a	  progressive	  basis.	  Zionist	  officials	  admitted	  as	  much	  in	  
conversations	  with	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  during	  which	  they	  expressed	  anxiety	  that	  
groups	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi’s	  administration	  might	  found	  their	  own	  
schools,	  effectively	  meaning	  that	  “the	  more	  wealthy	  section	  of	  a	  Jewish	  community	  
might	  object	  to	  paying	  for	  the	  education	  of	  the	  poorer	  sections.”88	  	  
However	  when	  it	  came	  to	  Palestine	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  
repeatedly	  demanded	  that	  revenue	  derived	  from	  Jewish	  taxation	  only	  be	  used	  to	  
fund	  Jewish	  education,	  a	  request	  that	  was	  met	  by	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  and	  
incorporated	  into	  the	  Education	  Ordinance	  of	  1933.	  The	  Ordinance	  therefore	  
allowed	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  local	  education	  sub-­‐committees,	  in	  lieu	  of	  a	  unified	  
authority,	  in	  areas	  with	  a	  mixed	  population	  and	  stipulated	  that	  “school	  fees	  collected	  
by	  any	  Sub-­‐Committee…shall	  be	  expended	  only	  upon	  the	  schools	  controlled	  by	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  Colonial	  Office	  memorandum,	  December	  12,	  1932.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/224/11.	  	  
88	  Meeting	  minutes	  with	  Brodetsky,	  1932.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/222/1	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Sub-­‐Committee.”89	  Thus	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  internal	  world	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community,	  
the	  Zionist	  Organization	  jealously	  guarded	  the	  principles	  of	  universal	  access	  to	  
education	  and	  progressive	  taxation	  to	  finance	  it;	  externally,	  it	  rejected	  both	  
premises.	  	  
Lurking	  behind	  this	  rejection	  was,	  of	  course,	  the	  unwillingness	  to	  see	  the	  
Palestinian	  Arab	  as	  a	  fellow	  citizen.	  This	  feeling	  was	  of	  course	  not	  exclusive	  to	  the	  
Zionist	  community,	  but	  rather	  the	  flip-­‐side	  found	  widespread	  acceptance	  in	  Arab	  
circles	  as	  communal	  boundaries	  hardened	  into	  political	  ones.	  However	  the	  lack	  of	  
any	  Arab	  parallel	  to	  the	  Jewish	  Agency	  meant	  that	  such	  objections	  never	  received	  
the	  same	  level	  of	  official	  attention	  as	  those	  voiced	  by	  the	  Zionist	  Organization.	  Given	  
the	  political	  climate	  of	  the	  period	  and	  the	  asymmetric	  recognition	  of	  national	  rights	  
upon	  which	  the	  Mandate	  was	  based,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  the	  situation	  could	  have	  
been	  otherwise.	  Yet,	  as	  Michelle	  Campos	  has	  recently	  shown	  in	  her	  study	  of	  the	  
Ottoman	  constitutional	  period,	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  assume	  that	  this	  was	  the	  
natural	  or	  inevitable	  state	  of	  affairs	  stemming	  from	  the	  reality	  of	  multiple	  ethno-­‐
religious	  groups	  inhabiting	  a	  single	  territory.	  Separatism	  had	  to	  be	  produced	  at	  
numerous	  levels—politically,	  socially,	  commercially	  and	  educationally	  and	  legally.	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Government	  of	  Palestine,	  “Education	  Ordinance,	  1933.”	  Regulations	  by	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  
under	  Section	  14,	  number	  60.	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Monolingualism	  and	  the	  Logic	  of	  Separation	  	  
“It	  is	  no	  doubt	  easy	  to	  be	  wise	  after	  the	  event,”	  wrote	  H.S.	  Scott	  of	  the	  
Colonial	  Office	  in	  November	  1944,	  while	  commenting	  on	  a	  memorandum	  by	  the	  
Director	  of	  Education	  summarizing	  the	  “tragic	  history”	  of	  education	  during	  the	  
Mandate.	  “If	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  Mandatory	  was	  to	  establish	  a	  composite	  state	  one	  
would	  have	  thought	  that	  unity	  of	  treatment	  in	  education	  should	  have	  been	  adopted	  
from	  the	  beginning.”	  The	  danger	  of	  allowing	  separate	  systems	  of	  education	  to	  
flourish,	  he	  continue,	  was	  that	  “the	  cultural	  rift	  between	  Jews	  and	  Arabs,	  which	  it	  
was	  a	  mandatory	  obligation	  to	  close,	  would	  actually	  be	  widened	  and	  I	  fear	  that	  is	  
exactly	  what	  has	  happened.”90	  Scott’s	  comments	  encapsulate	  the	  general	  lament	  
that	  swept	  through	  much	  of	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  during	  the	  Mandate’s	  final	  years.	  
Generally	  speaking,	  officials	  spent	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  period	  arguing	  that	  a	  unified	  
school	  system	  was	  undesirable	  and	  the	  final	  years	  lamenting	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  no	  
longer	  feasible.	  	  
Much	  of	  the	  confusion	  stemmed	  from	  the	  vagueness	  of	  the	  Mandate	  itself	  and	  
the	  differing	  interpretations	  as	  to	  what	  political	  and	  social	  reality	  it	  entailed.	  It	  is	  
telling	  that	  in	  1944,	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  could	  not	  exactly	  clarify	  what	  the	  
Mandatory’s	  policy	  had	  been	  or	  should	  have	  been.	  Was	  the	  goal,	  as	  Scott	  articulated	  
it,	  to	  form	  a	  “composite	  state”	  with	  a	  binational	  character?	  Or	  was	  Palestine	  to	  be	  a	  
Jewish	  state	  with	  the	  Arab	  majority	  rendered	  a	  minority	  through	  massive	  
immigration?	  Was	  it	  to	  have	  an	  Arab	  majority	  with	  a	  large,	  autonomous	  Jewish	  
population?	  The	  fact	  that	  an	  unambiguous	  answer	  to	  these	  questions	  was	  never	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  H.S.	  Scott,	  “on	  memorandum	  by	  Jerome	  Farrell.”	  November	  3,	  1944.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/453/4.	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forthcoming—or	  that	  the	  answer	  changed	  with	  every	  White	  Paper—left	  education	  
administrators	  without	  a	  clear	  sense	  of	  what	  role	  schools	  were	  to	  play	  in	  shaping	  
the	  political	  future.	  	  
Moreover,	  the	  mere	  suggestion	  that	  policy	  should	  be	  dictated	  by	  political,	  
rather	  than	  educational,	  concerns	  violated	  the	  epistemic	  order	  on	  which	  colonial	  
educators	  depended	  to	  distinguish	  social	  engineering	  from	  pedagogic	  necessity.	  
Bearing	  a	  deeply	  idealized	  understanding	  of	  education	  as	  an	  apolitical	  exercise	  in	  
character	  formation,	  both	  Bowman	  and	  Farrell	  often	  failed	  to	  understand	  the	  very	  
real	  political	  implications	  of	  what	  they	  regarded	  as	  educational	  decisions.	  Perhaps	  
the	  best	  illustration	  of	  this	  self-­‐understanding	  can	  be	  located	  in	  discussions	  of	  
monolingualism,	  a	  policy	  that	  was	  both	  socially	  conservative	  in	  effect	  and	  yet	  
justified	  through	  an	  appeal	  to	  modern	  pedagogic	  research.	  Importantly	  for	  our	  
purposes,	  the	  Department	  of	  Education’s	  “progressive”	  support	  for	  monolingualism	  
effectively	  squashed	  any	  possibility	  of	  mixed	  Jewish-­‐Arab	  schooling	  and	  thereby	  
accelerated	  communal	  trends	  toward	  self-­‐segregation	  and	  political	  division.	  
The	  Palestine	  Royal	  Commission	  was	  among	  the	  first	  bodies	  to	  openly	  
comment	  on	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  unified	  sense	  of	  public	  space	  or	  shared	  Palestinian	  
citizenship.	  The	  Commission	  identified	  the	  segregated	  school	  system	  as	  a	  leading	  
factor	  that	  had	  contributed	  to	  the	  mutual	  animosity	  that	  now	  rendered	  separation	  
the	  prerequisite	  for	  any	  future	  peace	  between	  Jews	  and	  Arabs	  in	  Palestine.	  In	  his	  
testimony	  before	  the	  PRC,	  Humphrey	  Bowman	  agreed	  with	  the	  Commissioners	  that	  
“one	  of	  the	  duties	  of	  the	  Mandatory	  is	  to	  promote	  good	  understanding	  between	  the	  
different	  sections	  of	  the	  population,”	  and	  that	  “the	  educational	  field	  would	  seem	  on	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the	  surface	  to	  afford	  an	  opportunity	  for	  promoting	  such	  good	  understanding,”	  and	  
yet	  he	  could	  offer	  no	  substantive	  example	  of	  actions	  that	  had	  furthered	  these	  lofty	  
goals.	  Rather,	  he	  replied	  that	  he	  had	  not	  “to	  any	  effective	  extent”	  been	  able	  to	  apply	  
the	  educational	  system	  to	  those	  ends	  though	  he	  had	  “tried	  within	  certain	  limits.”91	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  that	  the	  PRC	  suggested	  the	  partition	  of	  Palestine	  into	  Jewish	  
and	  Arab	  enclaves,	  the	  members	  also	  praised	  the	  work	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	  private	  
“mixed	  schools”	  and	  wondered	  if	  more	  could	  have	  been	  done	  in	  the	  past	  to	  promote	  
this	  form	  of	  education.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  mixed	  schools	  singled	  out	  for	  
praise	  were	  all	  Christian	  missionary	  establishments,	  ideally	  portrayed	  as	  safe	  spaces	  
where	  Jews	  and	  Muslims	  could	  abandon	  their	  political	  strife	  through	  the	  acquisition	  
of	  good	  universal	  (i.e.	  Christian)	  values.	  	  However,	  and	  despite	  these	  models	  to	  the	  
contrary,	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  held	  that	  language	  represented	  an	  
unbridgeable	  gap	  that	  no	  school	  system	  could	  overcome.	  Bowman,	  for	  example,	  
spoke	  of	  the	  difficulties	  involved	  in	  fostering	  a	  shared	  educational	  space	  as	  linguistic	  
rather	  than	  political	  in	  nature.	  “The	  language	  of	  Arabs	  is	  Arabic;	  the	  language	  of	  the	  
Jews	  is	  Hebrew.	  Both	  races	  attach	  very	  great	  importance	  to	  the	  education	  in	  
elementary	  schools	  through	  their	  own	  language.	  It	  would	  be	  impossible	  in	  my	  
opinion	  to	  have	  Arabs	  and	  Jews	  in	  one	  school	  as	  long	  as	  the	  language	  difficulty	  exists	  
and	  I	  see	  no	  possibility	  of	  that	  language	  difficulty	  being	  solved.”92	  
The	  matter	  was	  inevitably	  complicated	  by	  regulations	  regarding	  education	  
included	  in	  the	  Mandate	  for	  Palestine.	  In	  particular,	  Article	  15	  guaranteed	  “the	  right	  
of	  each	  community	  to	  maintain	  its	  own	  schools	  for	  the	  education	  of	  its	  own	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  "Testimony	  of	  	  Mr.	  H.	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  Bowman,	  C.M.G.,	  C.B.E.,	  Director	  of	  Education.	  November	  27,	  1936,"	  50.	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  Ibid.	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members	  in	  its	  own	  language,	  while	  conforming	  to	  such	  educational	  requirements	  
of	  a	  general	  nature	  as	  the	  Administration	  might	  impose.”	  British	  officials,	  therefore,	  
tended	  to	  regard	  any	  type	  of	  joint	  schooling	  as	  both	  impractical	  and	  as	  a	  potential	  
violation	  of	  the	  Mandate.	  Once	  set	  in	  motion,	  this	  logic	  foreclosed	  any	  possibility	  of	  a	  
common	  linguistic	  space	  and	  required	  escalating	  levels	  of	  administrative	  
compromise	  to	  support	  the	  bifurcated	  public	  sphere.	  The	  following	  exchange	  
between	  Bowman	  and	  the	  PRC	  is	  instructive	  in	  this	  regard:	  
(Commissioner):	  I	  am	  rather	  dismayed	  to	  find	  on	  looking	  at	  the	  Government	  
papers	   that	   the	  regulations	  are	  printed	   in	   three	   languages.	  That	   I	   take	   it	   is	  
required	  by	  your	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Mandate?	  
	  
(Bowman):	  That	  is	  not	  the	  real	  reason.	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  the	  [matriculation]	  
examination	  can	  be	  taken	  in	  any	  of	  those	  three	  languages.	  
	  
(Commissioner):	  But	  why	  do	  you	  permit	  the	  examination	  to	  be	  taken	  in	  any	  
of	  the	  three	  languages?	  Is	  that	  because	  you	  feel	  the	  Mandate	  requires	  it?	  
	  
(Bowman):	   It	  would	  be	   impossible	  under	  the	  present	  system	  to	  arrange	  an	  
examination	   in	   any	   other	   way	   because	   the	   language	   of	   instruction	   in	   the	  
Hebrew	  secondary	  schools	  is	  Hebrew	  and	  in	  the	  one	  complete	  Government	  
secondary	  school	  Arabic.93	  	  
	  
Thus,	  the	  educational	  structure	  helped	  produce	  an	  administrative	  necessity	  to	  
maintain	  multiple	  official	  languages	  on	  a	  pragmatic	  (rather	  than	  purely	  symbolic)	  
basis.	  Palestine	  therefore	  had	  the	  curious	  status	  of	  being	  a	  multi-­‐lingual	  society	  not	  
because	  of	  its	  cosmopolitan	  character,	  but	  because	  each	  community	  was	  only	  meant	  
to	  know	  a	  single	  tongue.	  	  
Most	  importantly,	  both	  Bowman	  and	  his	  successor,	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  dismissed	  
the	  possibility	  of	  a	  mixed	  school	  system	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  was	  pedagogically	  
unsound.	  Echoing	  contemporary	  European	  arguments	  regarding	  the	  harm	  of	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multilingualism	  to	  the	  child’s	  intellectual	  and	  psychological	  development,	  officials	  in	  
the	  Department	  of	  Education	  defended	  their	  decision	  to	  use	  Arabic	  as	  the	  sole	  
language	  of	  instruction	  in	  public	  schools.	  Thus	  when	  the	  Royal	  Commission	  Report	  
raised	  the	  question	  whether	  more	  might	  be	  done	  to	  foster	  mixed	  schooling,	  Farrell	  
countered	  that	  “on	  purely	  educational	  grounds	  the	  proposals	  can	  hardly	  be	  justified.	  
No	  elementary	  or	  secondary	  pupil	  whose	  native	  language	  is	  of	  literary	  and	  cultural	  
value	  should	  be	  encouraged	  to	  seek	  instruction	  through	  a	  foreign	  medium.”94	  	  
The	  Department	  of	  Education	  relied	  on	  the	  same	  defense	  to	  justify	  not	  
opening	  any	  English-­‐speaking	  public	  schools,	  particularly	  at	  the	  secondary	  level,	  
even	  though	  the	  policy	  of	  monolingualism	  represented	  a	  departure	  from	  
educational	  norms	  elsewhere.	  One	  member	  of	  the	  PRC	  went	  as	  far	  as	  to	  ask	  
Bowman	  to	  explain	  “this	  exceptional	  procedure,”	  noting	  that	  “in	  no	  other	  territory	  
under	  British	  rule…is	  there	  a	  Government	  maintained	  secondary	  school	  in	  which	  the	  
language	  of	  instruction	  is	  not	  English.”95	  Bowman	  insisted	  his	  reason	  was	  
“educational”,	  granting	  it	  a	  quasi-­‐scientific	  pedigree	  that	  functioned	  to	  remove	  the	  
issue	  of	  language	  from	  the	  highly	  divisive	  political	  context	  in	  which	  it	  was	  situated.	  
What	  is	  noteworthy	  here	  for	  our	  purposes	  is	  the	  attempt	  to	  outline	  a	  neutral	  
field	  of	  pedagogic	  action	  that—following	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  modern	  educational	  
constitution—British	  administrators	  held	  apart	  from	  political	  considerations.	  Yet	  
what	  makes	  this	  case	  study	  most	  fascinating	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  colonial	  educators	  
found	  allies	  among	  both	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  leaders,	  who,	  however,	  were	  quite	  clear	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Farrell	  memorandum	  on	  “Report	  of	  the	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Palestine:	  Recommendations	  with	  
regard	  to	  ‘mixed	  schools’	  and	  language	  instruction.”	  November	  20,	  1937.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/362/2.	  
95	  "Testimony	  of	  	  Mr.	  H.	  E.	  Bowman,	  C.M.G.,	  C.B.E.,	  Director	  of	  Education.	  November	  27,	  1936,"	  48.	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linking	  their	  respective	  “native”	  languages	  to	  larger	  political	  projects.	  For	  Zionists,	  
multilingualism	  was	  deeply	  associated	  with	  Diasporic	  existence,	  galutiyut,	  and	  
thereby	  ran	  counter	  to	  the	  aims	  of	  Jewish	  national	  “normalization”	  in	  Palestine.	  
While	  never	  without	  its	  points	  of	  ambivalence,	  the	  Zionist	  promotion	  of	  communal	  
separatism	  through	  the	  exclusive	  use	  of	  Hebrew	  aimed	  at	  “the	  escape	  from	  
European	  Jewish	  institutional	  pressures	  for	  multilingual	  education.”96	  Within	  the	  
yishuv,	  leaders	  such	  as	  Menahem	  Ussishkin	  argued	  that	  “the	  multiplicity	  of	  
languages	  is	  unnatural”	  while	  educators	  like	  Izhac	  Epstein	  warned	  of	  the	  
psychological	  damages	  of	  multilingualism,	  drawing	  on	  the	  latest	  in	  pedagogic	  
research	  from	  European	  countries.97	  
For	  their	  part,	  Palestinian	  nationalists	  welcomed	  the	  elevation	  of	  Arabic	  as	  
the	  language	  of	  instruction	  in	  government	  public	  schools,	  a	  change	  effected	  soon	  
after	  the	  British	  occupation.	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  late	  Ottoman	  Palestine,	  imperial	  
decentralists	  promoted	  the	  use	  of	  Arabic	  as	  an	  administrative	  and	  educational	  
language	  within	  regions	  of	  the	  Empire	  with	  an	  Arab	  majority.98	  Meanwhile,	  
educators	  and	  political	  leaders	  decried	  the	  influence	  of	  missionary	  schools	  that	  
educated	  Arab	  children	  in	  foreign	  languages	  and	  supposedly	  led	  to	  estrangement	  
from	  the	  national	  tongue.	  In	  1909	  many	  of	  these	  dynamics	  coalesced	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Liora	  Halperin,	  "Babel	  in	  Zion:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Language	  Diversity	  in	  Jewish	  Palestine,	  1920-­‐1948"	  
(UCLA,	  2010),	  321.	  
97	  Ibid.,	  326-­‐29.	  
98	  The	  Decentralization	  Party,	  al-­‐muntada	  al-­‐‘arabi,	  first	  emerged	  after	  the	  restoration	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  
constitution	  in	  1908	  and	  promoted	  greater	  autonomy	  of	  the	  Empire’s	  Arab	  provinces.	  In	  1913,	  the	  
First	  Arab	  Congress	  promoted	  a	  platform	  of	  decentralization	  within	  an	  Ottoman	  framework,	  
including	  the	  use	  of	  Arabic	  as	  an	  educational	  and	  administrative	  language.	  See	  Hourani,	  Arabic	  
Thought	  in	  the	  Liberal	  Age,	  1798-­‐1939:	  286-­‐89.	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Khalil	  al-­‐Sakakini’s	  famed	  Dusturiyya	  school,	  which	  used	  Arabic	  as	  the	  language	  of	  
instruction	  and	  included	  a	  largely	  secular	  curriculum.99	  
In	  sum,	  it	  was	  not	  that	  the	  British	  merely	  failed	  to	  support	  mixed	  schooling,	  
but	  that	  officials	  never	  seemed	  to	  consider	  the	  almost	  inevitable	  political	  
consequences	  of	  nurturing	  separate	  school	  systems.	  They	  saw	  nothing	  contradictory	  
about,	  on	  one	  hand,	  claiming	  that	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  was	  “to	  
lessen	  the	  cultural	  gulf	  between	  the	  two	  races,”100	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  facilitating	  the	  
complete	  separation	  of	  the	  two	  groups	  through	  segregated,	  monolingual	  education.	  
Education	  may	  have	  been	  a	  tool	  for	  equalizing	  the	  “two	  races”	  in	  Palestine,	  but	  
certainly	  not	  for	  facilitating	  their	  integration.	  	  
Such	  a	  policy	  had	  no	  shortage	  of	  ambiguities,	  but	  two	  in	  particular	  are	  
worthy	  of	  mention.	  First,	  support	  for	  monolingual	  education	  in	  each	  community’s	  
“native”	  language	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  education	  policies	  that	  earned	  the	  unequivocal	  
approval	  of	  Palestinian	  and	  Zionist	  nationalist	  forces,	  and	  yet	  it	  inevitably	  
contributed	  to	  the	  political	  and	  social	  fragmentation	  of	  Palestine	  into	  distinct	  
Hebrew	  and	  Arabic	  spaces	  with	  limited	  capacity	  (to	  say	  nothing	  of	  desire)	  to	  
communicate	  with	  one	  another.	  Secondly,	  the	  justification	  for	  monolingualism	  
largely	  hinged	  not	  on	  obvious	  political	  motivations,	  but	  on	  the	  needs	  supposedly	  
dictated	  by	  modern	  pedagogical	  research	  and	  “progressive”	  colonial	  administrative	  
tools.	  As	  such,	  the	  question	  of	  language	  was	  dislocated	  from	  the	  political	  realm	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  For	  more	  on	  al-­‐Sakakini’s	  educational	  initiatives,	  see	  Robson,	  Colonialism	  and	  Christianity	  in	  
Mandate	  Palestine:	  29-­‐32.	  
100	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  “Note	  on	  the	  principles	  upon	  which	  the	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  of	  the	  Jewish	  public	  school	  
system	  should	  be	  estimated	  and	  applied.”	  January	  30th,	  1937.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/346/17.	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which	  it	  was	  situated	  to	  become	  a	  quasi-­‐scientific	  marker	  of	  race	  with	  its	  
corresponding	  educational	  necessities.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
It	  is	  necessary	  to	  state	  that	  upon	  their	  occupation	  of	  Palestine,	  the	  British	  
inherited	  a	  fragmented	  educational	  system.	  While	  they	  did	  not	  create	  these	  
divisions,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  administrators	  pursued	  educational	  policies	  that	  
accelerated	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  separatism,	  and	  furthermore,	  gave	  statutory	  
recognition	  to	  such	  separatism	  so	  that	  education	  could	  not	  proceed	  on	  any	  other	  
basis.	  This	  chapter	  has	  called	  attention	  to	  three	  distinct	  courses	  of	  action	  that	  
functioned	  to	  dramatically	  alter	  the	  form	  that	  educational	  separatism	  assumed	  
during	  the	  Mandate	  period.	  Far	  from	  representing	  a	  continuation	  from	  Ottoman	  
times,	  the	  educational	  structure	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine	  became	  ever	  more	  fragmented	  
due	  to	  policies	  relating	  to	  educational	  funding,	  the	  statutory	  recognition	  of	  multiple	  
public	  school	  systems,	  and	  the	  unwillingness	  to	  tackle	  challenges	  presented	  by	  
multiple	  languages	  of	  instruction.	  Conflating	  the	  nature	  of	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  
educational	  separatism	  under	  Ottoman	  and	  British	  rule	  requires	  overlooking	  these	  
developments,	  and	  indeed,	  projects	  onto	  the	  past	  a	  social	  structure	  that	  was	  still	  in	  
the	  process	  of	  formation.	  	  
I	  have	  further	  argued	  that	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  pursued	  courses	  of	  
action	  that	  were	  often	  at	  odds,	  lending	  a	  sense	  of	  disjointedness	  to	  policies.	  For	  
instance,	  the	  policy	  of	  “equalization”	  required	  a	  massive	  expansion	  of	  primary	  
education	  for	  Arab	  children,	  and	  yet	  no	  substantive	  measures	  were	  taken	  to	  expand	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access	  to	  secondary	  schools	  in	  which	  the	  majority	  of	  teachers	  were	  trained.	  
Similarly,	  while	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  repeatedly	  noted	  the	  strong	  demand	  
for	  female	  education	  and	  expressed	  support	  for	  its	  expansion,	  it	  drastically	  limited	  
the	  potential	  pool	  of	  female	  teachers.	  Moreover,	  the	  language	  of	  pedagogic	  
responsibility	  served	  to	  mask	  the	  political	  ramifications	  of	  decisions	  that	  were	  
purportedly	  based	  on	  educational	  best	  practices.	  	  
The	  refusal	  to	  acknowledging	  the	  inherently	  political	  nature	  of	  mass	  
schooling—to	  say	  nothing	  of	  the	  impossibility	  of	  insulating	  schools	  against	  the	  
surrounding	  political	  drama—also	  foreclosed	  any	  potential	  to	  craft	  an	  education	  
policy	  that	  might	  serve	  a	  positive	  political	  role.	  In	  this,	  the	  British	  diverged	  from	  
their	  Ottoman	  predecessors,	  who	  envisaged	  the	  school	  as	  a	  crucial	  site	  of	  
acculturation	  between	  the	  various	  religious	  and	  ethnic	  groups	  that	  constituted	  the	  
Empire.101	  It	  is	  true	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  system	  fell	  far	  short	  of	  this	  lofty	  goal.	  
However,	  it	  is	  significant	  that	  the	  British	  did	  not	  set	  such	  a	  goal	  to	  begin	  with,	  and	  
indeed,	  doing	  so	  would	  have	  been	  out	  of	  step	  with	  their	  conservative	  view	  of	  
education	  as	  a	  force	  that	  should	  preserve	  the	  status	  quo	  rather	  than	  transform	  it.	  
The	  irony,	  of	  course,	  was	  that	  the	  Palestinian	  social	  reality	  was	  being	  radically	  
transformed	  all	  around	  the	  schoolhouse.	  For	  the	  Department	  of	  Education,	  however,	  
it	  was	  business	  as	  usual.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  Somel,	  The	  modernization	  of	  public	  education	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  1839-­‐1908	  :	  Islamization,	  
autocracy,	  and	  discipline.	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Chapter	  Three	  
Education	  and	  Community	  under	  Sectarian	  Rule	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  further	  examine	  the	  relationship	  between	  religious	  education	  and	  
the	  Mandate’s	  legal	  structure,	  this	  chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  debates	  leading	  up	  to	  
the	  promulgation	  of	  the	  Palestine	  Education	  Ordinance	  in	  1933.	  Although	  the	  first	  
draft	  of	  the	  Ordinance	  was	  published	  in	  October	  1927,	  it	  took	  six	  years	  for	  
administrators	  in	  Palestine	  and	  officials	  in	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  to	  produce	  a	  piece	  of	  
legislation	  that	  appeased	  its	  critics,	  though	  it	  still	  failed	  to	  satisfy	  them.1	  Not	  only	  
was	  such	  legislation	  much	  delayed,	  but	  it	  was	  finally	  published	  in	  1933	  as	  an	  
emaciated	  version	  of	  its	  former	  self,	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  difficulties	  the	  Government	  of	  
Palestine	  encountered	  in	  attempting	  to	  extend	  its	  powers	  of	  supervision	  over	  those	  
schools	  maintained	  by	  religious	  bodies.	  The	  proposed	  Ordinance	  set	  off	  a	  heated	  
discussion	  about	  the	  powers	  of	  supervision	  that	  should	  be	  vested	  in	  the	  Department	  
of	  Education,	  the	  status	  of	  religious	  schools	  and	  religious	  knowledge,	  the	  definition	  
and	  role	  of	  local	  communities,	  and	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  those	  communities	  
could	  attain	  educational	  autonomy.	  As	  such,	  these	  debates	  gesture	  at	  the	  central	  role	  
of	  religion	  in	  framing	  the	  educational	  structure	  of	  Mandate	  Palestine,	  a	  legal	  
dependence	  rendered	  all	  the	  more	  problematic	  by	  ambiguities	  concerning	  the	  
boundaries	  of	  religious	  knowledge	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  religious	  communities.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	  his	  critique	  of	  the	  Mandatory	  Government	  and	  its	  education	  policies,	  Abdul	  Latif	  Tibawi	  dryly	  
notes	  dryly	  that	  laws	  regarding	  antiquities,	  customs,	  and	  cinema	  censorship	  were	  promulgated	  long	  
before	  an	  ordinance	  relating	  to	  education.	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  
three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration.	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In	  the	  analysis	  that	  follows,	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  unpack	  the	  different	  responses	  
to	  the	  legislation	  by	  various	  groups,	  and	  the	  compromises	  the	  Mandatory	  
Government	  made	  in	  response.	  While	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Ordinance	  was	  originally	  
designed	  to	  accommodate	  the	  privileged	  position	  of	  Catholic	  and	  other	  Christian	  
missionary	  schools	  in	  Palestine,	  it	  created	  legal	  and	  administrative	  structures	  that	  
had	  far-­‐reaching	  implications	  for	  religious	  education	  as	  a	  whole.	  I	  argue	  that	  British	  
officials	  dealt	  with	  the	  storm	  of	  diplomatic	  protests	  by	  designating	  religious	  
instruction	  as	  a	  category	  of	  exception	  that	  was	  largely	  exempted	  from	  state	  
supervision.	  As	  politically	  expedient	  as	  this	  compromise	  was,	  it	  was	  only	  possible	  
due	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  religious	  education	  as	  a	  conservative	  force	  that	  largely	  
functioned—like	  modes	  of	  “tradition”	  elsewhere—to	  augment	  the	  social	  and	  
political	  status	  quo.	  While	  the	  exemption	  of	  religious	  education	  from	  the	  
Ordinance’s	  provisions	  may	  seem	  to	  constitute	  its	  removal	  from	  the	  political	  space,	  
it	  in	  fact	  marked	  an	  attempt	  to	  encourage	  the	  “appropriate”	  form	  of	  political	  
organization	  at	  the	  sectarian	  level.	  Thus	  the	  Ordinance	  rendered	  religious	  
organization	  through	  a	  singular	  and	  monolithic	  “community”	  as	  the	  only	  means	  
through	  which	  to	  attain	  educational	  autonomy.	  Those	  who	  opted	  out	  of	  such	  
communities,	  or	  those	  who	  wished	  to	  organize	  schooling	  on	  a	  non-­‐sectarian	  basis,	  
were	  left	  to	  support	  their	  endeavors	  without	  official	  sanction	  or	  government	  
support.	  	  
Finally,	  I	  will	  show	  that	  the	  Zionist	  and	  Palestinian	  Arab	  leaderships	  were	  
both	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  Ordinance,	  but	  that	  their	  respective	  protests	  revealed	  
drastically	  different	  conceptions	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  the	  public	  space.	  Palestinian	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responses	  to	  the	  Ordinance	  reflected	  an	  attempt	  to	  increase	  their	  participation	  in	  
the	  country’s	  educational	  affairs	  while	  still,	  however	  reluctantly,	  recognizing	  the	  
Mandatory	  government	  as	  the	  legitimate	  site	  of	  political	  authority.	  Those	  from	  
Zionist	  leaders,	  however,	  advanced	  a	  vision	  of	  Palestine	  fragmented	  into	  multiple	  
public	  realms,	  each	  with	  their	  own	  corresponding	  sovereign	  power.	  Understanding	  
these	  key	  differences	  tells	  us	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  both	  the	  development	  of	  education	  
during	  this	  period	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  certain	  dynamics	  that	  would	  subsequently	  
define	  the	  larger	  political	  conflict.	  
	  
The	  Mandate	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Inspect	  
Upon	  occupying	  Palestine,	  the	  British	  assumed	  direct	  control	  of	  the	  former	  
Ottoman	  public	  schools	  and	  nominal	  control	  over	  a	  plethora	  of	  private	  schools	  
(including	  those	  of	  the	  Zionist	  Organization)	  teaching	  in	  no	  fewer	  than	  seven	  
languages	  and	  often	  maintained	  by	  political,	  philanthropic	  or	  missionary	  groups	  
abroad.	  Supervising	  such	  a	  motley	  crew	  was	  a	  tall	  order	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  but	  it	  was	  
made	  even	  more	  so	  by	  the	  peculiar	  terms	  of	  the	  Mandate.	  Article	  15	  guaranteed	  “the	  
right	  of	  each	  community	  to	  maintain	  its	  own	  schools	  for	  the	  education	  of	  its	  own	  
members	  in	  its	  own	  language,	  while	  conforming	  to	  such	  educational	  requirements	  
of	  a	  general	  nature	  as	  the	  Administration	  may	  impose.”	  On	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  Article	  15	  
seemed	  merely	  to	  offer	  statutory	  recognition	  to	  the	  Ottoman	  millet	  system,	  in	  which	  
religious	  minorities	  maintained	  a	  large	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  in	  educational	  affairs.	  
Yet,	  as	  Laura	  Robson	  has	  recently	  argued,	  rather	  than	  simply	  preserving	  the	  millet	  
system	  as	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  status	  quo,	  the	  Mandatory	  government	  actually	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expanded	  its	  scope	  and	  codified	  it	  in	  a	  legal	  system	  that	  rendered	  sectarian	  identity	  
a	  prerequisite	  for	  political	  participation.2	  We	  shall	  see	  that	  the	  attempt	  to	  govern	  
Palestine	  through	  sectarian	  units	  produced	  consequences	  that	  were	  particularly	  
significant	  for	  religious	  education.	  
Until	  the	  Education	  Ordinance	  was	  finally	  promulgated	  in	  1933,	  Ottoman	  
laws	  were	  in	  theory	  still	  enforceable.	  The	  Ottoman	  Education	  Act	  of	  1913	  reserved	  
for	  government	  the	  right	  to	  supervise	  the	  curriculum,	  teaching	  staff,	  hygiene	  and	  
general	  administration	  of	  all	  schools	  in	  Palestine,	  be	  they	  public	  or	  private.	  In	  not	  
distinguishing	  between	  types	  of	  schools,	  the	  Ottoman	  law	  reflected	  a	  view	  of	  
education	  as	  a	  central	  concern	  of	  the	  modernizing	  state.	  In	  his	  critique	  of	  British	  
educational	  policy	  in	  Palestine,	  Abdul	  Latif	  Tibawi	  placed	  blame	  upon	  the	  British	  for	  
not	  exercising	  closer	  supervision	  of	  private	  schools	  as	  a	  continuation	  of	  this	  status	  
quo	  ante	  bellum.3	  However,	  he	  overlooked	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Ottomans’	  control	  of	  
private	  educational	  institutions	  was	  in	  most	  cases	  purely	  nominal.4	  In	  practice,	  the	  
Sublime	  Porte’s	  concessions	  to	  European	  powers	  often	  included	  a	  pledge	  not	  to	  
interfere	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  Christian	  or	  Jewish	  schools.	  Thus	  both	  Christian	  missionary	  
groups	  and	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  would	  protest	  that	  the	  Mandatory	  
Government’s	  attempt	  to	  supervise	  their	  schools	  represented	  a	  drastic	  departure	  
from	  the	  status	  quo.	  “It	  has	  been	  said	  that	  some	  of	  the	  requirements	  (e.g.	  
registration	  of	  schools)	  merely	  maintain	  the	  Turkish	  law,”	  the	  Latin	  Patriarch	  wrote	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Robson,	  Colonialism	  and	  Christianity	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine.	  	  
3	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  
134-­‐35.	  
4	  It	  is	  telling	  that	  in	  her	  extended	  account	  of	  Hebrew	  education	  in	  Ottoman	  Palestine,	  Rachel	  Elboim	  
Dror	  has	  little	  to	  say	  about	  the	  Ottoman	  government.	  The	  chapter	  on	  the	  crucial	  years	  1912-­‐13,	  when	  
the	  Ottoman	  education	  act	  was	  promulgated,	  is	  wholly	  devoted	  to	  the	  conflicts	  within	  the	  Jewish	  
community.	  Elboim-­‐Dror,	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  ha-­‐ivri	  be-­‐Erets-­‐Yisrael.	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to	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  in	  response	  to	  the	  proposed	  regulations.	  “The	  fact	  is	  shown…	  
that	  the	  Porte	  has	  granted	  many	  privileges,	  and	  what	  are	  privileges,	  if	  not	  
suspensions	  from	  the	  law?”5	  
The	  laissez-­‐faire	  approach	  to	  supervision	  of	  private	  schools	  provided	  a	  sharp	  
contrast	  with	  that	  of	  public	  schools,	  over	  which	  the	  Director	  of	  Education	  assumed	  
complete	  control.	  “If	  the	  English	  reader	  can	  imagine	  one	  single	  person	  who	  
combines	  the	  powers	  and	  functions	  of	  Parliament,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Education,	  the	  
local	  education	  authorities	  and	  the	  National	  Union	  of	  Teachers,	  he	  will	  have	  an	  
approximate	  picture	  of	  the	  powers	  and	  functions	  of	  the	  Director	  of	  Education	  in	  
Palestine.”6	  An	  Assistant	  Director	  and	  two	  groups	  of	  school	  inspectors,	  for	  the	  Arab	  
and	  Hebrew	  public	  systems,	  respectively,	  rounded	  out	  the	  Department	  of	  
Education’s	  staff.	  The	  inspectorate	  included	  a	  number	  of	  noteworthy	  figures,	  
including	  Sheikh	  Hussam	  al-­‐Din	  Jarallah—who	  was	  chosen	  by	  the	  ‘ulema	  of	  
Palestine	  to	  assume	  the	  title	  of	  Grand	  Mufti	  before	  the	  British	  appointed	  Haj	  Amin	  
al-­‐Husseini7—and	  the	  future	  scholars	  Abdul	  Latif	  Tibawi,	  Joseph	  Bentwich	  and	  
Shlomo	  Dov	  Goitein.	  	  
Palestinian	  nationalists	  frequently	  criticized	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  for	  
maintaining	  almost	  total	  control	  of	  public	  education.	  Here,	  the	  case	  of	  Palestine	  
offered	  a	  striking	  contrast	  with	  other	  Class	  A	  Mandates	  in	  which	  education	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Louis	  Barlassina	  to	  Colonial	  Office,	  August	  16,	  1928.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/146/8.	  
6	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  30.	  	  
7	  See	  “Hassam	  al-­‐Din	  Jarallah”	  in	  Muhammad	  'Amr	  Hamada,	  A'lām	  filasṭīn	  min	  al-­‐qurn	  al-­‐awal	  hata	  al-­‐
khāmis	  'ashar	  	  (Damascus:	  Dar	  Qutaybah,	  1985),	  133-­‐34.	  On	  the	  elections	  to	  chose	  the	  Grand	  Mufti,	  
see:	  Bayan	  Nuwayhed	  Al-­‐Hout,	  al-­‐qiyādāt	  wa	  al-­‐mu'assassāt	  al-­‐siyāsiya	  fi	  filasṭīn	  1917-­‐1948,	  3	  ed.	  
(Institute	  for	  Palestine	  Studies,	  1986),	  203-­‐05.	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among	  the	  first	  portfolios	  handed	  over	  to	  local	  leaders.8	  Moreover,	  nationalists	  
claimed	  that	  the	  centralization	  of	  control	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Directorate	  actually	  
overturned	  the	  status	  quo	  by	  eliminating	  the	  active	  participation	  of	  local	  education	  
councils	  that	  helped	  manage	  Ottoman	  public	  schools.	  The	  Palestinian	  educator	  
Khalil	  Totah,	  famously	  gave	  voice	  to	  this	  complaint	  in	  his	  testimony	  before	  the	  
Palestine	  Royal	  Commission	  in	  1936.	  “The	  major	  grievance	  of	  the	  Arabs	  as	  regards	  
education,	  is	  that	  they	  have	  no	  control	  over	  it,”	  he	  stated.	  “It	  would	  seem	  that	  Arab	  
education	  is	  either	  designed	  to	  reconcile	  the	  Arabs	  to	  this	  policy	  [of	  creating	  a	  
Jewish	  national	  home]	  or	  to	  make	  that	  education	  so	  colourless	  as	  to	  make	  it	  
harmless	  and	  not	  endanger	  the	  carrying	  out	  of	  that	  policy.”9	  
Local	  Education	  Authorities	  did	  exist,	  and	  indeed,	  the	  need	  to	  decentralize	  
school	  funding	  helped	  fuel	  the	  creation	  of	  such	  councils.	  Yet	  their	  role	  was	  strictly	  
limited	  to	  providing	  supplementary	  financing	  for	  schools	  in	  each	  municipality	  or	  
district.	  As	  I	  addressed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  anxiety	  over	  educational	  financing	  
led	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  to	  recommend	  an	  arrangement	  whereby	  villages	  
that	  desired	  schools	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	  providing	  the	  building	  and	  
furnishings,	  while	  the	  Government	  would	  pay	  the	  teacher’s	  salary	  and	  other	  annual	  
expenditures.	  “Afterwards,”	  Bowman	  stated,	  “there	  might	  be	  a	  measure	  of	  
decentralization,	  both	  of	  finance	  and	  control.”	  He	  “felt	  sure	  that	  the	  members	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  For	  an	  account	  of	  education	  in	  Mandate	  Syria,	  see:	  Philip	  S.	  Khoury,	  Syria	  and	  the	  French	  Mandate:	  
the	  politics	  of	  Arab	  nationalism,	  1920-­‐1945	  	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1987).	  Jennifer	  
Dueck,	  The	  Claims	  of	  Culture	  at	  Empire's	  End	  	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  51-­‐90.	  For	  a	  
discussion	  of	  British	  educational	  policy	  in	  Mandate	  Iraq,	  see:	  Peter	  Sluglett,	  Britain	  in	  Iraq,	  1914-­‐1932	  	  
(London:	  Ithaca	  Press,	  1976),	  273-­‐91.	  Orit	  Bashkin,	  ""When	  Mu'awiya	  Entered	  the	  Curriculum"	  -­‐	  
Some	  Comments	  on	  the	  Iraqi	  Education	  System	  in	  the	  Interwar	  Period,"	  in	  Islam	  and	  Education:	  
Myths	  and	  Truths,	  ed.	  Wadad	  Kadi	  and	  Victor	  Billeh	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2007).	  
9	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  
131-­‐33.	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[Advisory]	  Council	  would	  agree	  with	  him	  that	  the	  more	  education	  was	  decentralized	  
the	  more	  likely	  it	  is	  to	  succeed	  and	  the	  greater	  the	  interest	  the	  inhabitants	  will	  take	  
in	  it.”10	  
It	  was	  against	  this	  backdrop	  that	  Humphrey	  Bowman,	  along	  with	  the	  new	  
High	  Commissioner,	  Lord	  Plumer,	  drafted	  Palestine’s	  first	  Education	  Ordinance.	  The	  
legislation	  would	  transfer	  part	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  educational	  financing	  from	  central	  
funds	  to	  Local	  Education	  Authorities	  (LEAs)	  established	  at	  the	  municipal	  level.	  In	  
many	  ways	  LEAs	  in	  Palestine	  resembled	  those	  in	  Great	  Britain	  itself,	  with	  the	  crucial	  
exception	  that	  they	  were	  granted	  financial	  responsibility	  without	  any	  corresponding	  
measure	  of	  administrative	  control.	  This	  selective	  nature	  of	  educational	  
decentralization	  did	  not	  escape	  the	  notice	  of	  the	  municipalities.	  The	  Jerusalem	  
council,	  perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  few	  public	  bodies	  that	  included	  both	  Jews	  and	  Arabs,	  
submitted	  a	  memorandum	  detailing	  their	  objections	  on	  this	  front:	  
While	   the	   Director	   of	   Education	   is	   empowered	   to	   deal	   with	   all	  
administrative	   questions,	   such	   as	   the	   opening	   of	   schools,	   registration	   of	  
schools,	   appointment	   of	   teachers,	   registration	   and	   licensing	   of	   teachers,	  
determination	   of	   their	   qualifications,	   closing	   of	   schools,	   rejecting	   their	  
registration,	  refusing	  the	  applications	  made	  for	  the	  registration	  of	  teachers,	  
inspection	   of	   schools,	   preparation	   of	   the	   syllabus,	   issue	   of	   licenses,	  
cancellation	   of	   licenses,	   examination	   of	   candidates	   for	   appointment	   of	  
teachers;	  while	  all	  these	  powers	  are	  vested	  in	  the	  Director	  of	  Education,	  the	  
local	   education	   authorities	   are	   only	   executive	   implements	   in	   the	   hands	   of	  
the	   Director	   in	   order	   to	   meet	   all	   the	   required	   expenses	   which	   cannot	   be	  
estimated.11	  
	  
Conversely,	  administrative	  decentralization	  of	  the	  Zionist	  system	  was	  far	  more	  
complete.	  There	  was	  of	  course	  no	  Arab	  Agency	  with	  parallel	  functions	  and	  status	  to	  
those	  given	  to	  the	  Jewish	  Agency	  that	  could	  lobby	  for	  similar	  powers	  of	  consultation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Second	  Advisory	  Council	  Meeting	  minutes,	  November	  9,	  1920.	  TNA,	  CO	  814/6-­‐0002.	  
11	  Jerusalem	  Municipal	  Council,	  Untitled	  memorandum.	  August	  16,	  1928.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/146/8.	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in	  issues	  affecting	  Arab	  schools.12	  As	  a	  largely	  self-­‐financed	  operation,	  the	  “Hebrew	  
Public	  System”	  was	  granted	  almost	  complete	  autonomy.	  However,	  self-­‐financed	  
should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  supported	  in	  its	  totality	  by	  Palestinian	  Jewry.	  
Particularly	  during	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  Mandate,	  most	  of	  the	  financing	  for	  the	  
Zionist	  school	  system	  came	  from	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  in	  London	  and	  donations	  
from	  Jews	  living	  abroad.	  The	  extension	  of	  a	  large	  block	  grant	  beginning	  in	  1927,	  tied	  
to	  the	  proportion	  of	  Jews	  in	  the	  population,	  in	  theory	  subjected	  the	  Hebrew	  Public	  
System	  to	  closer	  government	  supervision.	  In	  practice,	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  
never	  posed	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  the	  autonomy	  of	  Zionist	  schools;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  it	  
helped	  secure	  it.13	  	  
Though	  government	  administrators	  were	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  Zionist	  school	  
system,	  threats	  to	  withhold	  the	  block	  grant	  if	  certain	  reforms	  were	  not	  executed	  
proved	  to	  be	  empty.	  For	  instance,	  writing	  five	  years	  after	  the	  grant	  was	  initiated,	  the	  
High	  Commissioner	  noted,	  “though	  the	  [Jewish]	  Agency	  has	  expressed	  its	  general	  
agreement	  with	  the	  [reform]	  principles	  laid	  down,	  it	  has	  found	  itself	  unable	  to	  make	  
any	  substantial	  progress	  toward	  giving	  effect	  to	  them.”	  14	  Yet	  the	  grant	  was	  never	  
suspended,	  and	  conversely,	  the	  government	  soon	  agreed	  to	  act	  as	  a	  guarantor	  for	  
the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  when	  the	  latter	  applied	  for	  a	  L.P.	  100,000	  loan	  for	  new	  school	  
construction.15	  Additionally,	  while	  government	  inspectors	  attended	  meetings	  
convened	  by	  Zionist	  education	  administrators,	  their	  recommendations	  were	  taken	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  why	  an	  Arab	  Agency	  was	  never	  created—and	  never	  could	  be	  within	  the	  terms	  
of	  the	  Mandate—see	  Khalidi,	  The	  Iron	  Cage:	  the	  story	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  struggle	  for	  statehood:	  44-­‐45.	  
13	  Reshef,	  ha-­‐ẖinukh	  ha-­‐ivri	  bi-­‐yamei	  ha-­‐bayit	  ha-­‐leumi,	  1919-­‐1948:	  153.	  
14	  High	  Commissioner	  Wauchope	  to	  Sir	  Philip	  Cunliffe-­‐Lister,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies.	  April	  
9,	  1932.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/224/11.	  
15	  High	  Commissioner	  Wauchope	  to	  Sir	  Philip	  Cunliffe-­‐Lister,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies.	  April	  
19,	  1935.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/274/4.	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as	  suggestions	  rather	  than	  demands.	  A	  memorandum	  prepared	  by	  the	  Jewish	  
Agency	  reflected	  this	  attitude,	  stating,	  “while	  the	  Jewish	  authorities	  are	  prepared	  to	  
entertain	  recommendations	  and	  proposals	  on	  such	  points	  from	  the	  Government	  
Department	  of	  Education,	  we	  cannot	  look	  upon	  such	  recommendations	  as	  being	  
mandatory.”16	  
The	  Education	  Ordinance	  itself	  was	  based	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  former	  
Ottoman	  law	  and	  education	  legislation	  taken	  from	  Great	  Britain	  and	  Nigeria.17	  As	  I	  
argued	  in	  Chapter	  Two,	  officials	  in	  Palestine	  were	  true	  believers	  in	  the	  Gospel	  
according	  to	  Lugard,	  the	  former	  Governor	  of	  Nigeria,	  and	  aimed	  to	  strike	  a	  delicate	  
balance	  between	  educational	  progress	  and	  social	  stability.	  It	  was	  hoped	  that	  the	  
“right”	  type	  of	  education	  would	  halt	  the	  flow	  of	  peasants	  to	  urban	  centers	  by	  
rendering	  modes	  of	  “traditional”	  life	  less	  burdensome	  through	  increased	  
agricultural	  productivity	  and	  better	  sanitary	  conditions.	  	  
While	  Nigeria	  served	  as	  the	  immediate	  colonial	  model	  for	  the	  Palestinian	  
legislation,	  administrators	  adopted	  certain	  provisions—specifically	  those	  relating	  to	  
religious	  schools—from	  Great	  Britain	  itself.	  Provisions	  regarding	  the	  licensing	  of	  
teachers,	  inspection	  of	  schools,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  Local	  Education	  Authorities	  can	  be	  
traced	  to	  England’s	  own	  education	  reforms	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  and	  
particularly,	  to	  Conservative	  attempts	  to	  strengthen	  the	  position	  of	  Anglican	  
schools.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  “Memorandum	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Agency	  on	  the	  proposals	  of	  the	  
Director	  of	  Education	  regarding	  reform	  of	  the	  Jewish	  schools	  system.”	  Received	  December	  12,	  1932.	  
TNA,	  CO	  733/224/11.	  	  
17	  Norman	  Bentwich,	  “Explanatory	  Note	  on	  the	  Education	  Ordinance.”	  May	  17,	  1927.	  TNA,	  CO	  
733/141/17.	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The	  first	  draft	  of	  the	  Ordinance	  was	  published	  in	  October	  1927	  and	  gave	  the	  
Department	  of	  Education	  and	  its	  Director	  complete	  power	  of	  supervision	  over	  all	  
schools	  irrespective	  of	  type.	  This	  control	  encompassed	  matters	  of	  curriculum,	  
school	  syllabi	  and	  textbooks,	  licensing,	  appointment	  and	  dismissal	  of	  teachers,	  
registration,	  opening	  and	  closing	  of	  schools,	  health	  and	  medical	  inspections	  and	  
general	  oversight	  to	  protect	  against	  “morally	  or	  politically	  corrupt”	  teachings.	  
Importantly,	  the	  regulations	  were	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  all	  categories	  of	  school	  without	  
exception,	  effectively	  granting	  the	  Director	  of	  Education	  the	  same	  inspection	  rights	  
in	  missionary	  and	  Zionist	  schools	  as	  he	  enjoyed	  in	  those	  maintained	  by	  the	  
government.18	  
This	  was	  in	  fact	  the	  goal.	  Humphrey	  Bowman	  expressed	  hope	  that	  the	  
Ordinance	  would	  provide	  the	  legal	  means	  for	  extending	  government	  supervision	  
into	  the	  realm	  of	  private	  schools,	  which	  had	  previously	  proved	  impossible	  to	  
control.	  After	  the	  first	  draft	  of	  the	  Ordinance	  was	  published	  in	  1927,	  he	  noted	  with	  
satisfaction	  that	  the	  new	  legislation	  might	  provide	  the	  statutory	  basis	  for	  such	  
supervision,	  writing,	  “it	  will	  be	  a	  great	  help	  with	  bringing	  into	  line	  the	  non-­‐
government	  schools.”19	  Bowman	  expected	  the	  Ordinance	  to	  take	  effect	  within	  
months,	  and	  in	  this	  he	  greatly	  underestimated	  the	  storm	  of	  controversy	  the	  draft	  
legislation	  would	  generate.	  	  
Interestingly,	  even	  groups	  that	  explicitly	  opposed	  the	  Mandate	  argued	  that	  
the	  proposed	  legislation	  was	  contrary	  to	  its	  terms.	  Christian	  and	  Jewish	  groups	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Government	  of	  Palestine,	  “An	  Ordinance	  Relating	  to	  Education,”	  in	  The	  Palestine	  Gazette.	  October	  
16,	  1927.	  	  
19	  Humphrey	  Bowman,	  diary	  entry	  dated	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  MEC,	  Humphrey	  Bowman	  collection,	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claimed	  that	  the	  Government’s	  attempts	  to	  register	  and	  inspect	  their	  schools	  
violated	  Article	  15.	  Meanwhile,	  Palestinian	  Arabs	  asserted	  that	  Article	  15	  also	  
guaranteed	  their	  rights	  to	  educational	  autonomy	  and	  demanded	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  the	  
administration	  of	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System.	  I	  will	  deal	  with	  each	  of	  these	  protests	  in	  
turn,	  as	  the	  form	  each	  assumed	  tells	  us	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  differing	  conceptions	  of	  
governance,	  community,	  and	  the	  legitimate	  location	  of	  authority	  within	  a	  
fragmented	  political	  and	  social	  space.	  
The	  loudest	  voices	  of	  protest	  came	  from	  France,	  Italy	  and	  the	  Vatican,	  and	  
were	  chiefly	  concerned	  that	  the	  draft	  Ordinance	  represented	  a	  direct	  challenge	  to	  
the	  autonomy	  that	  Catholic	  schools	  historically	  enjoyed.	  In	  response,	  Lord	  Plumer	  
argued	  that	  the	  educational	  freedoms	  granted	  by	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  Mandate	  were	  
tempered	  by	  Article	  16,	  which	  gave	  the	  Mandatory	  supervisory	  rights	  over	  religious	  
or	  missionary	  bodies	  “as	  may	  be	  required	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  public	  order	  and	  
good	  Government.”	  The	  High	  Commissioner	  held	  that	  it	  was	  therefore	  possible	  to	  
impose	  requirements	  on	  schools	  maintained	  by	  religious	  bodies	  “which	  are	  
educational	  in	  nature.”20	  	  
Generally	  speaking,	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  and	  the	  Director	  of	  Education	  
sought	  to	  bestow	  upon	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  far	  greater	  powers	  of	  
educational	  supervision	  than	  the	  Colonial	  Office—faced	  with	  a	  flurry	  of	  
complaints—was	  willing	  to	  allow.	  Part	  of	  the	  dispute	  stemmed	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  
administrators	  had	  substantial	  experience	  in	  colonial	  settings	  and	  expected	  similar	  
regulations	  to	  be	  enacted	  in	  Palestine.	  Officials	  in	  the	  Colonial	  Office,	  on	  the	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Lloyd,	  T.I.K.	  “Draft	  Education	  Ordinance,	  Etc.”	  November	  28,	  1928.	  TNA,	  CO	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hand,	  were	  preoccupied	  by	  the	  novelty	  of	  a	  Mandate	  under	  international	  control	  and	  
unsure	  of	  what	  legal	  limitations	  it	  entailed.	  Regarding	  the	  Education	  Ordinance,	  the	  
latter	  group	  was	  unconvinced	  that	  the	  legislation	  as	  drafted	  was	  consistent	  with	  the	  
terms	  of	  the	  Mandate,	  and	  noted	  that	  “the	  mere	  fact	  that	  the	  question	  is	  one	  of	  
interpretation,	  that	  the	  whole	  subject	  of	  education	  in	  Palestine	  is	  so	  controversial	  
and	  that	  neither	  the	  Turkish	  nor	  the	  Palestine	  governments	  have	  in	  the	  past	  
interfered	  in	  any	  way	  with	  religious	  schools,	  clearly	  makes	  it	  desirable	  to	  proceed	  
with	  utmost	  circumspection.”21	  	  
Officials	  in	  London	  also	  feared	  that	  the	  Ordinance	  would	  create	  barriers	  
before	  private	  educational	  initiatives,	  which	  would	  consequently	  place	  a	  larger	  
financial	  burden	  on	  the	  Palestine	  Government.	  At	  the	  most	  basic	  level,	  the	  more	  
children	  were	  enrolled	  in	  Zionist,	  missionary	  and	  other	  private	  schools,	  the	  more	  
the	  Government’s	  own	  responsibility	  for	  education	  would	  diminish.	  This	  
perspective	  was	  not	  at	  all	  surprising	  given	  that	  Great	  Britain	  had	  left	  the	  education	  
of	  its	  own	  population	  primarily	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Anglican	  Church	  and	  other	  
private	  organizations	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.22	  Even	  by	  the	  final	  
years	  of	  the	  Mandate,	  far	  more	  children	  were	  educated	  in	  Zionist	  and	  private	  
religious	  schools	  than	  in	  the	  government-­‐run	  Arab	  Public	  System.	  For	  the	  1925-­‐26	  
school	  year,	  there	  were	  a	  total	  of	  19,737	  total	  students	  enrolled	  in	  the	  government’s	  
public	  schools,	  versus	  45,071	  pupils	  in	  private	  schools	  (which,	  at	  this	  time,	  included	  
Zionist	  ones).	  15,145	  students	  were	  enrolled	  in	  Christian	  schools	  alone.	  Twenty	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Ibid.	  
22	  Anne	  Digby	  and	  Peter	  Searby,	  Children,	  School,	  and	  Society	  in	  nineteenth-­‐century	  England	  	  (London:	  
New	  York,	  1981).	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years	  later,	  81,042	  students	  attended	  Arab	  public	  schools,	  versus	  87,287	  in	  the	  
Hebrew	  Public	  System,	  and	  64,523	  in	  private	  schools.23	  
Thus,	  ever	  conscious	  of	  their	  dependence	  on	  private	  bodies	  to	  supplement	  
state	  social	  services,	  officials	  in	  the	  colonial	  office	  deemed	  certain	  proposed	  
regulations	  “badly	  drafted”	  and	  “characteristically	  meddlesome”.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  
T.I.K.	  Lloyd,	  writing	  in	  1928,	  “to	  the	  need	  for	  the	  development/spread	  of	  education,	  
which	  in	  present	  financial	  crisis	  must	  be	  left	  largely	  to	  non-­‐governmental	  agencies,	  
the	  regulations	  as	  a	  whole	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  far	  too	  restrictive	  in	  character.”24	  
Thus	  while	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  initially	  sought	  to	  extend	  its	  powers	  of	  
supervision,	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  argued	  that	  any	  substantive	  measure	  of	  control	  
would	  discourage	  private	  educational	  initiatives	  and	  thereby	  undermine	  the	  
financial	  strategy	  for	  delivering	  social	  services.	  	  
For	  their	  part,	  Catholic	  powers	  found	  fault	  with	  clauses	  requiring	  all	  schools	  
to	  register	  and	  all	  teachers	  to	  be	  licensed	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Education.	  They	  took	  
further	  issue	  with	  the	  broad	  powers	  of	  inspection	  given	  to	  education	  officials.	  In	  
response,	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  recommended	  amending	  the	  legislation	  to	  exempt	  
religious	  schools	  from	  certain	  clauses.	  Owing	  to	  “apprehension	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
religious	  bodies…that	  the	  draft	  gave	  possibilities	  of	  inquisitions	  by	  officers	  not	  
properly	  qualified	  to	  inspect	  schools,”	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  limited	  powers	  of	  
“general	  inspection”	  to	  the	  Director	  of	  Education.	  He	  agreed	  to	  exempt	  from	  the	  
Ordinance	  schools	  imparting	  religious	  education	  exclusively	  and	  to	  not	  interfere	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  Department	  of	  Education,	  Annual	  Report	  1925-­‐26	  and	  Annual	  Report	  
1945-­‐46.	  	  	  
24	  Lloyd,	  T.I.K.	  Untitled	  minute,	  July	  30,	  1928.	  TNA,	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with	  matters	  of	  religious	  curriculum	  in	  private	  schools,	  even	  those	  receiving	  
government	  aid.	  Finally	  he	  offered	  assurance	  that	  any	  teacher’s	  license	  “signed	  by	  
the	  Religious	  Head	  of	  the	  Communion	  to	  which	  the	  teacher	  belongs”	  would	  be	  
recognized	  as	  valid.25	  
An	  amended	  draft	  of	  the	  Ordinance	  was	  published	  in	  July	  1928,	  though	  critics	  
still	  found	  it	  far	  from	  satisfactory.	  A	  particularly	  scathing	  rebuttal	  arrived	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  a	  21-­‐page	  missive	  from	  the	  Latin	  Patriarch	  of	  Jerusalem,	  Louis	  Barlassina.	  
The	  Patriarch	  objected	  to	  the	  draft	  Ordinance	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  prior	  assurances	  given	  
by	  the	  British	  Government	  not	  to	  interfere	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  Catholic	  schools.	  As	  a	  
matter	  of	  precedent,	  he	  wrote,	  France	  (acting	  in	  its	  self-­‐appointed	  role	  as	  “Protector	  
of	  Catholics	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire”)	  had	  secured	  an	  arrangement	  with	  the	  Sublime	  
Porte	  “which	  secured	  the	  liberty	  of	  teaching	  in	  Catholic	  schools	  without	  let	  or	  
hindrance	  from	  the	  officers	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Government.”	  After	  the	  war,	  Great	  
Britain	  agreed	  “to	  recognize	  all	  the	  rights	  obtained	  by	  France	  from	  the	  Ottoman	  
Government,	  including	  those	  of	  schools.”	  He	  continued,	  “Although	  the	  Ottoman	  Law	  
has	  some	  regulations	  and	  restrictions	  with	  regard	  to	  private	  schools,	  which	  are	  
found	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Code,	  nevertheless,	  if	  on	  one	  side	  the	  Turkish	  Government	  has	  
inserted	  them	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  its	  authority,	  on	  the	  other	  it	  was	  conscious	  of	  the	  
inconvenience	  of	  putting	  them	  into	  force.”26	  
The	  Patriarch	  sought	  to	  communicate	  that	  any	  British	  attempts	  to	  supervise	  
Catholic	  schools	  would	  prove	  equally	  inconvenient.	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  some	  of	  the	  
most	  vociferous	  responses	  to	  the	  legislation	  came	  from	  Christians,	  like	  the	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  Lord	  Plumer	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Patriarch,	  who	  displayed	  no	  greater	  enthusiasm	  for	  British	  rulers	  than	  he	  did	  for	  the	  
former	  Ottoman	  variety.	  Furthermore,	  he	  argued	  that	  by	  adopting	  legislation	  from	  
colonial	  settings,	  the	  Mandate	  government’s	  laws	  were	  actually	  far	  more	  
meddlesome	  than	  any	  he	  had	  faced	  in	  the	  past.	  “Palestine	  is	  not	  a	  COLONY	  and	  
cannot	  be	  treated	  as	  such,”	  he	  stated	  with	  characteristic	  frankness.27	  The	  Patriarch	  
offered	  the	  domestic	  British	  model	  in	  place	  of	  a	  colonial	  one	  and	  proposed	  that	  
private	  schools	  in	  Palestine	  should	  be	  given	  the	  complete	  autonomy	  they	  enjoyed	  in	  
England,	  where	  they	  operated	  unregistered	  and	  did	  not	  submit	  to	  government	  
inspections.	  	  	  
With	  a	  few	  minor	  exceptions,	  Barlassina’s	  protest	  did	  not	  involve	  matters	  of	  
curriculum,	  which	  was	  assumed	  to	  be	  beyond	  the	  pale	  of	  any	  proposed	  legislation.	  
Rather,	  the	  majority	  of	  his	  objections	  concern	  the	  regulatory	  machinery	  the	  
Ordinance	  attempted	  to	  enact	  as	  a	  means	  of	  gaining	  visibility	  into	  private	  
educational	  spaces.	  Though	  the	  Palestine	  government	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  dictate	  
what	  could	  be	  taught	  in	  schools	  maintained	  by	  religious	  orders,	  the	  draft	  Ordinance	  
stipulated	  under	  what	  conditions	  schools	  could	  open	  or	  continue	  to	  operate	  and	  
thus	  affected	  their	  capacity	  to	  teach	  at	  all.	  Barlassina	  regarded	  these	  regulations,	  
cloaked	  in	  the	  language	  of	  public	  order	  and	  sanitation,	  as	  of	  equal	  danger	  as	  those	  
that	  would	  have	  interfered	  in	  curricular	  matters.	  Here	  a	  telling	  example	  from	  the	  
Patriarch’s	  letter	  is	  worth	  quoting	  at	  length:	  
For	  some	  years	  past	  the	  Education	  Department	  has	  been	  trying	  to	  enroll	  all	  
the	  Catholic	  Educational	   institutions	  under	   its	  control…I	  myself,	   repeatedly	  
spoke	  to	  Mr.	  Bowman,	  Mr.	  Farrell,	  and	  Mr.	  Antonius	  on	  the	  subject,	  declaring	  
that	   we	   could	   not	   accept	   either	   the	   imposition	   of	   filling	   up,	   every	   three	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months,	   their	   complicated	   Attendance	   Return	   forms	   or	   the	   many	   other	  
innovations	   contained	   in	   circular	   letters	   issued	   from	   time	   to	   time.	  
Nevertheless	  I	  expressed	  our	  willingness,	   if	  only	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  courtesy,	  to	  
furnish	  yearly	  to	  the	  Education	  Department	  such	  information	  and	  statistics,	  
of	   not	   too	   complicated	   a	   nature,	   as	  might	   be	   useful…Notwithstanding,	   the	  
Education	   Department	   continued,	   every	   three	   months,	   to	   harass	   the	  
Communities	  who	  were	  urged	  to	   fill	  up	  these	  forms.	  Eventually	  seeing	  that	  
this	   was	   a	   loss	   of	   time…the	   Department	   of	   Education	   began	   to	   use	   other	  
means	  which,	  to	  say	  the	  least,	  were	  by	  no	  means	  delicate.28	  
	  
Forms	  were	  sent	  to	  directly	  to	  parish	  priests	  living	  in	  villages,	  many	  of	  whom	  
complied	  and	  returned	  them	  out	  of	  fear,	  though	  most	  appealed	  to	  the	  Patriarch	  for	  
instructions.	  In	  Barlassina’s	  eyes,	  the	  act	  of	  addressing	  the	  priests	  directly	  
represented	  a	  direct	  challenge	  to	  the	  hierarchical	  structure	  of	  the	  clergy,	  and	  thus	  
implicitly,	  to	  his	  status	  as	  mediator	  between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  masses.	  “Allow	  
me,	  Sir,”	  he	  wrote,	  “to	  ask	  whether	  it	  encourages	  discipline	  to	  be	  respected,	  to	  urge	  
subjects	  to	  do	  a	  thing	  which	  is	  known	  to	  be	  formally	  refused	  by	  their	  superiors.”	  	  
Unable	  to	  secure	  the	  Patriarch’s	  cooperation,	  he	  claimed	  that	  the	  Department	  
of	  Education	  turned	  to	  the	  Consuls,	  “hoping	  to	  obtain	  from	  them	  what	  the	  
Communities	  had	  refused	  up	  to	  that	  time	  through	  me.”	  He	  continued:	  
A	   letter…was	   sent	   to	   the	  Consuls.	   The	   subject	   of	   the	   letter	  was	   that	   of	   the	  
Customs	   Exemption	   but	   attached	   was	   the	   “FORM	   OF	   APPLICATION	   FOR	  
PERMISSION	  TO	  OPEN	  A	   SCHOOL”,	   and	   the	   Consuls	  were	   invited	   to	   cause	  
the	  same	  to	  be	  filled	   in	  by	  the	  Communities	  assisted	  by	  them.	  The	  Consuls,	  
strictly	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   courtesy,	   complied	   with	   the	   invitation,	   and	   the	  
Communities	  in	  returning	  the	  forms,	  carefully	  erased	  the	  phrase	  “FORM	  OF	  
APPLICATION	  FOR	  PERMISSION…”	  etc.	  The	  Consuls	  forwarded	  the	  forms	  on	  
to	   the	  Department	  of	  Education,	  but	  at	   the	  same	   time,	   they	  clearly	  pointed	  
out	   that,	   in	   doing	   so,	   they	   were	   merely	   performing	   an	   act	   purely	  
administrative,	  which	   did	   not	   derogate	   in	   any	  way	   the	   from	   the	   privileges	  
and	   liberty	   they	   enjoyed.	   But,	   what	   was	   the	   reward	   for	   such	   an	   act	   of	  
kindness?	   An	   Officer	   of	   Health	   immediately	   visited	   the	   religious	  
Communities,	  and	  then,	  an	  intimation	  dated	  14th	  September…was	  sent	  to	  all	  
the	   Communities	   beginning:	   ‘With	   reference	   to	   your	   application	   for	  
permission	  TO	  MAINTAIN	  YOUR	  SCHOOL’!!!	  When	  and	  by	  whom	  was	  such	  a	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permission	  asked	  for?	  From	  all	  that	  we	  have	  related	  above,	  does	  it	  not	  seem	  
that	  this	  was	  a	  trap?29	  	  
	  
Faced	  with	  unrelenting	  attacks	  on	  the	  proposed	  legislation,	  Lord	  Plumer	  appealed	  to	  
the	  Colonial	  Office	  that	  the	  British	  Government	  should	  “make	  Catholic	  opinion	  in	  
Europe	  realize	  that	  the	  Mandatory	  for	  Palestine	  has	  no	  intention	  to	  seek	  to	  exercise,	  
under	  the	  cloak	  of	  legislations,	  any	  interference	  with	  Catholic	  instruction	  to	  
adherents	  of	  that	  confession	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Mandate.”30	  
However,	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  refused	  to	  launch	  such	  a	  publicity	  campaign,	  stating	  
that,	  in	  effect,	  “they	  ask	  that	  H.M.G.	  should	  instruct	  Catholic	  opinion	  in	  Europe	  and	  
the	  Vatican,	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Catholic	  non-­‐assisted	  schools,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  intention	  of	  
the	  Palestine	  Government	  fully	  to	  use	  the	  powers	  which	  in	  the	  draft	  Ordinance	  they	  
propose	  to	  take.”31	  In	  short,	  Plumer’s	  proposed	  solution	  to	  the	  controversy	  was	  to	  
communicate	  that	  the	  Palestine	  Government	  was	  officially	  substituting	  its	  own	  
Education	  Ordinance	  in	  place	  of	  the	  old	  Ottoman	  one,	  but	  that	  in	  practice,	  
enforcement	  would	  be	  just	  as	  lax.	  
Instead,	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  pushed	  the	  Palestine	  Government	  to	  whittle	  down	  
its	  powers	  of	  supervision,	  not	  just	  in	  implementation,	  but	  in	  the	  legal	  text	  itself.	  “An	  
alternative…	  is	  to	  redraft	  the	  Ordinance	  and	  Regulations	  so	  as	  to	  define	  clearly	  and	  
exactly	  the	  powers	  which	  the	  legislation	  confers	  on	  the	  Palestine	  Government	  in	  
respect	  of	  religious	  non-­‐assisted	  schools.”32	  One	  official	  recommended	  the	  following	  
course	  of	  action:	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I	   should	   therefore	  prefer	  definitely	   to	  abandon	   the	   claim	   that	   the	  Mandate	  
entitles	   the	   Palestine	   Government	   to	   enforce	   on	   religious	   schools	  
‘educational	  requirements	  of	  a	  general	  nature’.	  If	  it	  is	  possible	  in	  practice	  to	  
distinguish	   between	   schools	   of	   religious	   bodies	   and	   schools	   of	   national	  
bodies…	   I	   see	   no	   reason	   why	   educational	   requirements	   of	   a	   general	  
character	  should	  not	  be	  imposed	  on	  the	  latter	  class	  of	  schools…The	  position	  
would	  then	  be	  that,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  schools	  of	  religious	  bodies	  (not	  necessarily	  
schools	   imparting	   only	   religious	   instruction),	   the	   Palestine	   Government	  
would	  take	  the	  minimum	  powers	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  public	  order	  and	  good	  
government.33	  
	  
The	  maintenance	  of	  “public	  order	  and	  good	  government”	  would	  only	  enable	  the	  
Palestine	  Government	  to	  demand	  “the	  dismissal	  of	  any	  teacher	  convicted	  of	  an	  
offense	  involving	  moral	  turpitude”	  and	  to	  ensure	  the	  hygienic	  and	  sanitary	  
conditions	  of	  the	  school	  were	  adequate.	  Schools	  maintained	  by	  religious	  bodies	  
would	  be	  exempted	  from	  all	  other	  regulations.	  However,	  the	  practical	  difficulties	  
involved	  in	  distinguishing	  between	  schools	  maintained	  by	  religious	  bodies	  as	  
opposed	  to	  (European)	  national	  ones	  proved	  insurmountable,	  and	  the	  CO	  thus	  
recommended	  all	  concessions	  given	  to	  the	  former	  class	  of	  schools	  be	  extended	  to	  
the	  latter	  as	  well.	  A	  minute	  dated	  December	  24,	  1928,	  noted,	  “Mr.	  Lloyd	  discussed	  
amended	  draft	  with	  [Humphrey]	  Bowman	  on	  Friday	  morning.	  He	  was	  rather	  
reluctant	  to	  see	  the	  powers	  taken	  in	  the	  draft	  Ordinance	  whittled	  down,	  but	  we	  at	  
last	  induced	  him	  to	  agree	  to	  the	  memo.”34	  
After	  months	  of	  contestation	  between	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  and	  administrators	  
in	  Palestine,	  the	  following	  categories	  of	  private	  religious	  schools	  were	  finally	  
adopted:	  1.	  Assisted	  schools	  in	  receipt	  of	  public	  aid,	  2.	  Non-­‐assisted	  schools	  in	  which	  
religious	  instruction	  exclusively	  was	  given,	  and	  3.	  Non-­‐assisted	  schools	  maintained	  
by	  religious	  bodies	  in	  which	  some	  secular	  instruction	  was	  given.	  The	  first	  category	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of	  schools	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  Ordinance,	  with	  the	  exception	  that	  
the	  Government	  had	  no	  rights	  of	  supervision	  over	  religious	  curriculum	  or	  teachers	  
of	  religious	  subjects.	  It	  was	  agreed	  that	  schools	  in	  which	  religious	  instruction	  
exclusively	  was	  given	  should	  be	  exempt	  from	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  Ordinance,	  save	  for	  
sanitary	  requirements	  deemed	  necessary	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  public	  health.	  	  
The	  third	  category	  of	  schools—which	  included	  most	  Catholic	  and	  missionary	  
schools—proved	  the	  most	  difficult	  to	  address.	  After	  much	  discussion	  about	  the	  
necessity	  of	  registration	  for	  schools	  and	  teachers,	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  recommended	  
these	  schools	  be	  exempted	  from	  both	  clauses.	  Additionally,	  a	  clause	  reserving	  for	  
the	  High	  Commissioner	  the	  right	  to	  “require	  the	  dismissal	  of	  any	  teacher	  who	  has	  
been	  convicted	  of	  any	  criminal	  offence,	  or	  who	  has	  been	  shown…	  to	  have	  imparted	  
teaching	  of	  a	  seditious,	  disloyal	  or	  otherwise	  harmful	  character”	  was	  deleted.	  The	  
Director	  of	  Education	  and	  his	  immediate	  deputy	  would	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  visit	  
schools,	  but	  not	  inspect	  them,	  and	  this	  only	  after	  “due	  notice”	  was	  given.	  Assurances	  
would	  be	  extended	  that	  “the	  power	  to	  visit…and	  request	  certain	  information	  does	  
not	  confer	  on	  the	  Director…	  any	  power	  to	  demand	  changes	  in	  the	  curriculum	  or	  in	  
the	  internal	  administration	  of	  schools.”35	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  only	  provisions	  that	  fully	  
applied	  to	  schools	  maintained	  by	  religious	  bodies	  were	  those	  related	  to	  sanitation	  
and	  hygiene.	  T.I.K.	  Lloyd	  of	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  summarized	  these	  points	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  
the	  Foreign	  Office	  requesting	  them	  to	  arrange	  for	  diplomatic	  representation	  of	  the	  
Government’s	  position	  at	  the	  Vatican.	  He	  noted	  that	  while	  “it	  would	  perhaps	  be	  open	  
to	  the	  Palestine	  Government	  to	  impose	  educational	  requirements	  of	  a	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  T.I.K.	  Lloyd	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  March	  1,	  1929.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/165/5.	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stringent	  character”	  on	  schools	  maintained	  by	  religious	  bodies,	  “the	  subject	  of	  
education	  in	  Palestine	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  so	  many	  communities	  and	  
religions	  it	  is	  desirable	  to	  proceed	  with	  the	  utmost	  circumspection.”36	  	  
It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  Barlassina	  remained	  unwilling	  to	  accept	  any	  
Government	  inspection	  of	  his	  schools	  or	  comply	  with	  new	  regulatory	  provisions,	  
with	  the	  exception	  that	  he	  “realized	  the	  right	  of	  the	  Government	  to	  supervise	  the	  
Hygiene	  and	  Sanitation	  of	  the	  schools.”	  He	  qualified	  this	  admission	  by	  demanding	  
“the	  Government	  to	  be	  satisfied	  with	  arrangements	  suited	  to	  slender	  means,	  and	  not	  
of	  such	  a	  pretentious	  character	  as	  could	  not	  be	  found	  even	  in	  the	  best	  places	  of	  
London	  or	  Paris.”37	  Suffice	  it	  to	  say	  that	  many	  schools	  in	  Palestine	  were	  not	  able	  to	  
meet	  the	  Health	  Department’s	  requirements,	  which	  stipulated	  that	  schools	  must	  
have	  running	  taps,	  toilets,	  “proper”	  furnishings	  and	  a	  playground.	  	  
Yet,	  what	  this	  example	  nonetheless	  demonstrates	  is	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  
public	  health	  discourse	  that	  asserted	  the	  government’s	  unequivocal	  right	  to	  inspect,	  
supervise	  and	  enforce	  certain	  sanitary	  conditions.	  As	  concerns	  that	  purportedly	  
transcended	  the	  narrow	  confines	  of	  politics	  and	  sought	  only	  the	  public	  good,	  such	  
regulations	  reached	  into	  the	  private	  space	  of	  religious	  education	  in	  ways	  in	  which	  
no	  other	  body	  of	  legislation	  could.	  Moreover,	  although	  they	  may	  have	  tried	  to	  shirk	  
government	  oversight,	  religious	  communities	  largely	  acknowledged	  that	  matters	  of	  
health	  and	  hygiene	  fell	  within	  the	  legitimate	  scope	  of	  its	  authority.	  While	  a	  full	  
analysis	  of	  this	  topic	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  current	  project,	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  
worth	  noting	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  public	  health	  discourse	  paralleled	  that	  which	  




claimed	  to	  speak	  in	  the	  name	  of	  apolitical,	  scientifically	  validated,	  pedagogic	  
necessity.	  	  
	  
Communal	  and	  the	  Sectarian	  Game	  
I	  have	  argued	  thus	  far	  that	  officials	  in	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  gradually	  whittled	  
down	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Education	  Ordinance	  to	  create	  categories	  of	  exception	  
for	  religious	  instruction,	  teachers	  of	  religious	  subjects	  and	  schools	  maintained	  by	  
religious	  bodies.	  The	  final	  form	  of	  the	  Education	  Ordinance	  exempted	  from	  all	  
provisions	  those	  schools	  in	  which	  only	  religious	  instruction	  was	  given,	  waived	  
licensing	  requirements	  for	  teachers	  of	  religious	  subjects,	  and	  promised	  not	  to	  
interfere	  in	  the	  religious	  curriculum	  of	  any	  non-­‐government	  school	  irrespective	  of	  
whether	  it	  was	  in	  receipt	  of	  public	  funds.	  It	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  archival	  record	  that	  the	  
impulse	  for	  these	  measures	  stemmed	  primarily	  from	  the	  desire	  to	  maintain	  
diplomatic	  tranquility	  with	  European	  countries	  that	  maintained	  missionary	  schools	  
in	  Palestine.	  Yet	  the	  resulting	  compromise—namely	  designating	  religious	  education	  
as	  a	  category	  exempted	  from	  Governmental	  control—had	  consequences	  that	  
reached	  far	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  Christian	  missionary	  schools.	  	  
Ironically,	  it	  was	  the	  great	  champion	  of	  religious	  values,	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  who,	  at	  an	  
earlier	  phase	  in	  his	  career,	  voiced	  the	  only	  word	  of	  caution	  regarding	  this	  legal	  structure.	  
The	  Ordinance	  relied	  on	  legal	  terms	  that	  “require	  very	  careful	  definition”	  in	  a	  setting	  where	  
“such	  definitions	  are	  neither	  possible	  nor	  desirable.”	  As	  Farrell	  remarked:	  	  
It	   is	  not	  always	  easy	  to	  distinguish	  schools	  giving	  only	  religious	  instruction	  
from	   schools	   of	   a	   religious	   character	   giving	   also	   some	   secular	   instruction.	  
Strictly	  regarded,	  no	  school,	  except	   for	  adults,	  can	  come	  under	  1.	  at	  all,	  but	  
Moslem	  schools	  teaching	  reading	  and	  writing	  from	  the	  Quran,	  and	  teaching	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law,	   logic,	   etc.,	  might	   claim	   to	   be	   exclusively	   religious,	   since	   Islam	   touches	  
every	  human	  activity.	  Such	  schools	  are	  precisely	   those	  which	  require	  most	  
moral	  supervision,	  and	  possibly	  political	  supervision	  too.38	  	  	  
	  
Farrell	  was	  unique	  among	  administrators	  in	  identifying	  religious	  schools	  as	  potential	  
political	  actors,	  though	  even	  his	  understanding	  of	  this	  possibility	  remained	  limited.	  Thus,	  in	  
the	  above	  passage,	  it	  is	  primarily	  “moral	  supervision”	  that	  such	  schools	  required,	  a	  
sentiment	  that	  was	  wholly	  consistent	  with	  the	  emphasis	  on	  religious	  education	  as	  an	  
exercise	  in	  character	  formation.	  	  
The	  Education	  Ordinance	  gave	  rise	  to	  other	  unintended	  consequences	  as	  
well,	  some	  of	  which	  related	  to	  the	  type	  of	  communal	  organization	  the	  Ordinance	  
envisaged.	  Certain	  regulations	  were	  borrowed	  from	  Great	  Britain’s	  own	  education	  
reform	  acts	  of	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  and	  as	  such,	  were	  
designed	  around	  a	  religious	  context	  that	  was	  quite	  different	  than	  that	  of	  Palestine.	  
For	  example,	  Local	  Education	  Authorities	  were	  first	  founded	  in	  England	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  the	  1902	  (coincidentally-­‐named)	  Balfour	  Education	  Act.	  The	  law	  established	  LEAs	  
to	  replace	  local	  school	  boards,	  which	  had	  proved	  popular	  among	  liberals,	  Non-­‐
Conformists,	  and	  radicals	  because	  they	  allowed	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  non-­‐sectarian	  
schools	  for	  areas	  and	  populations	  not	  served	  by	  Anglican	  or	  public	  schools.39	  Local	  
education	  taxes	  funded	  the	  new	  board	  schools,	  while	  Anglican	  schools	  were	  
ineligible	  for	  any	  portion	  of	  these	  rates.	  In	  1902	  the	  Conservative	  Government	  
abolished	  school	  boards	  and	  transferred	  responsibility	  to	  open	  and	  maintain	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  “J.	  Farrell’s	  comments	  [on	  the	  Draft	  Education	  Ordinance].”	  TNA,	  CO	  733/191/2.	  
The	  document	  is	  undated,	  though	  this	  passage	  is	  quoted	  almost	  verbatim	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  Foreign	  
Office	  dated	  September	  19,	  1930	  (Letter	  number	  77198/30	  in	  the	  same	  folder),	  which	  would	  
probably	  place	  Farrell’s	  comments	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1930.	  
39	  Until	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  most	  schools	  in	  England	  were	  maintained	  by	  the	  Anglican	  
Church.	  Certain	  exceptions	  included	  the	  “public	  schools,”	  which	  were	  public	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  
were	  open	  to	  anyone	  who	  passed	  the	  entrance	  examination	  and	  could	  afford	  their	  steep	  fees.	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schools,	  pay	  teacher	  salaries	  and	  provide	  textbooks	  and	  equipment	  to	  LEAs.	  
Importantly,	  the	  Act	  also	  made	  Anglican	  schools	  eligible	  for	  a	  portion	  of	  any	  rates	  
levied	  by	  LEAs	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  strengthen	  their	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  board	  schools.40	  	  
British	  officials	  inserted	  a	  similar	  provision	  into	  the	  Palestine	  Education	  
Ordinance,	  which	  stipulated	  that	  any	  school	  maintained	  by	  a	  community	  recognized	  
by	  the	  Religious	  Communities	  Organization	  Ordinance	  was	  eligible	  for	  a	  portion	  of	  
education	  rates	  levied	  by	  LEAs.	  The	  Religious	  Communities	  Organization	  Ordinance	  
was	  adopted	  in	  1926	  chiefly	  to	  appease	  the	  Zionist	  Organization,	  which	  was	  the	  only	  
group	  that	  ever	  applied	  for	  statutory	  recognition	  under	  its	  terms.	  The	  legislation	  
provided	  that	  “each	  Religious	  Community	  recognized	  by	  the	  Government	  shall	  enjoy	  
autonomy	  for	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  the	  Community,”	  and	  conferred	  upon	  the	  
Community	  the	  right	  to	  hold	  property,	  enter	  into	  contracts	  and	  levee	  taxes	  on	  its	  
members.41	  Unless	  they	  officially	  opted	  out	  (which	  a	  number	  of	  Orthodox	  Jews	  did),	  
all	  Jews	  above	  the	  age	  of	  18	  were	  automatically	  included	  in	  the	  official	  Jewish	  
community	  of	  Palestine,	  or	  Knesset	  Israel,	  with	  the	  “Va’ad	  Leumi”	  (national	  counsel)	  
serving	  as	  its	  executive	  committee.	  It	  was	  therefore	  the	  Zionist	  community	  and	  its	  
political	  organ	  that	  gained	  statutory	  recognition	  under	  the	  Religious	  Communities	  
Organization	  Ordinance,	  and	  which	  subsequently	  became	  entitled	  to	  additional	  
privileges	  through	  the	  Education	  Ordinance.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  schools	  
gained	  a	  similar	  legal	  status	  as	  that	  granted	  in	  England	  to	  schools	  maintained	  by	  the	  
Anglican	  Church.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Searby,	  Children,	  School,	  and	  Society	  in	  nineteenth-­‐century	  England:	  18-­‐20.	  
41	  Government	  of	  Palestine,	  “Religious	  Communities	  Organization	  Ordinance.”	  No.	  19	  of	  1926.	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With	  this	  example	  in	  mind,	  a	  careful	  reading	  of	  the	  Ordinance	  reveals	  that	  its	  
provisions	  regarding	  religious	  schools	  took	  for	  granted	  the	  existence	  of	  recognized	  
communal	  authorities	  that	  were	  entitled	  to	  represent	  believers’	  educational	  
interests	  and	  make	  political	  claims	  on	  their	  behalf.	  For	  instance,	  the	  licensing	  of	  
teachers	  by	  each	  communion’s	  “Religious	  Head”	  was	  clearly	  adopted	  with	  Catholic	  
protests	  in	  mind,	  but	  could	  become	  quite	  problematic	  when	  dealing	  with	  more	  
diffuse	  or	  contested	  structures	  of	  religious	  authority.	  This	  is	  a	  lesser-­‐noticed	  
consequence	  of	  sectarianism,	  which,	  in	  locating	  political	  power	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  
religious	  community,	  renders	  it	  imperative	  to	  centralize	  control	  of	  the	  community	  in	  
a	  singular	  entity.	  	  
As	  such,	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  was	  as	  integral	  to	  Palestine’s	  sectarian	  landscape	  as	  
the	  Supreme	  Muslim	  Council,	  though	  neither	  body	  ever	  gained	  uncontested	  
recognition	  by	  the	  community	  it	  was	  authorized	  to	  represent.	  The	  differences	  
between	  the	  two	  bodies,	  their	  creation,	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  are	  immense	  and	  
should	  not	  be	  conflated.	  The	  Supreme	  Muslim	  Council	  was	  a	  British	  invention	  
whereas	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  grew	  from	  within	  the	  yishuv	  and	  was	  granted	  official	  
recognition	  by	  the	  Mandatory	  Government.	  Nevertheless,	  a	  full	  appreciation	  of	  how	  
the	  Ordinance	  took	  shape	  must	  account	  for	  the	  protests	  from	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  and	  
the	  Supreme	  Muslim	  Council	  as	  “Religious	  Heads”	  that	  were	  either	  self-­‐appointed	  or	  
newly	  manufactured.	  	  
In	  his	  seminal	  study	  of	  education	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine,	  Tibawi	  maintained	  
that,	  “Latin	  opposition	  considerably	  weakened	  those	  portions	  of	  the	  law	  [Education	  
Ordinance]	  dealing	  with	  private	  schools,	  while	  Jewish	  opposition	  did	  equal	  damage	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to	  those	  portions	  dealing	  with	  public	  schools.”42	  He	  also	  noted	  that	  “so	  long	  as	  the	  
actual	  documents	  dealing	  with	  many	  sides	  of	  the	  subject…remain	  secret	  in	  the	  
archives	  in	  Whitehall	  and	  elsewhere,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  examine	  in	  detail	  the	  stand	  
which	  was	  taken	  by	  the	  Vatican,	  France	  and	  Italy	  on	  one	  side,	  and	  the	  Zionists	  on	  the	  
other.”43	  Fortunately,	  many	  of	  these	  documents	  are	  now	  declassified,	  and	  they	  shed	  
a	  great	  deal	  of	  light	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  protests.	  	  
Generally	  speaking,	  the	  Zionist	  response	  to	  the	  proposed	  legislation	  was	  to	  
advocate	  two,	  somewhat	  contradictory,	  courses	  of	  action.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  
Zionist	  Organization	  lobbied	  the	  Palestine	  Government	  and	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  for	  
explicit	  recognition	  of	  an	  autonomous	  Zionist	  school	  system,	  writing,	  “the	  special	  
position	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Agency	  under	  the	  Mandate	  should	  be	  recognized	  in	  the	  
Ordinance,	  and…express	  provision	  should	  be	  made	  for	  the	  special	  treatment…of	  
schools	  maintained	  by	  the	  Jewish	  Agency.”44	  The	  Zionist	  Organization	  argued	  its	  
schools	  represented	  a	  public	  school	  system	  that	  paralleled	  that	  maintained	  by	  the	  
Department	  of	  Education,	  thereby	  casting	  itself	  as	  an	  equal	  party	  to	  the	  Mandatory	  
Government.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Two,	  after	  their	  classification	  as	  “public	  
schools,”	  Zionist	  schools	  were	  entitled	  to	  a	  share	  of	  Government	  funds	  based	  on	  the	  
percentage	  of	  Jews	  in	  the	  total	  population,	  paid	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  annual	  block	  grant	  
to	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi.	  Yet,	  the	  Jewish	  Agency	  argued	  that	  the	  schools	  were	  also	  
“community	  schools”,	  i.e.	  those	  maintained	  by	  a	  religious	  community	  under	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Khalidi,	  The	  Iron	  Cage	  :	  the	  story	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  struggle	  for	  statehood:	  Chapter	  2.	  
43	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  
153.	  
44	  Zionist	  Organization,	  “Palestine	  Education	  Ordinance”	  (memorandum).	  December	  14,	  1928.	  TNA,	  
CO	  733/146/8.	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Religious	  Communities	  Organization	  Ordinance.	  As	  “community	  schools”	  Zionist	  
schools	  were	  eligible	  for	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  tax	  revenue	  collected	  by	  the	  LEAs;	  such	  
classification	  also	  required	  the	  Director	  of	  Education	  for	  the	  Palestine	  Government	  
to	  consult	  with	  the	  Zionist	  Education	  Department	  in	  any	  matter	  related	  to	  these	  
schools.45	  	  
In	  sum,	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  sought	  to	  secure	  official	  recognition	  of	  its	  
schools	  as	  both	  public	  and	  communal	  entities,	  a	  demand	  which	  the	  sectarian	  nature	  
of	  the	  Mandate’s	  legal	  structure	  was	  able	  to	  affirm.	  The	  partition	  of	  Palestine	  into	  
distinct	  social	  and	  political	  bodies	  is	  thus	  already	  apparent	  in	  gestures	  that	  equate	  
“the	  public”	  with	  the	  religious	  community.	  Taken	  to	  the	  logical	  extreme,	  such	  
thinking	  effectively	  eradicates	  any	  concept	  of	  a	  non-­‐sectarian	  public	  space.	  If	  this	  
partition	  was	  more	  conceptual	  than	  material	  during	  these	  negotiations	  in	  the	  late	  
1920’s,	  it	  appeared	  as	  an	  obvious	  reality	  to	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Palestine	  Royal	  
Commission	  in	  1936.	  	  
Alongside	  its	  push	  for	  official	  recognition	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Agency’s	  “special	  
position”	  and	  the	  corresponding	  status	  of	  its	  schools,	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  
lobbied	  the	  Palestine	  Government	  to	  delegate	  the	  vast	  portion	  of	  its	  educational	  
authority	  to	  Zionist	  officials	  in	  the	  va’ad	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  (Board	  of	  Education)	  and	  
maẖlakat	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  (Department	  of	  Education).	  For	  example,	  the	  Zionist	  
Organization	  argued	  that	  the	  Ordinance	  gave	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  too	  much	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Government	  of	  Palestine,	  “Education	  Ordinance	  1933.”	  The	  second	  clause	  of	  the	  Ordinance	  states,	  
“In	  his	  discharge	  of	  his	  functions	  in	  regard	  to	  any	  group	  of	  public	  schools	  established	  or	  maintained	  
in	  part	  by	  a	  Local	  Authority	  or	  an	  association,	  the	  Director	  shall	  consult	  with	  such	  authority	  or	  
association.”	  Officials	  inserted	  this	  clause	  in	  a	  compromise	  with	  the	  Zionist	  Organization,	  which	  
demanded	  that	  in	  his	  dealings	  with	  the	  Hebrew	  Public	  System,	  the	  Director	  of	  Education	  consult	  with	  
the	  Jewish	  Agency’s	  Education	  Department.	  See	  Zionist	  Organization	  memorandum,	  “Palestine	  
Education	  Ordinance	  1928.”	  December	  14,	  1928.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/146/8.	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control	  over	  the	  appointment	  and	  dismissal	  of	  teachers,	  powers	  that	  should	  
properly	  reside	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Zionist	  Director	  of	  Education.46	  The	  basis	  of	  this	  
request	  represented	  nothing	  less	  than	  an	  all-­‐out	  assault	  on	  the	  Orientalist	  expertise	  
of	  British	  administrators:	  
Seeing	   that	   it	   is	   admittedly	   impossible	   for	   any	   non-­‐Jewish	   authority	   to	  
execute	  the	  technical	  duties	  involved	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  National	  Hebrew	  
Educational	  system,	  it	  is	  proposed	  that	  the	  same	  article	  [that	  recognized	  the	  
Jewish	  Agency]	  should	  invest	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  Jewish	  public	  school	  system	  
of	  education	  with	  the	  necessary	  powers,	  while	  reserving	  for	  the	  Director	  of	  
the	   Department	   of	   Education	   full	   powers	   in	   all	   such	   matters	   as	   should	  
properly	  be	  subject	  to	  governmental	  control.47	  
	  
Colonial	  officials	  chafed	  at	  the	  suggestion	  that	  managing	  the	  Zionist	  school	  system	  
was	  somehow	  beyond	  their	  capacity	  and	  rejected	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  Jews	  
possessed	  any	  innate	  pedagogic	  or	  administrative	  prowess	  that	  distinguished	  them	  
from	  Palestinian	  Arabs.	  Rather,	  according	  to	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  “until	  little	  more	  than	  a	  
century	  ago	  the	  Jews…had	  like	  the	  Arabs	  a	  markedly	  medieval	  form	  of	  oriental	  
culture.”48	  The	  battle	  over	  educational	  expertise	  remained	  a	  source	  of	  contention	  
long	  after	  the	  Education	  Ordinance	  was	  promulgated,	  as	  reflected	  by	  the	  following	  
Colonial	  Office	  memo	  from	  1941:	  	  
When	  I	  saw	  Mr.	  Ben	  Gurion	  recently	  he	  discussed	  at	  length	  the	  usual	  Zionist	  
contention	   that	   a	   Jewish	   community	   is	   unsuited	   to	   Crown	   Colony	  
administration,	  and	  produced	  as	  an	   illustration	  of	  what	  he	  regarded	  as	   the	  
extraordinary	   impertinence	   of	   the	   Palestine	   Government	   in	   assuming	   that	  
they	   could	   profitably	   interfere	   in	   the	   administration	   of	   the	   Jewish	  
community’s	  educational	  organization.	  In	  his	  view,	  Jews	  of	  Palestine	  are	  far	  
too	   cultivated	   and	   experienced	   to	   be	   prepared	   to	   subordinate	   their	  
organization	  to	  the	  directions	  of	  a	  Palestine	  Colonial	  government.49	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Zionist	  Organization	  Memorandum,	  “Palestine	  Education	  Ordinance.”	  December	  14,	  1928.	  TNA,	  CO	  
733/146/8.	  
47	  Zionist	  Organization	  Memorandum,	  September	  14,	  1928.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/146/8.	  
48	  Jerome	  Farrell.	  “The	  Distribution	  of	  Educational	  Benefits	  in	  Palestine.”	  December	  17,	  1945.	  MEC,	  
Jerome	  Farrell	  collection.	  	  
49	  Sir	  Harry	  Luke,	  Untitled	  minute.	  October	  10,	  1941.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/442/17.	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Unwilling	  to	  sit	  on	  the	  receiving	  end	  of	  colonial	  tutelage,	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  
desired	  official	  recognition	  of	  its	  schools	  as	  public	  entities	  without	  the	  
corresponding	  measure	  of	  government	  supervision,	  at	  least	  from	  the	  Government	  of	  
Palestine.	  Consequently,	  controls	  that	  it	  thought	  appropriate	  for	  the	  Arab	  Public	  
System	  were	  dismissed	  as	  unsuitable	  when	  applied	  to	  Zionist	  schools,	  though	  both	  
were	  technically	  “public”	  bodies.50	  	  
Conversely,	  its	  letters	  display	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  anxiety	  about	  centralizing	  
control	  of	  Jewish	  education	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  quasi-­‐state	  apparatus	  administered	  
by	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi.	  For	  instance,	  when	  the	  first	  draft	  of	  the	  Ordinance	  effectively	  
put	  Local	  Education	  Authorities	  in	  charge	  of	  all	  schools	  in	  their	  district,	  including	  
Zionist	  ones,	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  petitioned	  the	  government	  to	  allow	  for	  
separate	  sub-­‐committees	  in	  districts	  with	  mixed	  populations,	  for	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  
schools	  respectively.	  The	  government	  complied	  and	  furthermore,	  stipulated	  that	  in	  
mixed	  areas,	  Local	  Education	  Authority	  would	  include	  two	  nominees	  of	  the	  Zionist	  
Organization.	  The	  latter,	  however,	  deemed	  these	  measures	  inadequate,	  as	  “the	  
proposed	  new	  regulation	  is	  to	  apply	  only	  in	  mixed	  areas,	  so	  that	  there	  would	  
apparently	  be	  no	  representatives	  of	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  on	  the	  Committee	  
dealing	  with	  the	  Hebrew	  schools	  in	  a	  Jewish	  area.”	  The	  result,	  they	  feared,	  was	  “that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  For	  example,	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  objected	  that	  the	  Education	  Ordinance	  would	  provide	  the	  
High	  Commissioner	  with	  power	  over	  curriculum	  in	  public	  schools,	  including	  those	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  
Public	  System.	  The	  Zionist	  Organization	  expressed	  its	  alarm	  that	  such	  curricular	  powers	  even	  
extended	  to	  religious	  instruction,	  which—while	  certainly	  not	  objectionable	  in	  the	  Arab	  Public	  
System—was	  out	  of	  the	  question	  for	  the	  Zionist	  schools.	  “It	  is	  not	  thought	  that	  this	  is	  a	  power	  which	  
it	  is	  intended	  that	  the	  Government	  should	  actually	  exercise,”	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  wrote,	  as	  “it	  
does	  not	  follow	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  or	  desirable	  that	  the	  Government	  should	  take	  the	  initiative	  in	  
laying	  down	  regulations	  as	  to	  the	  syllabus…in	  schools	  which	  are	  not	  Government	  schools.”	  Zionist	  
Organization	  Memorandum,	  “Palestine	  Education	  Ordinance.”	  December	  14,	  1928.	  TNA,	  CO	  
733/146/8.	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the	  unity	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  school	  system	  is	  not	  ensured	  by	  the	  new	  legislation.”51	  Thus	  
it	  was	  not	  just	  government	  or	  Arab	  control	  of	  their	  schools	  that	  the	  Zionist	  
Organization	  feared,	  but	  any	  decentralized	  control,	  even	  by	  Jews	  themselves.	  	  
In	  issue	  after	  issue,	  the	  refrain	  remained	  the	  same.	  The	  recognition	  of	  Zionist	  
schools	  as	  “public”	  entities	  was	  of	  vital	  importance,	  but	  any	  corresponding	  
supervision	  should	  reside	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  Zionist	  leaders.	  Centralized	  control	  was	  
essential,	  but	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  was	  not	  the	  legitimate	  entity	  to	  exercise	  
it.	  In	  short,	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  requested	  official	  recognition	  from	  an	  entity	  
whose	  very	  legitimacy	  it	  constantly	  called	  into	  question.	  This	  mix	  of	  audacity	  and	  
insecurity	  was	  not	  unique	  to	  Zionist	  claims	  regarding	  education,	  but	  rather	  
emblematic	  of	  a	  larger	  dynamic	  whereby	  the	  Jewish	  state	  in	  the	  making	  wavered	  
between	  bold	  political	  assertions	  and	  recognition	  of	  its	  own	  weakness.	  In	  education,	  
as	  elsewhere,	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  did	  not	  want	  government	  control,	  but	  still	  
needed	  its	  support.	  	  
As	  it	  turned	  out,	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  got	  much	  less	  than	  it	  asked	  for,	  at	  
least	  as	  far	  as	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law	  was	  concerned.	  “The	  Zionists	  have	  had	  their	  say	  in	  
the	  matter,”	  wrote	  an	  official	  in	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  in	  1930,	  “but…it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  
accept	  most	  of	  their	  suggestions,	  and	  it	  seems	  possible,	  in	  the	  present	  agitated	  state	  
of	  Jewish	  feeling,	  that	  the	  promulgation	  of	  the	  Ordinance	  will	  be	  greeted	  as	  another	  
deathblow	  to	  Zionist	  aspirations	  in	  Palestine.	  I	  submit	  that	  we	  must	  face	  that.”52	  The	  
final	  draft	  of	  the	  Ordinance	  made	  no	  mention	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Agency	  or	  any	  other	  
Zionist	  body,	  though	  it	  did	  attach	  a	  schedule	  of	  schools	  that	  were	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Ibid.	  
52	  Sir	  John	  Shuckburg,	  Untitled	  minute.	  November	  11,	  1930.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/191/2.	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the	  nucleus	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  Public	  System.	  Similarly,	  no	  mention	  was	  made	  of	  the	  
Zionist	  Education	  Department	  or	  its	  Director	  and	  the	  Ordinance	  granted	  them	  no	  
powers.	  It	  did,	  however,	  stipulate	  that	  in	  his	  dealings	  with	  schools	  maintained	  by	  a	  
communal	  association,	  “the	  Director	  shall	  consult	  with	  such	  authority	  or	  
association.”53	  Moreover,	  officials	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  promised	  the	  
Zionist	  Organization	  that	  the	  Hebrew	  Public	  System	  would	  not	  be	  subjected	  to	  the	  
full	  regulatory	  scope	  of	  the	  Ordinance.54	  Yet	  as	  I	  argued	  above,	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
Education	  Ordinance	  in	  terms	  of	  enforcement	  (or	  non-­‐enforcement	  in	  the	  case	  
described)	  is	  only	  part	  of	  the	  story.	  Perhaps	  of	  even	  greater	  significance	  is	  the	  type	  
of	  sectarian	  organization	  that	  it	  envisaged,	  and	  ultimately,	  helped	  create.	  	  	  
Another	  source	  of	  tension	  stemmed	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  Zionist	  schools	  were	  in	  
direct	  competition	  with	  private	  bodies	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  education	  of	  Jewish	  
children	  in	  Palestine.	  A	  number	  of	  Jewish	  schools	  were	  maintained	  by	  organizations	  
such	  as	  the	  Alliance	  Israélite	  Universelle,	  the	  Anglo-­‐Jewish	  Association	  and	  Agudat	  
Israel.	  Numerous	  ẖederim	  and	  talmudei	  torah	  existed,	  particularly	  in	  the	  urban	  
centers	  of	  the	  Old	  Yishuv,	  in	  which	  children	  acquired	  the	  religious	  knowledge	  
required	  for	  Orthodox	  communal	  life.	  Taken	  as	  a	  whole,	  schools	  outside	  the	  Hebrew	  
Public	  System	  educated	  approximately	  one-­‐third	  of	  Jewish	  children	  in	  Palestine	  
throughout	  much	  of	  the	  Mandate	  period.55	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Government	  of	  Palestine,	  “Education	  Ordinance	  1933.”	  Part	  1,	  clause	  2.	  For	  more	  details	  regarding	  
the	  impetus	  for	  this	  clause,	  see	  Zionist	  Organization	  Memorandum,	  “Palestine	  Education	  Ordinance.”	  
December	  14,	  1928.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/146/8.	  
54	  Reshef,	  ha-­‐ẖinukh	  ha-­‐ivri	  bi-­‐yamei	  ha-­‐bayit	  ha-­‐leumi,	  1919-­‐1948:	  160.	  
55	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  Department	  of	  Education,	  Annual	  Report	  1929-­‐1930.	  According	  to	  the	  
report	  there	  were	  21,031	  pupils	  in	  schools	  maintained	  by	  the	  Jewish	  Agency	  versus	  10,565	  in	  private	  
institutions	  of	  this	  type.	  The	  ratio	  of	  pupils	  in	  private	  to	  Jewish	  Agency	  schools	  remained	  fairly	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However,	  the	  structure	  of	  educational	  funding	  hardly	  accounted	  for	  this	  
reality,	  particularly	  after	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  gained	  recognition	  under	  the	  Religious	  
Communities	  Ordinance	  as	  the	  official	  representative	  of	  Jews	  in	  Palestine.	  Groups	  
who	  refused	  to	  participate	  in	  Zionist	  political	  bodies—chiefly	  Ashkenazi	  Jews	  from	  
the	  Old	  Yishuv—were	  no	  longer	  recognized	  as	  being	  part	  of	  Palestine’s	  official	  
Jewish	  community.	  They	  thereby	  sacrificed	  the	  two	  chief	  streams	  of	  public	  financing	  
for	  education:	  First,	  the	  annual	  block	  grant	  for	  Jewish	  education,	  based	  on	  the	  total	  
number	  of	  Jews	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  Palestine’s	  total	  population,	  but	  given	  to	  the	  
Va’ad	  Leumi	  exclusively;	  and	  secondly,	  tax	  revenue	  collected	  by	  Local	  Education	  
Authorities,	  which	  only	  public	  and	  “community”	  (i.e.	  Zionist)	  schools	  were	  eligible	  to	  
receive.	  As	  one	  official	  in	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  characterized	  the	  situation,	  with	  regard	  
to	  “schools	  of	  Jews	  who	  find	  themselves	  outside	  the	  recognized	  Jewish	  Community,	  
it	  was	  alleged	  that	  there	  was	  unfair	  discrimination,	  since	  they	  would	  not	  be	  eligible	  
for	  those	  financial	  benefits	  which	  might	  be	  anticipated	  for	  the	  schools	  of	  the	  
recognized	  Jewish	  Community.”56	  
After	  a	  revised	  draft	  of	  the	  Ordinance	  was	  published	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1928,	  
the	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  received	  letters	  of	  protest	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  Orthodox	  
groups,	  including	  representatives	  of	  Etz	  Haim,	  the	  Diskin	  Orphanage,	  the	  
neighborhood	  of	  Mea	  Shearim,	  Congregation	  Sha’arei	  Torah,	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  
Ashkenazic	  Jewish	  Community	  and	  Agudat	  Israel.57	  The	  letters	  display	  a	  general	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
constant	  until	  1945,	  when	  many	  private	  schools	  were	  absorbed	  into	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  system.	  See	  
Government	  of	  Palestine	  Department	  of	  Education,	  Annual	  Report	  1945-­‐46.	  13.	  	  
56	  Colonial	  Office,	  “Palestine	  Education	  Ordinance	  and	  Regulations”	  -­‐	  Draft	  memo	  for	  the	  Advisory	  
Committee	  on	  Education	  in	  the	  Colonies.	  January	  1929.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/146/8.	  
57	  Petition	  addressed	  to	  Chief	  Secretary,	  “27th	  Ab	  5688”	  (August	  13,	  1928);	  Council	  of	  Ashkenazic	  
Jewish	  Community	  to	  OAG,	  August	  13,	  1928;	  Agudat	  Yisrael	  to	  OAG,	  August	  13,	  1928;	  Congregation	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sense	  of	  anxiety	  about	  the	  prospect	  of	  any	  Government	  control	  of	  Jewish	  religious	  
education.	  “Education	  is	  the	  soul	  of	  Israel	  and	  outsiders	  can	  by	  no	  means	  
understand	  our	  mentality,”	  wrote	  the	  rabbi	  of	  Sha’arei	  Torah,	  who	  was	  “amazed	  to	  
hear	  that	  the	  Government	  intended	  to	  interfere	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  the	  
education	  system	  to	  which	  we	  adhere,	  despite	  provision	  of	  the	  Mandate	  according	  
to	  which	  Government	  is	  not	  to	  interfere	  in	  religious	  matters.”58	  Note	  that	  the	  status	  
of	  education	  as	  a	  “religious	  matter”	  is	  assumed	  here,	  and	  with	  it,	  the	  consequent	  
rejection	  that	  the	  government	  could	  claim	  any	  regulatory	  authority	  over	  education	  
as	  a	  state	  concern.	  	  
Other	  responses	  were	  more	  positive,	  noting	  with	  satisfaction	  that	  “the	  
Government	  remained	  faithful	  to	  the	  spirit	  of	  Article	  16	  of	  the	  Mandate	  and	  treated	  
religious	  instruction	  in	  schools	  with	  the	  utmost	  caution:	  and	  have	  not	  confused	  it	  
with	  secular	  instruction	  [sic].”59	  And	  indeed,	  in	  subsequent	  drafts	  of	  the	  Ordinance,	  
officials	  exempted	  schools	  imparting	  religious	  instruction	  exclusively	  (a	  category	  
into	  which	  most	  ẖederim	  and	  talmudei	  torah	  fell)	  from	  all	  provisions	  with	  the	  
exception	  of	  sanitary	  regulations.	  The	  chief	  complaint	  that	  remained	  was	  that	  “it	  is	  
most	  unreasonable	  to	  impose	  a	  rate	  upon	  people	  who	  are	  not	  themselves	  entitled	  to	  
benefit	  from	  their	  own	  rate.”60	  Orthodox	  groups	  therefore	  requested	  exemption	  
from	  the	  requirement	  to	  pay	  taxes	  levied	  by	  Local	  Education	  Authorities	  since	  their	  
schools	  were	  not	  “community	  schools”	  and	  were	  therefore	  ineligible	  for	  any	  portion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Shaarei	  Torah	  to	  OAG,	  August	  14,	  1928.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/146/8.	  While	  internal	  rivalries	  often	  plagued	  
the	  Old	  Yishuv,	  the	  dates	  of	  the	  letters	  suggest	  some	  sort	  of	  concerted	  effort	  to	  oppose	  the	  Ordinance.	  
TNA,	  CO	  733/146/8.	  	  
58	  Congregation	  Shaarei	  Torah	  (signed	  “Joseph	  Rabbi”)	  to	  OAG,	  August	  14,	  1928.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/146/8.	  
59	  Petition	  addressed	  to	  Chief	  Secretary,	  “27th	  Ab	  5688”	  (August	  13,	  1928).	  TNA,	  CO	  733/146/8.	  
60	  Council	  of	  Ashkenazic	  Jewish	  Community	  to	  OAG,	  August	  13,	  1928.	  TNA,	  CO/146/8.	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of	  these	  funds.	  However,	  British	  officials	  did	  not	  consent	  either	  to	  exempt	  members	  
of	  the	  Old	  Yishuv	  from	  the	  education	  rate	  or	  to	  amend	  the	  Ordinance	  so	  that	  schools	  
outside	  of	  the	  recognized	  Jewish	  Community	  could	  apply	  for	  assistance.	  	  
This	  was	  hardly	  the	  end	  of	  the	  matter.	  Whereas	  in	  the	  1920s,	  Agudat	  Israel	  
cooperated	  with	  other	  Orthodox	  factions	  to	  protest	  the	  statutory	  recognition	  given	  
to	  the	  Zionist	  community	  by	  the	  Religious	  Communities	  Organization	  Ordinance,61	  
the	  group	  spent	  much	  of	  the	  following	  decade	  lobbying	  to	  be	  legally	  recognized	  as	  a	  
discrete	  Jewish	  community.	  Such	  recognition	  would	  theoretically	  restore	  their	  
communal	  rights	  in	  issues	  of	  personal	  status	  (heretofore	  handled	  by	  the	  Zionist	  
religious	  courts)	  and	  enable	  their	  schools	  to	  receive	  a	  portion	  of	  local	  education	  
rates.	  The	  1934	  Palestine	  Annual	  Report	  notes	  that	  the	  Government	  (acting	  as	  an	  
“intermediary”)	  had	  convened	  negotiations	  between	  representatives	  from	  Agudat	  
Israel	  and	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  absorbing	  the	  former	  into	  the	  
“community”	  represented	  by	  the	  latter.	  The	  heart	  of	  the	  compromise	  involved	  
dividing	  Jewish	  affairs	  into	  “religious”	  and	  “lay”	  categories	  overseen	  by	  distinct	  
committees.	  If	  it	  had	  succeeded,	  such	  a	  compromise	  would	  have	  effectively	  left	  
“secular”	  matters	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi,	  whose	  political	  standing	  derived	  
from	  its	  status	  as	  a	  “religious	  community.”	  	  
This	  attempted	  reconciliation	  of	  Jewish	  interests	  was	  challenging	  to	  enact,	  
chiefly	  because	  the	  parties	  involved	  came	  with	  divergent	  ideas	  as	  to	  the	  boundaries	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Agudat	  Israel	  combined	  forces	  with	  the	  Chief	  Rabbi	  of	  the	  Ashkenazic	  Old	  Yishuv,	  Rabbi	  
Sonnenfeld,	  and	  other	  members	  of	  the	  va’ad	  ha-­‐ir	  (city	  council	  of	  the	  Old	  Yishuv)	  to	  oppose	  the	  
Religious	  Communities	  Organization	  Act	  and	  the	  corresponding	  recognition	  of	  the	  Zionist	  faction	  as	  
the	  official	  Jewish	  community.	  See:	  Vaad	  Ha’ir	  of	  the	  Ashkenazic	  Jewish	  Community	  to	  Secretary	  of	  
State	  for	  the	  Colonies,	  April	  24,	  1925.	  TNA,	  FO	  371/10839.	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(or	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  boundary	  at	  all)	  between	  religious	  and	  lay	  matters.	  The	  Va’ad	  
Leumi’s	  representatives	  proposed	  to	  cede	  “religious”	  matters,	  including	  supervision	  
of	  the	  Rabbinate,	  shechita	  (ritual	  slaughter)	  and	  burial	  services,	  to	  a	  Board	  
“consisting	  of	  persons	  with	  a	  sympathetic	  attitude	  to	  religion,”	  while	  retaining	  for	  
itself	  control	  of	  “all	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  affairs.”62	  By	  contrast,	  Agudat	  
Israel	  defined	  religious	  affairs	  in	  a	  far	  more	  expansive	  fashion,	  encompassing	  “the	  
Rabbinate,	  Shechita,	  burial,	  education,	  maintenance	  of	  orphans,	  treatment	  of	  the	  
sick,	  etc.”63	  In	  an	  era	  where	  religious	  and	  secular	  were	  still	  very	  much	  categories	  in	  
formation,	  a	  compromise	  of	  the	  type	  envisioned	  by	  the	  government	  was	  all	  but	  
impossible	  to	  achieve.	  	  
In	  a	  manner	  that	  echoed	  its	  broader	  self-­‐representation	  as	  an	  impartial	  
mediator	  among	  fanatic	  sects	  “swarming...about	  the	  corpse	  of	  religion,”	  the	  
Mandatory	  government	  cast	  itself	  as	  an	  objective	  party	  attempting	  to	  reconcile	  a	  
petty	  squabble	  between	  warring	  Jewish	  factions.64	  The	  Palestine	  Annual	  Report	  
continued	  to	  state	  that	  incorporating	  Agudat	  Israel	  into	  the	  official	  Jewish	  
community	  was	  preferred	  over	  the	  recognition	  of	  it	  as	  a	  second	  community,	  lest	  a	  
schism	  emerge	  among	  Palestinian	  Jews:	  “The	  hope	  and	  intention	  of	  the	  Government	  
are	  by	  this	  means	  to	  satisfy	  the	  legitimate	  requirements	  of	  the	  Agudath	  Israel	  
without	  perpetuating	  the	  schism	  in	  the	  Jewish	  population	  of	  Palestine	  which	  
separate	  recognition	  of	  the	  Agudath	  Israel	  as	  a	  community	  under	  the	  Religious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Draft	  Agreement	  by	  the	  Vaad	  Leumi,	  Enclosure	  III.	  TNA,	  FO	  371/18959.	  	  
63	  Draft	  Agreement	  by	  the	  Agudath	  Israel,	  Enclosure	  IV.	  TNA,	  FO	  371/18959.	  	  
64	  Harry	  Charles	  Luke,	  Chief	  Secretary	  for	  Palestine,	  1927.	  Quoted	  and	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  Robson,	  
Colonialism	  and	  Christianity	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine:	  44-­‐74.	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Communities	  Organization	  Ordinance,	  1926,	  might	  involve.”65	  The	  irony,	  of	  course,	  
was	  that	  such	  this	  schism	  was	  largely	  the	  byproduct	  of	  government	  legislation	  that	  
bestowed	  official	  recognition	  on	  one	  portion	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community	  and	  granted	  it	  
quasi-­‐ecclesiastical	  powers	  over	  all	  others.	  That	  these	  “religious”	  powers	  were	  
granted	  to	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  at	  a	  time	  when	  many	  Zionist	  immigrants	  were	  avowedly	  
secular	  or	  even	  atheists—while	  Jews	  who	  maintained	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  religious	  
observance	  were	  not	  recognized	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community—was	  but	  one	  of	  
the	  many	  points	  of	  tension.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  final	  chapter	  of	  this	  study,	  this	  
categorical	  confusion	  was	  only	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  dispute	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  
Jewishness	  and	  the	  definition	  of	  “religion”	  itself.	  	  
While	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  was	  adamant	  to	  bridge	  the	  “schism”	  between	  
Agudat	  Israel	  and	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi,	  his	  correspondence	  with	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  also	  
demonstrates	  that	  he	  misunderstood	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  conflict.	  When	  
representatives	  from	  Agudat	  Israel	  proposed	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  second	  beit	  din	  
(rabbinical	  court)	  so	  its	  members	  did	  not	  have	  to	  submit	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  Zionist	  
courts,	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  greeted	  the	  proposal	  with	  apprehension.66	  At	  the	  
most	  basic	  level,	  he	  could	  not	  comprehend	  the	  resistance	  to	  a	  unified	  religious	  
authority	  given	  that	  members	  of	  Agudat	  Israel	  were	  “not	  in	  any	  fundamental	  respect	  
in	  theory	  or	  in	  practice	  at	  variance”	  with	  the	  Orthodox	  Jews	  within	  the	  Zionist	  fold.	  
What	  is	  noteworthy	  about	  this	  claim	  for	  our	  purposes	  is	  the	  High	  Commissioner’s	  
extreme	  reluctance	  to	  recognize	  the	  Jewish	  community	  as	  a	  heterogeneous	  entity,	  
indeed,	  as	  multiple	  Jewish	  communities.	  He	  may	  have	  been	  correct	  in	  stating	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Government	  of	  Palestine,	  1934	  Annual	  Report.	  	  
66	  A.G.	  Wauchope	  to	  Colonial	  Office,	  July	  12,	  1935.	  FO	  371/18959.	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many	  Zionist	  Jews	  were	  as	  religiously	  observant	  as	  those	  within	  Agudat	  Israel;	  
however	  he	  did	  not	  grasp	  that	  disagreements	  related	  to	  observance	  were	  of	  lesser	  
importance	  than	  the	  larger	  dispute,	  namely,	  the	  replacement	  of	  numerous	  
communities	  and	  religious	  courts	  bearing	  distinct	  minhagim	  (customs	  that	  can	  
assume	  the	  status	  of	  law)	  with	  a	  single	  religious	  authority	  under	  Zionist	  control.67	  
The	  fact	  that	  a	  single	  beit	  din	  had	  never	  exercised	  juridical	  authority	  over	  the	  whole	  
of	  Palestinian	  Jewry	  since	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Sanhedrin	  was	  apparently	  unimportant.	  68	  	  
In	  commenting	  on	  the	  High	  Commissioner’s	  dispatch,	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  
noted,	  “the	  Government	  are	  clearly	  prejudiced	  against	  the	  Agudath	  Israel,	  which	  is	  
doubtless	  explained	  by	  their	  reluctance	  to	  allow	  a	  schism	  to	  develop	  in	  the	  official	  
organization	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community,	  with	  its	  resultant	  administrative	  
inconveniences.”69	  As	  I	  have	  argued,	  such	  “administrative	  inconveniences”	  were	  at	  
least	  partially	  government	  creations	  insofar	  as	  they	  related	  to	  regulations	  (including	  
the	  Education	  Ordinance)	  that	  assumed	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  singular	  religious	  
authority.	  Substantive	  divisions	  between	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  and	  Agudat	  Israel	  did	  
exist,	  and	  certainly	  predated	  the	  Mandate.	  However,	  they	  assumed	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Rabbi	  Hershel	  Schachter	  records	  the	  following	  anecdote	  regarding	  the	  Brisker	  Rav,	  who	  famously	  
avoided	  involvement	  in	  political	  disputes:	  "I	  heard	  that	  [R.	  Joseph	  Soloveitchik]	  mentioned	  at	  that	  
point	  how	  his	  uncle	  (R.	  Yitzchak	  Zev	  Soloveichik)	  did	  not	  usually	  participate	  in	  controversy	  and	  
demonstrations,	  such	  as	  when	  there	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  open	  mixed	  [gender]	  swimming	  pools	  in	  
Jerusalem,	  or	  matters	  that	  include	  violations	  of	  Shabbos,	  because	  those	  are	  (just)	  specific	  sins.	  Only	  
when	  they	  wanted	  to	  erect	  a	  Sanhedrin	  in	  the	  Heikhal	  Shlomo	  building	  –	  on	  this	  he	  loudly	  protested	  
in	  order	  to	  end	  the	  matter,	  because	  he	  saw	  in	  it	  a	  much	  greater	  matter,	  namely,	  ziyuf	  ha-­‐Torah	  
(misrepresentation	  of	  Torah)."	  R.	  Hershel	  Schachter,	  be-­‐ikvei	  ha-­‐tzon,	  p.	  23.	  
68	  The	  Sanhedrin	  was	  the	  assembly	  of	  judges	  in	  ancient	  Israel	  that	  ruled	  on	  halachic	  (Jewish	  legal)	  
matters.	  Each	  city	  was	  entitled	  to	  a	  Sanhedrin	  of	  23	  judges,	  and	  a	  single	  Great	  Sanhedrin	  with	  71	  
judges	  acted	  as	  a	  court	  of	  final	  appeal.	  The	  Sanhedrin	  was	  dissolved	  in	  358	  CE	  and	  various	  attempts	  
to	  revive	  it—famously	  by	  Napoleon—and	  by	  segments	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community	  have	  been	  met	  with	  
widespread	  hostility.	  The	  normative	  Orthodox	  position	  is	  that	  the	  Sanhedrin	  cannot	  be	  reconvened	  
until	  the	  days	  of	  the	  Messiah.	  	  
69	  JG	  Ward,	  August	  31,	  1935	  minute.	  TNA,	  FO	  371/18959.	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dispute	  over	  the	  right	  to	  act	  as	  the	  exclusive	  representative	  of	  the	  Jewish	  
community—with	  the	  corresponding	  privileges—only	  within	  the	  context	  of	  British	  
rule.	  	  
In	  recent	  years,	  scholars	  from	  multiple	  disciples	  have	  turned	  their	  attention	  
to	  the	  politics	  of	  sectarianism,	  its	  discursive	  characteristics	  and	  historical	  
consequences.70	  While	  the	  contours	  of	  sectarian	  rule	  are	  clearly	  discernable	  through	  
legal	  structures	  that	  made	  the	  religious	  group	  the	  basic	  political	  unit,	  I	  have	  argued	  
that	  the	  Education	  Ordinance	  (along	  with	  other	  regulations)	  also	  generated	  
consequences	  for	  relations	  within	  each	  religious	  group,	  as	  argued	  above.	  Having	  
recognized	  Knesset	  Israel	  as	  the	  official	  representative	  body	  of	  the	  Jewish	  
community	  in	  Palestine,	  Jews	  who	  found	  themselves	  outside	  this	  community	  had	  no	  
legitimate	  claim	  to	  Government	  assistance	  for	  educating	  their	  children.	  Legal	  
structures	  such	  as	  the	  Religious	  Communities	  and	  Education	  Ordinances	  functioned	  
to	  transform	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  community	  from	  a	  group	  bounded	  by	  language	  and	  
custom	  that	  functioned	  alongside	  numerous	  co-­‐communities,	  into	  a	  monolith	  whose	  
primary	  purpose	  was	  political	  organization.	  
Jewish	  identity—historically	  fractured	  along	  various	  political,	  linguistic	  and	  
ethno-­‐religious	  (edah)	  axes—had	  to	  be	  forcefully	  suppressed	  into	  a	  singular,	  
homogenized	  strand	  in	  order	  to	  function	  within	  a	  culture	  of	  sectarianism.	  Yet	  it	  is	  
crucial	  to	  state	  that	  the	  pressure	  to	  homogenize	  did	  not	  originate	  with	  British	  
colonial	  rule.	  Rather,	  the	  crafting	  of	  a	  revitalized,	  uniform,	  Hebraicized	  Jewish	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  A	  sampling	  of	  this	  important	  scholarship	  includes	  Makdisi,	  The	  Culture	  of	  Sectarianism:	  Community,	  
History,	  and	  Violence	  in	  nineteenth-­‐century	  Ottoman	  Lebanon;	  Max	  Weiss,	  In	  the	  Shadow	  of	  
Sectarianism:	  Law,	  Shi'ism,	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Lebanon	  	  (Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  Harvard	  
University	  Press,	  2010);	  Robson,	  Colonialism	  and	  Christianity	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine.	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identity	  was	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  Zionist	  project	  from	  its	  inception.	  What	  we	  
witness	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine	  is	  the	  convergence	  of	  two	  rather	  complementary	  
discourses	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  function	  (if	  not	  the	  nature,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  Chapter	  
Five)	  of	  religious	  identity.	  The	  confluence	  of	  colonial	  sectarian	  policies	  that	  
concentrated	  religious	  authority	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  single	  entity	  with	  the	  Zionist	  
pretense	  to	  encompass	  and	  represent	  the	  full	  range	  of	  Jewish	  existence	  produced	  a	  
political	  structure	  that	  struggled	  to	  accommodate	  those,	  like	  the	  members	  of	  Agudat	  
Israel,	  who	  opted	  out	  of	  the	  “Jewish	  Community.”	  Here,	  the	  act	  of	  epistemic	  violence	  
inherent	  within	  colonial	  politics	  only	  mirrored	  that	  performed	  by	  nationalism	  itself.	  	  
	  
Arab	  Education	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  Public	  Space	  
To	  conclude	  this	  discussion,	  we	  must	  take	  into	  account	  protests	  by	  
Palestinian	  Arab	  groups,	  which,	  on	  the	  whole,	  were	  of	  an	  entirely	  different	  character	  
than	  those	  emerging	  from	  Zionist	  quarters.	  At	  the	  most	  basic	  level,	  official	  protests	  
from	  Palestinian	  leaders	  were	  generally	  milder	  than	  those	  raised	  by	  either	  Jewish	  or	  
Christian	  bodies.	  Though	  they	  expressed	  concern	  at	  certain	  provisions,	  Palestinian	  
groups	  largely	  acquiesced	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  Government	  supervision.	  This,	  I	  
believe,	  stemmed	  partially	  from	  the	  immediate	  historical	  past,	  in	  which	  the	  Ottoman	  
Empire	  exercised	  similar	  educational	  oversight.	  The	  overriding	  cause,	  however,	  was	  
that	  Palestinian	  Arabs	  had	  no	  other	  Government	  to	  which	  to	  turn,	  and	  indeed,	  no	  
reason	  to	  contemplate	  building	  a	  state	  within	  a	  state	  akin	  to	  that	  created	  by	  the	  
Jewish	  Agency/Va’ad	  Leumi.	  While	  Zionists	  generally	  viewed	  the	  Mandatory	  
government	  as	  a	  transitory	  structure	  that	  would	  soon	  be	  replaced	  by	  the	  “real”	  (i.e.	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Jewish)	  government,	  Palestinians	  assumed	  that	  they	  would	  gradually	  assume	  
control	  over	  the	  existing	  administration	  as	  was	  occurring	  in	  neighboring	  Arab	  
countries.	  Despite	  their	  consistent	  opposition	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Mandate	  and	  the	  
refusal	  to	  accept	  its	  legitimacy,	  on	  the	  whole,	  Palestinian	  Arabs	  lobbied	  for	  greater	  
participation	  within	  the	  Mandatory	  Government,	  not	  the	  delegation	  of	  its	  powers	  to	  
a	  parallel	  entity.	  
Perhaps	  because	  of	  this	  fundamentally	  different	  relationship	  to	  the	  public	  
realm	  represented	  by	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  and	  its	  schools,	  the	  Education	  
Committee	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Muslim	  Council’s	  protest	  against	  the	  Ordinance	  differed	  
from	  that	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  Zionist	  Organization.	  For	  example,	  the	  Committee	  
complained	  that	  the	  Ordinance	  enabled	  education	  or	  medical	  officials	  the	  right	  to	  
inspect	  schools	  at	  any	  time,	  so	  that	  “with	  no	  definite	  procedure…	  inspection	  will	  be	  
unnecessarily	  repeated.”	  They	  suggested	  that	  the	  provision	  be	  amended	  to	  
“regularize	  the	  inspection	  of	  schools	  whether	  for	  education	  or	  medical	  purposes.”71	  
The	  Council	  neither	  questioned	  the	  need	  for	  such	  inspection	  nor	  nominated	  an	  
outside	  party	  to	  complete	  it.	  Similarly,	  the	  Committee	  took	  umbrage	  with	  the	  
provision	  requiring	  all	  teachers	  to	  register	  with	  the	  Department	  of	  Education,	  which	  
was	  thought	  would	  “impose	  an	  undue	  restriction	  on	  private	  and	  communal	  schools,	  
which	  may	  be	  obliged	  from	  time	  to	  time	  to	  engage	  teachers	  from	  outside	  Palestine.”	  
Once	  again,	  however,	  the	  Committee	  offered	  a	  measured	  compromise,	  namely	  that	  
the	  emergency	  license	  usually	  granted	  to	  unregistered	  teachers	  for	  a	  duration	  of	  
three-­‐months	  be	  extended	  to	  a	  full	  academic	  year.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Haj	  Muhammad	  Amin	  al-­‐Husseini	  to	  Chief	  Secretary,	  August	  19,	  1928.	  TNA,	  CO/733/146/8.	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The	  Supreme	  Muslim	  Council	  did	  protest	  more	  forcefully	  against	  the	  
provision	  that	  granted	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  the	  authority	  to	  close	  any	  school	  he	  
deemed	  was	  being	  conducted	  “in	  a	  manner	  contrary	  to	  good	  order	  and	  morals.”	  The	  
Council	  noted,	  “there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  differing	  meanings	  and	  interpretations	  may	  be	  
given	  to	  the	  term	  ‘good	  order	  and	  morals’,	  which	  differ	  according	  to	  the	  locality,	  
religion	  and	  sex…it	  is	  believed	  that	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  term	  and	  the	  issue	  for	  
closing	  of	  schools	  should	  be	  vested	  in	  the	  Courts.”72	  This	  remark	  was	  consistent	  
with	  the	  general	  tenor	  of	  Palestinian	  protests	  over	  education:	  it	  was	  not	  that	  the	  
Government	  did	  not	  have	  the	  prerogative	  to	  exercise	  certain	  powers,	  but	  that	  it	  
should	  do	  so	  in	  concert	  with	  local	  bodies.	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  the	  memo	  from	  the	  
Committee	  reiterated	  its	  suggestion	  that	  an	  education	  council	  be	  recognized	  by	  the	  
Ordinance,	  “in	  which	  the	  inhabitants	  would	  be	  represented	  and	  whose	  members	  
should	  participate	  in	  the	  proper	  enforcement	  of	  the	  Ordinance	  and	  the	  regulations	  
issued	  thereunder.”	  Such	  a	  Council	  was	  of	  special	  importance	  in	  Palestine	  “in	  view	  of	  
the	  non-­‐existence	  in	  this	  country	  of	  any	  legislative	  body	  representing	  the	  
inhabitants	  which	  would	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  wishes	  and	  needs	  of	  the	  
population.”73	  
Absent	  such	  a	  representative	  body,	  Palestinian	  leaders	  hoped	  to	  at	  least	  
expand	  the	  role	  of	  Local	  Education	  Authorities.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  LEAs	  were	  
created	  primarily	  to	  levee	  rates	  in	  order	  to	  supplement	  central	  funding	  for	  
education,	  but	  given	  no	  real	  administrative	  powers.	  While	  the	  Jewish	  Agency	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  Ibid.	  
73	  Hajj	  Muhammad	  Amin	  al-­‐Husseini	  to	  Chief	  Secretary,	  August	  19,	  1928.	  TNA,	  CO/733/146/8.	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lobbied	  the	  Government	  to	  transfer	  much	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Education’s	  
authority	  to	  the	  Zionist	  Organization’s	  internal	  education	  department,	  Palestinian	  
protests	  sought	  the	  delegation	  of	  certain	  powers	  to	  LEAs.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  
memorandum	  submitted	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Muslim	  Council,	  the	  latter	  wrote,	  “The	  
Local	  Education	  Committee	  should	  be	  vested	  with	  powers	  wider	  than	  those	  
provided	  for	  in	  the	  Regulations	  so	  long	  as	  such	  Committee	  is	  the	  responsible	  body	  
for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  school.	  The	  Local	  Education	  Committee	  should	  be	  given	  
exclusive	  jurisdiction	  in	  licensing	  teachers	  and	  in	  matters	  referred	  to	  in	  Articles	  18,	  
19,	  22	  and	  24	  of	  the	  Regulations;	  and	  therefore	  should	  have	  power	  to	  withdraw,	  
transfer	  or	  cancel	  licenses.”	  74	  Similarly,	  a	  letter	  from	  the	  Jerusalem	  Municipal	  
Council	  recommended	  the	  following	  course	  of	  action:	  
More	  powers	  should	  be	  allowed	   to	   the	   local	  education	  authority	   in	   that	  all	  
the	  powers	  given	  to	  the	  Director	  of	  Education	  be	  now	  vested	  in	  them	  as	  from	  
the	  administrative	  point	  of	  view.	  These	  authorities	  will	   cooperate	  with	   the	  
Director	   of	   Education	   in	   all	   the	   administration	  on	   condition	   that	   the	   latter	  
will	   have	   no	   right	   to	   take	   action	   on	   any	   administrative	  matter	   before	   the	  
Local	  Authority	  gives	  its	  decision.75	  
	  
In	  what	  must	  have	  been	  a	  shock	  for	  colonial	  administrators,	  the	  Municipal	  Council	  
demanded	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  “General	  Education	  Authority”	  comprised	  of	  
“representatives	  elected	  from	  the	  local	  authorities	  [LEAs]	  to	  supervise	  the	  work	  of	  
the	  Department	  of	  Education	  in	  Palestine.”76	  	  
As	  we	  can	  see	  from	  these	  petitions,	  the	  general	  tenor	  of	  Palestinian	  
objections	  and	  recommendations	  was	  quite	  distinct	  from	  that	  expressed	  by	  Zionist	  
leaders.	  Both	  political	  factions	  found	  fault	  with	  the	  Department	  of	  Education’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Ibid.	  
75	  Jerusalem	  Municipal	  Council	  memorandum,	  August	  16,	  1928.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/146/8.	  
76	  Ibid.	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attempts	  to	  supervise	  schools	  and	  regulate	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  they	  
operated,	  and	  yet,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  each	  party	  responded	  to	  these	  attempts	  
revealed	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  differing	  views	  of	  the	  Mandatory	  government	  as	  the	  
legitimate	  bearer	  of	  sovereignty.	  The	  Zionist	  Organization	  lobbied	  for	  the	  
recognition	  of	  an	  exclusively	  Jewish	  public	  space	  that	  was	  represented	  by	  its	  own	  
quasi-­‐state	  apparatus	  and	  supervised	  by	  its	  own	  education	  administrators.	  Fiercely	  
protective	  of	  its	  autonomy	  and	  anxious	  about	  extending	  its	  control	  over	  all	  Jewish	  
education	  in	  Palestine,	  Zionist	  leaders	  pressured	  the	  Director	  of	  Education	  to	  
delegate	  many	  of	  his	  powers	  to	  the	  maẖlakat	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  maintained	  by	  the	  Jewish	  
Agency.	  These	  demands	  advanced	  a	  single	  agenda,	  namely,	  to	  gain	  recognition	  from	  
the	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  that	  it	  was	  not	  the	  legitimate	  source	  of	  authority	  over	  
the	  Jewish	  population,	  and	  correspondingly,	  to	  centralize	  power	  in	  the	  parallel	  state	  
apparatus	  being	  constructed	  under	  Zionist	  auspices.	  The	  greater	  participation	  of	  
Jews	  in	  the	  management	  of	  their	  education	  therefore	  went	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  the	  
erosion	  of	  their	  presence	  in	  a	  general	  Palestinian	  public	  space	  inhabited	  by	  multiple	  
groups	  and	  overseen,	  however	  contentiously,	  by	  the	  Mandatory	  government.	  	  
In	  contrast,	  at	  least	  during	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  Mandate	  when	  debates	  over	  
the	  Education	  Ordinance	  occurred,	  Palestinian	  leaders	  responded	  to	  the	  legislation	  
with	  a	  greater	  willingness	  to	  compromise	  with	  the	  government	  and	  the	  Department	  
of	  Education.	  They	  largely	  acquiesced	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  government	  supervision,	  
and	  attempted	  to	  reach	  a	  modus	  vivendi	  with	  education	  administrators	  regarding	  
concrete	  points	  such	  as	  sanitary	  inspection	  and	  the	  licensing	  of	  teachers.	  Above	  all,	  
they	  demanded	  a	  seat	  at	  the	  government’s	  table,	  not	  a	  separate	  administrative	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structure.	  Likewise,	  both	  the	  Supreme	  Muslim	  Council	  and	  the	  Jerusalem	  Municipal	  
Council	  lobbied	  for	  the	  expanded	  role	  of	  local	  administrative	  bodies,	  like	  the	  LEAs,	  
which	  were	  regarded,	  importantly,	  as	  extensions	  of	  the	  central	  government	  rather	  
than	  rival	  institutions.	  	  
These	  proposed	  forays	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  school	  administration	  were	  
unacceptable	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Education,	  which	  argued	  that	  Arabs	  who	  
petitioned	  for	  such	  powers	  were	  welcome	  to	  found	  and	  oversee	  independent	  
communal	  institutions	  for	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  students,	  respectively.	  In	  the	  end,	  
Palestinian	  Arabs	  were	  faced	  with	  a	  Catch	  22:	  the	  Government	  public	  schools	  
afforded	  them	  no	  say	  in	  educational	  matters,	  and	  the	  prospect	  of	  gaining	  greater	  
educational	  autonomy	  by	  organizing	  on	  a	  religious	  basis	  entailed	  the	  dissolution	  of	  
national	  unity.	  
Finally,	  I	  must	  say	  some	  words	  about	  the	  Supreme	  Muslim	  Council,	  which	  
occupied	  a	  somewhat	  awkward	  position	  within	  the	  sectarian	  landscape	  when	  it	  
came	  to	  education.	  As	  Rashid	  Khalidi	  has	  argued,	  the	  British	  occupation	  of	  Palestine	  
was	  soon	  followed	  by	  “the	  creation…of	  ‘Islamic’	  institutions	  that	  had	  no	  precedent	  
in	  that	  country’s	  history,	  or	  indeed	  in	  the	  entirety	  of	  Islamic	  history.”	  According	  to	  
Khalidi,	  bodies	  like	  the	  Supreme	  Muslim	  Council	  and	  the	  office	  of	  Grand	  Mufti	  of	  
Palestine	  were	  primarily	  designed	  to	  divide	  the	  Arab	  populace	  on	  religious	  lines	  
and,	  by	  bestowing	  some	  element	  of	  prestige	  to	  the	  officeholders,	  co-­‐opt	  the	  notable	  
class	  into	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Government.	  The	  Council’s	  creation	  also	  represented	  
an	  attempt	  to	  divert	  Arab	  political	  energies	  toward	  communal	  matters	  of	  religious	  
significance,	  such	  as	  the	  management	  of	  awqaf	  and	  the	  appointment	  of	  judges	  to	  the	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shari‘a	  courts.	  	  However	  much	  to	  the	  government’s	  chagrin,	  the	  SMC	  did	  not	  provide	  
the	  desired	  outlet	  for	  Palestinian	  Arab	  political	  frustrations,	  nor	  did	  the	  SMC	  
embrace	  the	  divide	  between	  religious	  and	  political	  affairs	  that	  the	  British	  
envisioned.	  Rather,	  as	  Laura	  Robson	  has	  indicated,	  the	  Mandate	  government	  
“unwillingly	  assisted	  the	  emergence	  of	  religious	  nationalism”	  that	  drew	  heavily	  on	  
Islamic	  symbolism	  and	  rhetoric.	  Rather	  than	  redirecting	  energies	  toward	  a	  clearly	  
delineated	  “religious”	  sphere,	  the	  SMC	  infused	  the	  political	  one	  with	  a	  religious	  
sensibility.	  
Education,	  however,	  occupied	  a	  somewhat	  anomalous	  space	  within	  the	  
framework	  of	  British	  sectarian	  rule	  and	  particularly,	  the	  attempt	  to	  render	  the	  
Muslim	  community	  a	  millet.	  Because	  the	  Muslim	  population	  was	  the	  numerical	  
majority	  in	  Palestine	  and	  therefore	  the	  primary	  beneficiary	  of	  Government	  public	  
schools,	  it	  had	  no	  reason	  to	  contemplate	  building	  a	  parallel	  school	  system	  akin	  to	  
the	  Zionist	  one,	  which	  claimed	  to	  represent	  a	  mere	  continuation	  of	  the	  educational	  
autonomy	  Jews	  enjoyed	  under	  Ottoman	  rule.	  The	  SMC	  did	  maintain	  its	  own	  system	  
of	  private	  schools;	  however	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Muslim	  children	  attended	  either	  
government	  public	  schools	  or	  private	  katātīb.77	  Furthermore,	  while	  education	  in	  late	  
Ottoman	  Palestine	  was	  arguably	  seen	  as	  a	  communal	  matter,	  the	  expansion	  of	  
government	  public	  schools	  with	  secularized	  curricula	  functioned	  to	  remove	  them	  
from	  	  “religious”	  realm	  in	  which	  the	  SMC	  could	  claim	  jurisdiction.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  In	  1945,	  the	  schools	  maintained	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Muslim	  Council	  educated	  2023	  pupils,	  versus	  
81,042	  in	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System.	  Note	  that	  1936-­‐1937	  is	  the	  last	  year	  for	  which	  statistics	  for	  the	  
Arab	  Public	  System	  are	  divided	  according	  to	  religion	  of	  the	  pupils.	  See:	  Palestine,	  Annual	  Report	  
1945-­‐46:	  2,	  12.	  The	  Ottoman	  public	  schools	  were	  officially	  open	  to	  all,	  but	  in	  actuality	  they	  served	  the	  
Muslim	  community	  almost	  exclusively.	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  
three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  19.	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The	  result	  of	  these	  cross-­‐currents	  was	  that,	  on	  one	  hand,	  the	  Palestinian	  
Muslim	  community	  was	  part	  of	  the	  majority	  population	  which	  depended	  on	  public	  
social	  services,	  as	  in	  Ottoman	  times,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  a	  religious	  community,	  whose	  
autonomy	  hinged	  on	  private	  initiative.	  The	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  thus	  presided	  
over	  a	  shrinking	  public	  sphere	  that	  forbade	  political	  participation	  within	  its	  
boundaries,	  while	  suggesting	  that	  Arab	  management	  of	  education	  could	  only	  occur	  
within	  the	  context	  of	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  religious	  organization.	  Had	  this	  
suggestion	  been	  fully	  followed,	  “the	  Department	  of	  Education	  in	  Palestine	  would	  
have	  suddenly	  found	  itself	  in	  a	  position	  with	  no	  schools	  to	  control	  and	  no	  education	  
to	  direct.”78	  As	  this	  discussion	  of	  the	  Palestine	  Education	  Ordinance	  reveals,	  the	  
erasure	  of	  a	  common	  public	  space	  was	  thus	  not	  an	  unfortunate	  byproduct	  of	  
Mandate	  rule,	  but	  an	  essential	  characteristic	  of	  its	  legal	  structure.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Politics,	  Education	  and	  the	  Boundaries	  of	  Religious	  Knowledge	  
	  
Surely	  the	  church	  is	  a	  place	  where	  one	  day’s	  truce	  ought	  to	  be	  allowed	  	  
to	  the	  dissensions	  and	  animosities	  of	  mankind.1	  
	  
In	  the	  Introduction	  to	  this	  study,	  I	  offered	  a	  variation	  of	  Bruno	  Latour’s	  
“modern	  constitution”	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  understand	  the	  colonial	  attempt	  to	  delimit	  proper	  
and	  improper	  approaches	  to	  education.	  At	  the	  center	  of	  this	  model	  sits	  the	  need	  to	  
absolutely	  distinguish	  between	  “pure”	  pedagogic	  practices	  and	  their	  corrupted	  
forms,	  associated,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  with	  Zionist	  and	  private	  Palestinian	  endeavors.	  
Thus	  British	  administrators	  would	  earnestly	  claim	  that	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System	  
nurtured	  healthy	  national	  pride	  as	  opposed	  to	  national	  chauvinism;	  that	  it	  taught	  
public	  service	  without	  veering	  into	  mass	  politics;	  that	  it	  embraced	  religious	  
education	  as	  a	  moral,	  rather	  than	  political,	  practice;	  and	  that	  all	  policies	  were	  guided	  
by	  pedagogic	  best	  practices	  rather	  than	  the	  cynical	  use	  of	  education	  as	  a	  form	  of	  
social	  engineering.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  boundary	  between	  proper	  and	  improper	  
practices	  was	  constantly	  transgressed	  is	  obvious	  enough	  from	  our	  review	  of	  policies	  
like	  monolingualism	  and	  public	  health	  supervision.	  The	  following	  two	  chapters	  
expand	  on	  this	  central	  theme	  by	  analyzing	  colonial	  approaches	  to	  religious	  
education	  and	  civic	  engagement	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  “transgressive”	  alternatives	  
put	  forth	  by	  Palestinian	  nationalists	  and	  Zionists,	  on	  the	  other.	  	  
Understanding	  this	  history	  requires	  a	  direct	  confrontation	  with	  the	  fundamental	  
assumptions	  upon	  which	  British	  educational	  planning	  was	  based:	  namely,	  that	  of	  education	  
as	  a	  practice	  distinct	  from,	  and	  indeed	  outside	  of,	  the	  political	  realm;	  and	  that	  of	  religion	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Edmund	  Burke,	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Revolution	  in	  France	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  2009),	  12.	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inherently,	  or	  at	  least	  ideally,	  apolitical.	  I	  suggested	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  that	  this	  
understanding	  of	  “religion”	  as	  an	  otherworldly	  venture	  seemed	  to	  shape	  the	  Education	  
Ordinance	  that	  exempted	  religious	  schools	  from	  most	  forms	  of	  government	  supervision.	  
Thus	  schools	  imparting	  only	  religious	  instruction	  were	  entirely	  freed	  from	  the	  legislation,	  
and	  became	  subject	  to	  inspection	  and	  other	  bureaucratic	  requirements	  only	  with	  the	  
introduction	  of	  secular	  studies	  like	  history,	  geography	  or	  mathematics.	  The	  seepage	  of	  
political	  concerns	  into	  the	  schoolroom	  therefore	  constituted	  nothing	  less	  than	  an	  intrusion	  
that	  compromised	  the	  nature	  of	  education	  itself.	  While	  children	  were	  to	  be	  educated	  in	  
their	  “native”	  language	  and	  preserve	  their	  “national”	  culture,	  administrators	  nevertheless	  
held	  that	  education	  should	  never	  veer	  into	  contemporary	  national	  politics.	  Thus	  “politics”	  
figures	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  British	  officials	  as	  a	  force	  that	  upsets	  the	  educational	  equilibrium,	  
rather	  than	  as	  an	  inevitable	  component	  of	  modern,	  national	  schooling	  under	  centralized	  
state	  supervision.	  	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  educators	  assigned	  a	  monumental	  task	  to	  religious	  
education.	  This	  amounted	  to	  nothing	  less	  than	  instilling	  in	  children	  a	  “universal”	  
moral	  system	  that	  was	  presumably	  shared	  by	  Palestine’s	  three	  major	  monotheistic	  
religions—and	  yet	  bore	  a	  striking	  resemblance	  to	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  British	  
Protestantism.	  Moreover,	  it	  was	  through	  the	  cultivation	  of	  religious	  education	  that	  
children	  could	  presumably	  be	  shielded	  from	  the	  destructive	  pull	  of	  mass	  politics.	  As	  
such,	  religious	  education	  represented	  a	  lynchpin	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  maintain	  the	  
“traditional”	  order	  in	  which	  rule	  through	  religious	  authorities	  was	  thought	  to	  offer	  
an	  antidote	  to	  popular	  mobilization.	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Building	  on	  this	  theoretical	  frame,	  this	  chapter	  argues	  that	  the	  Government	  
of	  Palestine	  developed	  an	  approach	  to	  religious	  education	  that	  linked	  Islam	  to	  the	  
cultivation	  of	  individual	  moral	  virtues.	  The	  innovation	  here	  lay	  not	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  
religion	  as	  a	  site	  of	  moral	  fashioning,	  but	  in	  equating	  “religion”	  primarily	  with	  
individual	  ethics	  in	  a	  way	  which	  excluded	  other	  fields	  of	  human	  behavior—
commerce,	  for	  instance—and	  knowledge,	  as	  subjects	  like	  Arabic,	  history	  and	  
hygiene	  were	  removed	  from	  an	  Islamic	  framework.	  In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  this	  
chapter,	  I	  argue	  that	  contemporary	  Muslim	  educators	  largely	  acquiesced	  in	  this	  
educational	  schema.	  Curricula	  and	  textbooks	  during	  this	  period	  reflected	  a	  
heightened	  concern	  with	  individual	  moral	  fashioning	  through	  ritual	  practice	  
(‘ibadat)	  and	  devoted	  less	  attention	  to	  elements	  of	  shari’a	  that	  regulated	  social	  
behavior	  (mu’amalat).	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  educational	  content	  of	  Islam	  underwent	  
an	  arc	  of	  secularization	  similar	  to	  that	  which	  occurred	  in	  Egypt,	  and	  that	  has	  been	  
productively	  analyzed	  by	  Gregory	  Starrett	  with	  regard	  to	  modern	  schooling	  and	  
Talal	  Asad	  in	  his	  study	  of	  shari‘a	  court	  reform.2	  	  
However,	  based	  on	  a	  case	  study	  of	  the	  Najah	  National	  School	  in	  Nablus,	  I	  
would	  like	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  was	  more	  to	  the	  matter	  than	  mere	  colonial	  mimicry.	  
By	  exploring	  articulations	  of	  Islam	  as	  a	  civilizational—rather	  than	  juridical—
system,	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  association	  of	  “religion”	  with	  individual	  moral	  conduct	  
could	  actually	  facilitate	  attempts	  to	  overcome	  Palestine’s	  sectarian	  divisions	  by	  
giving	  rise	  to	  an	  Islam	  shared	  by	  all	  Arabs,	  even	  non-­‐Muslims.	  Thus,	  while	  the	  legal	  
jurisdiction	  of	  “religion”	  was	  increasingly	  focused	  on	  the	  individual	  conscience,	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Gregory	  Starrett,	  Putting	  Islam	  to	  Work	  	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1998);	  Asad,	  
Formations	  of	  the	  Secular:	  Christianity,	  Islam,	  Modernity;	  ibid.	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did	  not	  signal	  the	  acceptance	  of	  a	  worldview	  in	  which	  Islam	  was	  separated	  from	  
mass	  politics.	  Rather,	  Islam	  and	  Arabism	  could	  work	  hand	  in	  hand	  as	  mutually	  
reinforcing	  foundations	  of	  political	  engagement.	  
The	  notion	  that	  religious	  education	  was	  historically	  linked	  to	  either	  
otherworldly	  concerns	  (and	  thus,	  political	  indifference)	  or	  to	  instilling	  a	  sense	  of	  
respect	  for	  religious	  functionaries	  (who	  presumably	  knew	  best)	  requires	  some	  
attention	  here.	  As	  was	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  One,	  pre-­‐modern	  Islamic	  education	  was	  
more	  often	  than	  not	  associated	  with	  the	  conservation	  of	  the	  social	  order,	  functioning	  
as	  “a	  pillar	  of	  stability	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  force	  for	  change”	  (original	  emphasis).3	  This	  
cannot,	  however,	  be	  conflated	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  religious	  schools	  were	  not	  
concerned	  with	  political	  matters,	  and	  not	  merely	  because	  religious	  scholars	  and	  
institutions	  historically	  assumed	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  orientations	  toward	  the	  public	  
sphere.	  More	  crucially,	  asking	  whether	  pre-­‐modern	  Islamic	  education	  was	  “political”	  
in	  nature	  elides	  the	  relatively	  recent	  formation	  of	  “politics”	  as	  a	  discrete	  sphere	  of	  
human	  activity,	  the	  rise	  of	  which	  was	  coterminous	  with	  national	  “state	  space”	  –	  
including	  not	  only	  the	  nation-­‐state’s	  ventures	  into	  mass	  education,	  public	  health	  and	  
management	  of	  the	  economy,	  but	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  public	  space	  as	  the	  
privileged	  site	  of	  mass	  politics.4	  With	  these	  considerations	  in	  mind,	  the	  question	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Berkey,	  "Madrasas	  Medieval	  and	  Modern:	  Politics,	  Education,	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Muslim	  Identity,"	  
46.	  
4	  On	  the	  related	  emergence	  of	  “politics”	  and	  “economy”	  as	  sites	  of	  state	  management	  and	  social	  
action,	  see	  Timothy	  Mitchell,	  Rule	  of	  Experts:	  Egypt,	  Techno-­‐Politics,	  Modernity	  	  (Berkeley:	  University	  
of	  California	  Press,	  2002).	  ———,	  "Rethinking	  Economy,"	  Geoforum	  39,	  no.	  3	  (2008).	  On	  the	  concept	  
of	  modern	  state	  space,	  see	  Henri	  Lefebvre,	  The	  Production	  of	  Space,	  trans.	  Donald	  Nicholson-­‐Smith	  
(Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  Blackwell,	  1991).	  Manu	  Goswami	  is	  one	  author	  who	  has	  productively	  modified	  
Lefebvre’s	  theory	  to	  explain	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  “colonial	  state	  space”	  was	  produced.	  See	  Manu	  
Goswami,	  Producing	  India	  	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press	  2004).	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to	  whether	  pre-­‐modern	  forms	  of	  religious	  education	  were	  “political”	  in	  nature	  is	  
akin	  to	  asking	  whether	  medieval	  theologians	  were	  hostile	  to	  socialized	  medicine.	  	  
The	  reality	  is	  that	  Modernity	  engendered	  new	  forms	  of	  political	  engagement	  
whose	  relationship	  with	  education	  and	  religious	  knowledge	  had	  to	  be	  formulated,	  
not	  merely	  rearticulated.	  It	  is	  the	  details	  of	  that	  relationship,	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  
which	  it	  was	  contested	  between	  Palestinian	  and	  British	  educators,	  that	  requires	  our	  
attention.	  We	  should	  not,	  therefore,	  imagine	  this	  as	  a	  battle	  between	  a	  traditional	  
Islamic	  approach	  and	  a	  modern	  colonial	  one.	  Both	  positions,	  in	  fact,	  forwarded	  
views	  regarding	  religious	  education	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  political	  action	  that	  were	  
necessarily	  novel,	  connected	  as	  they	  were	  to	  the	  historically	  contingent	  forces	  of	  
mass	  politics,	  state	  bureaucracies	  and	  new	  forms	  of	  intellectual	  authority.	  	  
Understanding	  these	  discursive	  currents	  requires	  a	  close	  analysis	  of	  
curricula	  used	  in	  politically	  opposed	  educational	  spaces:	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System,	  
managed	  directly	  by	  the	  Mandatory	  government,	  and	  the	  national	  schools	  created	  
by	  Palestinian	  leaders.	  The	  following	  comparison	  will	  challenge	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
we	  should	  view	  these	  schools	  as	  oppositional	  in	  terms	  of	  either	  curricula	  or	  political	  
function.	  In	  fact,	  both	  systems	  were	  intimately	  involved	  in	  “politics”	  of	  one	  kind	  or	  
another,	  as	  the	  Government’s	  insistence	  on	  the	  political	  neutrality	  of	  education	  
represented	  a	  very	  real	  form	  of	  colonial	  politics.	  Rather,	  it	  was	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  
political	  activity—and	  whether	  it	  was	  recognized	  as	  “political”	  at	  all—that	  became	  




And	  Never	  the	  Twain	  Shall	  Meet	  
Humphrey	  Bowman,	  a	  product	  of	  Eton	  and	  Oxford,	  tellingly	  included	  the	  following	  
quote	  from	  Plato’s	  Laws	  as	  a	  preface	  to	  his	  Palestine	  memoir:	  “We	  are	  not	  speaking	  of	  
education	  in	  this	  narrower	  sense,	  but	  of	  that	  other	  education	  in	  virtue	  from	  youth	  upwards,	  
which	  makes	  a	  man	  eagerly	  pursue	  the	  ideal	  perfection	  of	  citizenship,	  and	  teaches	  him	  how	  
rightly	  to	  rule	  and	  how	  to	  obey.”5	  Bowman	  saw	  no	  contradiction	  in	  stressing	  the	  virtues	  of	  
citizenship	  to	  a	  population	  thoroughly	  subjected	  to	  colonial	  rule	  and	  earnestly	  tried	  to	  
instill	  in	  teachers	  the	  value	  of	  public	  service.	  Writing	  in	  his	  diary	  in	  1929,	  he	  stated,	  “‘public	  
service’	  is	  what	  I	  preach	  everywhere	  now,	  and	  though	  it	  does	  not	  meet	  with	  much	  
response,	  I	  believe	  gradually	  the	  people	  must	  realize	  that	  the	  leaders	  must	  do	  something	  
for	  their	  own	  youth,	  for	  the	  blind,	  for	  the	  infirm,	  for	  the	  halfwitted.	  They	  expect	  
government	  to	  do	  everything	  and	  of	  course	  government	  can’t.	  Partly	  because	  there	  is	  not	  
the	  money	  and	  partly	  because,	  chiefly	  because,	  there	  are	  some	  things	  which	  are	  so	  much	  
better	  done	  by	  private…	  enterprise.”6	  Noting	  this	  tendency	  to	  separate	  “the	  concepts	  of	  
citizenship	  and	  character	  from	  their	  cultural	  base,”	  Ylana	  Miller	  has	  argued	  that	  British	  
officials	  “sought	  to	  use	  education…to	  maintain	  a	  stable	  social	  order	  and	  to	  transmit	  what	  
seemed	  to	  them	  universal	  values,”	  thereby	  immunizing	  “the	  population	  against	  nationalist	  
emotions.”7	  	  
Nevertheless,	  colonial	  administrators	  went	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  distinguish	  their	  
project—dictated	  by	  pedagogic	  necessity,	  managed	  through	  benign	  administrative	  
channels,	  devoted	  to	  character	  formation—from	  education	  as	  a	  form	  of	  social	  engineering.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Bowman,	  Middle-­‐East	  Window:	  249.	  	  
6	  Humphrey	  Bowman,	  diary	  entry	  dated	  April	  7,	  1929.	  MEC,	  Humphrey	  Bowman	  collection,	  Box	  3B.	  	  
7	  Miller,	  Government	  and	  Society	  in	  Rural	  Palestine	  1920-­‐1948:	  97.	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This	  had	  the	  discursive	  effect	  of	  separating	  educational	  concerns	  from	  political	  ones	  (or	  
rather,	  of	  rendering	  colonial	  politics	  invisible)	  and	  correspondingly,	  education	  officials	  
viewed	  the	  entrance	  of	  national	  politics	  into	  the	  classroom	  with	  great	  anxiety.	  This	  unease	  
peaked	  at	  times	  of	  domestic	  upheaval,	  such	  as	  the	  school	  strikes	  that	  accompanied	  Lord	  
Balfour’s	  1925	  visit,	  and	  during	  the	  riots	  in	  1929.	  8	  In	  Bowman’s	  words,	  “As	  the	  political	  
situation	  gradually	  worsened,	  we	  were	  faced	  by	  another	  danger.	  This	  was	  the	  effect	  of	  
politics	  on	  teachers	  and	  pupils.	  In	  the	  neighboring	  Egypt,	  school	  strikes	  and	  
demonstrations	  had	  had	  a	  disastrous	  effect	  on	  discipline,	  and	  had	  seriously	  reacted	  on	  
educational	  progress.	  Once	  this	  virus	  entered	  the	  schools	  of	  Palestine,	  I	  knew	  we	  were	  
doomed.”9	  
Indeed,	  the	  contemporary	  upheaval	  in	  Egypt—a	  “Frankenstein	  monster	  raised	  by	  
Zaghlul”10—weighed	  heavily	  on	  officials	  in	  Palestine.	  An	  editorial	  clipping	  from	  The	  Times	  
preserved	  in	  Humphrey	  Bowman’s	  personal	  papers	  explicitly	  referenced	  the	  Egyptian	  
revolution	  as	  a	  cautionary	  tale	  and	  implored	  the	  Mandatory	  Government	  to	  take	  all	  
possible	  measures	  to	  prevent	  the	  unnatural	  intrusion	  of	  politics	  into	  the	  classroom.	  “In	  
fairness	  alike	  to	  national	  safety	  and	  to	  the	  education	  of	  the	  young	  Arab	  it	  is	  absolutely	  
essential	  that	  the	  first	  sign	  of	  political	  propaganda	  in	  the	  schools	  of	  Palestine	  should	  be	  
checked	  without	  a	  moment’s	  delay.”	  As	  the	  editorial	  warned:	  
It	  was	  through	  his	  trained	  choruses	  of	  excited	  schoolboys	  (paid	  so	  many	  piastres	  for	  
each	  demonstration)	  that	  Zaghlul	   taught	  his	  parrot-­‐cries	   to	   the	  Egyptian	  people;	   it	  
was	   from	   the	   student	   class	   that	   the	  agents	  were	   recruited	   to	   carry	  out	   the	   crimes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  For	  an	  extended	  discussion	  of	  school	  strikes,	  see	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  
study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  Chp.	  7.	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  1925	  strike	  within	  the	  
Government	  Arab	  College,	  see:	  Rochelle	  Davis,	  "Commemorating	  Education:	  Recollections	  of	  the	  Arab	  
College	  in	  Jerusalem,	  1918-­‐1948,"	  Comparative	  Studies	  of	  South	  Asia,	  Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  23,	  
no.	  1-­‐2	  (2003).	  
9	  Bowman,	  Middle-­‐East	  Window:	  310.	  
10	  Ibid.,	  311.	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inspired	   by	   the	   Wafd.	   In	   fact,	   the	   authorized	   introduction	   of	   politics	   into	   Cairo	  
schools—to	   the	   utter	   neglect	   of	   proper	   study	   and	   the	   systemic	   insulting	   of	   the	  
British	  teacher—has	  had	  the	  disastrous	  effect	  on	  the	  peace	  of	  the	  country	  as	  it	  has	  
had	  on	  the	  education	  of	  its	  children.	  
	  
So	   far	   the	   schools	   in	   Palestine	   have	   been	   fortunate	   in	   their	   freedom	   from	   such	  
interference	  by	  the	  Arab	  leaders…But	  there	  is	  a	  distinct	  tendency	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
Arab	   leaders	   to-­‐day	   to	   follow	   the	   example	   of	   Egyptian	   agitators.	   It	   must	   be	  
remembered	   that	   the	   Arab	   is	   not	   naturally	   a	   politician	   either	   by	   nature	   or	   by	  
inclination,	  and	  the	  original	   leaders	  of	  the	  protest	  against	  the	  Zionist	  policy,	  weary	  
of	  continued	  strife,	  are	  gradually	  drifting	  back	  to	  their	  daily	  tasks	  in	  the	  field.11	  
	  
The	  editorial	  reflects	  a	  number	  of	  conceptual	  frameworks	  that	  were	  broadly	  accepted	  in	  
British	  colonial	  circles.	  First,	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  Arab	  is	  fundamentally	  not	  a	  political	  
creature,	  but	  one	  suited	  to	  “daily	  tasks	  in	  the	  field,”	  found	  its	  corollary	  in	  attempts	  to	  design	  
the	  school	  curriculum	  around	  a	  “rural	  bias,”	  which	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  necessary	  corrective	  to	  
the	  “literary	  education”	  that	  had	  proven	  so	  disastrous	  in	  India.	  Second,	  the	  presence	  of	  
politics	  in	  the	  classroom	  is	  here	  formulated	  as	  an	  unnatural	  intrusion,	  just	  as	  unnatural	  as	  
the	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  Arab	  meddling	  in	  politics.	  Thus	  it	  is	  to	  the	  great	  fortune	  of	  the	  
Palestinian	  schools	  that	  they	  have	  been	  free	  from	  “such	  interference.”	  Finally,	  the	  
censorship	  of	  the	  press	  and	  other	  means	  developed	  to	  combat	  the	  seepage	  of	  politics	  into	  
the	  schoolhouse	  are	  not	  presented	  as	  political	  actions	  in	  and	  of	  themselves,	  but	  as	  
necessities	  dictated	  by	  pedagogic	  responsibility	  and	  an	  overarching	  concern	  for	  children’s	  
wellbeing.	  Situated	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  long	  learning	  curve	  that	  arced	  around	  India	  and	  Egypt	  
before	  passing	  through	  Palestine,	  educators	  of	  Bowman’s	  vintage	  diligently	  studied	  these	  
lessons	  from	  the	  past	  (and	  present)	  in	  seeking	  to	  develop	  a	  school	  system	  that	  focused	  on	  
practical	  training	  and	  tried	  to	  detach	  civic	  responsibility	  from	  political	  agitation.12	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  "Following	  a	  Bad	  Example,"	  The	  Times	  March	  20,	  1925.	  
12	  In	  his	  chapters	  regarding	  the	  historical	  background	  of	  Egyptian	  religious	  education,	  Starrett	  notes	  
both	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  Indian	  example	  on	  the	  development	  of	  education	  policy	  in	  Egypt,	  and	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  results	  of	  colonial	  education	  projects	  were	  often	  at	  odds	  with	  their	  stated	  aims.	  The	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Educational	  policies	  in	  Palestine	  were	  therefore	  cast	  as	  an	  improvement	  on	  both	  the	  Indian	  
and	  Egyptian	  models:	  moral	  education	  that	  was	  practically	  directed	  toward	  the	  village	  
economy.	  	  
Interestingly,	  Bowman	  characterized	  his	  attempt	  to	  shield	  the	  Department	  of	  
Education	  from	  politics,	  “in	  so	  far	  as	  this	  was	  humanly	  possible,”	  as	  largely	  successful	  up	  
until	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Arab	  revolt.	  He	  attributed	  this	  success	  in	  part	  to	  the	  Department’s	  
contacts	  with	  Hajj	  Amin	  al-­‐Husseini	  and	  other	  Muslim	  leaders.	  “We	  never	  tired	  of	  stressing	  
the	  disastrous	  results	  on	  character	  and	  upbringing	  of	  political	  agitation	  in	  the	  schools.”13	  
On	  a	  related	  front,	  Bowman’s	  successor,	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  attributed	  the	  government’s	  
success	  in	  combating	  “a	  violent	  nationalism”	  within	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System	  to	  the	  
Department’s	  “directing	  the	  syllabus	  in	  accordance	  with	  true	  pedagogic	  values	  rather	  than	  
by	  the	  demands	  of	  an	  artificial	  and	  hysterical	  racial	  pride.”	  Although	  Arabic	  was	  the	  
language	  of	  instruction	  and	  the	  curriculum	  even	  devoted	  some	  attention	  to	  the	  Arab	  nahḍa,	  
“the	  aim	  has	  been	  the	  formation	  of	  individual	  character,”	  rather	  than	  the	  creation	  of	  
budding	  Arab	  nationalists.14	  
More	  strident	  measures	  were	  also	  adopted	  alongside	  private	  exhortations	  and	  
monitoring	  of	  schools’	  curricula.	  Following	  the	  1925	  school	  strikes,	  the	  Government	  
forbade	  teachers	  in	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System	  from	  membership	  in	  any	  political	  organizations	  
and	  required	  teachers	  to	  sign	  the	  following	  oath:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
introduction	  of	  modern	  forms	  of	  discipline	  and	  associated	  technologies	  of	  rule	  meant	  to	  neutralize	  
the	  threat	  of	  lower	  classes	  could	  also	  facilitate	  revolt.	  “If	  schools,	  universities,	  the	  press,	  and	  the	  
military	  barracks	  act	  as	  centers	  of	  revolt,	  it	  is	  because	  the	  spread	  of	  their	  unique	  disciplinary	  
practices	  across	  the	  whole	  of	  society	  is	  accompanied	  by	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  distinctly	  new	  techniques	  
and	  potentials	  for	  revolt	  associated	  with	  them.”	  Starrett,	  Putting	  Islam	  to	  Work:	  58.	  	  
13	  Bowman,	  Middle-­‐East	  Window:	  311.	  
14	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  “Notes	  on	  Jewish	  Education	  and	  the	  McNair	  Report.”	  November	  30,	  1946.	  TNA,	  
CO/733/476/2.	  Section	  21.	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I,	  ____________________	  hereby	  give	  a	  solemn	  undertaking	  that	  so	  long	  as	  I	  am	  a	  teacher	  
under	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  I	  will	  not	  introduce	  any	  political	  considerations	  
into	  my	  duties	  as	  a	  teacher,	  nor	  will	  I	  take	  any	  active	  part	  in	  any	  movement	  or	  in	  any	  
meeting	  or	  demonstration	  which	  has	  a	  political	  character	  or	  purpose,	  or	  engage	  in	  
any	  form	  of	  political	  propaganda.15	  
	  
While	  teachers	  were	  no	  longer	  free	  to	  belong	  to	  popular	  Muslim-­‐Christian	  Associations,	  
they	  were	  still	  able	  to	  belong	  to	  the	  presumably	  neutral	  Y.M.C.A.16	  This	  was	  but	  one	  
instance	  in	  which	  English,	  and	  more	  broadly,	  Christian,	  organizations	  were	  regarded	  as	  
disinterested	  parties	  in	  the	  unraveling	  of	  Palestine.	  	  
However	  futile	  the	  attempts	  to	  prevent	  “politics”	  from	  entering	  the	  classroom	  would	  
eventually	  prove,17	  for	  many	  years	  officials	  maintained	  faith	  that	  the	  right	  curriculum	  could	  
help	  neutralize	  the	  threat.	  An	  exchange	  between	  High	  Commissioner	  Wauchope	  and	  Susan	  
Lawrence,	  a	  British	  Parliament	  member,	  is	  instructive.	  	  Following	  a	  visit	  to	  Arab	  public	  
schools	  in	  Palestine,	  Lawrence	  expressed	  a	  mixture	  of	  admiration	  and	  alarm	  at	  what	  she	  
had	  witnessed:	  
I	   cannot	   tell	   you	  how	   impressed	  and	   touched	   I	  was	   that	   the	   first	  demand	  of	   these	  
bitterly	  poor	  people	  was	  for	  education.	   I	  don’t	  believe	  that	  any	  European	  peasants	  
would	  have	  done	  the	  same.	  
	  
But	  when	   I	  have	   talked	   to	  my	   Jewish	   friends,	   I	   find	   they	   look	  on	   the	  Arab	   schools	  
with	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   alarm.	   They	   say	   that	   they	   teach	   race-­‐hatred	   and	   that	   the	  
teachers	  everywhere	  are	  the	  very	  centre	  of	  the	  agitation	  against	  them.	  
I	  mention	  this	  –	  for	  if	  it	  is	  true	  –	  it	  would	  be	  comparatively	  easy	  for	  you	  by	  means	  of	  
private	  or	  public	  utterances	  to	  your	  inspectors,	  the	  training	  schools,	  or	  the	  teachers	  
to	  impress	  upon	  these	  servants	  of	  the	  Government	  the	  correct	  view	  that	  the	  schools	  
must	  take	  no	  part	  in	  current	  politics.18	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  “Undertaking	  to	  be	  signed	  by	  Teachers.”	  May	  1925.	  TNA,	  CO	  814/3.	  	  
16	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  
184.	  
17	  Tibawi	  is	  quite	  unequivocal	  in	  arguing	  that,	  despite	  all	  regulations	  to	  the	  contrary,	  schools	  in	  the	  
Arab	  Public	  System	  inevitably	  became	  sites	  for	  inculcating	  a	  sense	  of	  Palestinian	  identity	  and	  Arab	  
nationalism.	  See:	  ibid.,	  195-­‐203.	  Similarly	  the	  Palestine	  Royal	  Commission	  lamented	  that	  schools	  in	  
the	  Arab	  Public	  System	  had	  become	  “hothouses	  for	  nationalism.”	  See:	  Palestine	  Royal	  Commission,	  
"Summary	  of	  Report,"	  (London1937),	  339-­‐40.	  
18	  Susan	  Lawrence	  to	  Arthur	  Wauchope,	  undated	  (May/June	  1935).	  TNA,	  CO	  733/273/5.	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In	  his	  response,	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  assured	  MP	  Lawrence	  that	  a	  combination	  of	  
suitable	  textbooks	  and	  detailed	  syllabi	  were	  effective	  barriers	  against	  the	  politicization	  of	  
schools.	  For	  potentially	  contentious	  subjects	  such	  as	  history,	  for	  which	  no	  textbook	  “in	  
Arabic	  suitable	  for	  pupils	  in	  Palestine	  schools	  at	  present	  exists,”	  the	  detailed	  nature	  of	  the	  
syllabus	  ensured	  that	  this	  absence	  was	  “not	  necessarily	  an	  encouragement	  to	  undesirable	  
propaganda	  by	  teachers.”	  To	  the	  contrary,	  “the	  syllabus	  for	  history,	  as	  for	  all	  other	  subjects,	  
is	  clearly	  laid	  down	  by	  the	  Department,	  and	  may	  not	  be	  altered	  by	  the	  teacher,	  whose	  notes	  
of	  lessons	  are	  always	  available	  to	  the	  Head	  of	  his	  school	  and	  to	  Inspectors.”19	  	  
That	  the	  teaching	  of	  modern	  Palestinian	  history	  was	  viewed	  as	  potentially	  seditious	  
is	  clear	  enough.	  The	  Department	  of	  Education	  vetoed	  numerous	  texts	  by	  Arab	  authors	  for	  
political	  reasons,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  no	  textbooks	  for	  these	  subjects	  were	  used	  for	  most	  of	  
the	  Mandate	  period.	  Only	  in	  the	  early	  1940s,	  and	  through	  an	  agreement	  with	  a	  “well-­‐known	  
publisher	  in	  England,”	  did	  the	  government	  take	  steps	  to	  procure	  textbooks.	  The	  publisher	  
agreed	  to	  “send	  writers	  to	  Palestine	  to	  produce	  suitable	  text-­‐books	  in	  consultation	  with	  the	  
department	  [of	  education].”	  Books	  would	  then	  be	  “translated	  locally,”	  apparently	  the	  only	  
step	  in	  the	  production	  of	  history	  texts	  that	  could	  be	  entrusted	  to	  those	  whose	  history	  was	  
being	  written!	  Commenting	  on	  this	  development,	  the	  Advisory	  Committee	  for	  Education	  in	  
the	  Colonies	  noted,	  “until	  these	  books	  become	  available	  for	  pupils	  the	  teaching	  of	  history	  
and	  geography	  in	  the	  whole	  Arab	  system	  must	  remain	  largely	  ineffective.”20	  
On	  one	  hand,	  the	  absence	  of	  textbooks	  for	  history	  and	  geography	  reflected	  the	  
Department	  of	  Education’s	  difficulty	  in	  producing	  a	  historical	  record	  freed	  from	  the	  very	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  A.G.	  Wauchope	  to	  Susan	  Lawrence,	  undated	  (May/June	  1935).	  TNA,	  CO	  733/273/5.	  	  
20	  Advisory	  Committee	  for	  Education	  in	  the	  Colonies,	  Palestine	  Sub-­‐Committee,	  undated	  draft	  chapter	  
(“Chapter	  VI:	  Education”),	  probably	  1940.	  MEC,	  Humphrey	  Bowman	  collection.	  Box	  2,	  File	  2,	  Section	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  189	  
political	  concerns	  it	  sought	  to	  exclude	  from	  the	  classroom.	  Yet,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  lack	  
of	  a	  uniform	  textbook	  may	  have	  allowed	  teachers	  even	  greater	  freedom	  in	  adding	  their	  own	  
interpretations	  of	  historical	  events	  and	  personalities	  included	  in	  the	  official	  syllabus.	  As	  
Tibawi	  claimed,	  all	  restrictions	  placed	  on	  teachers	  eventually	  proved	  ineffective.	  Teachers	  
of	  “even	  modest	  cultural	  attainments”	  were	  “so	  fired	  by	  the	  claims	  of	  nationalism	  that	  they	  
found	  no	  difficulty	  in	  circumventing	  the	  restrictions	  in	  the	  classroom.”21	  	  
Toward	  the	  end	  of	  his	  tenure	  in	  Palestine	  in	  1936,	  Humphrey	  Bowman	  seemed	  to	  
finally	  accept	  that	  his	  efforts	  to	  exclude	  “politics”	  from	  the	  classroom	  through	  regulations	  
and	  censorship	  were	  in	  vain.	  In	  this	  sense,	  his	  testimony	  before	  the	  Palestine	  Royal	  
Commission	  can	  be	  read	  as	  an	  admission	  of	  failure.	  One	  member	  of	  the	  PRC	  commission	  
inquired	  whether,	  “In	  the	  Arab	  schools	  at	  any	  stage	  have	  they	  been	  taught	  anything	  at	  all	  
about	  the	  surrounding	  Arab	  countries,	  their	  development	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  their	  having	  self-­‐
government,	  which	  would	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  stirring	  up	  pan-­‐Arabism?”	  Bowman	  responded,	  
resigned	  at	  last	  to	  the	  futility	  of	  his	  efforts,	  “I	  do	  not	  think	  anything	  in	  the	  schools	  has	  made	  
any	  difference	  in	  that	  way…because	  they	  all	  know	  it	  from	  their	  mother’s	  milk.”22	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  dreaded	  creep	  of	  “politics”	  into	  the	  classroom,	  administrators	  
hoped	  that	  religious	  education	  could	  establish	  the	  foundation	  for	  shared	  moral	  principles	  
that	  were	  aloof	  from	  the	  contemporary	  political	  turmoil.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  the	  
Director	  of	  Education	  for	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  Mandate	  period,	  “Religion	  is	  a	  full	  subject	  in	  
the	  curriculum	  and	  thus	  the	  ultimate	  basis	  of	  ethical	  values	  in	  the	  Government	  schools	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Abdul	  Latif	  Tibawi,	  "Educational	  Policy	  and	  Arab	  Nationalism	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine,"	  Die	  Welt	  des	  
Islams	  4,	  no.	  1	  (1955):	  18.	  
22	  "Testimony	  of	  	  Mr.	  H.	  E.	  Bowman,	  C.M.G.,	  C.B.E.,	  Director	  of	  Education.	  November	  27,	  1936."	  An	  
extended	  transcript	  of	  Bowman’s	  testimony,	  including	  that	  from	  the	  Commission’s	  private	  sessions,	  
can	  be	  found	  in	  his	  personal	  papers.	  MEC,	  Humphrey	  Bowman	  collection.	  Box	  2,	  File	  2.	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common	  to	  Islam	  and	  to	  Christianity.”	  23	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  educators	  found	  the	  existing	  
systems	  of	  religious	  education,	  particularly	  among	  the	  Muslim	  population,	  as	  worthy	  of	  
preservation.	  The	  goal	  was	  rather	  to	  reconstitute	  existing	  forms	  of	  religious	  education	  to	  
accommodate	  the	  contradictory	  demands	  that	  schooling	  both	  nurture	  the	  “traditional”	  
order	  and	  support	  the	  introduction	  of	  new	  technical	  skills	  geared	  for	  Palestine’s	  changing	  
economy.	  	  
The	  “new”	  Arab	  public	  schools	  therefore	  reflected	  an	  ambivalent	  relationship	  with	  
existing	  institutions	  of	  religious	  education.	  Rural	  schools	  in	  particular	  were	  anchored	  by	  
subjects	  that	  were	  commonly	  found	  in	  the	  katātīb	  they	  were	  meant	  to	  supersede:	  namely,	  
Arabic,	  religious	  instruction,	  and	  Arithmetic.24	  However,	  there	  was	  much	  about	  customary	  
forms	  of	  Islamic	  schooling	  that	  were	  deemed	  archaic,	  misdirected	  or	  pedagogically	  
unsound.	  The	  katātīb	  were	  therefore	  a	  favorite	  target	  of	  colonial	  administrators	  and	  
Palestinians	  alike.	  The	  Department	  of	  Education	  characterized	  these	  schools	  as	  “old-­‐
fashioned	  and	  often	  inefficient”	  institutions	  in	  which	  “the	  standard	  in	  most	  remains	  rather	  
low.”	  25	  Anecdotal	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  Palestinian	  Arabs	  were	  similarly	  dissatisfied	  with	  
the	  state	  of	  rural	  schooling,	  and	  particularly	  with	  the	  village	  teacher.	  Even	  before	  the	  First	  
World	  War,	  letters	  in	  the	  burgeoning	  national	  press	  lamented	  that	  the	  village	  teacher	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  “Notes	  on	  Jewish	  Education	  and	  the	  McNair	  Report.”	  November	  30,	  1946.	  
CO/733/476/2.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/476/2.	  Section	  22.	  
24	  The	  matter	  was	  further	  complicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  “new”	  public	  schools	  were	  actually	  
katātīb	  that	  had	  been	  absorbed	  into	  the	  Government	  system	  through	  the	  extension	  of	  grants-­‐in-­‐aid.	  
Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  27.	  	  
25	  This	  characterization	  of	  katātīb	  remained	  consistent	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Education’s	  Annual	  
Reports	  throughout	  the	  Mandate	  period.	  Compare,	  for	  instance,	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  Department	  
of	  Education.	  Annual	  Report,	  1925-­‐26,	  1940-­‐41	  and	  1945-­‐46.	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“more	  ignorant	  than	  Hubnaqa,”	  and	  “the	  germ	  of	  every	  evil	  and	  the	  source	  of	  all	  
corruption.”26	  	  
One	  way	  of	  differentiating	  new	  village	  schools	  from	  their	  former	  selves	  came	  in	  the	  
manner	  in	  which	  “traditional”	  subjects	  were	  taught.	  The	  new	  directives	  shied	  away	  from	  
memorization,	  which	  was	  thought	  to	  come	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  true	  comprehension,	  and	  
instead	  aimed	  to	  develop	  the	  child’s	  “facility	  for	  and	  a	  habit	  of	  rapid	  silent	  reading.”27	  Oral	  
recitation	  and	  memorization	  were	  to	  be	  used	  only	  sparingly	  in	  teaching	  religious	  subjects,	  
and	  expunged	  from	  all	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  new	  curriculum.	  	  
Additionally,	  the	  subjects	  learned	  in	  the	  kuttāb	  were	  seemingly	  devoid	  of	  practical	  
application	  and	  indeed,	  an	  over-­‐exposure	  to	  religious	  texts	  was	  thought	  to	  produce	  
children	  who	  were	  alienated	  from	  the	  necessities	  of	  village	  life.	  The	  Palestinian	  educator,	  
Khalil	  Totah,	  offered	  the	  anecdote	  of	  overhearing	  a	  peasant	  exclaim,	  “What!	  Do	  you	  expect	  
my	  son	  to	  work—he	  can	  read!”	  Echoing	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  the	  British	  administrators,	  Totah	  
identified	  this	  alleged	  distaste	  for	  “practical	  education”	  to	  be	  at	  “the	  crux	  of	  the	  educational	  
problem	  in	  the	  Holy	  Land,	  where	  education,	  elementary	  as	  it	  is,	  seems	  incompatible	  with	  
manual	  work.”28	  Without	  addressing	  the	  agricultural	  basis	  of	  village	  life,	  the	  customary	  
curriculum	  would	  do	  nothing	  to	  remedy	  the	  economic	  hardship	  that	  propelled	  urban	  drift.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Suleiman	  Beidas,	  "Al-­‐ta'lim	  fi	  al-­‐Qurah,"	  Filistin,	  16	  Tamuz	  1911	  The	  figure	  of	  Hubnaqa	  is	  allegedly	  
based	  on	  the	  example	  of	  Yazid	  ben	  Thurwan,	  and	  has	  for	  centuries	  served	  as	  a	  model	  for	  foolishness	  
and	  stupidity.	  The	  medieval	  writer,	  Ibn	  al-­‐Jawzi,	  immortalized	  the	  figure	  of	  Hubnaqa	  and	  his	  follies	  
by	  featuring	  him	  in	  his	  Akhbar	  al-­‐hamqa	  wa	  al-­‐mughallafin	  [Annals	  of	  fools	  and	  the	  uncivilized	  
(literally,	  uncircumcised)].	  	  
27	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  Department	  of	  Education,	  Elementary	  School	  Syllabus,	  Revised	  Edition	  ed.	  
(Jerusalem	  1925),	  10.	  
28	  Totah,	  "Education	  in	  Palestine,"	  165.	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Thus,	  to	  the	  usual	  subjects	  were	  added	  geography,	  nature	  study,	  history,	  hygiene,	  drawing,	  
and	  agricultural	  and	  manual	  work.29	  	  
However,	  the	  introduction	  of	  new	  subjects	  into	  the	  curriculum	  was	  arguably	  less	  
significant	  than	  the	  divisions	  created	  between	  existing	  types	  of	  knowledge.	  The	  syllabus	  in	  
fact	  reflected	  an	  effort	  to	  remove	  “religion”	  from	  sites	  it	  formerly	  seemed	  to	  subsume:	  
among	  them	  were	  the	  Arabic	  language,	  the	  historical	  record	  and	  the	  human	  body.	  One	  
consequence	  of	  this	  contraction	  of	  “religious”	  topics	  was	  that	  it	  largely	  freed	  religious	  
education	  from	  matters	  concerning	  material	  relations	  or	  the	  political	  order.	  Such	  
instruction	  could	  therefore	  be	  reconstituted	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  “universal”	  code	  of	  individual	  
ethics.	  To	  understand	  this	  shift,	  and	  the	  tensions	  it	  generated,	  we	  must	  look	  not	  merely	  at	  
the	  government	  curriculum	  for	  religious	  instruction,	  but	  what	  was	  newly	  excluded	  from	  the	  
category	  of	  religion	  itself.	  
	  The	  Government	  of	  Palestine’s	  official	  syllabus	  for	  town	  and	  village	  schools,	  based	  
largely	  on	  the	  Egyptian	  model,	  was	  first	  published	  in	  1921.	  It	  included	  detailed	  instructions	  
regarding	  the	  number	  of	  hours	  devoted	  to	  each	  subject	  in	  each	  grade,	  the	  topics	  to	  be	  
covered	  therein,	  and	  additional	  directions	  to	  teachers	  regarding	  the	  proper	  conduct	  of	  
students.	  For	  instance,	  “During	  the	  intervals	  between	  classes,	  boys	  should	  be	  encouraged	  to	  
run	  about	  as	  much	  as	  possible,	  or	  take	  part	  in	  easily-­‐organised	  games.	  Books	  should	  not	  
be	  taken	  into	  the	  playground”	  [original	  emphasis].30	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  Department	  of	  Education,	  "Syllabus	  for	  State	  Elementary	  Schools	  for	  Boys	  
in	  Towns	  and	  Villages,"	  (Jerusalem	  1921),	  6.	  On	  the	  mixed	  record	  of	  the	  DOE	  in	  implementing	  
agricultural	  training	  in	  schools,	  see	  Miller,	  Government	  and	  Society	  in	  Rural	  Palestine	  1920-­‐1948:	  108-­‐
12.;	  and	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  
administration:	  235-­‐38.	  
30	  Department	  of	  Education,	  "Syllabus	  for	  State	  Elementary	  Schools	  for	  Boys	  in	  Towns	  and	  Villages,"	  
6.	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The	  Arabic	  language,	  which	  had	  historically	  been	  a	  core	  subject	  of	  study	  within	  the	  
kuttāb	  and	  madrasa	  (and	  indeed,	  many	  of	  the	  great	  treatises	  on	  the	  Arabic	  language	  were	  
published	  by	  Muslim	  theologians),	  was	  now	  treated	  as	  distinct	  subject	  that	  aimed	  at	  the	  
attainment	  of	  permanent	  literacy.31	  Further	  departing	  from	  the	  traditional	  order	  of	  the	  
kuttāb,	  the	  1925	  version	  of	  the	  syllabus	  stated	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  Arabic	  language	  instruction	  
was	  to	  develop	  interest	  in	  classical	  and	  modern	  Arabic	  literature.	  Memorization	  was	  to	  be	  
avoided,	  and	  “vulgarisms	  and	  provincialisms	  in	  pronunciation,	  grammar	  and	  vocabulary	  
must	  be	  carefully	  eradicated.”32	  Interestingly,	  memorization	  was	  allowed	  within	  the	  
context	  of	  religious	  education,	  but	  “vulgarisms”	  were	  similarly	  discouraged:	  thus	  “the	  
Qur’an	  should	  be	  memorized	  perfectly	  and	  read	  with	  the	  intonation	  practiced	  by	  the	  early	  
Moslems,”	  a	  feat	  which	  required	  that	  “the	  affected	  method	  of	  reading	  the	  Qur’an	  followed	  in	  
the	  old	  maktabs	  [katātīb]	  should	  be	  discarded.”33	  In	  this	  instance,	  modernization	  came	  to	  
depend	  precisely	  on	  abandoning	  contemporary	  practices	  in	  favor	  of	  reconstructed—and	  
supposedly	  more	  authentic—classical	  models.	  
The	  revival	  of	  the	  Arab	  national	  spirit	  had	  been	  a	  familiar	  trope	  in	  British	  
intellectual	  circles,	  and	  the	  purging	  of	  “correct”	  Arabic	  of	  its	  colloquial	  corruptions	  was	  a	  
natural	  extension	  of	  this	  narrative.34	  This	  argument	  was	  not	  merely	  a	  colonial	  creation,	  but	  
rather	  formed	  a	  crucial	  component	  of	  the	  Arab	  nahḍa,	  in	  which	  intellectuals	  scorned	  Arabic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  The	  acquisition	  of	  permanent	  literacy	  was	  a	  primary	  goal	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Education.	  See,	  for	  
example,	  "Testimony	  of	  	  Mr.	  H.	  E.	  Bowman,	  C.M.G.,	  C.B.E.,	  Director	  of	  Education.	  November	  27,	  1936."	  	  
32	  ———,	  Elementary	  School	  Syllabus:	  8-­‐9.	  
33	  ———,	  "Syllabus	  for	  State	  Elementary	  Schools	  for	  Boys	  in	  Towns	  and	  Villages,"	  32.	  
34	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  advocates	  of	  Islamic	  revival	  argued	  that	  the	  return	  of	  the	  caliphate	  to	  Arab	  hands	  
was	  crucial	  to	  restoring	  Islam’s	  former	  grandeur.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Wilfred	  Scawen	  Blunt,	  The	  Future	  
of	  Islam	  	  (London:	  Paul,	  1882).	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dialects	  and	  demanded	  that	  the	  new	  Arabic	  literature	  be	  produced	  in	  fuṣḥa.35	  In	  effect,	  the	  
government	  syllabus	  seems	  to	  have	  echoed	  attempts	  by	  contemporary	  Arab	  intellectuals	  to	  
construct	  a	  national-­‐linguistic	  heritage	  that	  predated,	  and	  was	  distinct	  from,	  an	  Islamic	  
religious	  context.	  That	  this	  emphasis	  on	  Arabic	  as	  the	  carrier	  of	  national	  identity	  was	  not	  
deemed	  incompatible	  with	  the	  effort	  to	  keep	  national	  politics	  at	  bay	  points	  again	  at	  the	  
colonial	  attempt	  to	  demarcate	  appropriate	  educational	  goals	  (instilling	  a	  “healthy	  national	  
feeling”)	  from	  inappropriate	  ones	  (“hysterical	  racial	  pride”).	  	  
Continuing	  our	  discussion	  of	  the	  curricular	  distinctions	  reflected	  in	  the	  syllabus,	  
Hygiene	  represents	  a	  subject	  that	  could	  have	  quite	  easily	  been	  subsumed	  under	  the	  
category	  of	  religious	  education.	  Indeed,	  children	  did	  study	  “practical	  knowledge	  of	  the	  
principles	  of	  ablutions”	  as	  part	  of	  the	  class	  dedicated	  to	  Islamic	  religious	  instruction.36	  
However,	  in	  treating	  hygiene	  as	  a	  distinct	  component	  of	  the	  syllabus,	  the	  curriculum	  
indicated	  that	  these	  practices	  were	  not	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  part	  of	  a	  particular	  religious	  
ritual,	  but	  rather,	  as	  universal	  norms	  grounded	  in	  scientific	  objectivity.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  
hygiene	  as	  a	  school	  subject	  also	  reflected	  the	  larger	  trend	  whereby	  everyday	  rural	  activities	  
were	  transformed	  into	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  that	  were	  only	  acquired	  by	  removing	  the	  child	  
from	  the	  home	  in	  which	  they	  were	  usually	  learned.	  This	  was	  true	  not	  merely	  of	  hygiene,	  but	  
also	  of	  poultry	  keeping,	  agricultural	  work,	  or	  embroidery	  (in	  girls’	  schools)—skills	  with	  
which	  no	  child	  in	  rural	  Palestine	  was	  truly	  unfamiliar.	  As	  I	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  Two,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  For	  example,	  after	  the	  publication	  of	  Zaynab	  in	  1913,	  widely	  considered	  the	  first	  modern	  Arabic	  
novel,	  Taha	  Hussein	  lamented	  its	  use	  of	  colloquial	  Arabic	  for	  dialogue,	  noting	  that	  the	  colloquial	  was	  
not	  “a	  suitable	  instrument	  for	  mutual	  understanding	  and	  a	  method	  for	  realizing	  the	  various	  goals	  of	  
our	  intellectual	  life.”	  Quoted	  in	  Roger	  Allen,	  The	  Arabic	  Novel:	  an	  historical	  and	  critical	  introduction	  	  
(Manchester:	  University	  of	  Manchester,	  1982),	  35.	  	  
36	  Department	  of	  Education,	  Elementary	  School	  Syllabus:	  72.	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result	  was	  an	  educational	  paradigm	  in	  which	  corrupt	  village	  conditions	  were	  thought	  to	  
necessitate	  the	  academic	  training	  of	  children	  in	  an	  idealized	  “traditional”	  life.	  	  
However	  noteworthy	  were	  these	  curricular	  innovations,	  it	  is	  by	  comparing	  syllabi	  
for	  Islamic	  religious	  instruction	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  history	  on	  the	  other,	  that	  the	  approach	  to	  
religion	  as	  a	  distinct	  category	  of	  personal	  experience	  becomes	  most	  apparent.	  In	  this	  sense,	  
the	  curriculum	  offers	  a	  rich	  site	  for	  analyzing,	  in	  Talal	  Asad’s	  words,	  ““How,	  when,	  and	  by	  
whom	  are	  the	  categories	  of	  religion	  and	  the	  secular	  defined”	  and	  “What	  assumptions	  are	  
presupposed	  in	  the	  acts	  that	  define	  them?”37	  It	  is	  to	  these	  questions	  that	  we	  now	  turn.	  
	  
Boundary	  Making:	  On	  secular	  time	  and	  sacred	  virtues	  
	  
Emerging	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  kuttāb	  and	  its	  undifferentiated	  curriculum	  in	  
which	  reading,	  writing	  and	  tales	  from	  the	  past	  were	  inseparable	  parts	  of	  learning	  the	  
Qur’an,	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System	  claimed	  to	  offer	  a	  new	  and	  improved	  form	  of	  education.	  As	  I	  
have	  argued,	  in	  addition	  to	  introducing	  new	  topics—say,	  Themistocles	  and	  the	  battles	  of	  
Artemisium	  and	  Salamis	  in	  the	  history	  curriculum—the	  syllabus	  repackaged	  existing	  forms	  
of	  knowledge	  into	  new	  categories,	  and	  expanded	  the	  realm	  of	  subject	  matter	  to	  include	  
“practical”	  knowledge	  that	  was	  formerly	  acquired	  through	  everyday	  living.	  	  
As	  numerous	  authors	  have	  noted,	  the	  teaching	  of	  history	  and	  geography	  in	  Arab	  
public	  schools	  constituted	  a	  continual	  source	  of	  tension	  between	  the	  Department	  of	  
Education	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  Arab	  public.	  Palestinian	  nationalists	  regarded	  the	  
government	  curriculum	  as	  a	  classic	  colonial	  attempt	  to	  obviate	  the	  identity	  formation	  of	  the	  
Arab	  child	  by	  turning	  his	  attention	  to	  foreign	  events	  while	  simultaneously	  neglecting	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Asad,	  Formations	  of	  the	  Secular:	  Christianity,	  Islam,	  Modernity:	  201.	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history	  of	  modern	  Palestine.38	  There	  is	  certainly	  an	  element	  of	  truth	  to	  this	  claim,	  though	  it	  
does	  not	  fully	  capture	  the	  matrix	  within	  which	  these	  curricular	  decisions	  operated,	  how	  the	  
boundaries	  between	  sacred	  and	  secular	  events	  were	  established,	  and	  what	  significance	  was	  
attached	  to	  each.	  
The	  general	  structure	  of	  the	  new	  history	  curriculum	  narrated	  a	  teleological	  story	  at	  
whose	  apex	  sat	  European	  modernity,	  its	  commercial	  triumphs,	  scientific	  advancements	  and	  
political	  conquests.	  Thus	  the	  child	  may	  study	  figures	  from	  the	  Arab	  past	  in	  classes	  devoted	  
to	  ancient	  or	  medieval	  history,	  but	  modernity	  as	  a	  historical	  period	  was	  reserved	  almost	  
exclusively	  for	  European	  (and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  North	  American)	  developments.	  The	  
second	  class,	  for	  instance,	  included	  the	  following	  topics	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  “modern	  
history:”	  Columbus;	  Drake,	  his	  voyage	  round	  the	  world;	  Cromwell	  and	  the	  struggle	  
between	  King	  and	  Parliament;	  Watt	  Stephenson	  and	  the	  invention	  of	  the	  steam	  engine;	  
William	  Wilberforce	  and	  the	  abolition	  of	  slavery	  in	  British	  domains;	  Napoleon;	  Nelson,	  the	  
battle	  of	  the	  Nile;	  Gordon,	  and	  the	  suppression	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  in	  the	  Sudan.39	  To	  the	  
extent	  that	  lands	  outside	  of	  the	  Euro-­‐American	  context	  appeared,	  it	  was	  as	  objects	  of	  
colonial	  conquest	  and,	  as	  the	  Sudanese	  example	  above	  suggests,	  improvement.	  	  
Yet,	  as	  indicated	  above,	  the	  curriculum	  was	  not	  totally	  bereft	  of	  Arab	  historical	  
figures	  or	  events.	  For	  instance,	  teachers	  were	  given	  a	  list	  of	  “great	  men”	  whose	  biographies	  
formed	  the	  basis	  of	  lessons,	  particularly	  in	  the	  lower	  grades.	  They	  included	  “the	  principal	  
characters	  in	  Bible	  history,”	  Socrates,	  Josephus,	  the	  rightly	  guided	  Caliphs,	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Malik	  ibn	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  According	  to	  Tibawi’s	  account,	  Arab	  nationalists	  never	  ceased	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  History	  syllabus	  
“insisted	  in	  its	  content	  and	  tone	  on	  the	  international	  rather	  than	  the	  national	  character	  of	  Palestine.”	  
Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  88.	  
More	  recently,	  Rashid	  Khalidi	  has	  pointed	  to	  this	  fact	  (and	  the	  educational	  structure	  as	  a	  whole)	  as	  
being	  partially	  responsible	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  Palestinian	  state	  formation	  during	  the	  Mandate	  period	  and	  
in	  the	  years	  following.	  See:	  Khalidi,	  The	  Iron	  Cage:	  the	  story	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  struggle	  for	  statehood.	  
39	  Elementary	  school	  syllabus,	  Rev.	  ed.	  (Jerusalem,	  1925),	  37.	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al-­‐Marwan,	  Harun	  al-­‐Rashid,	  Charlemagne,	  al-­‐Ghazali,	  Richard	  the	  Lionheart,	  Salah	  al-­‐Din	  
al-­‐Ayyubi,	  Christopher	  Columbus,	  Napoleon	  and	  Ibrahim	  Pasha,	  to	  give	  only	  a	  very	  small	  
sampling.40	  There	  are	  two	  questions	  we	  must	  therefore	  address:	  first,	  if	  Arab	  history	  was	  
not	  actually	  excluded	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  has	  been	  suggested,	  what	  topics	  were	  fit	  for	  
inclusion	  and	  why?	  Second,	  how	  did	  caliphs	  and	  jurists	  come	  to	  be	  included	  in	  “secular”	  
history	  rather	  than	  within	  religious	  instruction,	  and	  what	  were	  the	  interpretive	  
consequences	  of	  this	  shift?	  	  
On	  one	  hand,	  the	  figures	  and	  events	  deemed	  worthy	  of	  inclusion	  function	  as	  
milestones	  within	  an	  unbroken	  chain	  of	  Arab	  national	  heritage	  extending	  back	  to	  pre-­‐
Islamic	  times:	  the	  Jahaliya	  poets	  Hatim	  al-­‐Ta’i	  and	  ‘Amr	  ibn	  Madi	  Karib	  initiate	  a	  
chronology	  that	  includes	  the	  rightly	  guided	  caliphs,	  great	  military	  heroes	  (Khalid	  ibn	  al-­‐
Walid,	  Tariq	  ibn	  Ziyad,	  Jawhar	  al-­‐Siqilli,	  Salah	  al-­‐Din),	  renowned	  artists	  and	  scholars	  (al-­‐
Shafi‘i,	  al-­‐Farabi,	  al-­‐Ghazali,	  al-­‐Mutanabbi),	  and	  culminates	  in	  19th	  century	  reformers	  
(Muhammad	  ‘Ali,	  Ibrahim	  Pasha,	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Qadir	  al-­‐Jaza’iri).	  This	  was	  by	  now	  a	  familiar	  
narrative,	  one	  that	  found	  its	  first	  modern	  articulation	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  figures	  associated	  
with	  the	  Arab	  nahḍa	  before	  its	  adoption	  by	  Arab	  nationalist	  thinkers.	  It	  is	  therefore	  not	  
surprising	  to	  find	  a	  similar	  version	  of	  this	  chronology	  within	  history	  textbooks	  written	  by	  
Palestinian	  nationalist	  educators,	  such	  as	  those	  by	  Muhammad	  ‘Izzat	  Darwaza.41	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Department	  of	  Education,	  Elementary	  School	  Syllabus:	  30-­‐37.	  As	  this	  list	  suggests,	  the	  syllabus	  was	  
entirely	  devoid	  of	  great	  women,	  though	  this	  was	  interestingly	  not	  the	  case	  in	  curricular	  materials	  
prepared	  by	  ‘Izzat	  Darwaza,	  who	  I	  discuss	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  His	  Arab	  history	  textbook	  included	  a	  
discussion	  of	  Khula	  bint	  al-­‐Azwar,	  who	  led	  a	  group	  of	  women	  in	  the	  battle	  of	  Yarmouk,	  and	  invited	  
students	  to	  compare	  her	  heroic	  deeds	  with	  the	  lowly	  condition	  of	  Muslim	  women	  in	  their	  day.	  
Darwaza,	  durūs	  al-­‐tārikh	  al-­‐'arabi	  min	  aqdam	  al-­‐azmina	  ila	  al-­‐ān	  95.	  
41	  See,	  for	  example,	  ———,	  durūs	  al-­‐tārikh	  al-­‐'arabi	  min	  aqdam	  al-­‐azmina	  ila	  al-­‐ān	  	  Darwaza	  served	  
as	  principal	  of	  the	  Najah	  school	  in	  Nablus	  from	  1922-­‐1927.	  He	  was	  later	  one	  of	  the	  founding	  
members	  of	  the	  Istiqlal	  nationalist	  party.	  For	  more	  on	  Darwaza’s	  political	  activities,	  see	  Weldon	  C.	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Thus,	  it	  is	  not	  that	  Arab	  history	  was	  entirely	  neglected.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  figures	  from	  
the	  Arab	  classical	  heritage	  commanded	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  attention.	  What	  was	  neglected,	  
however,	  was	  contemporary	  Arab	  history	  as	  seen	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  national	  revival,	  
foreign	  betrayal	  and	  colonial	  conquest.	  For	  instance,	  while	  the	  government	  syllabus	  and	  
‘Izzat	  Darwaza’s	  nationalist	  textbook	  both	  concluded	  with	  lessons	  on	  “The	  Great	  War	  and	  
its	  results	  in	  the	  Arab	  land”	  (“al-­‐	  ḥarb	  al-­‐kubra	  wa	  atharuha	  fi	  al-­‐bilād	  al-­‐‘arabiya”	  in	  
Darwaza’s	  text,	  suggesting	  a	  rather	  literal	  mirroring	  of	  the	  government	  curriculum),	  the	  
content	  of	  those	  lessons	  were	  quite	  different.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  topical	  similarities	  between	  
these	  two,	  allegedly	  oppositional,	  history	  curricula	  gesture	  at	  one	  of	  the	  great	  
contradictions	  of	  the	  Mandatory	  government’s	  educational	  planning:	  students	  were	  
expected	  to	  gain	  the	  literary	  skills	  required	  to	  appreciate	  classical	  and	  modern	  Arabic	  
literature,	  and	  to	  deduce	  moral	  lessons	  from	  the	  great	  military	  and	  political	  heroes	  of	  the	  
Arab	  past,	  but	  were	  to	  avoid	  relating	  to	  this	  knowledge	  as	  a	  source	  of	  inspiration	  for	  their	  
modern	  political	  identities.	  	  	  
As	  indicated	  by	  the	  list	  of	  “great	  men”	  above,	  the	  child’s	  first	  introduction	  to	  history	  
was	  a	  mixed	  one	  in	  many	  ways.	  It	  included	  both	  Arab	  and	  foreign	  figures,	  taken	  from	  both	  
sacred	  and	  secular	  settings.	  Here	  Biblical	  figures	  could	  inhabit	  the	  same	  historical	  space	  as	  
al-­‐Shafi‘i	  and	  King	  Alfred.	  It	  was	  not	  merely	  figures	  from	  the	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  tradition	  that	  
found	  their	  way	  into	  the	  syllabus,	  as	  intermediate	  classes	  covered	  the	  family	  of	  
Muhammad,	  “his	  mission	  and	  life	  in	  detail,”	  the	  spread	  of	  Islam	  and	  the	  decay	  of	  the	  
Caliphate.42	  This	  removal	  of	  characters	  and	  events	  from	  the	  annals	  of	  sacred	  history	  can	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Matthews,	  Confronting	  an	  Empire,	  Constructing	  a	  Nation:	  Arab	  Nationalists	  and	  Popular	  Politics	  in	  
Mandate	  Palestine	  	  (London	  and	  New	  York:	  I.B.	  Tauris	  2006).	  
42	  Department	  of	  Education,	  Elementary	  School	  Syllabus:	  40-­‐41.	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read	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  naturalize	  the	  historical	  record,	  wherein	  the	  rapid	  spread	  of	  Islam,	  
for	  example,	  is	  attributable	  to	  the	  “organisation	  of	  the	  Arab	  Empire”	  and	  its	  “fiscal	  system,”	  
rather	  than	  divine	  providence.43	  Similarly,	  lessons	  should	  stress	  “the	  effect	  of	  climate,	  
physical	  conditions,	  means	  of	  communications,	  and	  environment	  on	  the	  development	  of	  
the	  different	  races.”44	  What	  is	  evident	  from	  this	  example	  is	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  Islamic	  
history	  into	  discrete	  ethical	  and	  political	  components,	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  in	  the	  contexts	  of	  
religious	  instruction	  and	  secular	  history,	  respectively.	  As	  such,	  the	  history	  curriculum	  
posited	  a	  new	  interpretive	  framework	  for	  explaining	  familiar	  episodes	  from	  the	  human	  
past.	  What	  occurred	  within	  the	  “old-­‐fashioned”	  kuttāb,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  not	  genuine	  
history,	  perhaps	  less	  on	  account	  of	  what	  was	  studied	  than	  because	  of	  how	  the	  march	  of	  
time	  was	  encountered	  and	  explained.	  	  
With	  overtly	  “religious”	  leaders	  relegated	  to	  the	  ancient	  and	  medieval	  periods,	  and	  
naturalistic	  explanations	  provided	  even	  to	  explain	  even	  the	  most	  theologically	  charged	  
events,	  historical	  time	  is	  doubly	  purged	  of	  the	  political-­‐theological	  mingling	  that	  European	  
modernity	  deemed	  unacceptable.	  Following	  Latour,	  we	  might	  characterize	  this	  as	  an	  act	  of	  
“purification”	  that	  distinguishes	  secular	  and	  sacred	  discourses	  of	  the	  past,	  while,	  we	  might	  
suspect,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  facilitating	  the	  violation	  of	  that	  very	  same	  boundary.45	  Yet	  we	  
should	  not	  conflate	  the	  creation	  of	  this	  new	  discursive	  framework	  with	  a	  broader	  attempt	  
to	  promote	  secularism	  as	  an	  ideological	  framework.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  religious	  institutional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Elementary	  school	  syllabus:	  40.	  
44	  ———,	  "Syllabus	  for	  State	  Elementary	  Schools	  for	  Boys	  in	  Towns	  and	  Villages,"	  16.	  
45	  Latour,	  We	  have	  never	  been	  modern.	  For	  an	  analysis	  of	  historical	  positivism	  and	  its	  theological	  
points	  of	  reference,	  see:	  Karl	  Lowith,	  Meaning	  in	  History	  	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  
1949).	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networks	  and	  interpretive	  structures	  still	  had	  much	  work	  to	  do	  in	  Palestine.	  A	  closer	  look	  
at	  the	  syllabus	  for	  religious	  instruction	  will	  help	  illustrate	  this	  argument.	  	  
Within	  rural	  schools,	  “Mohammedan”	  (in	  the	  1921	  syllabus)	  or	  “Moslem	  Religious	  
Instruction”	  (in	  the	  revised	  1925	  version)	  commanded	  a	  relatively	  large	  share	  of	  the	  
weekly	  school	  hours,	  topped	  only	  by	  the	  extensive	  time	  spent	  on	  the	  Arabic	  language.46	  In	  
order	  to	  assuage	  the	  Muslim	  population	  “that	  the	  importance	  they	  always	  attached	  to	  the	  
moral	  and	  religious	  basis	  of	  education	  was	  not	  to	  be	  neglected,”	  the	  curriculum	  for	  
religious	  education	  was	  created	  by	  a	  “classical	  scholar	  of	  well-­‐established	  reputation	  in	  the	  
Arab	  world.”47	  This	  scholar	  was	  most	  likely	  Sheikh	  Hussam	  al-­‐Din	  Jarallah,	  who	  tied	  in	  the	  
election	  for	  Grand	  Mufti	  before	  the	  British	  enshrined	  Hajj	  Amin	  al-­‐Husseini	  in	  the	  
position.48	  Jarallah	  held	  a	  number	  of	  official	  posts	  beginning	  under	  the	  military	  government	  
in	  1917.	  He	  served	  as	  the	  chief	  clerk	  for	  the	  shari‘a	  courts,	  a	  district	  inspector	  for	  the	  
Department	  of	  Education,	  and	  was	  even	  seconded	  to	  Trans-­‐Jordan	  to	  assume	  a	  position	  as	  
the	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  in	  1926.	  He	  later	  returned	  to	  Palestine	  where	  he	  continued	  to	  hold	  
positions	  within	  the	  shari‘a	  courts	  and	  served	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  awqaf	  commission.49	  
Following	  the	  Jordanian	  occupation	  in	  1948,	  King	  Abdullah	  appointed	  Sheikh	  Jarallah	  as	  
Chief	  Qadi	  and	  Mufti	  of	  Jerusalem,	  supplanting	  his	  long-­‐time	  rival.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  In	  the	  first	  two	  grades,	  students	  spent	  five	  hours	  a	  week	  on	  religious	  instruction,	  five	  hours	  on	  
arithmetic,	  and	  a	  whopping	  14	  hours	  on	  Arabic,	  out	  of	  a	  total	  30	  hours	  in	  school	  each	  week.	  In	  grades	  
3	  and	  4,	  religious	  instruction	  commanded	  four	  hours,	  which	  was	  further	  reduced	  to	  thee	  hours	  in	  the	  
final	  two	  years.	  Department	  of	  Education,	  "Syllabus	  for	  State	  Elementary	  Schools	  for	  Boys	  in	  Towns	  
and	  Villages,"	  6.	  
47	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  
149.	  
48	  See	  “Hassam	  al-­‐Din	  Jarallah”	  in	  Hamada,	  A'lām	  filasṭīn	  min	  al-­‐qurn	  al-­‐awal	  hata	  al-­‐khāmis	  'ashar:	  
133-­‐34.	  On	  the	  elections	  to	  chose	  the	  Grand	  Mufti,	  see:	  Al-­‐Hout,	  al-­‐qiyādāt	  wa	  al-­‐mu'assassāt	  al-­‐
siyāsiya	  fi	  filasṭīn	  1917-­‐1948:	  203-­‐05.	  
49	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  Civil	  Service	  List	  1939,	  Revised	  to	  1st	  January	  1939.	  Alexandria,	  Whitehead	  
Morris	  Limited	  1939.	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Jarallah	  was	  a	  modernist	  scholar	  and	  former	  student	  of	  Muhammad	  ‘Abduh.	  While	  
no	  writings	  of	  Jarallah’s	  have	  been	  published,	  we	  can	  glean	  some	  information	  about	  his	  
views	  from	  an	  interview	  with	  his	  daughter,	  Sa‘ida.50	  She	  remembers	  her	  father	  as	  a	  
progressive	  figure	  among	  Palestine’s	  ‘ulema	  who	  believed	  strongly	  in	  the	  education	  of	  
women.	  He	  sent	  Sa‘ida	  to	  Schmidt’s	  College,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  a	  Catholic	  
institution,	  and	  then	  to	  the	  Women’s	  Training	  College.	  In	  1938-­‐1939,	  he	  sent	  her—alone—
to	  continue	  her	  studies	  in	  England,	  a	  decision	  that	  apparently	  generated	  no	  small	  share	  of	  
controversy.	  Further	  stressing	  her	  father’s	  progressive	  credentials,	  Sa‘ida	  recounted	  the	  
following	  anecdote	  that	  occurred	  following	  the	  1948	  war:	  	  	  
I	  remember	  one	  time	  there	  was	  a	  big	  feast	  and	  King	  Abdallah	  was	  attending.	  One	  of	  
the	  people	  told	  the	  king	  that	  Shaykh	  Hussam	  teaches	  his	  daughters	  how	  to	  play	  the	  
piano	   and	   sends	   his	   daughters	   to	   foreign	   schools.	  My	   father	   stood	   in	   front	   of	   the	  
king	  and	  cited	  some	  of	  the	  Prophet's	  sayings	  about	  education	  and	  culture	  in	  front	  of	  
everybody.	   He	   told	   him	   that	   the	   prophet	   said	   "you	   should	   pursue	   your	   education	  
even	   if	   it	   takes	   you	   to	   China"—	   and	   that	   education	   was	   a	   requirement	   for	   every	  
Muslim	  man	  and	  woman.	  We	  were	  the	  first	  to	  go	  to	  Zion	  (shorthand	  for	  Dames	  de	  
Sion,	  a	  girls'	  school)	  in	  a	  boarding	  school	  and	  the	  first	  to	  learn	  to	  play	  the	  piano.	  This	  
was	  very	  difficult	  sixty	  or	  seventy	  years	  ago.	  Muslims	  were	  very	  strict	  those	  days.51	  	  
	  
Even	  if	  Sheikh	  Jarallah	  was	  not	  the	  “classical	  scholar”	  referred	  to	  in	  Tibawi’s	  account,	  we	  
can	  nonetheless	  detect	  numerous	  traces	  of	  Islamic	  modernism	  in	  the	  curriculum	  that	  are	  
reminiscent	  of	  reforms	  proposed	  in	  Muhammad	  ‘Abduh’s	  letter	  to	  the	  Sheikh	  al-­‐Islam,	  
analyzed	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  shift	  away	  from	  memorization,	  the	  curriculum	  
stressed	  uniformity	  in	  religious	  studies,	  the	  linkage	  of	  ritual	  practice	  to	  symbolic	  meaning,	  
and	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  as	  a	  source	  for	  religious	  guidance.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  Ellen	  Fleischmann	  interviewed	  Sa’ida	  Jarallah	  in	  1994	  while	  researching	  the	  Palestinian	  women’s	  




Given	  the	  popularity	  of	  “Protestant”	  approaches	  to	  Islam	  within	  reformist	  circles	  of	  
the	  late	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  centuries,	  it	  should	  serve	  as	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  Qur’an	  served	  
as	  the	  center	  of	  religious	  education	  in	  government	  schools.	  “The	  Qur’an	  should	  be	  the	  
source	  of	  authority	  in	  deducing	  doctrines,	  ritual,	  moral	  axioms,	  and	  civil	  transactions.”52	  
The	  Qur’an	  and	  sunna	  functioned	  as	  the	  vessels	  for	  the	  transmission	  of	  these	  virtues,	  as	  it	  
was	  through	  the	  moral	  exemplars	  contained	  therein	  that	  the	  child	  acquired	  “fear	  of	  his	  
maker	  in	  all	  his	  religious	  and	  worldly	  (dunyawiya)	  acts.”53	  Furthermore,	  the	  first	  goal	  of	  
religious	  instruction	  (al-­‐diyana	  or	  al-­‐ta‘līm	  al-­‐dīnī)	  was	  “the	  propagation	  of	  superior	  moral	  
virtues	  by	  means	  of	  example	  and	  good	  lesson”	  (al-­‐‘abra	  wa	  al-­‐mu’atha	  al-­‐hasana).54	  This	  
passage	  suggests,	  and	  the	  following	  analysis	  will	  substantiate,	  that	  Mandatory	  officials	  
promoted	  religious	  education	  as	  a	  means	  of	  character	  formation	  that	  was	  not	  dissimilar	  to	  
contemporary	  British	  views	  of	  education	  at	  home.	  And	  indeed,	  taking	  into	  consideration	  
Jonathan	  Sheehan’s	  excellent	  study	  of	  approaches	  to	  the	  Bible	  in	  late	  19th	  century	  England,	  
it	  is	  not	  altogether	  surprising	  that	  British	  administrators	  in	  early	  20th	  century	  Palestine	  
would	  regard	  religious	  education	  as	  a	  means	  of	  diffusing	  “universal”	  ethical	  and	  civil	  values	  
rather	  than	  an	  integral	  component	  of	  material	  life	  or	  a	  means	  to	  secure	  individual	  
salvation.55	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Department	  of	  Education,	  "Syllabus	  for	  State	  Elementary	  Schools	  for	  Boys	  in	  Towns	  and	  Villages,"	  
32.	  
53	  Mininstry	  of	  Public	  Education,	  "Irshādāt	  al-­‐'amaliya,"	  (Cairo:	  Royal	  Printing	  Press	  (al-­‐mutba'	  al-­‐
amiriya),	  1920),	  15.	  
54	  Ibid.,	  17.	  Like	  other	  curricular	  and	  pedagogical	  materials,	  this	  text	  was	  borrowed	  from	  the	  
Egyptian	  education	  system,	  however	  it	  remained	  in	  use	  even	  after	  the	  original	  Palestinian	  syllabus	  
(based	  on	  the	  Egyptian	  model)	  was	  revised.	  Thus	  the	  1925	  Elementary	  School	  Syllabus	  specifies	  that	  
“the	  teacher	  of	  Quran	  and	  Moslem	  Religious	  Instruction	  should	  read	  carefully	  pages	  15	  and	  17	  of	  the	  
‘Irshadatu	  ‘l	  ‘Amalieh’	  on	  the	  teaching	  of	  Quran	  and	  Moslem	  Religion.”	  See:	  Department	  of	  Education,	  
Elementary	  School	  Syllabus:	  71.	  
55	  Jonathan	  Sheehan,	  The	  Enlightenment	  Bible	  	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press	  2005),	  Chp.	  9.	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The	  syllabus	  further	  divided	  its	  contents	  into	  two	  segments:	  “Qur’an”	  and	  “Religious	  
Instruction.”	  The	  former	  consisted	  of	  an	  ordered	  timetable	  for	  reading	  the	  Qur’an	  in	  its	  
entirety	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  final	  year	  of	  schooling,	  prescribing	  which	  ajza’	  should	  be	  read	  
and	  which	  committed	  to	  memory.	  The	  creation	  of	  a	  large	  network	  of	  public	  schools	  in	  
which	  each	  child	  learned	  the	  same	  portion	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  at	  the	  same	  time	  must	  itself	  be	  
appreciated	  as	  a	  novelty.	  As	  such,	  the	  incorporation	  of	  religious	  education	  into	  the	  school	  
curriculum	  was	  not	  the	  mere	  continuation	  of	  the	  past	  but	  a	  significant	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  
uniform	  approach	  to	  the	  Qur’an’s	  teaching	  and	  interpretation.	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  the	  
introduction	  of	  an	  official	  textbook	  for	  the	  upper	  grades	  reflected	  the	  urge	  to	  ensure	  
teachers	  followed	  a	  standardized	  curriculum.	  This	  necessarily	  stripped	  the	  teacher	  of	  some	  
of	  the	  autonomy	  he	  possessed	  within	  private	  katātīb,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  detailed	  
syllabi	  and	  textbooks	  can	  in	  fact	  be	  read	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  the	  uneven	  influence	  of	  
individual	  teachers.	  In	  this,	  the	  British	  did	  nothing	  that	  wasn’t	  already	  envisioned	  decades	  
earlier	  by	  Muhammad	  ‘Abduh,	  who	  argued	  that	  only	  a	  unified	  approach	  to	  religious	  
education,	  purged	  of	  its	  irrational	  elements,	  could	  combat	  the	  creep	  of	  jahl	  among	  Ottoman	  
Muslims.56	  
In	  addition	  to	  stipulating	  which	  Qur’anic	  passages	  the	  child	  would	  read	  and	  
memorize	  each	  year,	  the	  syllabus	  reflected	  a	  long-­‐standing	  European	  anxiety	  that	  the	  
practice	  of	  memorization	  left	  the	  child	  bereft	  of	  true	  comprehension.	  This	  concern	  was	  not	  
a	  mere	  pedagogic	  one,	  but	  rather	  emerged	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  religious	  text	  must	  contain	  
some	  ethical	  core	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  ritual	  practices	  and	  performances	  that	  surround	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  'Abduh,	  "lā'iḥa	  iṣlāḥ	  al-­‐ta'līm	  al-­‐'othmānī."	  
	  204	  
it.57	  This	  understanding	  no	  doubt	  emerged	  from	  approaches	  to	  religious	  education	  in	  19th	  
century	  Britain,	  where	  reformers	  insisted	  that,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Gregory	  Starrett,	  “true	  
moral	  instruction	  lay	  in	  the	  study	  and	  understanding	  of	  ‘lessons’	  drawn	  from	  Scripture.	  The	  
text	  itself,	  aside	  from	  refining	  literary	  taste,	  was	  secondary	  to	  the	  conveyance	  of	  such	  
lessons.”58	  Therefore,	  teachers	  were	  to	  give	  “the	  meaning	  of	  difficult	  words	  and	  a	  resume	  of	  
the	  general	  sense”	  of	  each	  juz’	  that	  was	  memorized.	  Furthermore,	  “the	  verses	  selected	  for	  
the	  various	  years	  of	  study	  should	  be	  explained	  so	  that	  they	  may	  become	  firmly	  rooted	  in	  
the	  minds	  of	  the	  pupils	  who	  should	  be	  led	  to	  act	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  principles	  and	  precepts	  
embodied	  therein.”59	  As	  Brinkley	  Messick	  has	  argued	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Yemen,	  this	  
emphasis	  on	  understanding	  the	  ethical	  content	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  overturned	  older	  modes	  of	  
relating	  to	  the	  text’s	  divinity	  as	  something	  to	  be	  embodied	  through	  recitation.60	  As	  such,	  it	  
was	  not	  merely	  that	  memorization	  was	  deemed	  pedagogically	  unsound,	  but	  that	  it	  
compromised	  the	  modern	  project	  of	  relating	  to	  the	  Qur’an	  as	  a	  coherent	  set	  of	  dogmas	  and	  
ethical	  precepts	  to	  be	  absorbed	  by	  the	  individual	  conscience.	  	  
Under	  the	  heading	  of	  “Religious	  Instruction,”	  lowers	  classes	  focused	  on	  the	  life	  and	  
attributes	  of	  Muhammad,	  his	  family,	  migration	  to	  Medina,	  death	  and	  burial.	  These	  were,	  
significantly,	  all	  topics	  that	  appeared	  in	  the	  history	  syllabus	  as	  well,	  though	  here	  particular	  
stress	  was	  paid	  to	  the	  prophet	  as	  a	  moral	  guide,	  “his	  self-­‐abnegation	  and	  humility,”	  “his	  
interest	  in	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  children,”	  “his	  refraining	  from	  revenge	  when	  revenge	  lay	  in	  his	  
power.”	  Through	  the	  incorporation	  of	  “moral	  training”—namely	  “virtues	  whose	  practice	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  For	  an	  alternate	  interpretation	  of	  the	  functional	  role	  of	  memorizing	  the	  Qur’an,	  see	  Helen	  N.	  Boyle,	  
"Memorization	  and	  Learning	  in	  Islamic	  Schools,"	  in	  Islam	  and	  Education	  Myths	  and	  Truths,	  ed.	  Wadad	  
Kadi	  and	  Victor	  Billeh	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2007).	  	  
58	  Starrett,	  Putting	  Islam	  to	  Work:	  38.	  
59	  Department	  of	  Education,	  "Syllabus	  for	  State	  Elementary	  Schools	  for	  Boys	  in	  Towns	  and	  Villages,"	  
32.	  
60	  Brinkley	  Messick,	  Calligraphic	  State	  	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1996).	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inferred	  from	  verses	  in	  the	  Qur’an”—the	  upper	  grades	  combined	  the	  earlier	  emphasis	  on	  
Muhammad’s	  biography	  with	  the	  reformist	  stress	  on	  the	  Qur’an	  as	  the	  authoritative	  source	  
for	  deducing	  ethical	  principles.	  These	  included,	  for	  instance,	  “respect	  due	  to	  parents,”	  
“obedience	  due	  to	  rulers”	  and	  “the	  etiquette	  of	  visiting.”61	  
On	  one	  hand,	  the	  emulation	  of	  Muhammad’s	  behavior	  as	  a	  means	  of	  moral	  
fashioning	  was	  as	  old	  as	  Islamic	  education	  itself.	  What	  is	  interesting	  for	  our	  purposes	  is	  
that	  this	  emphasis	  came	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  teaching	  the	  material,	  social	  or	  political	  
dimensions	  of	  Islam.	  The	  curriculum	  thus	  promoted	  a	  view	  of	  religion	  as	  largely	  limited	  to	  
the	  biography	  of	  Muhammad,	  the	  text	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  the	  “universal	  moral	  values”	  that	  
were	  thought	  to	  represent	  an	  ethical	  core	  shared	  by	  Christianity,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  
Judaism.	  In	  contrast,	  many	  Muslim	  “religious”	  thinkers	  and	  leaders	  appeared	  not	  within	  the	  
syllabus	  for	  religious	  instruction,	  but	  within	  that	  for	  Arab	  history.	  Thus	  ‘Abu	  Bakr	  and	  al-­‐
Ghazali	  take	  their	  place	  in	  the	  curriculum	  along	  other	  heroes	  of	  the	  classical	  Arabic	  
tradition	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  Socrates	  and	  Julius	  Caesar	  were	  used	  to	  symbolize	  the	  
intellectual	  and	  political	  triumphs	  of	  the	  Greco-­‐Roman	  period.	  	  
I	  would	  like	  to	  suggest	  that	  in	  this	  instance,	  secular	  history	  was	  linked	  to	  the	  nation	  
in	  a	  way	  that	  religion,	  imagined	  as	  a	  source	  of	  universal	  values,	  could	  not	  support.	  Echoing	  
the	  earlier	  transformation	  of	  the	  Bible	  into	  an	  ethical	  text	  of	  neo-­‐humanistic	  heritage,	  
“religion”	  was	  meant	  to	  function	  in	  Palestine	  as	  a	  moral	  common	  ground	  that	  could	  rise	  
above	  the	  political	  clamor.	  If	  any	  degree	  of	  particularism	  was	  allowed	  to	  creep	  into	  the	  
classroom,	  it	  was	  through	  the	  historical	  study	  of	  the	  great	  men	  of	  the	  past,	  and	  hence	  the	  
heightened	  level	  of	  supervision	  over	  schools’	  history	  curricula.	  Prominent	  Muslim	  figures	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Department	  of	  Education,	  "Syllabus	  for	  State	  Elementary	  Schools	  for	  Boys	  in	  Towns	  and	  Villages,"	  
34-­‐35.	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could	  therefore	  migrate	  from	  sacred	  to	  secular	  history	  as	  exemplars	  of	  the	  Arab	  nation,	  a	  
movement	  that	  facilitated	  the	  approach	  to	  religion	  as	  a	  defined	  group	  of	  beliefs,	  ritual	  
practices	  and	  ethical	  norms.	  Stripped	  of	  most	  of	  its	  political	  leaders	  and	  cultural	  heroes,	  
Islamic	  religious	  instruction	  could	  thereby	  be	  reconstituted	  as	  part	  of	  a	  universal—or	  
perhaps	  more	  to	  the	  point,	  universalizing—moral	  system	  that	  was	  largely	  removed	  from	  
those	  affairs	  now	  claimed	  by	  the	  secular.	  	  	  
In	  concluding,	  it	  is	  worth	  reiterating	  that	  this	  approach	  to	  religion	  as	  a	  depoliticized	  
entity	  was	  directly	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  actual	  administrative	  structure	  of	  Palestine,	  whose	  
governance	  through	  religious	  units	  obviated	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  common	  public	  space.	  
More	  cynically,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  it	  was	  precisely	  because	  religion	  was	  conceived	  of	  in	  
apolitical	  terms	  that	  the	  British	  chose	  to	  govern	  through	  it.	  We	  are	  left,	  however,	  with	  a	  
bundle	  of	  contradictions	  that	  characterized	  the	  administration’s	  approach	  to	  Arab	  and	  
Islamic	  education:	  they	  desired	  secular	  education	  without	  secularism,	  national	  education	  
without	  nationalism,	  religious	  education	  without	  sectarianism.62	  	  
Nor	  should	  we	  conflate	  the	  way	  the	  curriculum	  was	  designed	  with	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
it	  was	  received.	  At	  least	  according	  to	  Tibawi’s	  account,	  the	  attempt	  to	  separate	  Islamic	  
religious	  education	  from	  its	  political	  context	  was	  at	  least	  partially	  undermined	  by	  the	  
mediating	  role	  of	  Palestinian	  teachers.	  “Texts	  from	  the	  Quran	  or	  Hadith	  of	  the	  Prophet	  
were	  expounded	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  outcome	  might	  as	  well	  be	  presumed	  to	  come	  from	  a	  
political	  treatise.	  Conversely,	  political	  events	  and	  current	  local	  affairs	  were	  so	  subtly	  
represented	  in	  religious	  garb,	  with	  an	  irresistible	  appeal	  to	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  young,	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  The	  attempt	  to	  avoid	  fueling	  sectarian	  conflicts	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  treatment	  of	  Christian	  
religious	  instruction,	  in	  which	  teachers	  are	  expressly	  forbidden	  from	  using	  any	  text	  other	  than	  the	  
Bible	  “unless	  the	  children	  are	  all	  of	  the	  same	  community.”	  Ibid.,	  36.	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gave	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  outcome	  was	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  early	  caliphs	  or	  
indeed	  of	  Muhammad	  himself.”63	  While	  my	  focus	  has	  not	  been	  on	  the	  reception	  of	  the	  
government	  curricula—a	  topic	  which,	  however	  difficult	  to	  assess,	  nonetheless	  is	  deserving	  
of	  its	  own	  study—we	  should	  remain	  mindful	  of	  the	  gap	  that	  in	  all	  likelihood	  separated	  the	  




It	  is	  telling	  that	  one	  of	  the	  first	  issues	  of	  the	  Arabic	  newspaper,	  Filistin,	  
featured	  an	  editorial	  on	  the	  state	  of	  education	  in	  Palestine.	  Reflecting	  the	  hopes	  of	  
the	  second	  Ottoman	  Constitutional	  era,	  the	  article	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  need	  to	  
transform	  public	  schools	  in	  order	  to	  train	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  citizens:	  “All	  that	  the	  
era	  of	  despotism	  begat	  must	  pass	  with	  it,	  and	  as	  to	  the	  era	  of	  freedom,	  everything	  in	  
it	  must	  be	  new.”	  Metaphorically,	  the	  author	  exhorted	  readers	  to	  don	  new	  garments	  
(athwāb	  jadīda)	  and	  to	  throw	  off	  the	  garb	  of	  despotism.	  Yet	  perhaps	  most	  
noteworthy	  is	  that	  the	  success	  of	  this	  project	  was	  represented	  as	  hinging	  on	  the	  
creation	  of	  new	  textbooks,	  without	  which	  “the	  nation	  will	  remain	  in	  its	  former	  
state…	  of	  hypocrisy,	  and	  fraud.”	  Indeed,	  it	  continued,	  “in	  our	  country	  we	  are	  in	  need	  
of	  a	  general	  overhaul	  of	  [text]books	  to	  establish	  new	  books	  accompanied	  by	  
principles	  of	  the	  constitutional	  era.”64	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Tibawi,	  Arab	  Education	  in	  Mandatory	  Palestine:	  A	  study	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  British	  administration:	  
184.	  
64	  "al-­‐Madaris	  fi	  Filistin,"	  Filistin,	  July	  5,	  1911.	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The	  impulse	  toward	  creating	  standardized	  textbooks	  to	  transmit	  the	  values	  of	  an	  
enlightened	  era	  to	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  citizens	  hints	  at	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  public	  
education	  in	  Palestine,	  even	  in	  its	  nascent	  form,	  was	  understood	  as	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  
new	  political	  order.	  The	  recognition	  of	  education’s	  political	  importance	  only	  increased	  
among	  Palestinian	  leaders	  following	  the	  Balfour	  Declaration	  and	  the	  British	  occupation,	  
and	  again,	  textbooks	  proved	  a	  crucial	  (and	  contentious)	  factor	  in	  attempts	  to	  prepare	  the	  
next	  generation	  for	  a	  new	  set	  of	  political	  challenges.	  This	  was	  all	  the	  more	  important	  in	  the	  
face	  of	  attacks	  on	  Arab	  unity—either	  through	  the	  severance	  of	  Palestine	  from	  Greater	  Syria	  
or	  sectarian	  attempts	  to	  sow	  dissension	  between	  Muslims	  and	  Christians—attacks	  that	  
could	  be	  somewhat	  mitigated	  by	  the	  production	  of	  textbooks	  that	  would	  allow	  
schoolchildren	  in	  Nablus	  to	  learn	  the	  same	  lessons	  as	  those	  in	  Jaffa.	  	  
Having	  examined	  the	  curriculum	  designed	  for	  use	  within	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System,	  
and	  situated	  it	  within	  the	  administrative	  and	  ideological	  contexts	  of	  British	  colonial	  rule,	  I	  
will	  now	  offer	  a	  comparison	  with	  the	  curricula	  and	  textbooks	  used	  in	  al-­‐Najah,	  and	  
specifically,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  articulated	  the	  relationship	  between	  Islam,	  secular	  
history	  and	  political	  action.	  I	  suggested	  above	  that	  there	  was	  some	  degree	  of	  overlap	  in	  the	  
government	  curricula	  and	  textbooks	  created	  by	  Palestinian	  nationalist	  educators,	  and	  it	  is	  
worth	  exploring	  these	  points	  of	  intersection	  in	  further	  detail	  and	  asking	  what,	  if	  anything,	  
they	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  negotiation	  of	  “religious”	  and	  “secular”	  forms	  of	  knowledge.	  Exploring	  
these	  points	  of	  convergence	  and	  rupture	  adds	  further	  nuance	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  Arab	  
modernists—who	  are	  too	  often	  either	  dismissed	  (or	  celebrated)	  as	  colonial	  mimics—as	  
intellectual	  figures	  and	  political	  actors.	  While	  not	  an	  exhaustive	  review,	  this	  exercise	  is	  
nonetheless	  suggestive	  of	  the	  epistemic	  paths	  forged	  by	  Palestinian	  nationalists	  in	  their	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attempts	  to	  create	  new	  forms	  of	  schooling	  that	  responded	  to	  concerns	  regarding	  both	  
cultural	  authenticity	  and	  social	  utility.	  	  	  	  
In	  fact,	  the	  leadership	  of	  al-­‐Najah	  largely	  acquiesced	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  
Education’s	  view	  of	  religious	  education	  as	  concerned	  primarily	  with	  individual	  moral	  
fashioning.	  It	  rejected,	  however,	  the	  notion	  that	  this	  separated	  Islam	  from	  social	  or	  political	  
activism.	  Based	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  curricula	  and	  textbooks,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  Protestant	  notion	  
of	  religiosity	  as	  a	  form	  of	  individual	  ethics	  could	  rather	  function	  to	  forge	  an	  Arab	  national	  
politics	  that	  transcended	  supposedly	  age-­‐old	  communal	  divisions.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  colonial	  
epistemic	  order	  was	  not	  without	  its	  practical	  advantages.	  If	  government	  policy	  reflected	  
both	  a	  desire	  to	  nurture	  religious	  affinities	  as	  an	  antidote	  to	  national	  politics	  and	  a	  
tendency	  to	  conceive	  of	  religiosity	  in	  Protestant	  terms,	  the	  leaders	  of	  al-­‐Najah	  seemed	  to	  
have	  accepted	  the	  latter	  conceptualization	  as	  a	  means	  of	  political	  mobilization	  rather	  than	  a	  
force	  that	  restrained	  it.	  Points	  of	  commonality	  with	  government	  curricula	  did	  not,	  
therefore,	  signal	  the	  acceptance	  of	  a	  form	  of	  Islam	  divorced	  from	  political	  action.	  	  
Rather,	  we	  must	  further	  distinguish	  religion	  as	  a	  source	  of	  political	  identity	  from	  
religion	  as	  a	  source	  of	  political	  inspiration.	  Like	  his	  contemporary	  Taha	  Hussein—whose	  
autobiography	  was	  required	  reading	  at	  al-­‐Najah	  by	  the	  late	  1930s—Darwaza’s	  texts	  
embraced	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  Islamic	  civilization	  system	  that	  was	  intertwined	  with	  the	  fate	  of	  
the	  Arab	  nation.	  Thus	  while	  the	  contraction	  of	  Islam’s	  legal	  jurisdiction	  to	  personal	  status	  
law	  and	  a	  pronounced	  emphasis	  on	  individual	  ethical	  formation	  may	  suggest	  an	  attempt	  to	  
relegate	  “religion”	  to	  the	  private	  space,	  we	  should	  not	  necessarily	  equate	  these	  shifts	  with	  
the	  wholesale	  adoption	  of	  secularism	  as	  a	  movement	  to	  liberate	  public	  reason	  and	  thus,	  
political	  action,	  from	  religious	  sensibilities.	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The	  Nahḍa	  in	  Nablus	  
We	  begin	  this	  analysis	  by	  taking	  al-­‐Najah	  National	  School	  and	  its	  former	  
headmaster,	  Muhammad	  ‘Izzat	  Darwaza,	  as	  a	  case	  study.65	  The	  school	  was	  founded	  in	  1918	  
by	  a	  group	  of	  educators	  and	  intellectuals	  in	  Nablus	  in	  order	  to	  cultivate	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  
elites	  poised	  to	  become	  future	  leaders,	  “possessing	  refined	  intellects…nurtured	  by	  useful	  
sciences	  (al-­‐‘ulum	  al-­‐nāfi‘a),	  culture	  and	  nationalism.”66	  In	  its	  curricular	  materials,	  the	  
school	  emphasized	  both	  the	  ethical	  content	  of	  its	  instruction—paying	  special	  attention	  to	  
moral	  fashioning	  as	  “character	  (khulq)	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  success	  in	  life”—and	  its	  belief	  in	  the	  
essential	  unity	  of	  the	  Arab	  nation,	  emphasizing	  that	  its	  doors	  were	  open	  to	  non-­‐Muslims	  as	  
well.67	  The	  latter	  were	  exempted	  from	  attending	  lessons	  pertaining	  to	  Islam,	  and	  exercises	  
in	  “their	  religious	  rituals”	  were	  offered	  in	  the	  students’	  own	  places	  of	  worship.68	  	  
Darwaza	  served	  as	  headmaster	  of	  al-­‐Najah	  from	  1921-­‐1926,	  though	  he	  is	  perhaps	  
better	  known	  for	  his	  political	  activities.	  A	  member	  of	  the	  1920	  congress	  of	  Damascus	  that	  
elected	  Emir	  Faisal	  King	  of	  Greater	  Syria,	  and	  later	  a	  co-­‐founder	  of	  the	  Istiqlāl	  
(Independence)	  Party	  in	  Palestine,	  Darwaza	  was	  unwavering	  in	  his	  opposition	  to	  Zionism	  
and	  the	  extension	  of	  Mandates	  over	  Arab	  territories	  following	  the	  Great	  War.	  He	  also	  
authored	  numerous	  textbooks	  for	  use	  in	  Palestinian	  national	  schools,	  particularly	  history	  
texts.	  While	  these	  books	  were	  never	  used	  in	  government	  schools	  because	  of	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Darwaza	  chronicled	  his	  involvement	  with	  the	  school	  in	  his	  memoir.	  	  Muhammad	  'Izzat	  Darwaza,	  
Muthakkirat	  Muhammad	  'Izzat	  Darwaza,	  vol.	  1	  (Beirut:	  Dar	  al-­‐gharb	  al-­‐Islami,	  1993),	  317-­‐18;	  520-­‐
47.	  
66	  Barnamaj	  al-­‐Najah	  al-­‐Wataniya	  Nablusi,	  	  	  (Jerusalem:	  Dar	  al-­‐Aytām	  al-­‐Islamiya,	  1939),	  2.	  For	  a	  
general	  history	  of	  the	  school,	  including	  information	  about	  its	  enrollment	  numbers,	  funding	  sources	  
and	  relationship	  to	  other	  Palestinian	  bodies,	  see	  Majd	  Abed-­‐al-­‐Fatah	  Abdoh,	  "Educational	  Conditions	  
in	  Nablus	  during	  the	  British	  Mandate	  (al-­‐ouḍā'	  al-­‐ta'limiya	  fi	  nablus	  ibān	  al-­‐intidāb	  al-­‐briṭāni)"	  (Al-­‐
Najah	  National	  University,	  1998).	  	  
67	  Barnamaj	  al-­‐Najah	  al-­‐Wataniya	  Nablusi:	  5.	  
68	  According	  to	  one	  report,	  approximately	  10%	  of	  students	  at	  al-­‐Najah	  were	  Christian	  in	  the	  1926-­‐27	  school	  
year.	  See	  ———,	  "Educational	  Conditions	  in	  Nablus	  during	  the	  British	  Mandate	  (al-­‐ouḍā'	  al-­‐ta'limiya	  fi	  nablus	  
ibān	  al-­‐intidāb	  al-­‐briṭāni),"	  129.	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nationalist	  overtones,	  they	  were	  used	  extensively	  in	  al-­‐Najah	  and	  other	  private	  schools	  in	  
Palestine.69	  For	  instance,	  the	  1938-­‐39	  curriculum	  for	  al-­‐Najah	  featured	  a	  number	  of	  
Darwaza’s	  works,	  including	  Lessons	  in	  Arab	  History	  from	  Antiquity	  to	  the	  Present,	  Lessons	  in	  
Ancient	  History,	  and	  Lessons	  in	  Medieval	  and	  Modern	  History.70	  
Reviewing	  the	  textbooks,	  it	  is	  immediately	  evident	  that	  Darwaza	  adopted	  many	  of	  
the	  assumptions	  prevalent	  within	  colonial	  circles	  about	  the	  backwardness	  of	  the	  Arab	  
lands	  and	  the	  need	  to	  adopt	  the	  tools	  of	  Western	  progress.	  For	  instance,	  his	  text	  on	  
medieval	  and	  modern	  history	  is	  almost	  exclusively	  confined	  to	  European	  and	  American	  
developments,	  reflecting	  the	  notion	  that	  Arab	  lands	  had	  not	  yet	  passed	  through	  the	  gates	  of	  
modernity.	  The	  text	  begins	  with	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Western	  Roman	  Empire	  and	  ushers	  students	  
through	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐Saxons,	  the	  “age	  of	  discovery”,	  the	  colonization	  of	  the	  
Americas,	  the	  Napoleonic	  wars	  and	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution.	  It	  concludes	  by	  addressing	  
the	  student	  directly	  and	  highlighting	  the	  political	  implications	  of	  attaining	  material	  
progress:	  
I	  think	  that	  after	  reading	  this	  lesson	  you	  are	  very	  distressed	  over	  your	  country	  and	  
your	   nation	   and	   you	   say	   to	   yourself	   that	   all	   of	   the	   inventions	   are	   in	   Europe	   and	  
America,	   and	   that	   the	  wondrous	   industries	   are	   in	  Europe	  and	  America,	   that	   every	  
thing	   that	   we	   use	   in	   terms	   of	   clothing,	   pots,	   bedding,	   kerosene	   stoves,	   cars,	   iron	  
railways,	  airplanes,	   lamps,	  cars	   [sic],	  pens	  and	  paper	  and	  other	  (things),	  all	  of	   it	   is	  
produced	  in	  the	  factories	  of	  Europe	  and	  in	  enormous	  America	  by	  means	  of	  modern	  
methods	  using	  machines	  powered	  by	  steam	  and	  electricity.71	  	  
	  
Modernity	  here	  functions	  both	  as	  a	  characteristic	  that	  differentiates	  Euro-­‐American	  nations	  
from	  Arab	  lands	  and	  that	  facilitates	  colonial	  domination	  over	  them.	  However	  this	  need	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Darwaza’s	  memoirs	  include	  a	  review	  of	  his	  publications	  and	  claim	  that	  his	  history	  texts	  were	  used	  
widely	  not	  only	  in	  private	  schools	  in	  Palestine,	  but	  that	  government	  history	  teachers	  also	  depended	  
on	  them	  in	  preparing	  their	  lessons.	  According	  to	  the	  memoirs,	  Darwaza’s	  textbooks	  were	  also	  used	  in	  
public	  schools	  in	  Jordan	  and	  Iraq.	  Darwaza,	  Muthakkirat	  Muhammad	  'Izzat	  Darwaza,	  1:	  19.	  
70	  ———,	  durūs	  al-­‐tārikh	  al-­‐'arabi	  min	  aqdam	  al-­‐azmina	  ila	  al-­‐ān	  ;	  Muhammad	  'Izaat	  Darwaza,	  darus	  
al-­‐tarikh	  al-­‐qadim	  	  (al-­‐Quds:	  Matb'a	  dar	  al-­‐Aytam	  al-­‐Islamiya	  al-­‐Sanaa'iya,	  1936).	  Muhammad	  'Izzat	  
Darwaza,	  durūs	  al-­‐tarikh	  al-­‐mutawasat	  wa	  al-­‐hadith	  	  (Cairo:	  Salafiya	  Press,	  1930).	  
71	  ———,	  durūs	  al-­‐tarikh	  al-­‐mutawasat	  wa	  al-­‐hadith:	  268.	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be	  the	  case	  forever,	  and	  Darwaza	  charges	  his	  readers	  to	  use	  their	  despair	  as	  a	  source	  of	  
inspiration	  in	  their	  struggle	  to	  transform	  the	  homeland	  through	  hard	  work	  and	  innovation.	  
By	  adopting	  the	  tools	  of	  European	  progress,	  Darwaza	  promises	  that	  “then	  your	  country	  will	  
advance	  and	  you	  will	  exchange	  your	  sadness	  for	  joy,”	  adding	  that	  such	  transformations	  
were	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  tradition	  itself,	  “Indeed	  your	  ancient	  forefathers	  already	  fought	  hard	  
(ijtahada)	  and	  were	  therefore	  successful.”72	  It’s	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  verb	  ijtahada	  means	  
both	  to	  struggle	  to	  overcome	  something	  and,	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  Islamic	  jurisprudence,	  to	  
offer	  an	  independent	  legal	  ruling.	  The	  term	  acquired	  significant	  symbolic	  weight	  at	  the	  turn	  
of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  due	  to	  its	  revival	  by	  Muslim	  (Sunni)	  modernists,	  who	  believed	  the	  
practice	  of	  ijtihad	  could	  facilitate	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  social	  and	  political	  changes	  within	  
Islamic	  societies.	  Darwaza	  was	  no	  doubt	  capitalizing	  on	  this	  dual	  meaning	  when	  he	  urged	  
his	  young	  readers	  to	  embrace	  the	  tools	  of	  European	  progress	  and	  use	  them	  to	  restore	  the	  
Arab	  nation	  to	  its	  former	  grandeur	  –	  an	  act	  for	  which,	  as	  he	  implies,	  there	  existed	  the	  most	  
prestigious	  of	  precedents.	  	  
The	  curriculum	  for	  al-­‐Najah	  shared	  much	  common	  ground	  with	  that	  which	  was	  used	  
in	  government	  schools,	  beginning	  with	  the	  privileged	  place	  given	  to	  the	  Arabic	  language.	  
The	  first	  four	  classes	  devoted	  an	  overwhelming	  number	  of	  their	  total	  class	  hours	  to	  the	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  Ibid.,	  269.	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Elementary	  classes	  used	  two	  primary	  texts	  for	  Arabic	  language	  instruction,	  both	  of	  which	  
are	  significant	  in	  terms	  of	  tracing	  the	  disassociation	  of	  Arabic	  from	  an	  Islamic	  milieu.	  The	  
first	  was	  an	  Arabic	  primer,	  al-­‐jadīd	  fi	  qirā’a	  al-­‐‘arabiya	  by	  Khalil	  al-­‐Sakakini,	  a	  Christian	  
Palestinian	  intellectual	  and	  educator.	  The	  second	  text,	  qusus	  aṭfāl	  by	  Kāmil	  Kilāni,	  adapted	  
popular	  stories	  like	  “Hayy	  Ibn	  Yaqzan”	  and	  portions	  of	  1001	  Nights	  into	  simple—though	  
not	  colloquial—language.	  The	  choice	  of	  these	  texts	  gestures	  at	  an	  understanding	  of	  Arabic	  
that	  was	  relatively	  novel:	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  its	  study	  Arabic	  existed	  independently	  (and	  indeed,	  
was	  given	  greater	  weight	  than)	  from	  the	  study	  of	  the	  Qur’an.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  a	  school	  
which	  touted	  its	  Islamic	  credentials	  could	  so	  easily	  adopt	  an	  Arabic	  textbook	  by	  one	  of	  
Palestine’s	  foremost	  Christian	  intellectuals	  testifies	  not	  only	  to	  al-­‐Sakakini’s	  influence	  or	  al-­‐
Najah’s	  progressive	  tendencies,	  but	  to	  a	  larger	  shift	  wherein	  the	  study	  of	  Arabic	  had	  
become	  disassociated	  with	  the	  study	  of	  Islam	  –	  a	  position	  that	  would	  have	  been	  untenable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Barnamaj	  al-­‐Najah	  al-­‐Wataniya	  Nablusi:	  8.	  
74	  al-­‐mu‘alūmāt	  al-­‐‘āma	  was	  given	  only	  in	  the	  first	  class	  and	  consisted	  in	  leading	  the	  students	  in	  
observation	  of	  plants	  and	  animals,	  general	  instruction	  about	  health	  and	  hygiene,	  and	  “geographical	  
and	  historical	  stories.”	  	  
75	  durūs	  al-­‐ashya’	  
Subject	   1st	  class	   2nd	  class	   3rd	  class	   4th	  class	  
Qur’an	  and	  Islamic	  
Religious	  instruction	  
4	   6	   6	   6	  
Arabic	  	   16	   13	   10	   8	  
English	   -­‐	   -­‐	   6	   7	  
Arithmetic	   5	   5	   5	   5	  
History	   -­‐	   2	   2	   2	  
Geography	   -­‐	   2	   1	   2	  
General	  instruction74	   4	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Object	  Lessons75	   -­‐	   2	   2	   2	  
Drawing	   1	   1	   1	   1	  
Physical	  education	   3	   2	   1	   1	  
Weekly	  total	   33	   33	   34	   34	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a	  few	  decades	  prior.	  Similarly,	  the	  adoption	  of	  reading	  primers	  like	  those	  created	  by	  Kāmil	  
Kilāni	  reflects	  an	  effort	  to	  identify	  an	  Arabic	  literary	  heritage	  that	  was	  not	  overtly	  Islamic	  in	  
tone,	  but	  rather	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  shared	  national	  property.	  	  
The	  production	  of	  reading	  primers	  formed	  a	  key	  step	  in	  a	  transformation	  away	  from	  
orality	  (both	  in	  terms	  of	  telling	  stories	  from	  memory	  and	  hearing	  them	  recited)	  toward	  a	  
social	  order	  that	  privileged,	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  government	  directive	  quoted	  above,	  “a	  habit	  
for	  rapid	  silent	  reading.”	  The	  popularity	  of	  such	  primers	  also	  testifies	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  
modern	  pedagogic	  ideas	  about	  the	  distinctiveness	  of	  childhood	  and	  the	  need	  to	  create	  
curricular	  materials	  that	  catered	  to	  the	  child’s	  immature	  sensibility.	  On	  both	  counts,	  the	  
kuttāb	  was	  woefully	  inadequate.	  As	  I	  show	  in	  the	  following	  chapter,	  similar	  trends	  also	  
swept	  through	  Zionist	  schools	  of	  the	  period,	  gesturing	  to	  a	  point	  of	  pedagogic	  overlap	  in	  
what	  were	  otherwise	  separate	  school	  systems.	  Indeed,	  this	  is	  yet	  another	  example	  of	  how	  
distinct	  educational	  networks	  were	  linked	  by	  certain	  administrative	  and	  pedagogic	  
practices,	  even	  while	  their	  leaders	  accused	  one	  another	  of	  various	  educational	  and	  political	  
misdeeds.	  
In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  much	  of	  al-­‐Najah’s	  curriculum	  for	  Islamic	  religious	  education	  
mirrored	  that	  used	  within	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System,	  with	  religious	  instruction	  divided	  into	  
two	  components,	  at	  least	  in	  elementary	  classes:	  a	  schedule	  for	  reading	  and	  memorizing	  the	  
Qur’an,	  and	  instruction	  in	  matters	  of	  ritual	  and	  moral	  guidance.	  Importantly,	  the	  school	  
adopted	  standardized	  textbooks	  for	  Islamic	  religious	  instruction,	  the	  appearance	  of	  which	  
represented	  a	  significant	  development	  in	  the	  history	  of	  modern	  Islamic	  education.	  If	  we	  
recall	  Muhammad	  ‘Abduh’s	  efforts	  to	  convince	  the	  Sublime	  Porte	  to	  issue	  standardized	  
books	  for	  this	  purpose,	  we	  can	  appreciate	  the	  importance	  of	  such	  texts	  in	  a	  modernist	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program	  geared	  toward	  a	  rationalized,	  univocal	  form	  of	  Islam.76	  Uniform	  textbooks	  were	  
all	  the	  more	  crucial	  given	  the	  association	  of	  local	  teachers	  with	  superstitious	  practices	  and	  
ignorance	  of	  “true”	  Islam.	  What	  better	  way	  to	  disseminate	  the	  new	  Orthodoxy	  than	  through	  
standardized	  books	  tailored	  to	  the	  child	  and	  young	  adult	  and	  supervised	  by	  a	  central	  
authority?	  	  
Indeed,	  a	  number	  of	  standardized	  texts	  for	  Islamic	  religious	  education	  were	  
published	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  not	  only	  in	  Palestine,	  but	  in	  Iraq,	  
Egypt	  and	  Transjordan	  as	  well.	  Many	  of	  the	  textbooks	  were	  written	  by	  scholars	  
associated	  with	  al-­‐Azhar,	  some	  of	  whom	  were	  also	  employed	  in	  the	  education	  
ministries	  of	  surrounding	  Arab	  countries.	  For	  instance,	  al-­‐Najah	  relied	  on	  a	  series	  of	  
books,	  ṣafwat	  durūs	  al-­‐dīn	  wa	  al-­‐akhlāq	  (Lessons	  of	  Religion	  and	  Morality),	  prepared	  
by	  Mustafa	  ‘Inānī	  and	  ‘Iṭiyah	  al-­‐Ashqar	  for	  use	  in	  Egyptian	  elementary	  schools.77	  As	  
the	  preface	  states,	  in	  1932	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Education	  “saw	  it	  fit	  to	  enlighten	  
the	  teaching	  of	  religion	  in	  its	  schools,”	  thus	  the	  Egyptian	  government	  launched	  a	  
textbook	  competition	  to	  solicit	  new	  publications.	  ‘Inānī	  and	  al-­‐Ashqar’s	  book	  
emerged	  victorious,	  and	  became	  the	  official	  text	  for	  elementary	  religious	  education	  
in	  Egypt.	  	  
‘Aṭiyah	  al-­‐Ashqar	  was	  a	  former	  public	  education	  inspector,	  while	  ‘Inānī	  was	  a	  senior	  
inspector	  for	  the	  Arabic	  sciences	  at	  Al-­‐Azhar.	  The	  latter	  figure	  also	  authored	  a	  textbook	  for	  
use	  in	  secondary	  schools,	  kitāb	  al-­‐dīn	  al-­‐islamī,	  along	  with	  Hasn	  Mansur	  and	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Wahāb	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  In	  his	  work	  on	  writing	  culture	  in	  Yemen,	  Brinkley	  Messick	  helped	  pioneer	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  
shift	  from	  polyvocal,	  flexible	  forms	  of	  shari‘a	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  modern,	  standardized	  legal	  codes	  
whose	  fixity	  led	  to	  increasingly	  univocal	  proclamations	  regarding	  the	  dictates	  of	  “Islamic	  law”.	  See	  
Messick,	  Calligraphic	  State.	  
77	  Mustafa	  'Ināni	  and	  'Atiyah	  al-­‐Ashqar,	  ṣafwat	  durūs	  al-­‐dīn	  wa	  al-­‐akhlāq	  	  (Cairo:	  al-­‐Matba'a	  al-­‐
Rahmaniya,	  1932).	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Khayr	  al-­‐Din,	  both	  of	  whom	  were	  affiliated	  with	  Dar	  al-­‐‘Ulūm	  (today	  Kuliya	  Dar	  al-­‐‘Ulum).	  
The	  college	  was	  established	  in	  1872	  to	  teach	  both	  Islamic	  and	  modern	  sciences,	  chiefly	  to	  
al-­‐Azhar	  graduates.	  After	  the	  British	  occupation	  of	  Egypt,	  the	  college	  became	  the	  de	  facto	  
center	  for	  training	  public	  school	  teachers.	  Its	  graduates	  would	  go	  on	  to	  include	  the	  activists	  
Hasan	  al-­‐Bana	  and	  Sayyid	  Qutb,	  both	  of	  whom	  began	  their	  careers	  as	  educators.	  A	  similar	  
series	  of	  texts,	  mabādá	  fi	  al-­‐dīn	  al-­‐islamī	  (Principles	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Religion)	  was	  published	  
in	  Palestine	  in	  1947,	  written	  by	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Hamid	  al-­‐Sā’iḥ,	  Ibrahim	  Mahmud	  Sanwir,	  Ahmed	  al-­‐
Khalifa	  and	  ‘Ali	  Hasn	  ‘Auda.	  All	  four	  men	  were	  active	  participants	  in	  interwar	  political	  and	  
educational	  programs,	  boasting	  affiliations	  with	  al-­‐Azhar	  (al-­‐Sā’ih	  and	  ‘Aūda),	  the	  Supreme	  
Muslim	  Council	  (al-­‐Sā’ih),	  Dar	  al-­‐‘Ulum	  and	  the	  Government	  Arab	  College	  in	  Jerusalem	  
(‘Aūda)	  and	  the	  Jordanian	  government,	  in	  which	  Sanwir	  held	  a	  number	  of	  official	  posts	  
following	  1948.	  	  
Mabādá	  fi	  al-­‐dīn	  al-­‐islamī	  is	  a	  six-­‐part	  series	  designed	  for	  use	  in	  primary	  and	  lower	  
secondary	  classes.	  The	  first	  volume	  notes	  prominently	  on	  its	  cover	  that	  it	  was	  designed	  “in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  Department	  of	  Education’s	  latest	  curriculum,”	  while	  the	  second	  part	  of	  
the	  series	  proudly	  announces	  that	  “the	  Department	  of	  Education	  in	  Palestine	  and	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Education	  in	  the	  Hashemite	  Kingdom	  of	  Jordan	  have	  decided	  to	  teach	  this	  
book.”	  Such	  pronouncements	  mirror	  that	  which	  appeared	  on	  the	  cover	  of	  ṣafwat	  durūs	  al-­‐
dīn	  wa	  al-­‐akhlāq,	  which	  stated,	  “The	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Education	  (Egypt)	  has	  chosen	  to	  use	  
this	  book	  in	  its	  schools.”	  Given	  the	  British	  colonial	  presence	  that	  existed	  in	  all	  three	  
countries,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  to	  find	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  commonality	  in	  the	  structure	  and	  
content	  of	  the	  textbooks,	  which	  may	  point	  to	  further	  curricular	  overlap	  between	  the	  Arab	  
Public	  System	  in	  Palestine	  and	  national	  schools	  like	  al-­‐Najah,	  that	  often	  adopted	  textbooks	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published	  in	  Egypt.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  it	  suggests	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  education	  in	  these	  two	  
school	  systems	  was	  not	  necessarily	  as	  different	  as	  their	  leaders	  liked	  to	  imagine.	  
	  These	  textbooks	  shared	  certain	  common	  features	  stemming	  from	  the	  legacy	  of	  
Islamic	  modernist	  thought	  explored	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  As	  we	  recall,	  it	  was	  ignorance	  of	  the	  truth	  
of	  Islam	  that	  Muhammad	  ‘Abduh	  highlighted	  as	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  
Ottoman	  Empire;	  the	  corollary	  was	  that	  political	  revival	  would	  require	  the	  dissemination	  of	  
“correct”	  ideas	  about	  religion	  through	  better	  training	  of	  teachers	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  
centralized	  control	  over	  school	  curricula	  on	  the	  other.	  Thus	  standardized	  textbooks	  were	  a	  
crucial	  component	  in	  ensuring	  greater	  administrative	  control	  over	  religious	  teachings,	  even	  
in	  environments	  that	  were	  already	  under	  greater	  state	  supervision	  than	  private	  katātīb.	  
The	  modernist	  program—and	  its	  points	  of	  intersection	  with	  the	  colonial	  one—becomes	  
even	  clearer	  by	  reviewing	  the	  content	  of	  the	  books	  themselves.	  I	  will	  examine	  four	  major	  
characteristics	  here:	  the	  concern	  for	  authentic	  scriptural	  meaning,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  
individual	  moral	  development,	  the	  privileging	  of	  ritualistic	  elements	  of	  Islam	  (‘ibādāt)	  over	  
socio-­‐ethical	  ones	  (mu’amalāt),78	  and	  the	  insistence	  on	  the	  social	  utility	  of	  religious	  
practice.	  	  
We	  must	  recall	  that	  the	  condemnation	  of	  rote	  memorization	  in	  learning	  the	  Qur’an	  
stemmed	  in	  part	  from	  the	  fear	  that	  the	  true	  meaning	  of	  the	  text	  was	  thereby	  not	  imparted.	  
As	  Gregory	  Starrett	  has	  argued	  regarding	  approaches	  to	  religious	  education	  in	  19th	  century	  
England,	  the	  text	  of	  Scripture	  was	  of	  secondary	  importance	  to	  the	  moral	  lessons	  it	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  ‘ibādāt	  and	  mu‘amalat	  are	  legal	  categories	  within	  shari‘a:	  ‘ibādāt	  are	  ritual	  actions	  relating	  to	  the	  
relationship	  between	  man	  and	  God,	  whereas	  mu‘amalat	  consist	  of	  laws	  governing	  relations	  between	  
men,	  often	  of	  a	  commercial	  or	  contractual	  nature.	  	   	  
	  218	  
supposed	  to	  impart,	  “and	  in	  any	  case	  the	  text	  had	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  order	  to	  be	  useful.”79	  
Whereas	  pre-­‐modern	  modes	  of	  learning	  the	  Qur’an	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  form	  of	  
embodiment	  in	  which	  “students	  embody,	  or	  possess	  the	  words	  of	  God	  within	  their	  very	  
beings,”80	  modernists	  stressed	  the	  need	  to	  convey	  the	  authentic	  meaning	  of	  passages	  to	  
children	  so	  that	  they	  would	  understand	  their	  ethical	  content.	  Turning	  to	  ṣafwat	  durūs	  al-­‐dīn	  
wa	  al-­‐akhlāq,	  we	  see	  this	  shift	  manifest	  in	  the	  very	  structure	  of	  the	  book.	  Each	  section	  
begins	  with	  a	  vocabulary	  table	  of	  uncommon	  terms,	  followed	  by	  a	  passage	  from	  the	  Qur’an	  
within	  which	  the	  new	  words	  appear,	  and	  concludes	  with	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  verses’	  
meaning	  and	  significance.	  The	  authors	  use	  the	  same	  structure	  for	  introducing	  the	  student	  
to	  Hadith,	  resulting	  in	  a	  form	  of	  authorial	  didacticism	  where	  the	  student	  (and	  the	  teacher)	  
are	  guided	  down	  the	  narrow	  path	  of	  true	  meaning.	  A	  similar	  attempt	  to	  impart	  uniformity	  
is	  evident	  in	  those	  portions	  of	  the	  texts	  related	  to	  ritual	  practices,	  or	  ‘ibadat.	  Precise	  
instructions	  regarding	  the	  ablutions	  to	  make	  prior	  to	  prayer	  are	  followed	  by	  directions	  
regarding	  the	  proper	  times	  for	  prayer	  and	  the	  postures	  to	  assume.	  Reinforcing	  the	  
importance	  of	  one’s	  ablutions,	  the	  text	  reminds	  student	  that	  “the	  clean	  pupil	  is	  loved	  by	  
God	  and	  the	  people.”81	  
Designed	  to	  combat	  what	  reformers	  viewed	  as	  the	  corruption	  of	  Islam	  in	  their	  
midst,	  religious	  textbooks	  of	  this	  type	  necessarily	  shied	  away	  from	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  
interpretations	  and	  approaches	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  singular	  narrative	  that,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  these	  
examples,	  receives	  the	  sanction	  of	  the	  state.	  Although	  such	  a	  description	  may	  seem	  to	  
represent	  a	  mere	  pedagogic	  change—and	  indeed,	  overtly	  political	  statements	  are	  rare	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Starrett,	  Putting	  Islam	  to	  Work:	  38.	  
80	  Boyle,	  "Memorization	  and	  Learning	  in	  Islamic	  Schools,"	  185.	  
81	  Ibrahim	  Sanwir	  'Abd	  al-­‐Hamid	  al-­‐Sā'ih,	  Ahmed	  al-­‐Khalifa,	  'Ali	  Hasn	  'Auda	  Mabāda	  fi	  al-­‐dīn	  al-­‐islamī	  	  
(Jaffa:	  Maktaba	  al-­‐Tahir	  Ikhwan,	  1947),	  18.	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within	  elementary	  texts	  of	  this	  type—attempts	  to	  articulate	  a	  version	  of	  “authentic”	  Islam	  
and	  propagate	  it	  through	  state	  channels	  should	  not	  be	  thought	  of	  in	  educational	  terms	  
alone.	  When	  we	  consider	  that	  the	  project	  of	  mass	  public	  education	  is	  political	  at	  its	  core,	  
that	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  link	  between	  individual	  behavior	  and	  civic	  duty	  is	  presupposed	  in	  the	  
formation	  of	  modern	  school	  systems,	  the	  leap	  from	  pedagogy	  to	  politics	  appears	  as	  little	  
more	  than	  a	  small	  step.	  Moreover,	  the	  political	  implications	  of	  this	  pedagogic	  movement	  
are	  visible	  in	  the	  later	  rise	  of	  groups	  that	  project	  this	  concern	  for	  “un-­‐Islamic”	  behavior	  into	  
the	  public	  space	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  states	  that	  attempt	  to	  promote	  their	  
own	  version	  of	  true	  Islam	  through	  the	  channels	  of	  public	  education.	  82	  	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	  ‘ibādāt	  occupy	  a	  central	  role	  in	  many	  of	  these	  texts,	  one	  that	  
often	  overshadows	  attention	  given	  to	  mu’amalāt.	  Teachings	  regarding	  the	  latter	  are	  
conspicuously	  absent	  from	  mabādá	  fi	  al-­‐dīn	  al-­‐islamī,	  whose	  volumes	  devote	  substantial	  
attention	  to	  laws	  related	  to	  prayer,	  fasting,	  pilgrimage	  and	  charity	  alongside	  lessons	  on	  
Hadith,	  the	  divine	  attributes	  (tawhid),	  etiquette	  (tahdhib)	  and	  the	  biography	  of	  
Muhammad.	  Read	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  articulate	  the	  modern	  contents	  of	  “the	  Islamic	  religion,”	  
the	  text	  does	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  remarkably	  restrictive	  from	  a	  classical	  perspective.	  In	  
juridical	  terms,	  mu’amalāt	  may	  regulate	  everything	  from	  how	  a	  commercial	  transaction	  is	  
carried	  out	  to	  what	  goods	  one	  produces	  for	  sale.	  As	  these	  instances	  suggest,	  the	  defining	  
characteristic	  of	  mu’amalāt	  is	  their	  social	  nature—indeed,	  the	  term	  is	  a	  derivation	  of	  the	  
verb	  “to	  treat	  (someone).”	  It	  is	  telling	  that,	  in	  lieu	  of	  a	  legalistic	  treatment	  of	  commerce	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  This	  should	  not,	  however,	  be	  taken	  to	  meant	  that	  either	  party	  is	  actually	  able	  to	  monopolize	  the	  
religious	  discourse.	  As	  Gregory	  Starrett	  has	  shown	  in	  his	  study	  of	  Egypt,	  the	  process	  of	  habituating	  
students	  to	  adopt	  “correct”	  Muslim	  behavior	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  functionalist	  terms	  “that	  actively	  
encourage	  students	  to	  draw	  connections	  between	  the	  world	  of	  this	  life	  and	  the	  world	  of	  texts,”	  
adding	  that	  “once	  the	  possibility	  of	  this	  sort	  of	  interpretation	  is	  opened,	  the	  construction	  of	  
additional,	  or	  alternate,	  readings	  of	  Muslim	  practice	  is	  inevitable.”	  Starrett,	  Putting	  Islam	  to	  Work:	  
129.	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social	  interactions,	  the	  textbook	  raises	  commercial	  issues	  in	  a	  moralistic	  manner.	  Thus	  the	  
student	  is	  told	  to	  imitate	  Muhammad,	  cast	  here	  as	  a	  budding	  capitalist:	  “The	  Prophet	  would	  
guard	  his	  profits	  (literally:	  booty)	  and	  trade,	  for	  he	  was	  active	  and	  a	  lover	  of	  work.”83	  	  
The	  emphasis	  on	  individual	  moral	  development	  offers	  a	  clear	  point	  of	  overlap	  with	  
the	  curriculum	  adopted	  for	  use	  in	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System.	  Within	  both	  cases,	  the	  novelty	  of	  
their	  discursive	  project	  lies	  not	  in	  the	  practices	  they	  describe,	  but	  in	  the	  impulse	  to	  identify	  
them	  as	  constituting	  the	  essential	  core	  of	  Islam.	  Consequently,	  it	  makes	  more	  sense	  to	  
speak	  of	  privileged	  tradition	  rather	  than	  invented	  ones.	  A	  few	  concrete	  examples	  elucidate	  
this	  point.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  textbooks	  I	  examined,	  we	  detect	  a	  marked	  tendency	  to	  privilege	  
explanations	  of	  religious	  duties	  that	  highlight	  their	  social	  utility.	  Thus	  according	  to	  one	  text,	  
the	  fast	  of	  Ramadan	  is	  undertaken	  to	  teach	  the	  child	  the	  pains	  of	  hunger	  so	  that	  he	  will	  
understand	  the	  imperative	  to	  give	  charity	  to	  those	  who	  are	  needy.84	  While	  this	  
humanitarian	  rationale	  may	  strike	  us	  as	  a	  modern	  invention,	  it	  is	  also	  found	  within	  a	  
number	  of	  classical	  sources,	  particularly	  from	  Shi‘a	  scholars.85	  What	  is	  unique,	  then,	  is	  not	  
the	  explanation	  itself,	  but	  the	  privileging	  of	  it	  over	  others	  that	  might	  stress,	  for	  instance,	  the	  
fragility	  of	  human	  life	  before	  God	  the	  creator.	  Similarly,	  the	  Hajj	  is	  described	  as	  an	  
opportunity	  to	  meet	  Muslims	  from	  other	  countries	  and	  establish	  communal	  ties	  with	  them,	  
stressing	  the	  practical	  benefits	  that	  stem	  from	  completing	  one’s	  obligation	  over	  those	  that	  
regard	  it	  as	  a	  commemoration	  of	  Muhammad’s	  resanctification	  of	  Mecca.86	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  'Abd	  al-­‐Hamid	  al-­‐Sā'ih,	  Mabāda	  fi	  al-­‐dīn	  al-­‐islamī.	  
84	  Ibid.,	  29-­‐30.	  
85	  For	  instance,	  the	  11th	  century	  scholar	  Muhammad	  Bakar	  Majlisi	  includes	  this	  justification	  in	  section	  
96	  of	  his	  Bihar	  al-­‐Anwar.	  The	  same	  sentiment	  was	  also	  attributed	  to	  the	  eighth	  Shi’a	  Imam,	  Ali	  ibn	  
Musa	  al-­‐Rida,	  a	  compendium	  Wasa’il	  al-­‐Shi’a,	  which	  is	  dated	  to	  the	  late	  16th	  or	  early	  17th	  century.	  I	  
would	  like	  to	  express	  my	  gratitude	  to	  Hossein	  Kamaly	  of	  Barnard	  College	  for	  bringing	  these	  sources	  
to	  my	  attention.	  	  
86	  'Abd	  al-­‐Hamid	  al-­‐Sā'ih,	  Mabāda	  fi	  al-­‐dīn	  al-­‐islamī:	  33.	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Much	  of	  what	  has	  been	  described	  thus	  far	  is	  harmonious	  with	  ideas	  about	  religious	  
education	  that	  emerged	  from	  British	  colonial	  circles.	  That	  said,	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  al-­‐Najah’s	  
program	  of	  study	  points	  toward	  the	  limits	  of	  this	  concord	  and	  helps	  to	  explain	  why	  
Palestinian	  nationalists	  derided	  the	  same	  government	  school	  system	  that	  they	  also	  imitated	  
in	  key	  ways.	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  the	  crucial	  element	  of	  dissonance	  stemmed	  
not	  from	  divergent	  definitions	  of	  Islam,	  but	  from	  the	  different	  conceptions	  of	  its	  role	  in	  the	  
life	  of	  the	  Arab	  nation	  as	  a	  political	  body.	  Here	  we	  see	  that	  the	  Protestant	  redefinition	  of	  
Islam	  as	  a	  bounded	  series	  of	  ritual	  practices—explained	  in	  terms	  of	  social	  benefit—and	  
universal	  ethical	  norms	  could	  actually	  facilitate	  the	  national	  project	  rather	  than	  restrain	  it.	  	  
There	  is	  perhaps	  no	  better	  example	  of	  this	  than	  Darwaza	  himself,	  who	  was	  both	  an	  
author	  of	  interpretive	  works	  on	  Islam	  and	  the	  co-­‐founder	  of	  a	  political	  party	  that	  
consciously	  tried	  to	  transcend	  the	  sectarian	  lines	  that	  divided	  Palestinian	  society.	  Together	  
with	  leaders	  like	  Hamdi	  al-­‐Husayni,	  Darwaza	  was	  the	  leading	  force	  in	  a	  movement	  that	  
“tied	  communal-­‐religious	  organization	  to	  imperialism,	  but	  nationalism	  to	  true	  
independence.87	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  no	  sense	  that	  he	  found	  his	  commitment	  to	  the	  
revitalization	  of	  Islam	  at	  odds	  with	  his	  belief	  in	  cross-­‐communal	  Arab	  unity.	  Through	  a	  
careful	  examination	  of	  Darwaza’s	  reading	  of	  history,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  detect	  a	  unique	  
conceptualization	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  Arab	  identity	  and	  Islam	  that	  accepted	  key	  
tenets	  of	  secular	  modernity	  while	  nevertheless	  rejecting	  the	  definition	  of	  religion	  bound	  by	  
the	  private	  space.	  	  
At	  the	  core	  of	  his	  thought,	  Darwaza	  argued	  that	  the	  Arab	  nation	  and	  Islam	  existed	  in	  
a	  mutually	  reinforcing	  relationship	  wherein	  the	  fortunes	  of	  one	  directly	  impacted	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  Matthews,	  Confronting	  an	  Empire,	  Constructing	  a	  Nation:	  Arab	  Nationalists	  and	  Popular	  Politics	  in	  
Mandate	  Palestine:	  116.	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position	  of	  the	  other;	  neither	  could	  flourish	  in	  the	  modern	  period	  without	  the	  other.	  
“Arabness	  grew	  stronger	  through	  the	  strength	  of	  Islam,	  and	  Islam	  grew	  stronger	  through	  
the	  strength	  of	  Arabness.”88	  As	  he	  states	  in	  his	  memoirs,	  it	  was	  his	  belief	  in	  an	  essential	  
Arab-­‐Islamic	  symbiosis	  that	  won	  the	  support	  of	  al-­‐Najah’s	  school	  committee,	  which	  was	  
initially	  divided	  regarding	  his	  appointment.	  “I	  synthesized	  social,	  historical,	  national	  and	  
Islamic	  discussions	  for	  the	  students,	  and	  this	  was	  most	  likely	  what	  caused	  them	  to	  decide	  
to	  include	  me	  in	  the	  body	  of	  founders	  and	  offer	  me	  the	  task	  of	  directing	  the	  school.”89	  
Darwaza’s	  textbooks	  represented	  an	  attempt	  to	  translate	  this	  intellectual	  current	  into	  
terms	  accessible	  to	  students	  learning	  about	  the	  Arab	  past.	  Consider	  the	  following	  passage	  
from	  Darwaza’s	  text,	  Studies	  in	  Arab	  History	  from	  Ancient	  Times	  until	  the	  Present,	  which	  was	  
used	  in	  the	  upper	  elementary	  classes	  at	  al-­‐Najah:	  	  
The	  hijra	  counts	  among	  the	  greatest	  events	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  prophet	  and	  Islam.	  
It	  shows	  us	  that	  the	  prophet	  and	  his	  companions	  abandoned	  their	  nation,	  relatives	  
and	  possessions	  and	  risked	  their	  lives	  in	  pursuit	  of	  the	  call	  of	  Islam.	  And	  this	  was	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  greatness	  of	  Islam	  and	  the	  Arabs.	  Afterward,	  Islam	  grew	  stronger	  to	  
a	   great	   extent,	   and	   because	   of	   that	   the	   Arabs	   acquired	   great	   strength	   and	   glory.	  
Therefore	  among	  the	  obligations	  of	  Muslims	  and	  Arabs	   is	   to	  respect	   the	  history	  of	  
the	  hijra,	  and	  to	  celebrate	  the	  first	  year	  of	  the	  hijra,	  and	  to	  follow	  the	  example	  of	  the	  
prophet	  and	  his	  noble	  companions	  in	  their	  sacrifice	  and	  willpower.90	  
	  
As	  is	  evident	  in	  this	  passage,	  which	  is	  taken	  from	  the	  textbook’s	  biography	  of	  Muhammad,	  
Darwaza	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  essential	  connection	  between	  Arabness	  and	  Islam	  created	  
an	  exclusionary	  framework.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  commemorating	  the	  prophet’s	  hijra	  to	  Medina	  
is	  recast	  here	  as	  an	  obligation	  upon	  Arabs	  as	  a	  collective	  entity.	  Because	  the	  greatness	  of	  
the	  Arab	  nation	  is	  organically	  linked	  to	  the	  advance	  of	  Islam,	  customs	  that	  were	  “religious”	  
in	  nature	  could	  be	  transformed	  into	  national	  obligations.	  Reinforcing	  the	  point,	  Darwaza	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  Darwaza,	  Muthakkirat	  Muhammad	  'Izzat	  Darwaza,	  1:	  9.	  
89	  Ibid.,	  520.	  
90	  ———,	  durūs	  al-­‐tārikh	  al-­‐'arabi	  min	  aqdam	  al-­‐azmina	  ila	  al-­‐ān	  63.	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concludes	  his	  biography	  of	  Muhammad	  with	  the	  following	  hadith:	  “If	  the	  Arabs	  are	  
degraded,	  Islam	  is	  degraded”	  (idha	  dhalat	  al-­‐‘arab	  dhal	  al-­‐islām).91	  
Perhaps	  most	  remarkably,	  the	  essential	  connection	  between	  Islam	  and	  the	  Arab	  
nation	  is	  actually	  what	  facilitates	  communal	  action	  across	  sectarian	  lines:	  because,	  
Darwaza	  suggests,	  Islam	  guarantees	  freedom	  of	  religion	  and	  does	  not	  command	  individuals	  
to	  abandon	  their	  own	  customs,	  it	  can	  act	  as	  both	  a	  pillar	  of	  Arab	  national	  heritage	  and	  a	  
preserver	  of	  religious	  difference.	  This	  is	  implied	  in	  a	  number	  of	  passages	  dealing	  with	  the	  
spread	  of	  Islam.	  For	  instance,	  when	  Muhammad	  and	  his	  followers	  arrived	  in	  Medina,	  he	  
concluded	  a	  pact	  with	  the	  Jews	  living	  there	  to	  respect	  their	  freedom	  of	  religion,	  “because	  
the	  Islamic	  religion	  does	  not	  command	  by	  force	  that	  one	  should	  leave	  his	  religion.”92	  This	  
forms	  a	  contrast	  with	  the	  Byzantine	  rulers	  of	  Greater	  Syria,	  who,	  according	  to	  Darwaza,	  
oppressed	  the	  people	  “regardless	  of	  their	  sect”	  by	  imposing	  high	  taxes	  and	  “interfering	  in	  
their	  religious	  freedom	  (huriyatuhum	  al-­‐diniya).93	  It	  was	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  Arab	  armies	  
were	  welcomed	  into	  Jerusalem	  as	  liberators,	  bearing	  a	  letter	  that	  guaranteed	  the	  
inhabitants	  of	  Palestine	  both	  religious	  freedom	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  property.94	  	  
With	  this	  historical	  understanding	  acting	  as	  a	  backdrop,	  it	  becomes	  clearer	  how	  al-­‐
Najah	  could	  boast	  of	  being	  an	  Islamic	  institution	  that	  opened	  its	  doors	  to	  non-­‐Muslim	  
students.	  Indeed,	  its	  curricular	  materials	  and	  mission	  statement	  speak	  to	  this	  outlook,	  
professing,	  on	  one	  hand,	  that	  the	  school	  was	  located	  “in	  an	  Arab,	  Islamic	  country	  and	  that	  
the	  eye	  of	  the	  pupil	  shall	  not	  encounter	  [in	  the	  school]	  other	  than	  what	  strengthens	  his	  
Arab	  and	  Islamic	  affinities.”	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  “the	  school	  opens	  its	  doors	  also	  to	  non-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Ibid.,	  71.	  
92	  Ibid.,	  66.	  
93	  Ibid.,	  85.	  
94	  Ibid.,	  111.	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Muslim	  students,”	  adding	  that	  “non-­‐Muslim	  students	  have	  lived	  with	  their	  Muslim	  brothers	  
a	  life	  of	  affection	  and	  complete	  serenity	  in	  what	  promises	  to	  thwart	  the	  sectarian	  tendency	  
implanted	  by	  [past]	  generations.”95	  
In	  order	  to	  round	  out	  this	  discussion	  of	  al-­‐Najah	  and	  understand	  its	  novelty,	  it	  is	  
worth	  considering	  one	  final	  textbook,	  kitāb	  al-­‐dīn	  al-­‐islamī,	  which	  the	  school	  used	  for	  
religious	  instruction	  in	  its	  secondary	  classes.96	  The	  book	  was	  co-­‐authored	  by	  Mustafa	  
‘Inānī,	  who	  we	  encountered	  above,	  along	  with	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Wahab	  Khayr	  al-­‐Din	  and	  Hasn	  
Mansur,	  both	  of	  Dar	  al-­‐‘Ulum.	  It	  is	  here	  that	  we	  are	  presented	  with	  the	  clearest	  articulation	  
of	  the	  form	  of	  Islamic	  modernism	  that	  al-­‐Najah	  promoted	  and	  the	  political	  dimensions	  it	  
entailed.	  As	  I	  have	  argued	  thus	  far,	  the	  school’s	  curriculum	  demonstrated	  a	  remarkable	  
degree	  of	  overlap	  with	  colonial	  ideas	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  Islam	  as	  an	  entity	  
conceptually	  bound	  to	  certain	  intellectual	  spaces	  and	  forms	  of	  religious	  experience	  on	  one	  
hand,	  and	  chiefly	  concerned	  with	  individual	  moral	  development	  on	  the	  other.	  Yet,	  in	  terms	  
of	  conceptualizing	  the	  role	  of	  Islam	  in	  the	  new	  political	  order,	  al-­‐Najah	  and	  its	  leaders	  
disputed	  the	  secular	  ideal	  of	  religious	  education	  separated	  from	  political	  engagement.	  It	  is	  
here	  that	  we	  see	  the	  two	  sides	  passing	  like	  ships	  in	  the	  night:	  one	  claiming	  religious	  
education	  as	  the	  key	  to	  maintaining	  the	  traditional	  order,	  the	  other	  claiming	  it	  as	  an	  
essential	  part	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  future.	  	  
	   In	  contrast	  to	  earlier	  grades—which	  mimicked	  the	  government’s	  division	  of	  Islam	  
into	  components	  concerned	  with	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  ritual	  practice—al-­‐Najah’s	  secondary	  
classes	  did	  away	  with	  this	  bifurcated	  approach	  and	  focused	  exclusively	  on	  “The	  Islamic	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  Barnamaj	  al-­‐Najah	  al-­‐Wataniya	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96	  'Abd	  al-­‐Wahab	  Khayr	  al-­‐Din	  Hasn	  Mansur,	  Mustafa	  'Ināni,	  kitāb	  al-­‐dīn	  al-­‐Islāmī	  	  (Cairo:	  Dar	  al-­‐
Kuttub,	  1930).	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Religion”	  (al-­‐diyāna	  al-­‐islāmiya),	  with	  subject	  matter	  increasingly	  geared	  toward	  the	  social	  
and	  political	  dimensions	  of	  Islam.	  Thus	  students	  in	  upper	  secondary	  classes	  were	  to	  study	  
the	  “wisdom	  of	  instituting	  ‘ibādāt	  and	  mu‘ālamāt,”	  and	  attend	  lectures	  on	  Islamic	  social	  
theory	  as	  well	  as	  “religious	  and	  social	  topics	  that	  have	  a	  direct	  relationship	  to	  the	  
contemporary	  life	  of	  Muslims.”97	  In	  lieu	  of	  moral	  exhortations	  or	  detailed	  descriptions	  of	  
proper	  ritual	  practice,	  the	  text	  delves	  into	  realms	  that	  secular	  modernity	  would	  deem	  
outside	  the	  scope	  of	  “religious”	  matters:	  governance,	  intellectual	  freedom,	  the	  rational	  
sciences	  and	  commercial	  activity.	  	  
	   Let	  us	  look,	  for	  example,	  at	  the	  chapters	  dealing	  with	  the	  scientific	  achievements	  
pioneered	  during	  the	  golden	  age	  of	  Islam.	  The	  first	  thing	  to	  highlight	  is	  that	  this	  material	  
occurs	  within	  the	  context	  of	  Islamic	  religious	  instruction,	  and	  yet	  includes	  content	  that—
following	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  government	  curriculum—would	  most	  likely	  be	  labeled	  historical	  
rather	  than	  “religious”	  in	  nature.	  However,	  this	  is	  fitting	  according	  to	  the	  text’s	  emphasis	  on	  
the	  singularity	  of	  Islam’s	  support	  for	  scientific	  inquiry;	  indeed,	  the	  rational	  sciences	  appear	  
in	  the	  text	  on	  a	  continuum	  that	  includes	  jurisprudence	  and	  other	  religious	  sciences.	  This	  is	  
because,	  the	  student	  is	  told,	  “the	  Islamic	  religion	  came	  to	  break	  the	  shackles	  of	  the	  mind.”98	  
Channeling	  the	  legacy	  of	  Jamal	  al-­‐Din	  al-­‐Afghani,	  the	  text	  quotes	  Herbert	  Spencer’s	  famous	  
statement	  about	  the	  incompatibility	  of	  knowledge	  and	  religion	  only	  to	  argue	  for	  Islam’s	  
exceptional	  nature.99	  The	  text	  then	  transitions	  to	  discuss	  “the	  service	  of	  Muslims	  to	  
science,”	  surveying	  a	  predictable	  assortment	  of	  scholars,	  the	  great	  libraries	  of	  the	  ‘Abbasid	  
Empire,	  and	  the	  madrasas	  founded	  by	  Nizam	  al-­‐Mulk.	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  Barnamaj	  al-­‐Najah	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98	  ———,	  kitāb	  al-­‐dīn	  al-­‐Islāmī:	  135.	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  Ibid.,	  139.	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   This	  was	  not	  meant	  as	  a	  mere	  historical	  lesson,	  but—sprinkled	  with	  a	  
carefully	  selected	  group	  of	  Qur’anic	  verses	  (ayat)	  and	  hadiths—as	  an	  attempt	  to	  
situate	  scientific	  inquiry	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  material	  progress	  as	  one	  of	  the	  Muslim’s	  
essential	  duties	  to	  God.	  Thus,	  the	  student	  is	  told	  that	  the	  sciences	  were	  created	  not	  
merely	  to	  know	  God,	  but	  “to	  overcome	  the	  hardships	  of	  this	  world”	  and	  that	  “the	  
Islamic	  religion	  prescribes	  learning	  the	  sciences	  regardless	  of	  their	  type	  or	  end	  
goal.”100	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  first	  group	  of	  ayat	  students	  encounter	  are	  taken	  from	  
Sura	  al-­‐A‘rāf:	  
Oh,	  Children	  of	  Abraham	  
Wear	  your	  beautiful	  apparel	  
At	  every	  time	  and	  place	  of	  prayer	  
Eat	  and	  drink,	  but	  waste	  not	  by	  excess,	  
For	  Allah	  loves	  not	  those	  who	  waste	  
Say:	  Who	  hath	  forbidden	  the	  gifts	  of	  Allah,	  
Which	  He	  hath	  produced	  for	  his	  servants,	  
And	  the	  things,	  clean	  and	  pure,	  
(Which	  he	  hath	  provided)	  for	  sustenance?	  
Say:	  They	  are	  in	  the	  life	  of	  this	  world	  for	  those	  who	  believe	  
And	  (purely)	  for	  them	  on	  the	  Day	  of	  Judgment.101	  
	  
Lest	  the	  point	  be	  lost,	  the	  text	  includes	  yet	  another	  set	  of	  ayat	  (Sura	  al-­‐Baqara,	  21-­‐22),	  with	  
a	  tafsir	  explaining	  that	  God	  calls	  believers	  to	  two	  types	  of	  works:	  ‘ibādāt,	  such	  as	  prayer	  and	  
fasting,	  and	  “worldly	  works,	  to	  be	  useful	  in	  their	  worldly	  lives—which	  are	  a	  means	  to	  their	  
final	  lives—such	  as	  the	  useful	  sciences,	  commerce	  and	  industry	  and	  others.”102	  Material	  
goods	  and	  the	  scientific	  knowledge	  required	  to	  produce	  them	  are	  not	  simply	  acceptable	  
within	  this	  framework,	  but	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  duties	  prescribed	  by	  God	  himself.	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  Ibid.,	  137-­‐38.	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  The	  Qur’an,	  Sura	  Al-­‐A‘ref,	  31-­‐32.	  Adapted	  from	  the	  translation	  of	  'Abdullah	  Yusuf	  'Ali,	  The	  Meaning	  
of	  the	  Holy	  Qur'an	  	  (Beltsville,	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  1999).	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  Hasn	  Mansur,	  kitāb	  al-­‐dīn	  al-­‐Islāmī:	  221.	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   Just	  as	  science	  and	  industry	  lie	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  “religious”	  concerns,	  so	  too	  do	  
matters	  dealing	  with	  governance.	  Here	  we	  find	  the	  clearest	  challenge	  to	  the	  colonial	  
epistemic	  order	  and	  the	  equation	  of	  religious	  values	  with	  political	  indifference.	  Following	  a	  
discussion	  on	  modes	  of	  juridical	  reasoning	  and	  different	  Islamic	  legal	  schools,	  the	  text	  turns	  
to	  a	  discussion	  of	  shura,	  consultation.	  “Allah	  made	  shura	  the	  basis	  of	  governance	  in	  Islam	  
and	  commanded	  his	  prophet	  (the	  blessing	  of	  God	  be	  upon	  him),	  saying,	  ‘And	  consult	  them	  
in	  the	  matter.”	  And	  he	  clarified	  what	  Muslims	  must	  do	  in	  their	  government,	  saying	  ‘And	  
command	  them	  to	  consult	  amongst	  themselves’.”103	  However,	  the	  corruption	  of	  later	  rulers	  
led	  to	  the	  decline	  and	  eventual	  disappearance	  of	  shura	  as	  a	  religious	  duty,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  
people	  began	  to	  think	  that	  Islam	  prescribed	  a	  form	  of	  authority	  that	  was	  individual	  and	  
despotic.	  	  
Enticing	  students	  to	  look	  at	  this	  past	  not	  merely	  as	  history,	  but	  rather,	  as	  sacred	  
duty,	  the	  section	  concludes	  with	  the	  following	  directive:	  “look	  at	  the	  most	  advanced	  states	  
in	  the	  current	  era	  and	  [see]	  their	  strength	  is	  found	  in	  their	  laws	  being	  based	  on	  
consultation	  (shura),	  and	  that	  the	  will	  of	  their	  people	  is	  respected.	  And	  this	  is	  the	  secret	  of	  
their	  greatness,	  happiness	  and	  progress.”104	  The	  political	  implications	  here	  are	  not	  difficult	  
to	  deduce,	  nor	  is	  the	  intertwining	  of	  religious	  obligations	  with	  worldly	  concerns	  hard	  to	  
discern.	  Rather,	  this	  review	  of	  curricular	  materials	  points	  toward	  the	  flexibility	  of	  Islamic	  
symbols	  and	  discourses	  to	  assume	  a	  functional	  role	  in	  modern	  political	  thought.	  As	  we	  shall	  
from	  examples	  drawn	  from	  Zionist	  education,	  it	  is	  precisely	  the	  privileging	  of	  certain	  
elements	  within	  a	  sacred	  textual	  tradition—often	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  all	  others—that	  
distinguished	  Muslim	  modernists	  from	  the	  so-­‐called	  traditionalists	  they	  hoped	  to	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supersede.	  Examples	  like	  this	  point	  to	  what	  Jonathan	  Sheehan	  has	  called	  “a	  different	  vision	  
of	  secularization,”	  one	  that	  “focuses	  less	  on	  the	  disappearance	  of	  religion	  than	  on	  its	  
transformation	  and	  reconstruction.”105	  
We	  should	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  this	  text	  was	  used	  in	  secondary	  classes	  at	  al-­‐Najah,	  
which	  makes	  direct	  comparison	  with	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System	  more	  difficult.	  As	  explained	  in	  
chapter	  2,	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  purposefully	  neglected	  secondary	  education	  
throughout	  the	  Mandate	  period,	  fearing	  the	  destabilizing	  effects	  of	  a	  well-­‐educated	  Arab	  
population.	  However	  imperfect,	  this	  comparison	  nevertheless	  reveals	  that	  there	  was	  a	  
great	  deal	  of	  conceptual	  overlap	  between	  the	  two	  curricula,	  particularly	  at	  the	  primary	  
level.	  However,	  as	  I	  have	  suggested,	  this	  similarity	  yields	  to	  points	  of	  divergence	  with	  
regard	  to	  how	  religious	  education	  was	  positioned	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  national	  politics.	  Certainly	  
Darwaza	  would	  have	  agreed	  with	  Jerome	  Farrell’s	  notion	  of	  a	  common	  Christian-­‐Muslim	  
morality,	  but	  not	  with	  his	  view	  of	  that	  moral	  system	  as	  set	  apart	  from	  national	  politics.	  
Rather,	  as	  al-­‐Najah	  emphasized,	  this	  commonality	  was	  what	  enabled	  Arab	  brothers	  from	  
across	  confessions	  to	  transcend	  the	  sectarian	  past	  while	  striving	  for	  a	  new	  national	  future.	  
Taken	  as	  a	  whole,	  this	  analysis	  highlights	  both	  the	  incredible	  proximity	  and	  irresolvable	  




This	  chapter	  has	  elaborated	  on	  observations	  made	  in	  Chapter	  Three	  regarding	  the	  
administrative	  structure	  established	  by	  Palestine’s	  Education	  Ordinance.	  In	  that	  context,	  I	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argued	  that	  Palestinian	  educators	  were	  in	  an	  unenviable	  position	  concerning	  its	  battles	  
with	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  insofar	  as	  control	  over	  Arab	  education	  was	  concerned.	  
The	  Department	  of	  Education	  rebuffed	  Palestinian	  attempts	  to	  exercise	  influence	  over	  
government	  schools	  as	  national	  bodies	  because	  educational	  autonomy	  was	  only	  granted	  to	  
recognized	  religious	  communities.	  This	  administrative	  order	  was	  favorable	  to	  Zionism,	  
whose	  organizational	  bodies	  were	  the	  only	  ones	  recognized	  as	  both	  religious	  and	  national	  
entities.	  Conversely,	  Palestinians	  who	  desired	  autonomy	  over	  education	  were	  thus	  offered	  
it	  insofar	  as	  they	  sought	  to	  create	  and	  supervise	  independent	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  schools;	  
they	  would	  not,	  however,	  be	  allowed	  to	  control	  public	  education	  as	  a	  national	  institution.	  
This	  chapter	  has	  tried	  to	  examine	  the	  conceptual	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  colonial	  
approach	  to	  religious	  education	  and	  has	  argued	  that	  British	  administrators	  conceived	  of	  
religious	  study	  as	  an	  apolitical	  practice	  linked	  to	  a	  traditional	  social	  order.	  Chiefly	  
concerned	  with	  matters	  of	  ritual	  and	  individual	  moral	  conduct,	  this	  mode	  of	  religiosity	  was	  
a	  presumed	  counterweight	  to	  nationalist	  passions.	  The	  key	  issue	  here	  is	  not	  whether	  
Islamic	  education	  was	  historically	  disconnected	  from	  political	  life.	  Rather,	  we	  are	  
elucidating	  a	  historically	  contingent	  relationship	  between	  religion,	  mass	  education	  and	  
political	  action	  that	  was	  impossible	  prior	  to	  the	  age	  of	  modernity.	  	  
Furthermore,	  this	  discussion	  has	  highlighted	  the	  capacity	  for	  figures	  like	  ‘Izzat	  
Darwaza	  to	  both	  accept	  the	  fundamental	  epistemic	  revolution	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  European	  
secularism	  and	  to	  reject	  its	  political	  implications.	  Certainly,	  this	  should	  point	  to	  the	  
inadequacy	  of	  paradigms	  that	  would	  explain	  such	  figures	  as	  either	  beacons	  of	  colonial	  
resistance,	  or	  conversely,	  colonial	  mimics	  who	  fully	  internalized	  the	  mental	  frame	  of	  the	  
very	  political	  forces	  they	  opposed.	  Moreover,	  the	  texts	  analyzed	  here	  suggest	  that	  al-­‐Najah	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attempted	  to	  chart	  its	  own	  path	  between	  colonial	  modernity	  and	  the	  “traditional”	  sectarian	  
order.	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  juridical	  and	  conceptual	  restriction	  of	  “the	  Islamic	  religion”	  
functioned	  to	  create	  a	  space	  for	  a	  cross-­‐communal	  Arab	  identity.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  new	  
epistemic	  order	  was	  not	  without	  its	  pragmatic	  advantages,	  particularly	  for	  nationalists	  like	  
Darwaza.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  restriction	  of	  Islam’s	  legal	  jurisdiction	  to	  newly-­‐coined	  
“religious”	  matters	  did	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  the	  waning	  of	  its	  political	  influence.	  Rather,	  al-­‐
Najah	  promoted	  a	  mutually	  constitutive	  Arab-­‐Islamic	  social	  order	  that	  framed	  political	  
action	  without	  harming	  individual	  freedom.	  This	  notion	  of	  religion	  seemed	  strange	  to	  
British	  officials,	  and	  yet	  should	  not	  have	  had	  they	  been	  more	  attentive	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
Christianity	  continued	  to	  impact	  their	  country’s	  own	  political	  action.	  It	  was	  only	  because	  
this	  influence	  was	  rendered	  invisible	  by	  the	  invention	  of	  the	  secular	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  
politicized	  religion	  seemed	  so	  contradictory.	  
More	  concretely,	  though,	  the	  administrative	  structure	  of	  Palestine	  presented	  its	  own	  
problems:	  the	  religious	  community	  was	  the	  sole	  unit	  of	  making	  political	  claims,	  and	  yet	  
religion	  itself	  was	  supposedly	  apolitical.	  There	  is	  certainly	  support	  here	  for	  a	  cynical	  view	  
that	  it	  was	  precisely	  because	  religion	  was	  thought	  of	  in	  apolitical	  terms	  that	  the	  British	  
chose	  to	  govern	  through	  it.	  Yet	  this	  assessment	  does	  not	  present	  a	  full	  picture.	  As	  I	  argue	  in	  
the	  following	  chapter,	  education	  administrators	  approached	  Jewish	  communities	  in	  much	  
the	  same	  way,	  generating	  a	  central	  contradiction	  in	  which	  Jews	  were	  recognized	  as	  a	  nation	  
while	  Judaism	  was	  supposed	  to	  rise	  above	  the	  political	  fray.	  This	  chapter	  has	  detailed	  the	  
ways	  that	  one	  Palestinian	  school	  responded	  to	  the	  new	  political	  and	  intellectual	  orders	  that	  
emerged	  during	  this	  formative	  period.	  The	  final	  chapter	  will	  examine	  attempts	  by	  Zionist	  
educators	  to	  formulate	  a	  new	  relationship	  between	  Jewishness	  and	  national	  politics.	  
	  231	  
Ultimately,	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  our	  story	  is	  not	  merely	  about	  the	  rule	  of	  Palestine	  through	  




I	  have	  argued	  thus	  far	  that	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine’s	  Department	  of	  
Education	  advanced	  two	  goals	  with	  regard	  to	  religious	  education.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  
religious	  education	  formed	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  effort	  to	  govern	  Palestine	  through	  
sectarian	  units	  that	  would	  allegedly	  preserve	  the	  “traditional”	  social	  and	  economic	  
order.	  This	  found	  reflection	  in	  Palestine’s	  legal	  structure,	  which	  made	  the	  religious	  
community	  the	  only	  entity	  capable	  of	  claiming	  educational	  autonomy.	  I	  have	  further	  
shown	  that	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  attempted	  to	  maintain	  and	  even	  expand	  
the	  role	  of	  religious	  education	  in	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System,	  propelled	  largely	  by	  the	  
belief	  in	  religious	  instruction—if	  done	  “properly”—as	  a	  tool	  for	  inculcating	  
“universal”	  moral	  ideals	  that	  would	  mitigate	  nationalist	  fervor.	  As	  shown	  in	  an	  
analysis	  of	  the	  government	  school	  curriculum,	  this	  universal	  morality	  was	  actually	  
the	  expression	  of	  a	  rather	  particular	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  
politics	  and	  religious	  practice	  whose	  defining	  modern	  characteristic	  has	  been	  an	  
attempt	  to	  hide	  its	  own	  particularism.	  	  
On	  the	  whole,	  British	  officials	  did	  not	  consider	  that	  religious	  education	  could	  
serve	  more	  radical	  purposes,	  as	  any	  revolutionary	  use	  of	  religious	  education	  
necessarily	  transgressed	  the	  boundary	  meant	  to	  separate	  “real”	  religious	  values	  
from	  their	  political	  expression.	  Within	  this	  framework,	  if	  religious	  education	  
meddled	  in	  the	  work	  of	  mass	  politics,	  it	  did	  so	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  its	  “religious”	  
nature;	  indeed,	  it	  became	  something	  else	  entirely.	  There	  was	  arguably	  no	  greater	  
offender	  of	  this	  educational	  model	  than	  the	  one	  being	  developed	  under	  Zionist	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auspices.	  At	  the	  most	  basic	  level,	  the	  fact	  that	  nearly	  every	  Zionist	  school	  was	  
administered	  by	  one	  of	  the	  three	  major	  political	  parties	  represented	  a	  direct	  
challenge	  to	  the	  British	  ideal	  of	  education	  devoid	  of	  political	  influence.	  As	  a	  further	  
complication,	  separate	  management	  structures	  for	  each	  of	  the	  three	  “streams”	  of	  
Zionist	  education—Labor,	  General	  and	  Mizrachi—led	  to	  administrative	  
redundancies	  and	  financial	  inefficiencies	  that	  supported	  the	  Department	  of	  
Education’s	  characterization	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  Public	  System	  as	  “uneconomical	  and	  
ineffective.”1	  
This	  chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  differing	  conceptions	  of	  the	  
content	  and	  function	  of	  religious	  education	  strained	  relations	  between	  the	  Zionist	  
school	  system	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine.	  In	  order	  to	  link	  the	  discursive	  
features	  of	  British	  policy	  making	  to	  the	  historical	  record,	  I	  will	  analyze	  the	  
government’s	  attempt	  to	  aid	  Orthodox	  Jewish	  education—including	  schools	  outside	  
the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  network—as	  a	  means	  to	  advance	  an	  educational	  alternative	  to	  the	  
perceived	  secularism	  of	  the	  Zionist	  mainstream.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  despite	  the	  
common	  sentiment	  among	  government	  administrators	  and	  latter	  day	  scholars,	  the	  
Zionist	  school	  system	  was	  anything	  but	  secular	  either	  in	  terms	  of	  presenting	  clear	  
lines	  of	  demarcation	  between	  sacred	  and	  worldly	  knowledge	  or	  promoting	  the	  latter	  
at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  former.	  Arguing	  against	  the	  notion	  that	  Jewish	  religious	  
education	  was	  largely	  neglected	  during	  the	  Mandate	  period,	  I	  reveal	  the	  necessity	  of	  
distinguishing	  between	  institutional	  and	  conceptual	  levels	  of	  analysis.	  While	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  characterization	  appears	  consistently	  in	  evaluations	  of	  the	  Zionist	  school	  system;	  see,	  for	  
example,	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  “Relations	  between	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  and	  the	  Jewish	  School	  
System	  1918-­‐1941.”	  November	  26,	  1943.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/453/4.	  Section	  21.	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former	  might	  suggest	  what	  I	  will	  term	  the	  decline	  thesis—usually	  accompanied	  by	  
puzzlement	  regarding	  the	  later	  “return”	  of	  religion	  in	  contemporary	  Israeli	  
society—a	  critical	  conceptual	  analysis	  suggests	  the	  Zionist	  movement	  was	  deeply	  
invested	  in	  stressing	  certain	  forms	  of	  religiosity	  –	  or	  more	  precisely,	  Jewishness.	  
Tensions	  with	  the	  Mandatory	  government	  thus	  reveal	  a	  quite	  complicated	  dispute	  
regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  “Judaism”	  as	  a	  religion	  among	  the	  Jews	  as	  a	  nation.	  
	  
Farrell’s	  Complaint	  	  
Beyond	  its	  administrative	  faults,	  the	  greatest	  source	  of	  contention	  between	  
the	  Zionist	  school	  system	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  concerned	  the	  
politicization	  of	  Jewish	  schools.	  While	  concerns	  of	  this	  nature	  existed	  throughout	  
the	  Mandate	  period,	  they	  reached	  a	  fevered	  pitch	  under	  the	  second	  director	  of	  
education,	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  who	  served	  in	  that	  role	  from	  1937-­‐1947.	  If	  Humphrey	  
Bowman	  had	  managed	  to	  find	  a	  modus	  operandi	  with	  Zionist	  leaders,	  that	  accord	  
began	  to	  break	  down	  with	  Farrell’s	  assumption	  of	  control.	  Under	  his	  tenure,	  the	  
Department	  of	  Education	  for	  the	  first	  time	  acted	  on	  its	  long-­‐standing	  threat	  to	  
withhold	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  block	  grant	  from	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  if	  certain	  reforms	  were	  
not	  enacted.	  As	  we	  are	  set	  to	  examine,	  the	  Department	  began	  extending	  direct	  aid	  to	  
a	  number	  of	  Orthodox	  religious	  schools	  unaffiliated	  with	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi.	  Both	  acts	  
were	  no	  doubt	  designed	  to	  challenge	  the	  Zionist	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  education	  of	  
Jewish	  youth	  in	  Palestine,	  or	  to	  at	  least	  moderate	  its	  approach.	  It	  is	  therefore	  worth	  
asking	  what	  particularly	  about	  the	  Zionist	  school	  system	  was	  so	  offensive?	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The	  recurring	  complaints	  were	  threefold.	  The	  first	  was	  that	  Zionist	  political	  
parties	  exercised	  undue	  influence	  over	  Jewish	  education.	  Directly	  stemming	  from	  
this,	  a	  second	  problem	  was	  that	  of	  administrative	  inefficiencies,	  in	  addition	  to	  
pedagogic	  misdeeds.	  Finally,	  members	  of	  the	  Zionist	  Teachers	  Association	  viewed	  
themselves	  not	  so	  much	  as	  “public	  officers”	  but	  as	  “leaders	  in	  an	  industrial	  dispute	  
whose	  primary	  and	  ultimate	  object	  is	  political	  power.”2	  However,	  as	  I	  shall	  argue,	  
these	  complaints	  were	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  problem	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  Mandatory	  
government,	  namely	  that	  harnessing	  Judaism	  to	  a	  political	  cause	  that	  viewed	  
education	  as	  one	  of	  its	  primary	  “weapons”	  upset	  not	  merely	  the	  proper	  educational	  
order,	  but	  the	  political-­‐theological	  one	  as	  well.3	  
During	  his	  tenure	  as	  Director	  of	  Education,	  Jerome	  Farrell	  authored	  several	  
reports	  in	  which	  he	  criticized	  the	  politicization	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  Public	  System.4	  In	  this	  
he	  was	  not	  alone,	  as	  both	  the	  McNair	  and	  Anglo-­‐American	  Commissions	  expressed	  
similar	  alarm	  regarding	  the	  subordination	  of	  Jewish	  education	  to	  Zionist	  political	  
ends.	  The	  former	  commission	  went	  as	  far	  as	  to	  direct	  a	  confidential	  letter	  to	  the	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies	  in	  order	  “to	  stress	  one	  matter	  to	  which	  we	  attach	  
importance	  but	  which,	  if	  we	  expressed	  our	  views	  fully	  in	  our	  Report,	  might,	  in	  the	  
present	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  Palestine,	  cause	  embarrassment	  or	  frustrate	  some	  of	  our	  
recommendations.”	  That	  matter,	  “one	  of	  the	  most	  disturbing	  aspects	  of	  education	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  High	  Commissioner	  Wauchope	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies.	  September	  29,	  1941.	  TNA,	  CO	  
733/442/17.	  	  
3	  Quote	  from	  Joseph	  Ahronovitz,	  “l’sheilah	  kiyum	  batei	  sefer	  b’eretz	  yisrael,”	  ha-­‐poel	  ha-­‐tza’ir,	  12	  
(1920),	  in	  Elboim-­‐Dror,	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  ha-­‐ivri	  be-­‐Erets-­‐Yisrael:	  Vol.	  2,	  4;	  ibid.,	  Vol.	  II;	  4.	  
4	  See,	  for	  example,	  Farrell’s	  memorandum	  of	  November	  26,	  1943,	  “Relations	  between	  the	  
Government	  of	  Palestine	  and	  the	  Jewish	  School	  System.	  1918-­‐1941.”	  TNA,	  CO	  733/453/4.	  Farrell	  
earlier	  expressed	  his	  views	  directly	  to	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  and	  urged	  the	  body	  to	  undertake	  numerous	  
pedagogic	  and	  administrative	  reforms.	  See	  Farrell,	  “Jewish	  Education	  Administrative	  Reform.”	  June	  
13,	  1939.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/435/18.	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and	  home	  life	  in	  Palestine,”	  was	  none	  other	  than	  “the	  extent	  to	  which	  young	  children	  
are	  preoccupied	  with	  political	  and	  other	  ideological	  matters.”5	  The	  letter	  continued	  
to	  lament	  the	  presence	  in	  Zionist	  schools	  of	  youth	  movements	  affiliated	  with	  each	  of	  
the	  major	  political	  parties.	  “The	  fact	  is	  that	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  of	  the	  political	  parties	  and	  
ideological	  groups	  are	  making	  a	  deliberate	  attempt,	  by	  means	  of	  a	  technique	  which	  
the	  totalitarian	  States	  have	  made	  familiar,	  to	  organise	  children	  under	  the	  respective	  
banners	  at	  a	  very	  early	  age	  without	  regard	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  children’s	  
education.”6	  In	  somewhat	  milder	  language,	  the	  published	  version	  of	  the	  report	  
touched	  on	  the	  inefficiencies	  and	  pedagogic	  damage	  done	  by	  the	  trend	  system,	  in	  
which	  “Jewish	  political	  parties	  have	  played	  a	  very	  prominent	  part	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  
schools	  and	  teachers.”7	  	  
The	  McNair	  Commission	  also	  criticized	  the	  behavior	  of	  teachers,	  who	  not	  
only	  went	  on	  frequent	  strikes	  when	  their	  salaries	  were	  in	  arrears,	  but	  refused	  to	  
curtail	  their	  political	  activism	  in	  a	  manner	  befitting	  public	  servants.	  While	  the	  
Government	  of	  Palestine	  had	  forbidden	  teachers	  in	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System	  from	  
joining	  any	  political	  group	  or	  association	  since	  1925,	  in	  1946,	  the	  McNair	  
Commission	  could	  merely	  plead	  that	  Jewish	  teachers	  “must	  realize	  their	  position,	  as	  
public	  servants	  entrusted	  with	  the	  care	  of	  children,	  makes	  it	  necessary	  for	  them	  to	  
place	  some	  degree	  of	  restriction	  upon	  their	  participation	  in	  public	  controversy,	  
whether	  religious	  or	  political.”8	  Echoing	  arguments	  repeatedly	  forwarded	  within	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Confidential	  letter	  from	  Arnold	  D.	  McNair	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies.	  March	  26,	  1946.	  CO	  
733/453/8.	  	  
6	  Ibid.	  
7	  The	  system	  of	  education	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community	  in	  Palestine:	  Report	  of	  the	  commission	  of	  enquiry	  
appointed	  by	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies	  in	  1945:	  7.	  
8	  Ibid.,	  76.	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British	  administrative	  circles,	  the	  Commission	  took	  for	  granted	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  
neutral	  educational	  field	  governed	  merely	  by	  pedagogic	  requirements	  upon	  which	  
political	  concerns	  exercised	  an	  unnatural	  influence.	  Not	  only	  was	  this	  understanding	  
undermined	  by	  the	  material	  dependence	  of	  systems	  of	  public	  education—both	  in	  
Britain	  and	  in	  the	  empire—on	  political	  decision	  making,	  it	  similarly	  masked	  the	  fact	  
that	  attempts	  to	  shield	  schools	  from	  political	  influence	  represented	  a	  very	  real	  form	  
of	  colonial	  politics.	  	  
Given	  these	  observations,	  the	  McNair	  Commission’s	  ultimate	  
recommendation	  that	  the	  Jewish	  community	  be	  given	  more	  autonomy	  in	  
educational	  matters	  seems	  somewhat	  contradictory.	  As	  “one	  of	  the	  chief	  
instruments	  in	  the	  building	  of	  the	  Jewish	  national	  home	  in	  Palestine,”	  the	  report	  
noted,	  “education	  means	  to	  the	  Zionist	  Jew	  something	  more	  than	  it	  does	  in	  England	  
or	  in	  most	  other	  countries.”	  Because	  “the	  strain	  of	  national	  idealism	  which	  pervades	  
Jewish	  education	  is	  often	  puzzling	  to	  those	  trained	  in	  one	  of	  the	  British	  educational	  
systems,”	  the	  Commission	  argued	  that	  “the	  responsibility	  for	  the	  management	  of	  the	  
Jewish	  schools	  should	  be	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community.”9	  Published	  the	  
same	  year,	  though	  broader	  in	  scope,	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  Committee	  of	  Inquiry	  
reflected	  a	  similar	  contradiction.	  While	  criticizing	  Jewish	  schools	  for	  inculcating	  “a	  
spirit	  of	  aggressive	  Hebrew	  nationalism,”	  the	  report	  nevertheless	  recommended	  
that	  the	  Jewish	  community	  should	  serve	  as	  a	  model	  for	  delegating	  control	  of	  
Palestinian	  education	  to	  Arab	  community.	  “A	  large	  share	  of	  responsibility	  for	  Arab	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education	  might	  well	  be	  assumed	  by	  an	  Arab	  community,	  similar	  to	  the	  Jewish	  
community	  already	  established	  in	  Palestine.”10	  
These	  inconsistencies	  were	  not	  lost	  on	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  who	  detailed	  his	  
observations	  on	  both	  reports	  in	  an	  extraordinary	  memorandum	  to	  the	  Colonial	  
Office	  in	  November	  1946.	  The	  lengthy	  report	  represents	  the	  ultimate	  distillation	  of	  
Farrell’s	  frustrations	  regarding	  Zionist	  education	  in	  Palestine.	  His	  immediate	  
concern	  was	  that	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  might	  entertain	  the	  McNair	  and	  Anglo-­‐
American	  Commissions’	  recommendations	  regarding	  increased	  educational	  
autonomy	  for	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  communities	  in	  Palestine.	  Commenting	  on	  both	  
reports,	  Farrell	  warned,	  “if	  unselfishness,	  peace	  and	  goodwill	  are	  principal	  aims	  of	  
education	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  reconcile	  the	  two	  relevant	  recommendations	  which	  
each	  Report	  in	  effect	  makes	  and	  which,	  bluntly	  stated,	  are	  (a)	  that	  a	  ‘fiery	  
nationalism’	  shall	  be	  eradicated	  from	  the	  schools,	  (b)	  that	  control	  of	  education	  shall	  
be	  vested	  in	  fiery	  nationalist	  politicians.”11	  	  
Farrell	  took	  further	  issue	  with	  the	  McNair	  Report’s	  conclusion	  that	  Zionist	  
leaders’	  sense	  of	  “national	  idealism”	  mandated	  their	  autonomous	  control	  over	  
Jewish	  education.	  “The	  phrase	  ‘national	  idealism’	  is	  misleading,”	  Farrell	  wrote,	  
continuing:	  
	  I	   should	   prefer	   “racial”	   or	   even	   “tribal”	   to	   “national”	   and	   “chauvinism”	   or	  
“indoctrination”	   to	   “idealism”,	   a	   word	   which	   to	   English	   minds	   inevitably	  
suggests	   high	   and	   unpractical	   moral	   standards.	   There	   are	   no	   doubt	  many	  
individual	   Jews	   who	   are	   idealists	   but	   the	   Zionist	   Organization’s	   official	  
policy	  and	  power	  direct	  the	  tribalism	  of	  the	  Jews	  to	  strictly	  selfish,	  practical	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  Committe	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and	  material	  ends.	  The	  aim	  is	  of	  course	  attained,	  as	  in	  Nazi	  Germany,	  by	  the	  
unscrupulous	  manipulation	  of	  childish	  and	  adolescent	  emotion.12	  
	  
This	  was	  only	  one	  of	  several	  instances	  in	  which	  Farrell	  compared	  the	  educational	  
practices	  of	  the	  Yishuv	  to	  the	  political	  indoctrination	  of	  totalitarian	  regimes,	  
particularly	  in	  Nazi	  Germany.	  Similarly	  he	  elsewhere	  expressed	  concern	  that	  
channeling	  funds	  through	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi,	  as	  opposed	  to	  via	  Local	  Education	  
Authorities,	  was	  a	  dangerous	  step	  toward	  “the	  excessive	  centralization	  of	  the	  
continent	  and	  of	  Nazism.”13	  Comparisons	  with	  totalitarian	  states	  are	  telling,	  as	  the	  
latter	  openly	  embraced	  the	  form	  of	  social	  engineering	  that	  Farrell	  claimed	  was	  
foreign	  to	  British	  values.	  If	  we	  recall	  the	  modern	  educational	  constitution	  proposed	  
earlier,	  such	  practices	  were	  situated	  directly	  across	  the	  absolute	  (yet	  continually	  
transgressed)	  boundary	  from	  pedagogic	  responsibility	  –	  the	  purported	  base	  of	  
colonial	  policies.	  	  
In	  fact,	  Farrell’s	  memo	  charged	  Zionism	  with	  severing	  Jews	  from	  the	  two	  
great	  “civilising	  influences”	  available	  to	  them:	  first,	  the	  gentile	  cultures	  of	  Western	  
European	  countries,	  and	  more	  important	  for	  our	  purposes,	  religious	  Judaism.	  
Zionists	  were	  thus	  depicted	  as	  having	  absolutely	  removed	  themselves	  from	  any	  
common	  ethical	  ground:	  
The	  immoral	  or	  hypocritical	  attitude	  of	  the	  Zionist	  leaders	  is	  not	  that	  of	  most	  
Western	  Jews	  but	  few	  of	  these	  migrate	  to	  Palestine	  and	  those	  who	  remain	  in	  
the	   Diaspora	   do	   not	   fully	   understand	   the	   differences	   between	   their	   own	  
ethical	   outlook	   and	   that	   of	   the	   Poles,	   Russians	   and	   other	   Easterners	   who	  
constitute	  the	  larger	  part	  of	  Palestinian	  Jewry	  and	  direct	  its	  internal	  policy.	  
These	   have	   not	   been	   long,	   widely	   and	   intimately	   subjected	   to	   civilising	  
influences	   either	   at	   home	   or	   in	   Palestine	   and,	   having	   abandoned	   religious	  
practices,	  are	  without	  any	  basis	  for	  the	  development	  of	  moral	  principle.14	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  Jerome	  Farrell	  to	  District	  Commissioner,	  Haifa.	  August	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  1943.	  ISA	  1056/35	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  mem.	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Indeed,	  Farrell	  emphasized,	  “there	  is	  no	  common	  moral	  and	  theological	  ground	  
upon	  which	  politically	  organised	  Jewry	  and	  a	  Christian	  civilization	  can	  stand	  
together	  in	  harmony.”15	  As	  he	  emphasized	  later	  in	  the	  memo,	  there	  was	  simply	  no	  
way	  that	  Jewish	  identity	  could	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  political	  action	  without	  violating	  
the	  principles	  of	  “common	  humanism,”	  principles	  that,	  we	  might	  add,	  were	  
seemingly	  uncompromised	  by	  the	  political	  acts	  of	  “Christian	  civilization.”	  Farrell	  
assumed	  a	  quasi-­‐confessional	  mode	  in	  stating:	  	  
I	   must	   admit	   that	   for	   many	   years,	   and	   despite	   many	   indications,	   I	   myself	  
failed	   fully	   to	  understand	  why	   in	   the	  national	  home,	  Palestine,	   it	   should	  be	  
necessary	   to	   reinforce	   the	   natural	   separatism	   which	   dispersed	   Jewry	   had	  
exhibited	   through	  millennia	   by	   exaggerated	   attention	   to	   Hebrew	   language	  
and	  other,	  more	  unprofitable,	  Hebrew	  studies.	  Ultimately,	  however,	   though	  
late,	   the	   reason	  became	   clear,	   that	   the	   aim	  was	  not	   a	  passive,	   cultural	   and	  
religious	   Judaism	   but	   the	   nurture	   of	   an	   active,	   selfish	   and	   aggressively	  
secular,	   and	   imperialistic	   spirit	   liable	   to	   direct	   itself	   to	   domination	   over	  
neighbouring	  peoples.16	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  there	  is	  no	  epistemic	  space	  for	  a	  religious	  Judaism	  that	  is	  
something	  other	  than	  cultural	  or	  passive.	  Beyond	  pedagogic	  irresponsibility,	  
Zionism	  was	  thus	  guilty	  of	  promoting	  a	  political-­‐theological	  hybrid	  that	  
simultaneously	  overturned	  the	  Jew’s	  “natural”	  passivity	  and	  violated	  the	  sublime	  
principles	  of	  religion	  itself.	  This	  attitude	  was	  common	  among	  British	  officers	  in	  
Palestine,	  including	  Farrell’s	  predecessor,	  Humphrey	  Bowman.	  The	  latter	  spoke	  
charitably	  of	  Orthodox	  Jews,	  particularly	  those	  who	  had	  been	  in	  Palestine	  prior	  to	  
the	  First	  World	  War.	  These	  were	  the	  watani	  Jews	  who	  granted	  coherence	  to	  the	  idea	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of	  the	  Holy	  Land,	  “the	  most	  unoffending	  and	  inoffensive	  Jews	  in	  the	  world:	  holy	  men	  
and	  their	  families,	  and	  religious	  students.”17	  
Zionists	  were	  not	  the	  only	  party	  guilty	  of	  using	  education	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  
political	  indoctrination,	  only	  the	  most	  successful.	  In	  the	  same	  memorandum,	  the	  
Director	  of	  Education	  continued	  to	  state,	  “the	  attitude	  of	  Palestine	  Zionists	  to	  
education	  is	  essentially	  identical	  not	  only	  with	  that	  of	  the	  Nazis	  and	  the	  Russian	  
Communists	  but	  also	  with	  that	  of	  Jamal	  Hussaini	  and	  other	  Arab	  politicians	  who	  
wish	  to	  use	  the	  Arab	  schools	  to	  inculcate	  fanatical	  anti-­‐Zionism.”	  However,	  he	  noted	  
with	  satisfaction,	  “the	  Arab	  politicians	  have	  been	  less	  successful	  and	  their	  influence	  
touches	  in	  any	  considerable	  degree	  only	  Moslem	  private	  schools....	  Thus	  a	  large	  
majority	  of	  the	  Moslem	  and	  Christian	  population	  is	  still	  educated	  in	  the	  common	  
principles	  of	  conduct	  which	  inform	  Christianity	  and	  Islam.”18	  	  
Farrell	  continued	  this	  line	  of	  argumentation	  throughout,	  asserting	  that	  the	  
Arab	  Public	  System	  was	  still	  grounded	  in	  the	  religious	  values	  that	  constituted	  a	  
universal	  moral	  system,	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  special	  attention	  devoted	  to	  religious	  
education.	  But	  insofar	  as	  Judaism	  acted	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  political	  identity,	  it	  sacrificed	  
its	  place	  in	  the	  Abrahamic	  assembly:	  	  
Religion	   is	   a	   full	   subject	   in	   the	   curriculum	   and	   thus	   the	   ultimate	   basis	   of	  
ethical	   values	   in	   the	   Government	   schools	   is	   common	   to	   Islam	   and	  
Christianity,	   for	   both	   accept	   a	   theology	   and	  moral	   principles	   based	   largely	  
on	  Greek	  philosophy,	  while	   Islam	   regards	  Christ	   as	   at	   least	   a	   prophet.	   But	  
“unassimilated”	   Judaism	   after	   rejecting	   successively	   both	   Hellenism	   and	  
Christ	  is	  now	  reducing	  its	  own	  traditional	  faith,	  so	  far	  as	  it	  still	  survives	  at	  all	  
as	  a	  religion,	  from	  monotheism	  to	  the	  older	  henotheism	  which	  leads	  to	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Humphrey	  Bowman,	  diary	  entry	  dated	  August	  28,	  1929.	  MEC,	  Humphrey	  Bowman	  collection,	  Box	  
4A.	  	  
18	  Ibid.	  Section	  6.	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racial	  self-­‐worship	  which	  Albert	  Rosenberg	  [sic]	  borrowed	  from	  the	  Jews	  for	  
Nordic	  ends.19	  
	  
Again,	  having	  turned	  away	  from	  all	  possible	  sources	  of	  civilization,	  i.e.	  Christianity	  
and	  Hellenism,	  Zionism	  was	  found	  guilty	  of	  further	  reducing	  the	  remnants	  of	  
Judaism.	  Regarding	  the	  religious	  education	  given	  in	  Zionist	  schools,	  Farrell	  
pronounced	  that	  within	  the	  Mizrachi	  system	  as	  “formal	  and	  dead,	  a	  matter	  of	  ritual	  
and	  obsolete	  tabus.”	  The	  General	  schools	  hardly	  fared	  any	  better	  in	  his	  estimation,	  
as	  “the	  majority	  [of	  teachers]	  seem	  to	  have	  replaced	  religion	  by	  racialism.”	  But	  
worst	  of	  all	  was	  the	  situation	  within	  Labor	  schools,	  which	  were	  “in	  general	  
secularizing	  and	  many	  are	  actively	  anti-­‐religious”	  (original	  emphasis).20	  	  
Finally,	  the	  memorandum	  provides	  an	  important	  clue	  as	  to	  Farrell’s	  self-­‐
understanding	  of	  his	  position	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  his	  views	  differed	  both	  from	  
those	  of	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  and	  the	  Zionist	  Organization.	  “There	  are	  now	  two,	  and	  
only	  two,	  relevant	  attitudes	  to	  educational	  policy,	  which	  need	  discussion	  in	  this	  
place,”	  he	  wrote.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  attitude	  of	  “persons	  who	  believe	  in,	  and	  misuse,	  
the	  power	  of	  education	  over	  the	  human	  mind,”	  namely	  “the	  Jewish	  Agency	  and	  the	  
Zionists.”	  The	  second	  was	  “the	  view	  of	  those	  who	  regard	  education,	  if	  at	  all,	  as	  a	  fad,	  
a	  luxury	  or	  a	  nuisance,”	  an	  attitude	  that	  “has	  often	  been	  exhibited	  by	  Colonial	  
Governments.”	  Most	  importantly	  for	  our	  purposes,	  Farrell	  identified	  a	  third	  
perspective,	  no	  doubt	  his	  own,	  “that	  of	  persons	  who	  desire	  to	  use	  education	  for	  the	  
common	  ends	  of	  Christian	  and	  Moslem	  morality.”	  Importantly,	  to	  borrow	  once	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  “Notes	  on	  Jewish	  Education	  and	  the	  McNair	  Report.”	  November	  30,	  1946.	  TNA,	  
CO/733/476/2.	  Section	  22.	  Farrell	  was	  in	  all	  likelihood	  referring	  to	  Alfred	  Rosenberg,	  one	  of	  the	  Nazi	  
party’s	  chief	  ideologues.	  	  	  
20	  Ibid.	  Section	  36.	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from	  Jonathan	  Sheehan,	  Farrell’s	  “universal”	  moral	  system	  was	  one	  that	  increasingly	  
excluded	  Jews	  from	  “the	  religious	  patrimony	  of	  Western	  nations”	  because	  the	  
“Hebrews	  simply	  could	  not	  provide	  the	  model	  of	  universal	  humanity	  that	  would	  
regulate	  the	  new	  ideology	  of	  culture.”21	  	  
However,	  as	  even	  Farrell	  recognized,	  his	  position	  was	  the	  minority	  one	  in	  
Palestine,	  and	  indeed,	  no	  longer	  relevant	  in	  a	  time	  when	  the	  greatest	  possible	  
danger—the	  transfer	  of	  education	  to	  Arab	  and	  Jewish	  communities—loomed	  on	  the	  
horizon.	  Lest	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  take	  seriously	  recommendations	  to	  increase	  the	  
level	  of	  local	  control	  over	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System,	  Farrell	  issued	  one	  final	  warning:	  
“If	  then	  the	  Arab	  politicians	  follow	  the	  Zionist	  model	  and	  if	  the	  recommendations	  of	  
the	  [McNair]	  Commission	  establish	  a	  premature	  and	  too	  complete	  autonomy	  in	  the	  
education	  of	  both	  Palestinian	  races	  no	  ordinary	  Police	  but	  a	  Gestapo	  will	  be	  
necessary	  to	  repress	  the	  over-­‐excitement	  of	  young	  minds,	  Arab	  as	  well	  as	  Jewish.”22	  	  
	  
Education	  at	  the	  crossroads	  of	  authenticity	  and	  revolution	  
With	  approximately	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  Palestine’s	  Jewish	  children	  in	  schools	  
under	  the	  Zionist	  administration,	  which	  possessed	  complete	  pedagogic	  and	  
curricular	  autonomy,	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  looked	  elsewhere	  in	  attempting	  
to	  strengthen	  the	  religious	  character	  of	  Jewish	  education.	  Numerous	  initiatives	  that	  
began	  in	  the	  early	  1940s	  offered	  financial	  assistance	  to	  Orthodox	  schools	  that	  were	  
often	  at	  political	  or	  ideological	  odds	  with	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi.	  These	  included	  not	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Sheehan,	  The	  Enlightenment	  Bible:	  xiv.	  
22	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  “Notes	  on	  Jewish	  Education	  and	  the	  McNair	  Report.”	  November	  30,	  1946.	  TNA,	  CO	  
733/476/2.	  Section	  22.	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the	  schools	  maintained	  by	  Agudat	  Israel,	  but	  a	  number	  of	  private	  talmudei-­‐torah	  and	  
schools	  that	  served	  Jews	  from	  Sephardic	  or	  Middle	  Eastern	  Jewish	  communities.	  
This	  was,	  in	  many	  ways,	  a	  curious	  development	  and	  it	  is	  worth	  asking	  which	  goals	  
the	  Department	  of	  Education	  hoped	  to	  achieve	  by	  supporting	  Orthodox	  Jewish	  
education	  in	  Palestine.	  This	  is	  all	  the	  more	  necessary	  because	  almost	  no	  scholarly	  
attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  
and	  Orthodox	  schools,	  while	  a	  review	  of	  this	  relationship	  challenges	  many	  of	  the	  
commonly	  held	  assumptions	  about	  Jewish	  education	  during	  this	  period.23	  
The	  surviving	  papers	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  illustrate	  that	  the	  
government	  grew	  increasingly	  involved	  in	  the	  support	  of	  Orthodox	  religious	  schools	  
during	  the	  final	  decade	  of	  Mandatory	  rule.	  It	  is	  also	  evident	  that	  this	  policy	  was	  not	  
merely	  advanced	  by	  Farrell	  or	  the	  Colonial	  Office,	  but	  largely	  embraced	  by	  the	  
Department’s	  Jewish	  inspectorate	  as	  well.	  This	  is	  significant,	  as	  these	  inspectors	  
were	  influential	  educators	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  They	  included	  Joseph	  Bentwich,	  the	  
younger	  brother	  of	  Norman	  Bentwich,	  the	  famed	  Orientalist,	  Shlomo	  Dov	  Goitein,	  
and	  the	  Honorary	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Scouts	  in	  Palestine,	  J.L.	  Bloom.	  In	  addition	  
to	  their	  regular	  responsibilities,	  Jewish	  inspectors	  oversaw	  a	  separate	  body,	  the	  
Jerusalem	  Orthodox	  Schools	  Committee	  (ha-­‐va’adat	  l’vatei	  sefer	  ẖaredim	  
b’yerushaliyim),	  which	  distributed	  over	  LP	  14,000	  in	  direct	  grants	  to	  Orthodox	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  there	  has	  been	  no	  examination	  of	  the	  Mandatory	  government’s	  relationship	  
with	  Orthodox	  (non-­‐Zionist)	  schools.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising	  given	  that	  scant	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  
even	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  and	  the	  Zionist	  school	  system.	  See,	  for	  
example,	  the	  very	  brief	  overview	  given	  in	  Reshef,	  ha-­‐ẖinukh	  ha-­‐ivri	  bi-­‐yamei	  ha-­‐bayit	  ha-­‐leumi,	  1919-­‐
1948:	  151-­‐70.	  The	  dominant	  scholarly	  trend,	  as	  reflected	  in	  Reshef	  and	  Deror’s	  account,	  is	  to	  treat	  the	  
Zionist	  school	  system	  as	  an	  autonomous	  unit	  that	  was	  shaped	  more	  by	  Zionist	  politics	  than	  by	  the	  
Mandatory	  government.	  For	  a	  different	  account	  that	  argues	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  was	  not	  attentive	  
enough	  to	  the	  Mandatory’s	  educational	  guidance,	  see	  Rachel	  Elboim-­‐Dror,	  "British	  Educational	  
Policies	  in	  Palestine,"	  Middle	  Eastern	  Studies	  36,	  no.	  2	  (2000).	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schools	  from	  1942-­‐1947.24	  This	  was	  apart	  from	  a	  separate	  grant-­‐giving	  initiative	  to	  
aid	  schools	  in	  centers	  of	  the	  Old	  Yishuv,	  which	  awarded	  between	  LP	  3000-­‐10,000	  
annually	  to	  Orthodox	  schools	  unaffiliated	  with	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi.25	  	  
It	  is	  also	  noteworthy	  that	  members	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Inspectorate	  tended	  to	  hold	  
ideological	  positions	  that	  differed	  in	  important	  ways	  from	  dominant	  strains	  of	  
Zionist	  thought.	  It	  was	  likely	  men	  of	  their	  ilk	  whom	  Farrell	  had	  in	  mind	  when	  
praising	  the	  small	  minority	  of	  Jewish	  teachers	  that	  were	  “influenced	  by	  a	  modernist	  
and	  more	  living	  religious	  sentiment.”26	  For	  instance,	  Joseph	  Bentwich	  hailed	  from	  a	  
British	  Zionist	  family	  that	  included	  his	  older	  brother	  Norman,	  Mandate	  Palestine’s	  
first	  Attorney	  General.	  Both	  men	  greatly	  admired	  the	  British	  and	  were	  alienated	  by	  
the	  extreme	  nationalism	  expressed	  by	  the	  Eastern	  European	  Zionist	  leadership.	  	  
Judging	  by	  his	  activism	  following	  Israel’s	  independence,	  Joseph	  was	  also	  
dissatisfied	  both	  with	  contemporary	  forms	  of	  Orthodox	  Judaism	  and	  with	  “secular”	  
Zionism,	  and	  this	  dissatisfaction	  may	  hint	  to	  why	  he	  was	  able	  to	  remain	  in	  Farrell’s	  
good	  graces.	  In	  the	  late	  1950’s,	  Bentwich	  founded	  the	  Amanah	  Group	  “to	  study	  and	  
promote	  new	  interpretations	  of	  Judaism.”27	  Amanah	  rejected	  the	  narrow	  equation	  of	  
“religion”	  (dat)	  with	  ritual	  observance,	  and	  insisted	  on	  an	  ethical	  understanding	  of	  
Judaism’s	  core.	  “You	  want	  to	  know	  if	  someone	  is	  ‘religious’	  or	  not.	  You	  look	  if	  he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Joseph	  Bentwich,	  “Summary	  of	  Activities	  for	  Jerusalem	  Orthodox	  Schools	  Committee,	  1942-­‐1947.”	  
October	  27,	  1947.	  ISA	  1057/24-­‐mem.	  	  
25	  For	  the	  1941-­‐42	  school	  year,	  LP	  4200	  was	  distributed,	  which	  included	  a	  LP	  1200	  grant	  to	  schools	  
maintained	  by	  Alliance	  Israélite	  Universelle.	  In	  1945-­‐46,	  the	  last	  year	  for	  which	  a	  complete	  report	  
exists,	  this	  aid	  reached	  LP	  10,800.	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  Department	  of	  Education,	  Annual	  Report	  
1941-­‐42	  and	  Annual	  Report	  1945-­‐46.	  	  
26	  Jerome	  Farrell,	  “Notes	  on	  Jewish	  Education	  and	  the	  McNair	  Report.”	  November	  30,	  1946.	  TNA,	  
CO/733/476/2.	  Section	  36.	  
27	  Benjamin	  Jaffe	  and	  Cecil	  Roth,	  "Bentwich	  family,"	  in	  Encyclopedia	  Judaica,	  ed.	  Michael	  Berenbaum	  
and	  Fred	  Skolnik	  (Detroit:	  Macmillan	  Reference	  USA,	  2007).	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wears	  a	  kippah	  on	  his	  head,	  restrains	  from	  traveling	  on	  Shabbat,	  eats	  kosher	  foods	  
(shomer	  kashrut).	  It	  is	  not	  important	  if	  he	  is	  honest	  in	  his	  speech	  and	  his	  exchanges,	  
if	  he	  is	  loyal	  to	  others	  or	  only	  worries	  for	  himself…If	  he	  performs	  the	  ‘positive	  
commandments’	  that	  are	  in	  the	  Shulẖan	  Arech,	  he	  is	  a	  religious	  Jew.”	  In	  contrast,	  
Bentwich	  encouraged	  the	  association	  of	  religiosity	  with	  ethical	  conduct,	  cooperation	  
with	  one’s	  neighbor,	  and	  inter-­‐religious	  tolerance.28	  	  
Shlomo	  Dov	  Goitein	  was	  similarly	  out	  of	  step	  with	  the	  Zionist	  mainstream.	  He	  
received	  a	  doctorate	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Frankfurt	  where	  he	  wrote	  a	  dissertation	  
on	  Islamic	  prayer	  under	  Joseph	  Horovitz.29	  After	  immigrating	  to	  Palestine	  in	  1923	  
(with	  his	  close	  friend,	  Gershom	  Scholem),	  he	  served	  as	  a	  teacher	  at	  the	  Reali	  School	  
in	  Haifa	  and	  became	  one	  of	  the	  first	  lecturers	  at	  the	  Hebrew	  University.	  Goitein’s	  
Zionism	  was	  distinctive	  in	  that	  it	  stressed	  the	  Semitic	  origins	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people	  
and	  held	  that	  the	  success	  of	  the	  national	  revival	  hinged	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Jews	  
were	  willing	  to	  embrace	  this	  patrimony.	  He	  encouraged	  Jews	  to	  study	  Arabic	  and	  
stressed	  the	  Arabian	  context	  of	  ancient	  Israel.30	  Perhaps	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  See,	  for	  example,	  Bentwich’s	  introductory	  remarks	  and	  lectures	  given	  at	  the	  group’s	  annual	  
meetings.	  "Dinim	  ve-­‐heshbonot	  	  al	  kinuse	  hug	  "Amanah"	  ba-­‐shanim	  722-­‐724,"	  ed.	  Joseph	  S.	  Bentwich	  
(Jerusalem	  ::	  R.	  Mas,	  1965),	  4,	  78-­‐83.	  
29	  A	  partial	  biography	  of	  Goitein,	  particularly	  regarding	  his	  involvement	  with	  the	  Cairo	  Geniza,	  is	  
available	  in	  Adina	  Hoffman,	  Sacred	  Trash:	  the	  lost	  and	  found	  world	  of	  the	  Cairo	  Geniza,	  ed.	  Peter	  Cole	  
and	  S.	  Schechter,	  1st	  ed.	  ed.	  (New	  York	  ::	  Nextbook	  :,	  2011),	  Chp.	  10.	  
30	  For	  more	  on	  Goitein’s	  encouragement	  of	  Arabic	  study,	  see	  Liora	  Halperin,	  "Orienting	  Language:	  
Reflections	  on	  the	  Study	  of	  Arabic	  in	  the	  Yishuv,"	  The	  Jewish	  Quarterly	  Review	  96,	  no.	  4	  (2006).	  
Within	  Goitein’s	  own	  body	  of	  scholarship,	  a	  number	  of	  publications	  address	  the	  similarities	  that	  
linked	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  peoples;	  for	  example,	  S.D.	  Goitein,	  "ha-­‐Makor	  'ha-­‐Aravi'	  shel	  Yisrael	  v'Dato	  
[The	  "Arabic"	  Source	  of	  Israel	  and	  its	  Religion],"	  Zion	  2,	  no.	  Alef	  (1937);	  ———,	  "ha-­‐Yachas	  el	  ha-­‐
Shilton	  b'Islam	  u	  v'Yahadut	  [The	  Relationship	  to	  Government/Rule	  in	  Islam	  and	  Judaism],"	  Tarbiz	  19,	  
no.	  3–4	  (Gimel-­‐Dalet)	  (1948);	  ibid.	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view,	  he	  performed	  ethnographic	  work	  on	  the	  Jews	  of	  Yemen,	  whom	  he	  viewed	  as	  
vessels	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  Judaism	  in	  its	  most	  authentic	  form.31	  	  
Goitein	  also	  wrote	  extensively	  on	  Jewish	  education,	  both	  historically	  and	  
prescriptively,	  publishing	  several	  articles	  in	  the	  leading	  education	  journal	  of	  the	  
yishuv,	  hed	  ha-­‐ẖinuch.	  During	  his	  time	  as	  an	  education	  inspector,	  he	  authored	  a	  full-­‐
length	  book,	  hora’at	  ha-­‐Tanakh,	  on	  teaching	  the	  Hebrew	  Bible,	  to	  which	  he	  often	  
referred	  Jewish	  educators.32	  In	  managing	  his	  own	  children’s	  education,	  Goitein	  
stressed	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  Torah	  and	  personally	  devoted	  attention	  to	  preparing	  
his	  son	  for	  his	  Bar	  Mitzvah.	  Goitein’s	  religious	  practice	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  largely	  
private:	  he	  prayed	  at	  home	  every	  morning,	  and	  with	  his	  family	  on	  the	  Sabbath.33	  	  
Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  Goitein	  maintained	  a	  distance	  from	  overt	  political	  
activism	  and	  never	  affiliated	  himself	  with	  a	  Zionist	  party,	  despite	  being	  friendly	  with	  
Judah	  Magnes	  and	  members	  of	  Brit	  Shalom.	  In	  this	  regard,	  it	  is	  telling	  that	  Goitein’s	  
political	  worldview	  is	  disputed:	  while	  his	  daughter,	  Ayala,	  believes	  he	  generally	  
sympathized	  with	  the	  Labor	  party,34	  a	  former	  student	  of	  Goitein’s,	  Eric	  Ormsby,	  has	  
characterized	  him	  as	  politically	  right-­‐wing.35	  He	  respected	  and	  admired	  the	  British	  
as	  a	  cultural	  force	  and	  maintained	  cordial	  relations	  with	  his	  colleagues	  at	  the	  
Department	  of	  Education,	  though	  he	  never	  developed	  a	  genuine	  friendship	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31For	  instance	  Goitein	  claimed	  that	  Yemenite	  Jews	  “remain	  very	  much	  the	  same	  as	  they	  had	  been	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  Talmudic	  period,”	  and	  thus	  offered	  a	  window	  into	  the	  original	  form	  of	  Jewish	  
education.	  ———,	  "Jewish	  Education	  in	  Yemen	  as	  an	  archetype	  of	  traditional	  Jewish	  education,"	  in	  
Between	  Past	  and	  Future,	  Essays	  and	  Studies	  on	  aspects	  on	  Immigrant	  absroption	  in	  Israel,	  ed.	  C.	  
Frankestein	  (Jerusalem:	  1953).	  
32	  ———,	  Hora'at	  ha-­‐Tanakh	  ba-­‐vait	  ha-­‐sefer	  ha-­‐'amimi	  v'ha-­‐tichoni:	  matarot,	  shita,	  tochnit	  [Teaching	  
the	  Hebrew	  Bible	  in	  elementary	  and	  high	  school:	  aims,	  method,	  syllabus]	  	  (Jerusalem1942).	  ———,	  
"Limud	  tefilah	  b'kitah	  dalet	  ha-­‐'amimit:	  tefilah	  ha-­‐chag	  [Teaching	  prayer	  in	  4th	  grade:	  Holiday	  
prayer],"	  hed	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  18,	  no.	  5	  (1944).	  
33	  Interview	  with	  Elon	  Goitein,	  January	  25,	  2012.	  Herzaliya	  Petuach,	  Israel.	  
34	  Interview	  with	  Ayala	  (Goitein)	  Gordon,	  January	  24th,	  2012.	  Jerusalem.	  
35	  Eric	  Ormsby,	  "The	  "born	  Schulmeister","	  The	  New	  Criterion	  2003.	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Farrell.36	  But	  his	  sense	  of	  professionalism	  and	  aloofness	  from	  Zionist	  politics	  surely	  
must	  have	  recommended	  him	  to	  the	  Director	  of	  Education,	  as	  Goitein	  appears	  as	  a	  
man	  who	  knew	  how	  to	  maintain	  a	  sense	  of	  separation	  between	  his	  religious,	  
political,	  professional	  and	  academic	  selves.	  	  
To	  pivot	  our	  discussion	  back	  to	  the	  archival	  record,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  
impetus	  to	  aid	  Orthodox	  Jewish	  schools	  outside	  the	  Zionist	  system	  came	  from	  two	  
directions:	  first,	  the	  refusal	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  to	  undertake	  certain	  
administrative	  reforms,	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  withholding	  
a	  portion	  of	  its	  annual	  block	  grant;	  and	  second,	  the	  desire	  to	  improve	  the	  status	  of	  
“traditional”	  religious	  education	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  perceived	  secularism	  of	  the	  Zionist	  
schools.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  financial	  stress	  on	  schools	  whose	  funding	  sources	  were	  
disrupted	  by	  World	  War	  II	  also	  contributed	  to	  the	  Department’s	  decision,	  though	  
the	  notoriously	  parsimonious	  Mandatory	  government	  was	  unlikely	  to	  extend	  its	  
resources	  based	  on	  financial	  need	  alone.	  	  
Summarizing	  the	  government’s	  position	  in	  a	  dispatch	  to	  the	  Colonial	  Office,	  
High	  Commissioner	  MacMichael	  noted	  that,	  “after	  due	  warning”,	  the	  Department	  of	  
Education	  had	  withheld	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  annual	  block	  grant	  given	  to	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  
for	  the	  financial	  years	  1938-­‐1941.	  These	  funds	  were	  then	  redirected	  toward	  the	  
“large	  number	  of	  Jewish	  schools”	  that	  existed	  “outside	  the	  Vaad	  Leumi	  system	  which	  
for	  various	  reasons	  they	  are	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  enter.”37	  The	  causes	  of	  the	  
present	  predicament	  were	  “not	  simple,”	  MacMichael	  stressed,	  and	  were	  ironically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Interview	  with	  Ayala	  (Goitein)	  Gordon,	  January	  24th,	  2012.	  Jerusalem.	  	  
37	  High	  Commissioner	  MacMichael	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies.	  August	  14,	  1942.	  TNA,	  CO	  
733/435/18.	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the	  products	  of	  the	  government’s	  preference	  for	  administering	  Palestine	  on	  
sectarian	  lines.	  “In	  the	  first	  place	  the	  Vaad	  Leumi,	  though	  it	  is	  the	  council	  of	  the	  
Jewish	  Religious	  Community	  in	  Palestine	  as	  established	  by	  Religious	  Communities	  
(Organization)	  Ordinance	  is	  not	  essentially	  a	  religious	  body	  and	  discourages	  
religious	  education	  except	  in	  a	  minority	  group	  of	  Vaad	  Leumi	  schools	  known	  as	  
Mizrachi.”	  However,	  he	  noted,	  “Mizrachi	  itself	  is	  a	  political	  body	  and	  does	  not	  
commend	  itself	  to	  all	  orthodox	  Jews.	  Complaints	  are	  frequent	  that	  the	  Vaad	  is	  
swayed	  by	  political	  rather	  than	  educational	  considerations	  and	  that	  the	  progress	  of	  
schools	  is	  hindered	  thereby.”38	  	  
Note	  here	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  distinguishes	  between	  
political	  and	  pedagogic	  considerations—a	  key	  tenet	  of	  colonial	  education	  discourse	  
that	  elides	  the	  Mandate	  government’s	  own	  transgression	  of	  this	  boundary.	  Yet	  the	  
letter	  is	  nevertheless	  overcome	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  befuddlement	  that	  Palestine’s	  official	  
Jewish	  religious	  community	  discouraged	  religious	  education.	  Adding	  to	  the	  trouble,	  
numerous	  Orthodox	  schools	  from	  the	  Old	  Yishuv	  were	  ineligible	  for	  government	  
support	  because	  they	  were	  not	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  official	  Jewish	  community.	  As	  
one	  official	  from	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  summarized	  the	  situation	  following	  a	  meeting	  
with	  members	  of	  Agudat	  Israel,	  “It	  was	  inequitable	  that	  in	  the	  Holy	  Land	  the	  
Community	  of	  Orthodox	  Jews	  were,	  by	  reason	  of	  their	  religious	  convictions,	  treated	  
as	  of	  less	  importance	  than	  the	  large	  immigrant	  population	  introduced	  into	  Palestine	  
by	  the	  Zionist	  movement.”39	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Ibid.	  	  
39	  Oranborne	  to	  Colonial	  Office.	  Summary	  of	  meeting	  with	  deputation	  from	  Agudat	  Israel,	  October	  23,	  
1942.	  TNA,	  CO	  733/435/18.	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As	  a	  solution,	  MacMichael	  proposed	  to	  extend	  direct	  aid	  to	  the	  schools	  of	  
Agudat	  Israel	  and	  those	  serving	  “Oriental	  Jews”	  who	  were	  underserved	  by	  the	  Va’ad	  
Leumi.	  For	  the	  1941-­‐42	  school	  year,	  the	  government	  distributed	  LP	  4,200	  in	  direct	  
aid	  to	  schools	  maintained	  by	  the	  Alliance	  Israélite	  Universelle,	  Agudat	  Israel,	  and	  
local	  committees	  in	  Jerusalem,	  Tel	  Aviv,	  Tiberias	  and	  Yavneh.	  Though	  the	  sum	  in	  
question	  was	  relatively	  small,	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  voiced	  support	  for	  increasing	  
these	  grants	  in	  coming	  years	  in	  pursuance	  of	  a	  policy	  whose	  main	  aim	  was	  “to	  
secure	  secular	  efficiency	  in	  the	  religious	  schools	  and	  a	  more	  religious	  spirit	  in	  the	  
secular	  schools.	  A	  single	  Jewish	  system	  of	  public	  education	  may	  then	  be	  gradually	  
formed	  under	  a	  more	  unified	  but	  more	  tolerant	  and	  varied	  control	  than	  the	  Vaad	  
Leumi	  has	  yet	  learnt	  to	  exercise.”40	  Responding	  to	  the	  dispatch,	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  
noted	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  Mandatory	  Government’s	  approach	  and	  voiced	  full	  
support	  of	  its	  attempt	  to	  evolve	  a	  single	  system	  of	  Jewish	  education	  with	  a	  more	  
“religious	  spirit.”41	  
MacMichael	  was	  merely	  putting	  into	  action	  the	  Education	  Director’s	  
longstanding	  desire	  to	  combat	  the	  secularism	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  Public	  System	  as	  a	  
means	  of	  reform.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  in	  Farrell’s	  1939	  letter	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  
Education	  of	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  in	  which	  he	  made	  a	  series	  of	  recommendations,	  he	  
stressed	  the	  rights	  of	  “parents	  of	  strong	  religious	  sentiment”	  to	  secure	  for	  their	  
children	  “not	  only	  proper	  instruction	  in	  faith,	  morals	  and	  ritual,	  but	  also	  secular	  
teaching	  in	  a	  religious	  atmosphere.”	  Furthermore,	  “the	  gap	  between	  the	  
denominational	  [i.e.	  Mizrachi]	  and	  the	  general	  schools	  should	  be	  closed	  by	  the	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  Ibid.	  	  
41	  Oranborne	  to	  High	  Commissioner	  MacMichael,	  October	  23,	  1942.	  TNA,	  CO	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encouragement	  of	  religious	  instruction	  in	  these	  latter	  schools	  too.	  This	  instruction	  
may	  follow	  a	  more	  modern	  syllabus	  than	  that	  of	  the	  denominational	  schools	  but	  will	  
accept	  the	  religious	  basis	  for	  conduct.”42	  An	  editorial	  in	  Palestine	  Review	  published	  
in	  response	  to	  the	  letter	  cheered	  that,	  “the	  religious	  authorities	  should	  rejoice	  that	  
they	  have	  found	  so	  doughty	  a	  champion	  outside	  their	  own	  ranks.”43	  
While	  grants	  to	  schools	  maintained	  by	  Agudat	  Israel	  may	  have	  been	  in	  part	  
politically	  motivated,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  the	  Department	  sought	  more	  than	  
simply	  to	  strengthen	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi’s	  rival.	  For	  instance,	  the	  
Department	  rejected	  Agudat	  Israel’s	  attempt	  to	  act	  as	  an	  intermediary	  in	  
distributing	  grants	  to	  a	  number	  of	  private	  ẖederim	  and	  talmudei-­‐torah.	  Deploying	  
the	  language	  of	  administrative	  efficiency	  the	  Department	  was	  known	  to	  favor,	  Rabbi	  
Blau	  of	  Agudat	  Yisrael	  argued	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Farrell	  that,	  “such	  centralization	  [of	  
orthodox	  education	  under	  their	  control]	  would	  no	  doubt	  improve	  education	  itself,	  
and	  would	  also	  most	  probably	  be	  welcomed	  by	  yourself,	  Sir,	  as	  they	  would	  serve	  to	  
centralize	  the	  control	  of	  the	  schools	  concerned	  through	  the	  cooperation	  between	  
your	  Department	  and	  the	  Education	  Department	  of	  Agudath	  Israel.”44	  
In	  response	  to	  the	  request,	  S.	  D.	  Goitein	  noted	  that	  a	  number	  of	  the	  schools	  Agudat	  
Israel	  proposed	  to	  include	  in	  its	  network	  were	  “talmudei	  torah	  for	  Oriental	  children”	  
with	  “no	  spiritual	  connection”	  to	  Agudat	  Israel	  (original	  emphasis).	  Goitein	  rebuffed	  
Agudat	  Israel’s	  attempt	  to	  represent	  schools	  of	  this	  type	  in	  a	  newly	  centralized	  
scheme,	  noting,	  “It	  would	  be	  more	  beneficial	  to	  consider	  these	  schools	  in	  connection	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Farrell	  to	  the	  Chairman	  and	  Executive	  Education	  Committee	  of	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi,	  June	  13,	  1939.	  
Reprinted	  in	  Palestine	  Review,	  Vol.	  IV,	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  March	  29,	  1940.	  	  
43	  “Notes	  and	  Comments,”	  Palestine	  Review,	  Vol.	  IV,	  No.	  35.	  March	  29,	  1940.	  	  
44	  Rabbi	  M.	  Blau	  to	  W.J.	  Farrell,	  September	  18,	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with	  the	  other	  institutions	  for	  Oriental	  children	  assisted	  by	  us	  so	  far	  in	  Jerusalem,	  
than	  to	  tie	  them	  up	  with	  Aguda,	  which	  would	  involve	  unnecessary	  obstacles	  to	  
reform.”45	  	  	  	  
If	  the	  primary	  purpose	  of	  extending	  government	  aid	  was	  to	  encourage	  
education	  reform,	  what	  were	  the	  features	  of	  this	  reformist	  agenda?	  In	  a	  fashion	  that	  
mirrored	  their	  efforts	  regarding	  the	  transformation	  of	  katātīb	  into	  public	  
elementary	  schools,	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  seized	  on	  the	  ẖederim	  and	  
talmudei-­‐torah	  of	  the	  Old	  Yishuv	  as	  sites	  for	  hygienic,	  pedagogic	  and	  curricular	  
transformation.	  “Is	  there	  no	  way	  of	  compelling	  the	  man	  to	  improve	  conditions	  at	  
least	  insofar	  as	  this	  can	  be	  done	  without	  expenses,	  such	  as	  keeping	  the	  rooms,	  the	  
latrine,	  himself,	  and	  the	  children	  clean	  and	  doing	  something	  useful	  with	  them?”46	  
The	  question,	  posed	  by	  one	  government	  inspector	  after	  visiting	  the	  talmud-­‐torah	  of	  
Rabbi	  Ovadya	  Eliahu,	  was	  illustrative	  of	  prevailing	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  “old-­‐
fashioned”	  Orthodox	  schools,	  which,	  similar	  to	  the	  katātīb,	  were	  regarded	  as	  filthy,	  
poorly	  staffed,	  and	  pedagogically	  backward.	  As	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  latter,	  the	  
Department	  of	  Education	  aimed	  not	  at	  the	  eradication	  of	  religious	  schools,	  but	  their	  
transformation	  into	  clean,	  rationally	  administered	  institutions	  that	  would	  retain	  the	  
centrality	  of	  religious	  instruction	  while	  introducing	  additional	  subjects	  to	  encourage	  
the	  embrace	  of	  “productive”	  professions.	  	  
Schools	  that	  were	  located	  within	  private	  dwellings,	  had	  insufficient	  
ventilation,	  lacked	  drinking	  taps,	  working	  toilets,	  playgrounds	  or	  furnishings	  were	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  S.D.	  Goitein,	  “New	  Schools	  to	  be	  admitted	  to	  the	  Aguda	  System.”	  August	  16,	  1942.	  ISA	  RG8,	  
1057/23-­‐mem.	  
46	  Untitled	  inspection	  report,	  November	  23,	  1946.	  ISA	  RG8,	  1053/8-­‐mem.	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bound	  to	  clash	  with	  the	  Department	  of	  Education,	  whose	  authority	  over	  private	  (un-­‐
aided)	  religious	  schools	  was	  limited	  to	  ensuring	  they	  registered	  with	  the	  
government	  and	  met	  its	  hygienic	  standards.	  The	  latter	  were	  ideally	  conceived	  and	  
had	  little	  relation	  to	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  schoolhouse,	  particularly	  among	  
the	  poverty-­‐stricken	  Orthodox	  Jews	  that	  made	  up	  the	  Old	  Yishuv.	  In	  extreme	  cases,	  
the	  Director	  of	  Education	  ordered	  the	  closure	  of	  non-­‐compliant	  schools,	  preferring	  
no	  education	  to	  one	  conducted	  in	  unsavory	  conditions.	  	  
While	  the	  majority	  of	  interactions	  between	  the	  Department	  and	  Orthodox	  
schools	  related	  to	  the	  government’s	  sanitary	  requirements,	  the	  Department	  was	  
equally	  interested	  in	  promoting	  curricular	  and	  pedagogic	  reforms.	  Many	  of	  the	  
suggested	  reforms	  complemented	  contemporary	  Zionist	  critiques	  of	  the	  “old”	  
educational	  model,	  such	  as	  the	  insistence	  that	  lessons	  focus	  on	  those	  sections	  of	  the	  
Hebrew	  Bible	  deemed	  appropriate	  for	  a	  child’s	  sensibility.	  General	  subjects	  were	  
not	  meant	  to	  challenge	  the	  primacy	  of	  religious	  instruction,	  but	  rather	  to	  prepare	  
children	  to	  be	  economically	  useful	  members	  of	  modern	  society.	  As	  earlier	  suggested	  
in	  our	  discussion	  of	  katātīb,	  we	  must	  distinguish	  between	  the	  utilitarian	  use	  of	  
secular	  education	  and	  secularism;	  while	  the	  former	  was	  to	  be	  heartily	  embraced,	  the	  
latter	  was	  not	  a	  model	  to	  be	  emulated	  by	  colonial	  subjects.	  A	  few	  case	  studies	  will	  
help	  elucidate	  the	  patterns	  that	  characterized	  the	  Department	  of	  Education’s	  





Model	  students	  and	  repeat	  offenders	  
There	  are	  notably	  few	  instances	  of	  praise	  for	  (non-­‐Zionist)	  Orthodox	  schools	  
in	  the	  Department	  of	  Education’s	  records.	  On	  the	  whole,	  the	  Director	  and	  the	  Jewish	  
inspectorate	  agreed	  with	  the	  prevailing	  view	  that	  saw	  them	  as	  sorely	  in	  need	  of	  
hygienic	  and	  pedagogic	  reform.	  Similarly,	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  characterized	  the	  vast	  
majority	  of	  talmudei-­‐torah	  and	  ẖederim	  as	  existing	  in	  “lowly	  condition,	  both	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  sanitary	  conditions	  that	  prevail	  within	  them	  and	  the	  educational	  
status.”47	  Echoing	  this	  sentiment,	  an	  editorial	  in	  the	  Hebrew	  daily,	  Ha-­‐aretz,	  further	  
lamented	  the	  continued	  survival	  of	  such	  antiquated	  schools,	  which	  offered	  “an	  
education	  that	  is	  insufficient	  for	  the	  general	  good,	  and	  particularly	  the	  national	  
good.”48	  
	  There	  were,	  however,	  notable	  exceptions,	  which	  the	  Department	  of	  
Education	  eagerly	  supported	  as	  a	  means	  of	  promoting	  a	  new	  form	  of	  “traditional”	  
Jewish	  education.	  Such	  was	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Jerusalem	  girls’	  school	  founded	  by	  Rabbi	  
Altschuler,	  which	  began	  receiving	  government	  aid	  in	  the	  late	  1920s.	  Though	  it	  
catered	  to	  Orthodox	  families,	  the	  school	  “differs	  from	  the	  old	  traditional	  girls’	  
school”	  in	  “curriculum,	  method	  and	  school	  organization.”	  Described	  as	  very	  clean	  
and	  orderly,	  the	  school	  displayed	  the	  other	  hallmarks	  of	  modernization:	  “there	  is	  a	  
definite	  time-­‐table;	  attendance	  registries	  are	  properly	  kept;	  recesses	  are	  well	  
arranged.”	  Though	  a	  government	  inspection	  report	  noted	  that	  teachers	  were	  largely	  
lacking	  in	  higher	  education	  or	  pedagogic	  training,	  the	  Department	  nevertheless	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Hanhalat	  ha-­‐va’ad	  ha-­‐leumi	  to	  District	  Commissioner,	  Jerusalem.	  April	  8,	  1935.	  ISA	  RG8,	  1016/1-­‐
mem.	  	  
48	  "Batei	  sefer	  ha-­‐amamiyim	  b'yerushaliyim	  l'or	  ha-­‐tzrachim,"	  Ha-­‐aretz,	  August	  30,	  1938.	  
	  255	  
looked	  favorably	  upon	  the	  school	  and	  viewed	  the	  government’s	  support	  as	  a	  means	  
to	  implement	  further	  reforms:	  “Though	  the	  school	  falls	  slightly	  below	  the	  general	  
elementary	  standard	  and	  is	  not	  entirely	  efficient	  I	  would	  strongly	  recommend	  that	  it	  
be	  given	  a	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid.	  The	  school,	  being	  perhaps	  the	  only	  one	  of	  this	  very	  desirable	  
type,	  deserves	  encouragement,	  and	  the	  more	  control	  we	  can	  exercise	  over	  it	  the	  
better.”49	  
Similarly,	  the	  inspectorate	  offered	  qualified	  praise	  to	  the	  talmud-­‐torah	  
maintained	  by	  histadrut	  he-­‐ẖaredim	  (the	  Federation	  of	  Haredi	  Jews),	  “one	  of	  the	  best	  
talmud	  torahs,”	  and	  deemed	  it	  worthy	  of	  both	  government	  and	  municipal	  aid.50	  
Housed	  in	  a	  large,	  modern	  building,	  it	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  schools	  of	  this	  type	  to	  
receive	  the	  stamp	  of	  approval	  from	  the	  Palestine	  Health	  Department.	  Moreover,	  the	  
Department	  of	  Education	  approved	  of	  its	  curriculum,	  which	  included	  Hebrew,	  
Arithmetic,	  Geography,	  Science,	  History	  and	  English	  among	  its	  “lay	  subjects.”	  The	  
school	  even	  devoted	  three	  to	  four	  weekly	  hours	  to	  the	  prophetic	  writings,	  
undoubtedly	  “as	  a	  sop	  to	  those	  of	  ‘modern’	  views	  on	  education.”51	  This	  represented	  
a	  departure	  from	  the	  custom	  in	  most	  talmudei-­‐torah,	  in	  which	  the	  Torah	  was	  the	  
only	  portion	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  Bible	  studied	  in	  some	  detail,	  and	  this	  only	  as	  a	  stepping-­‐
stone	  to	  more	  advanced	  oral	  commentaries.	  While	  such	  a	  curriculum	  was	  
undoubtedly	  a	  relative	  novelty	  in	  historical	  terms,	  the	  school’s	  founder,	  histadrut	  he-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Avinoam	  Yellin,	  “Report:	  Bait	  Hinnukh	  Yeladim.”	  November	  4,	  1926.	  ISA	  RG8,	  1034	  mem.	  	  
50	  “T.T.	  Histadrut	  Haredeim,	  Tel	  Aviv.”	  February	  10,	  1941.	  ISA	  RG8,	  1060/39-­‐mem.	  
51	  Ibid.	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ẖaredim,	  labeled	  itself	  nothing	  other	  than	  “the	  voice	  of	  true,	  pure	  Judaism	  (ha-­‐
yahadut	  ha-­‐amitit	  v’ha-­‐tzerufah).”52	  	  
On	  the	  opposite	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  were	  schools	  that	  served	  children	  from	  
edot	  ha-­‐mizrach,	  i.e.	  Jewish	  communities	  from	  Sephardic,	  North	  African,	  Middle	  
Eastern	  or	  Central	  Asian	  origin.	  From	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  Mandate,	  education	  among	  
edot	  ha-­‐mizraẖ	  had	  proved	  a	  thorn	  in	  the	  side	  of	  Zionist	  educators,	  who	  explicitly	  
aimed	  at	  the	  creation	  of	  dor	  ahid,	  a	  uniform	  generation	  of	  schoolchildren	  whose	  
homogenization	  was	  deemed	  essential	  to	  the	  national	  project.	  “The	  Jews	  who	  are	  
returning	  to	  Palestine	  come,	  literally,	  from	  the	  four	  corners	  of	  the	  earth	  and	  speak	  
many	  diverse	  languages,”	  wrote	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  of	  the	  
Jewish	  Agency	  in	  1930.	  “The	  restoration	  of	  Hebrew,”	  in	  which	  the	  new	  schools	  
played	  so	  central	  a	  role,	  was	  thus	  “not	  only	  a	  romantic	  venture.”	  To	  the	  contrary,	  it	  
was	  “the	  instrument	  of	  Jewish	  unification.”53	  While	  communities	  from	  edot	  ha-­‐
mizraẖ	  did	  not	  typically	  express	  the	  same	  ideological	  opposition	  as	  the	  Ashkenazi	  
Old	  Yishuv	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	  secular	  subjects	  in	  school	  curricula,	  they	  nevertheless	  
desired	  to	  maintain	  their	  native	  languages	  and	  a	  distinct	  sense	  of	  edah	  identity	  
rather	  than	  assimilating	  to	  the	  “universal”	  Zionist	  model.54	  As	  a	  result	  of	  extreme	  
neglect	  from	  Zionist	  educational	  bodies,	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  donations	  from	  communities	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  “Alon	  shel	  histadrut	  he-­‐haredim	  b’tev	  aviv.”	  June	  9,	  1933.	  ISA	  RG8,	  1060/39-­‐mem.	  
53	  I.B.	  Berkson,	  The	  Zionist	  School	  System	  (Jerusalem:	  Department	  of	  Education	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Agency	  
for	  Palestine	  1930).	  
54	  Elboim-­‐Dror,	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  ha-­‐ivri	  be-­‐Erets-­‐Yisrael.	  Volume	  2:	  228-­‐241.	  It	  is	  here	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  
term	  edah	  itself,	  usually	  meant	  to	  denote	  a	  Jewish	  community	  from	  a	  specific	  region,	  i.e.	  the	  Iranian	  
edah,	  appears	  to	  have	  undergone	  its	  own	  transformation	  during	  the	  Mandate	  period	  as	  the	  Zionist	  
Organization	  promoted	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  unified	  Jewish	  nation.	  By	  the	  late	  1930s,	  the	  term	  “ha-­‐edah	  ha-­‐
yehudit”	  (The	  Jewish	  edah)	  entered	  circulation,	  suggesting	  an	  attempt	  to	  overturn	  the	  particularistic	  
undertones	  usually	  associated	  with	  the	  term.	  See,	  for	  example,	  hanhalat	  ha-­‐va’ad	  ha-­‐leumi	  to	  Chief	  
Secretary	  of	  the	  Government,	  August	  10,	  1939.	  ISA	  RG8,	  1016/1-­‐mem.	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abroad	  similar	  to	  those	  that	  supported	  Ashkenazi	  institutions,	  schools	  serving	  
children	  from	  edot	  ha-­‐mizraẖ	  were	  among	  the	  poorest	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine.	  
Reflecting	  this	  fact,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Jewish	  children	  without	  access	  to	  any	  formal	  
education	  came	  from	  these	  communities.55	  
Depending	  on	  one’s	  perspective,	  Jews	  from	  Eastern	  communities	  were	  either	  
the	  living	  embodiment	  of	  ancient	  Judaism,	  or	  a	  force	  that	  destabilized	  the	  Zionist	  
attempt	  to	  render	  Jews	  modern	  (i.e.	  white,	  European,	  secular).	  S.D.	  Goitein	  was	  a	  
member	  of	  the	  former	  camp.	  In	  a	  1953	  article,	  he	  argued	  that	  Yemenite	  Jews	  
“remain	  very	  much	  the	  same	  as	  they	  had	  been	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Talmudic	  period,”	  
and	  contrasted	  the	  Yemenite	  Jew	  as	  a	  member	  of	  ‘Homo	  Religiosus’	  to	  modern	  man.	  
Thus	  while	  “we	  belong	  to	  the	  type	  of	  ‘Homo	  Economicus’,	  whose	  aim	  it	  is	  to	  achieve	  
a	  good	  life	  for	  himself	  and	  the	  greatest	  possible	  number	  of	  his	  fellowmen,	  the	  
Yemenite	  represents	  ‘Homo	  Religiosus’	  who	  is	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  salvation	  of	  his	  
soul	  and	  the	  souls	  of	  those	  for	  whom	  he	  feels	  responsible.”	  In	  this	  he	  was	  not	  unlike	  
Jews,	  even	  European	  ones,	  from	  generations	  past:	  “If	  we	  disregard	  outward	  
appearances,	  we	  shall	  find	  that	  the	  personality	  of	  the	  Yemenite	  Jew	  does	  not	  
essentially	  differ	  from	  that	  of	  the	  Jew	  of	  Eastern	  Europe,	  Hungary	  or	  Southern	  
Germany	  generations	  ago.	  What	  makes	  the	  Yemenite	  seem	  ‘strange’	  to	  us	  is	  the	  fact	  
that	  he	  has	  remained	  true	  to	  the	  ancient	  Jewish	  tradition.”56	  	  	  
Conversely,	  Zionist	  teachers	  and	  headmasters	  expressed	  concern	  at	  the	  
corrupting	  influences	  of	  Jews	  from	  Eastern	  communities.	  Letters	  to	  the	  Department	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  M.	  Brill,	  The	  School	  Attendance	  of	  Jewish	  Children	  in	  Jerusalem	  	  (Jerusalem:	  Hebrew	  University	  Press	  
Association	  1941).	  
56	  Goitein,	  "Jewish	  Education	  in	  Yemen	  as	  an	  archetype	  of	  traditional	  Jewish	  education,"	  109-­‐10.	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of	  Education	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Agency,	  and	  later,	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi,	  about	  the	  “Yemenite	  
problem”	  or	  the	  “Kurdish	  question”	  were	  not	  uncommon.	  For	  instance,	  one	  
headmaster	  complained	  about	  “a	  bothersome	  question,	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  
children”	  in	  his	  school:	  
This	  problem	  is	  an	  obstacle	  that	  stalls	  our	  work	  in	  the	  school.	  Their	  lack	  of	  
education	  in	  the	  home	  and	  their	  dwelling	  in	  an	  Arab	  village	  appears	  to	  
damage	  their	  virtues	  (midot)	  and	  corrupt	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  students	  in	  the	  
school	  that	  play	  [with	  them],	  and	  who	  are	  fed	  the	  poor	  values	  that	  they	  
introduce	  into	  the	  school…	  We	  strive	  to	  treat	  them	  in	  a	  special	  manner	  and	  
we	  hope	  we	  will	  succeed.	  But	  our	  success	  will	  increase	  only	  when	  they	  move	  
out	  of	  the	  village	  and	  come	  dwell	  close	  to	  Jews.57	  
	  
In	  this	  instance,	  the	  Kurdish	  Jews	  did	  not	  represent	  a	  more	  authentic	  or	  primitive	  
form	  of	  Judaism,	  but	  rather,	  by	  existing	  in	  uncomfortable	  proximity	  to	  Palestinian	  
Arabs,	  they	  constituted	  the	  seeds	  of	  corruption	  that	  threatened	  to	  undermine	  the	  
Zionist	  endeavor.	  
The	  position	  of	  Yemenite	  Jews	  in	  Palestine	  offers	  a	  particularly	  compelling	  
example	  as	  to	  how	  these	  communities	  became	  situated	  on	  the	  receiving	  end	  of	  
overlapping	  British	  and	  Zionist	  attempts	  to	  reform	  communal	  education.	  Yemenite	  
schools	  were	  notoriously	  underserved	  during	  both	  the	  Ottoman	  and	  British	  periods.	  
Immediately	  following	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  petitions	  lamented	  the	  neglect	  and	  
gross	  indifference	  of	  Zionist	  leaders	  to	  Yemenite	  education,	  despite	  the	  high	  value	  
the	  Yemenite	  community	  itself	  seemed	  to	  place	  on	  the	  education	  of	  their	  children.58	  
Several	  years	  later,	  the	  material	  conditions	  of	  Yemenite	  schools	  had	  hardly	  
improved:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Eliezer	  Cohen	  to	  M.	  Lifshitz,	  “sekira	  al	  avodat	  beit	  ha’sefer,”	  1924.	  CZA	  J1\7970\2.	  
58	  See,	  for	  example,	  “Appeal	  for	  Support	  for	  Education	  of	  Yemenite	  Children,”	  April	  30,	  1919.	  CZA	  
S2\398\1.	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On	  26th	  October,	  1926,	  I	  paid	  a	  casual	  visit	  to	  the	  Yemenite	  Talmud-­‐Torah	  
‘Torah-­‐Or’…	  The	  school	  is	  of	  the	  usual	  Yemenite	  kuttab	  type,	  where	  only	  
religious	  subjects	  are	  taught,	  and	  very	  old-­‐fashioned	  methods	  employed.	  
The	  sanitary	  conditions	  are	  unsatisfactory.	  The	  rooms	  are	  badly	  ventilated	  
and	  lighted,	  and	  were	  found	  dirty.	  No	  drinking	  water	  arrangements	  at	  all,	  
latrines	  not	  sufficient;	  no	  furniture	  of	  any	  description,	  except	  for	  some	  very	  
bad	  benches.59	  
	  
At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  inspector’s	  visit,	  the	  school	  was	  unregistered	  with	  the	  Department	  
of	  Education	  and	  operating	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  Agudat	  Israel.	  Numerous	  letters	  
demanding	  that	  the	  latter	  body	  register	  the	  school	  and	  arrange	  for	  its	  inspection	  by	  
a	  medical	  officer	  yielded	  no	  results,	  until	  finally	  the	  Yemenite	  community	  registered	  
it	  as	  an	  independent	  organization.60	  	  
Unsurprisingly,	  the	  government	  medical	  officer	  found	  the	  school	  “unfit	  from	  
a	  sanitary	  point	  of	  view,”	  based	  on	  various	  deficiencies	  including	  the	  lack	  of	  toilets,	  
running	  water	  and	  a	  playground.	  Humphrey	  Bowman	  therefore	  ordered	  the	  Deputy	  
District	  Commissioner	  of	  Jerusalem	  to	  close	  the	  school.61	  In	  response	  to	  the	  pleas	  
from	  Yemenite	  community	  leaders—and	  a	  promise	  that	  they	  would	  work	  in	  earnest	  
to	  locate	  a	  more	  suitable	  building	  for	  the	  school—the	  Department	  allowed	  the	  
school	  to	  reopen	  for	  a	  two-­‐week	  period.	  Two	  months	  passed	  before	  it	  was	  
discovered	  that	  “the	  Yemenite	  Community	  have	  not	  kept	  their	  promise,”	  and	  
Bowman	  ordered	  the	  school	  closed	  yet	  again.62	  These	  two	  closures	  over	  a	  three-­‐
month	  period,	  with	  the	  corresponding	  bargaining	  between	  representatives	  from	  the	  
Yemenite	  community	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  Education,	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Yellin	  note,	  dated	  November	  8,	  1926.	  ISA	  RG8,	  1034/9-­‐mem.	  
60	  See	  for	  instance,	  Letter	  no.	  2575,	  Director	  of	  Education	  to	  Secretary	  of	  Central	  Agudat	  Israel,	  
November	  26,	  1926.	  Ibid.	  After	  several	  notices,	  Agudat	  Israel	  claimed	  to	  have	  transferred	  control	  to	  
the	  Yemenite	  community,	  which	  registered	  the	  school	  as	  an	  independent	  entity.	  See,	  “Form	  of	  
Application	  for	  permission	  to	  open	  a	  School,”	  December	  5,	  1926.	  ISA	  RG8,	  1034/9-­‐mem.	  
61	  Director	  of	  Education	  to	  Deputy	  District	  Commissioner,	  Jerusalem,	  December	  23,	  1926.	  Ibid.	  
62	  Director	  of	  Education	  to	  Deputy	  District	  Commissioner,	  Jerusalem,	  March	  4,	  1927.	  Ibid.	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recurring	  pattern	  that	  would	  characterize	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  parties	  for	  
years	  to	  come.	  	  
The	  assumption	  that	  education	  could	  only	  occur	  under	  specific	  sanitary	  
conditions,	  and	  in	  a	  place	  specifically	  designated	  as	  a	  school,	  underpinned	  the	  
Department	  of	  Education’s	  sanitary	  policies	  and	  contrasted	  sharply	  with	  customary	  
forms	  of	  religious	  education.	  In	  one	  instance,	  the	  Senior	  Medical	  Officer	  rejected	  a	  
possible	  location	  for	  the	  Yemenite	  school	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  landlord’s	  living	  
quarters	  were	  within	  the	  same	  dwelling.63	  Synagogues,	  which	  had	  frequently	  
housed	  schools,	  were	  also	  suspect.	  Upon	  inspecting	  a	  synagogue	  that	  was	  the	  
proposed	  space	  in	  which	  to	  reopen	  Torah-­‐Or,	  the	  medical	  officer	  noted	  that	  “the	  
pillows	  or	  cushions	  on	  the	  benches,	  used	  by	  the	  congregation,	  will	  have	  to	  be	  
removed	  when	  the	  school	  functions,	  as	  they	  are	  liable	  to	  carry	  vermin.”	  Latrine	  were	  
also	  needed,	  both	  “as	  being	  the	  only	  way	  of	  introducing	  a	  little	  order	  and	  cleanliness	  
in	  this	  dirty	  and	  unwholesome	  spot”	  and	  as	  a	  means	  of	  bureaucratic	  training:	  “the	  
people	  really	  must	  be	  taught	  not	  to	  transgress	  P.H.D.	  [Palestine	  Health	  Department]	  
orders.”64	  	  
Meanwhile,	  the	  leaders	  of	  Torah-­‐Or	  engaged	  in	  a	  number	  of	  tactics	  to	  prevent	  
school	  closures	  or	  at	  least	  mitigate	  their	  effects.	  When,	  for	  example,	  the	  original	  
school	  was	  closed	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1927,	  the	  community	  seems	  to	  have	  simply	  re-­‐
opened	  it	  in	  a	  different	  quarter	  without	  informing	  the	  government.	  Similarly,	  letters	  
from	  the	  Yemenite	  community	  promising	  to	  undertake	  sanitary	  repairs	  at	  some	  
future	  date	  proved	  effective,	  at	  least	  temporarily.	  The	  community	  also	  deployed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Note	  from	  Sgd.	  J.L.B,	  September	  10,	  1928.	  ISA	  RG8	  1034/9-­‐mem	  –	  48.	  	  
64	  Memorandum	  from	  Senior	  Medical	  Officer,	  Feb.	  22,	  1929.	  ISA	  RG8	  1034/9-­‐mem.	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language	  that	  almost	  certainly	  capitalized	  on	  British	  anxiety	  about	  unsupervised	  
youth,	  noting	  in	  one	  petition	  that	  were	  it	  not	  for	  the	  school,	  scores	  of	  Yemenite	  
children	  would	  wander	  the	  streets	  (histovevu	  b’ẖutzot)	  without	  purpose.65	  	  
For	  their	  part,	  government	  inspectors	  criticized	  the	  “old-­‐fashioned”	  teachers	  
and	  narrow	  curriculum.	  As	  a	  partial	  remedy,	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  looked	  
favorably	  upon	  negotiations	  in	  1937	  to	  absorb	  the	  school	  into	  the	  Mizrachi	  system:	  
“This	   Talmud	   Torah…used	   to	   be	   maintained	   by	   the	   Committee	   of	   the	  
Yemenite	  Community	   in	  Jerusalem.	  The	  Talmud-­‐Torah	  was	  then	  conducted	  
on	   the	   lines	   of	   the	   old	   fashioned	   Talmudi-­‐Torah,	   in	   which	   nothing	   but	  
religious	  subjects	  are	  taught.	  Negotiations	  were	  recently	  conducted	  between	  
the	  Mizrachi	  and	  the	  Yemenite	  Committee	  with	  a	  view	  of	  absorbing	  the	  two	  
branches	   of	   the	   school….The	   Yemenites	   agreed	   to	   the	   teaching	   of	   certain	  
secular	  subjects,	  and	  the	  Mizrachi	  had	  to	  put	  with	  up	  the	  teaching	  of	  certain	  
religious	  subjects	  by	  old	   fashioned	  Yemenite	   teachers.	  The	  result	   is	  a	  good	  
step	   forward	   in	   transforming	   the	   old-­‐fashioned	   and	   extremely	   orthodox	  
Talmud-­‐Torah	   into	   a	   more	   or	   less	   regular	   Talmud-­‐Torah	   of	   the	   Mizrachi	  
type….the	   experiment	   deserves	   encouragement	   in	   as	   much	   as	   the	   pupils	  
now	  attending	  the	  Talmud-­‐Torah	  will	  get	  some	  secular	  education,	  whereas	  
in	  the	  old	  Talmud-­‐Torah	  they	  had	  no	  chance	  of	  getting	  any	  at	  all.”66	  
	  
School	  attendance	  forms	  for	  later	  years	  confirm	  that	  the	  talmud	  torah	  was	  indeed	  
administered	  by	  Mizrachi,	  and	  from	  this	  point	  forward	  teachers	  appointed	  by	  the	  
Va’ad	  Leumi	  oversaw	  a	  revised	  curriculum	  that	  included	  Hebrew,	  arithmetic,	  
drawing	  and	  singing.	  Physical	  training	  and	  nature	  study	  were	  “not	  tolerated	  at	  all,	  
but	  the	  teachers	  are	  attempting	  to	  touch	  some	  of	  the	  subject	  matter	  in	  the	  Hebrew	  
and	  other	  lessons.”67	  	  
Similar	  patterns	  occurred	  with	  regard	  to	  numerous	  schools	  serving	  children	  
from	  edot	  ha-­‐mizraẖ,	  and	  in	  many	  of	  these	  instances	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Petition	  to	  Director	  of	  Education	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Palestine	  from	  Yemenite	  community,	  
Jerusalem.	  August	  16,	  1927.	  Ibid.	  	  
66	  “Inspection	  note	  on	  Talmud-­‐Tora	  ‘Tora	  Or’	  for	  Yemenites.”	  12/14/1937.	  Ibid.	  	  
67	  Ibid.	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facilitated	  the	  eventual	  absorption	  of	  schools	  into	  the	  Mizrachi	  system.	  Such	  was	  the	  
case	  for	  talmuei	  torah	  serving	  Iraqi,	  Assyrian,	  and	  Anatolian	  Jewish	  communities.	  
They	  were	  often	  deemed	  pedagogically	  backward	  institutions—“the	  teacher…does	  
not	  know	  Hebrew.	  He	  teaches	  letters	  with	  vowels	  according	  to	  the	  method	  [used	  in]	  
kuttabs”—supervised	  by	  school	  committees	  that	  were	  “obstinate	  and	  
incompetent.”68	  In	  each	  instance	  the	  solution	  was	  the	  same:	  “I	  see	  no	  possibility	  for	  
further	  development	  if	  they	  do	  not	  get	  substantial	  help	  from	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  Dept.	  
in	  the	  future.”69	  More	  specifically,	  the	  Jewish	  inspectorate	  felt	  that	  “only	  a	  
supervisory	  authority	  like	  Mizrachi	  is	  able	  to	  bridge	  the	  ethnic	  factionalism”	  (ligshor	  
al	  ha-­‐pitzul	  ha-­‐edati),70	  i.e.	  help	  assimilate	  communities	  from	  edot	  ha-­‐mizraẖ	  into	  a	  
“standard”	  form	  of	  Jewish	  education.	  	  	  
In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Goitein	  grew	  frustrated	  with	  the	  rabbis	  who	  supervised	  
talmud-­‐torah	  Torat	  Aharon,	  which	  served	  Jerusalem’s	  Babylonian	  community.	  The	  
rabbis	  rebuffed	  Goitein’s	  suggestion	  that	  the	  school	  employ	  a	  married	  woman	  as	  a	  
teacher	  for	  the	  first	  grade,	  stating	  that	  Maimonides	  had	  forbidden	  such	  a	  practice.	  
Goitein	  attempted	  to	  counter	  this	  argument	  by	  stating	  that	  Maimonides	  also	  forbade	  
a	  bachelor	  from	  teaching	  boys,	  and	  yet	  the	  school	  employed	  no	  shortage	  of	  the	  
latter.	  The	  rabbis	  claimed	  that	  the	  legal	  ruling	  itself,	  the	  halacha,	  was	  beside	  the	  
point;	  the	  community	  would	  not	  consent	  to	  a	  female	  teacher	  in	  the	  school.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Both	  quotes	  are	  taken	  from	  discussions	  regarding	  Talmud	  Torah	  Urphalim,	  a	  Jewish	  community	  
from	  Eastern	  Anatolia.	  See	  S.D.	  Goitein,	  “Final	  Allocation	  of	  Grants	  to	  Jerusalem	  Orthodox	  Schools	  for	  
the	  School	  Year	  1945-­‐46,”	  November	  30,	  1945;	  and,	  Inspection	  report	  for	  Talmud	  Torah	  Urphalim,”	  
and	  S.D.	  Goitein,	  Talmud	  torah	  shel	  ha-­‐Urphalim,	  Yerushaliyim,	  Bikur	  b’yom	  1	  b’April	  1946,	  April	  1,	  
1946.	  ISA	  RG8,	  1057/24-­‐mem.	  
69	  S.D.	  Goitein,	  “Final	  Allocation	  of	  Grants	  to	  Jerusalem	  Orthodox	  Schools	  for	  the	  School	  Year	  1945-­‐
46,”	  November	  30,	  1945.	  Ibid.	  
70	  Joseph	  Goldschmidt,	  Talmud	  torah	  Ashurim	  shechonat	  Zichron	  Ya’akov,	  October	  29,	  1946.	  Ibid.	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Exasperated,	  Goitein	  could	  only	  conclude	  his	  minute	  by	  stating	  that,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  
“Mizrachi	  will	  have	  greater	  power	  to	  safeguard	  the	  religious	  character,”	  cast	  here	  as	  
an	  adherence	  to	  halachic	  textualism	  rather	  than	  the	  actual	  practices	  of	  the	  Jewish	  
community.71	  As	  Goitein’s	  letter	  suggests,	  it	  was	  precisely	  by	  abandoning	  the	  
customs	  of	  the	  edah	  that	  these	  communities	  could	  come	  to	  represent	  Judaism	  in	  its	  
more	  “authentic”	  form.	  
These	  efforts	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  found	  corollaries	  in	  
Zionist	  educators’	  tendency	  to	  view	  the	  education	  of	  children	  from	  edot	  ha-­‐mizraẖ	  
as	  a	  means	  of	  separating	  them	  from	  the	  languages	  and	  manners	  of	  the	  home.	  As	  
Rachel-­‐Elboim	  Dror’s	  work	  on	  Hebrew	  education	  following	  World	  War	  I	  has	  shown,	  
the	  newly	  empowered	  Zionist	  Organization	  struggled	  to	  deal	  with	  pupils	  who	  home	  
environment	  was	  “foreign	  in	  wisdom	  and	  spirit”	  to	  that	  of	  the	  school.	  “What	  the	  
school	  repairs,	  the	  home	  removes.”72	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  the	  discursive	  parallels	  
between	  these	  efforts	  and	  those	  developed	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Education’s	  
dealings	  with	  rural	  Arab	  society,	  which,	  as	  I	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  Four,	  could	  only	  be	  
preserved	  in	  its	  “traditional”	  form	  by	  removing	  children	  from	  the	  usual	  sites	  of	  
cultural	  transmission.	  	  
Regarding	  curricular	  reform,	  the	  Department	  of	  Education’s	  inspectors	  
frequently	  advised	  teachers	  and	  administrators	  of	  Orthodox	  schools	  regarding	  
subject	  matter	  and	  pedagogic	  practices.	  Here,	  Department	  officials	  pursued	  a	  path	  
that	  complemented	  the	  modernist	  revolt	  against	  an	  education	  wholly	  devoted	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  S.D.	  Goitein,	  pegisha	  im	  va’adat	  ha-­‐rabanim	  shel	  Talmud	  Torah	  Torat	  Aharon.	  October	  14,	  1947.	  
Ibid.	  	  
72	  Elboim-­‐Dror,	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  ha-­‐ivri	  be-­‐Erets-­‐Yisrael:	  Vol.	  II;	  243.	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“religious”	  subjects.	  While	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  did	  not	  endorse	  any	  Zionist	  
educational	  stream,	  administrators	  seemed	  to	  have	  the	  most	  sympathy	  with	  
Mizrachi’s	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  dual	  curriculum	  that	  included	  both	  religious	  and	  
general	  subjects.	  Certainly,	  the	  attempt	  to	  channel	  schools	  from	  edot	  ha-­‐mizraẖ	  into	  
the	  Mizrachi	  system	  suggests	  that	  the	  latter	  was	  regarded	  as	  the	  lesser	  of	  many	  
evils.	  	  
In	  this	  respect,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  consider	  a	  1942	  report	  by	  the	  inspector	  J.L.	  
Bloom,	  in	  which	  he	  relayed	  the	  details	  of	  his	  meeting	  with	  the	  chief	  Rabbi	  of	  Tel	  Aviv	  
and	  a	  Mizrachi	  representative	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Agency.	  The	  report	  suggested	  an	  
ambitious	  plan	  that	  was	  illustrative	  of	  the	  Department’s	  goal	  of	  achieving	  “secular	  
efficiency”	  in	  Orthodox	  schools.	  Describing	  an	  “argument	  of	  importance”	  relayed	  to	  
him	  with	  which	  “we	  all	  agree,”	  Bloom	  asserted,	  “the	  study	  of	  Talmud	  to	  be	  of	  value	  
has	  to	  be	  done	  after	  say	  the	  age	  of	  12.”	  It	  therefore	  followed,	  “Talmud	  Torahs,	  which	  
are	  differentiated	  from	  other	  schools	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  Talmud	  taught,	  are	  not	  
justifiable	  for	  children	  under	  13.	  Children	  under	  that	  age	  should	  attend	  decent	  
religious	  schools,	  where	  the	  religious	  element	  would	  be	  represented	  by	  Pentat.	  
[Pentateuch]	  with	  Rashi,	  Bible,	  Mishnah	  and	  beginnings	  of	  Talmud.	  After	  that,	  the	  
gifted	  boys	  should	  transfer	  to	  decent	  talmud	  torahs	  or	  “small”	  yeshivas.”73	  These	  
“small	  yeshivas”	  were	  “to	  be	  run	  on	  lines	  consonant	  with	  present	  day	  
requirements,”	  effectively	  meaning	  that	  they	  would	  feature	  a	  basic	  general	  
curriculum	  alongside	  the	  usual	  sacred	  texts	  and	  commentaries.	  Bloom	  noted	  that	  
S.D.	  Goitein	  also	  advocated	  this	  line	  of	  action,	  and	  concluded	  his	  memo	  on	  a	  hopeful	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Minute	  from	  J.L.	  Bloom	  to	  Director	  of	  Education,	  August	  17,	  1942.	  ISA	  RG8,	  1057/23/mem.	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note.	  “The	  grant	  at	  our	  disposal	  may	  serve	  as	  a	  lever	  in	  bringing	  about	  a	  reform	  in	  
religious	  education.”74	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  that	  Bloom	  envisioned	  reformed	  yeshivot	  with	  diversified	  
curricula,	  he	  also	  supported	  the	  extension	  of	  more	  rigorous	  religious	  studies	  into	  
General	  Zionist	  schools.	  Told	  of	  an	  existing	  program	  that	  dispatched	  members	  of	  
reshet	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  ha-­‐talmudi	  (Organization	  of	  Talmudic	  Education)	  to	  teach	  Talmud	  
in	  Mizrachi	  schools,	  Bloom	  responded	  that	  “it	  would	  be	  more	  to	  the	  point	  if	  they	  
were	  sent	  to	  General	  [Zionist]	  schools”	  and	  promised	  to	  investigate	  whether	  the	  
Department	  of	  Education	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  extend	  a	  grant	  to	  further	  these	  
efforts.75	  While	  it	  is	  unclear	  from	  the	  records	  if	  this	  plan	  reached	  fruition,	  the	  
willingness	  to	  recommend	  government	  funding	  for	  Talmudic	  studies	  in	  a	  
memorandum	  addressed	  to	  the	  Director	  of	  Education	  is	  noteworthy	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  
Taken	  together,	  the	  report	  expresses	  the	  two	  pillars	  of	  the	  Department’s	  reform	  
agenda:	  ““to	  secure	  secular	  efficiency	  in	  the	  religious	  schools	  and	  a	  more	  religious	  
spirit	  in	  the	  secular	  schools.”76	  
	   Finally,	  administrators	  attempted	  to	  transform	  the	  way	  that	  religious	  
subjects	  themselves	  were	  taught,	  though	  here	  they	  had	  admittedly	  less	  leverage.	  
The	  payment	  of	  government	  grants	  depended	  on	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  minimal	  secular	  
curriculum,	  and	  suggestions	  regarding	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  religious	  subjects	  were	  
taught	  were	  merely	  advisory.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  suggestions	  are	  
useful	  in	  understanding	  the	  type	  of	  reforms	  that	  the	  Department	  envisioned,	  and	  the	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  Ibid.	  
75	  Ibid.	  
76	  High	  Commissioner	  MacMichael	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies.	  August	  14,	  1942.	  TNA,	  CO	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extent	  to	  which	  they	  overlapped	  with	  ongoing	  attempts	  within	  Jewish	  modernist	  
circles.	  Of	  primary	  importance	  was	  an	  expanded	  place	  for	  the	  Hebrew	  Bible	  in	  the	  
school	  curriculum.	  The	  customary	  educational	  order	  had	  used	  the	  Torah	  as	  a	  
pedagogic	  tool	  for	  acquiring	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  language,	  and	  devoted	  little	  if	  
any	  attention	  to	  the	  other	  books	  in	  the	  Bible.	  Within	  such	  a	  setting,	  familiarity	  with	  
the	  Torah	  served	  as	  a	  stepping-­‐stone	  to	  learning	  the	  oral	  traditions	  recorded	  in	  the	  
Mishnah	  and	  Talmud,	  which	  formed	  the	  true	  center	  of	  the	  curriculum.	  The	  revolt	  
against	  the	  Talmud	  in	  favor	  of	  renewed	  attention	  on	  the	  Hebrew	  Bible	  began	  with	  
the	  Haskalah,	  continued	  through	  the	  scholarly	  ventures	  associated	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  
Wissenschaft	  des	  Judentums	  in	  Germany,	  and	  reached	  a	  fevered	  pitch	  in	  the	  Zionist	  
embrace	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  Bible	  as	  a	  textbook	  of	  Jewish	  political	  and	  cultural	  history.	  	  
	   The	  revolt	  against	  commentary	  was	  thus	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  embrace	  of	  the	  
Hebrew	  language	  and	  the	  Hebrew	  Bible	  as	  the	  true	  foundations	  of	  the	  Jewish	  nation,	  
the	  vessels	  that	  had	  preserved	  its	  ancient	  kultur	  and	  that	  united	  Jews	  from	  across	  
political	  and	  geographic	  spectrums.	  “We	  have	  one	  language	  and	  one	  Tanakh	  
[Hebrew	  Bible],	  one	  history	  and	  one	  homeland.”77	  Conversely,	  Zionist	  educators	  
held	  that	  extensive	  Talmudic	  study	  	  “created	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  diasporic	  inertia	  in	  
the	  midst	  of	  a	  period	  that	  was	  distinguished	  precisely	  by	  national	  and	  ideological	  
independence.”78	  Even	  Rashi’s	  commentary	  on	  the	  Torah,	  which	  had	  long	  served	  as	  
an	  indispensible	  aid,	  was	  fair	  game	  for	  those	  who	  desired	  an	  unmediated	  
relationship	  with	  the	  ancient	  text.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Eliezer	  Riger—among	  the	  
founders	  of	  ha-­‐shomer	  ha-­‐tzair	  who	  later	  served	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Moshe	  Aharon	  Bejel,	  untitled,	  undated	  memorandum	  (most	  likely	  1940-­‐1941).	  CZA	  J17\4996.	  
78	  Reshef,	  ha-­‐ẖinukh	  ha-­‐ivri	  bi-­‐yamei	  ha-­‐bayit	  ha-­‐leumi,	  1919-­‐1948:	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the	  Va’ad	  Leumi—however	  impressive	  from	  an	  intellectual	  perspective,	  Rashi’s	  
commentary	  nevertheless	  “serves	  as	  a	  barrier	  (meẖitza)	  that	  separates	  our	  children	  
from	  the	  Torah,	  this	  at	  the	  time	  that	  they	  have	  a	  direct	  and	  natural	  relationship	  to	  
the	  Torah	  and	  what	  is	  written	  there.”79	  
What	  was	  unique,	  then,	  about	  the	  Department	  of	  Education’s	  
recommendations	  regarding	  the	  reform	  of	  Orthodox	  educational	  models	  was	  not	  
their	  content,	  but	  the	  harnessing	  of	  them	  to	  a	  professional	  language	  that	  claimed	  to	  
speak	  in	  the	  name	  of	  pedagogic	  necessity.	  Discrediting	  educational	  traditions	  
evolved	  over	  several	  centuries,	  Department	  officials	  scoffed	  at	  the	  use	  of	  “incorrect”	  
Hebrew,	  the	  reading	  of	  the	  Torah	  out	  of	  order,	  neglect	  of	  the	  prophetic	  writings,	  and	  
the	  inclusion	  of	  subject	  matter	  deemed	  inappropriate	  for	  immature	  sensibilities.80	  
Such	  efforts	  found	  parallels	  in	  Zionist	  schools,	  where	  “the	  portions	  of	  Tanakh	  that	  
include	  things	  that	  are	  not	  suitable	  for	  children’s	  spirit	  will	  dropped.”81	  What	  
connected	  these	  points—both	  to	  one	  another	  and	  to	  the	  larger	  reform	  effort	  
undertaken	  by	  the	  Department—was,	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  Judaism’s	  
essential	  core,	  religious	  education	  must	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  a	  novel	  fashion.	  Connecting	  
the	  child	  with	  this	  Jewish	  authenticity	  was	  thereby	  dependent	  on	  a	  number	  of	  
departures	  from	  traditional	  educational	  practices.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Eliezer	  	  Riger,	  Ha-­‐ẖinuch	  ha-­‐ivri	  b'eretz	  yisrael	  	  (Tel	  Aviv1940),	  46.	  
80	  The	  inspection	  reports	  for	  talmudei-­‐torah	  and	  ẖederim	  offer	  numerous	  examples	  in	  this	  regard;	  
see,	  for	  instance,	  ISA	  RG8,	  1057/24-­‐mem,	  which	  includes	  Avinoam	  Yellin,	  “Report:	  Bait	  Hinnukh	  
Yeladim.”	  November	  4,	  1926;	  S.D.	  Goitein,	  “Talmud	  torah	  shel	  ha-­‐Urphalim,	  Yerushaliyim,	  Bikur	  
b’yom	  1	  b’April	  1946,”	  April	  1,	  1946.	  See	  also,	  S.D.	  Goitein	  to	  Talmud-­‐Torah	  Megen	  David,	  September	  
27,	  1945.	  ISA	  RG	  8,	  1034/14-­‐mem.	  	  
81	  Maẖlakah	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  shel	  ha-­‐hanhala	  ha-­‐tzioni	  b'eretz	  yisrael,	  Tokhnit	  batei-­‐ha-­‐sefer	  ha-­‐amamiyim	  
ha-­‐ironiyim	  	  (Jerusalem	  1923-­‐23),	  20.	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In	  closing	  this	  discussion,	  we	  should	  note	  that	  this	  attitude	  toward	  Orthodox	  
Jewish	  schools	  was	  not	  something	  that	  existed	  in	  a	  vacuum.	  However	  unexpected—
particularly	  given	  the	  prevalence	  of	  studying	  Palestine	  through	  the	  “dual	  society”	  
model—these	  policies	  found	  corollaries	  in	  the	  approach	  we	  examined	  toward	  rural	  
Arab	  education.	  In	  particular,	  administrators	  attempted	  to	  preserve	  the	  central	  
place	  of	  religious	  education—again	  of	  a	  “reformed”	  type—while	  introducing	  new	  
subjects	  that	  were	  deemed	  more	  economically	  useful	  given	  “present	  day	  
requirements.”	  Only	  within	  such	  a	  schema	  could	  religious	  education	  counteract	  the	  
dangerous	  creep	  of	  national	  politics	  or	  the	  “anti-­‐religious	  racialism”	  of	  the	  Zionist	  
leadership.	  These	  points	  of	  overlap	  challenge	  the	  historiographical	  tendency	  to	  treat	  
Arab	  and	  Jewish	  education	  as	  unrelated	  entities.	  Speaking	  in	  institutional	  terms,	  
they	  clearly	  represented	  separate	  realms;	  however	  we	  should	  not	  take	  this	  to	  mean	  
that	  these	  school	  systems	  existed	  without	  intersections	  at	  either	  the	  discursive	  or	  
material	  levels.	  Rather,	  reformers	  within	  both	  communities	  shared	  the	  Department	  
of	  Education’s	  assumption	  that	  cultural	  and	  religious	  authenticity	  was	  something	  
that	  could	  only	  be	  imparted	  away	  from	  the	  family	  and	  the	  customary	  paths	  of	  
transmission.	  Only	  then	  could	  the	  modern	  school	  become	  a	  vehicle	  for	  inculcating	  a	  
“traditional”	  education	  free	  from	  the	  adverse	  influence	  of	  actual	  religious	  
communities.	  
	  
Religion	  at	  Large	  
From	  what	  has	  been	  said	  thus	  far,	  one	  might	  be	  led	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  
Mandate	  period	  marked	  the	  apex	  of	  secular	  Jewish	  education.	  Certainly	  Farrell’s	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accusations	  against	  the	  Hebrew	  Public	  System	  suggest	  the	  waning	  of	  a	  religious	  
worldview,	  as	  do	  scholarly	  works	  that	  speak	  of	  Zionist	  education	  as	  being	  a	  
predominately	  secular	  project.	  For	  Mizrachi	  educators,	  who	  were	  often	  on	  the	  
fringes	  of	  the	  ruling	  elite,	  Zionist	  education	  bodies	  like	  the	  Board	  of	  Education	  (va’ad	  
ha-­‐ẖinuch)	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  (maẖlakah	  ha-­‐ẖinuch)	  appeared	  bent	  
on	  undermining	  the	  religious	  spirit	  of	  schools.	  Letters	  of	  complaint	  claimed	  
discrimination	  against	  parents	  who	  desired	  an	  Orthodox	  upbringing	  for	  their	  
children,	  particularly	  in	  agricultural	  settlements,	  where	  “the	  hearts	  of	  these	  fathers	  
and	  mothers	  ache	  and	  worry	  greatly	  over	  the	  lack	  of	  religious	  education.”82	  	  
Following	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  I,	  Mizrachi	  issued	  a	  list	  of	  demands	  
regarding	  religious	  education	  that	  reflected	  this	  mistrust	  of	  the	  Zionist	  leadership,	  
insisting	  that	  its	  control	  be	  centralized	  under	  an	  autonomous	  authority	  “to	  defend	  
the	  internal	  spiritual	  character	  of	  ẖaredi	  [i.e.	  Orthodox]	  education	  against	  all	  sorts	  of	  
uninvited	  ‘helpers’	  and	  ‘leaders’	  from	  the	  outside.”	  It	  was,	  the	  report	  specified,	  the	  
current	  Board	  of	  Education	  and	  in	  particular,	  Dr.	  Yosef	  Luria,	  which	  had	  
strengthened	  their	  conviction	  that	  religious	  education	  must	  be	  safeguarded	  under	  
Mizrachi	  control.	  The	  party	  therefore	  requested	  authority	  to	  bypass	  the	  Board	  of	  
Education	  altogether	  and	  deal	  with	  the	  Zionist	  Executive	  directly.	  83	  The	  Zionist	  
Organization	  did	  in	  fact	  take	  steps	  to	  appease	  Mizrachi	  in	  this	  regard,	  and	  in	  1920,	  it	  
granted	  pedagogic	  autonomy	  to	  religious	  schools	  and	  transferred	  responsibility	  for	  
Jewish	  religious	  education	  in	  Palestine	  to	  Mizrachi	  authorities.84	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  Haim	  Dov	  to	  va’ad	  ha-­‐mefakeaẖ	  al	  batei	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  shel	  ha-­‐ẖaredim.	  Dec.	  25,	  1918.	  CZA	  S2\398\1.	  
83	  Tazhir	  al	  odot	  drishot	  ‘ha-­‐mizrahi’	  b’nogea	  la’ẖinuch	  ha-­‐ẖaredi,	  1919.	  CZA	  S2\398\1.	  
84	  Reshef,	  ha-­‐ẖinukh	  ha-­‐ivri	  bi-­‐yamei	  ha-­‐bayit	  ha-­‐leumi,	  1919-­‐1948:	  18.	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However,	  a	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  the	  sources	  casts	  doubt	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  we	  can	  accurately	  speak	  of	  this	  period	  as	  one	  of	  a	  decline	  in	  religious	  
education;	  more	  importantly,	  such	  an	  exercise	  shifts	  questions	  about	  religiosity	  to	  a	  
conceptual	  field	  that	  interrogates	  the	  significance	  of	  “secular”	  and	  “religious”	  as	  
forms	  of	  Jewish	  identity.	  Speaking	  purely	  in	  institutional	  terms,	  the	  “anti-­‐religious”	  
schools	  of	  the	  Labor	  movement	  only	  included	  a	  minority	  of	  children	  in	  the	  Hebrew	  
Public	  System.	  The	  vast	  majority	  attended	  either	  General	  or	  Mizrachi	  schools,	  which	  
used	  common	  syllabi	  for	  subjects	  such	  as	  history	  and	  geography,	  and	  devoted	  
substantial	  time	  to	  studying	  both	  the	  Jewish	  textual	  tradition	  and	  elements	  of	  ritual	  
practice.85	  The	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  trends	  was,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Dr.	  Luria,	  
the	  study	  of	  Talmud	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  compulsion	  on	  the	  other:	  
The	   difference	   between	   ẖaredi	   [e.g.,	   Mizrachi]	   elementary	   schools	   and	  
General	   ones	   is	   that	   in	   the	   first,	   much	   time	   is	   given	   to	   the	   study	   of	   the	  
Talmud,	  which	  they	  begin	  in	  the	  fourth	  year	  and	  to	  which	  they	  dedicate	  10	  
hours	   weekly	   in	   each	   class.	   On	   account	   of	   this	   they	   are	   compelled	   to	  
minimize	   general	   studies,	   especially	   nature	   subjects,	   singing,	   drawing	   and	  
physical	  exercise.	  There	  is	  yet	  another	  distinction	  and	  it	  is	  –	  the	  relationship	  
to	   the	  practical	  obligations	   (drishot	  ma’asiot)	  of	   religion.	   Indeed	   in	  General	  
schools	   students	   also	   learn	   prayer,	   in	   several	   they	   also	   study	   the	   Shulẖan	  
Arech,	   Oreach	   Haim	   and	   in	   several	   settlements	   it	   is	   customary	   to	   find	  
communal	   prayer	   in	   the	   schools,	   but	   the	   education	   of	   children	   in	   carrying	  
out	   positive	   commandments	   is	   not	   part	   of	   the	   General	   schools	   and	   they	  
relate	   to	   this	   as	   to	   something	   that	   is	   transmitted	   to	   the	   heart	   of	   each	  
[student]	  from	  his	  parents.86	  
	  
While,	  as	  the	  above	  quotation	  indicates,	  General	  and	  Mizrachi	  schools	  featured	  
much	  curricular	  overlap,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  tendency	  to	  only	  regard	  the	  latter	  system	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  In	  1929-­‐30,	  there	  were	  1,506	  pupils	  in	  Labor	  schools	  vs.	  6,392	  in	  Mizrachi	  and	  13,133	  in	  General	  
schools.	  Education,	  Annual	  Report	  1929-­‐1930:	  30.	  Even	  after	  the	  relative	  growth	  of	  Labor	  school	  
enrollment,	  the	  movement	  still	  only	  accounted	  for	  approximately	  24%	  of	  Hebrew	  Public	  System	  
students	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Mandate	  period.	  Additionally,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  when	  considered	  into	  
relation	  to	  the	  total	  number	  of	  Jewish	  schoolchildren	  (i.e.	  including	  those	  educated	  in	  predominately	  
Orthodox	  schools	  outside	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  network),	  the	  percentage	  of	  children	  in	  Labor	  schools	  for	  
1945-­‐46	  drops	  to	  19%.	  See	  Palestine,	  Annual	  Report	  1945-­‐46:	  11;	  13.	  
86	  Quoted	  in	  Reshef,	  ha-­‐ẖinukh	  ha-­‐ivri	  bi-­‐yamei	  ha-­‐bayit	  ha-­‐leumi,	  1919-­‐1948:	  61-­‐62.	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as	  “religious”	  in	  nature.	  Certainly	  such	  thinking	  informed	  Farrell’s	  perception	  of	  the	  
Zionist	  school	  system	  as	  predominantly	  secular.	  However,	  assessing	  the	  validity	  of	  
this	  claim	  depends	  in	  part	  upon	  how	  we	  identify	  and	  characterize	  “religious	  
education”	  as	  it	  existed	  in	  the	  Hebrew	  Public	  System.	  This	  analysis	  can	  only	  begin	  to	  
speak	  to	  this	  question.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  very	  difficulty	  
we	  face	  in	  isolating	  the	  “religious”	  element	  of	  Jewish	  education	  hints	  at	  the	  
inadequacy	  of	  an	  approach	  that	  would	  treat	  religion	  and	  secularism	  as	  pre-­‐existing	  
categories	  into	  which	  a	  curriculum,	  school	  or	  community	  could	  unproblematically	  
fit.	  	  
As	  an	  alternate	  interpretation,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  Zionist	  
curricula	  points	  to	  what	  Talal	  Asad	  has	  termed	  a	  “reordering	  of	  religious	  priorities”	  
that	  consciously	  blurred	  the	  boundaries	  between	  secular	  studies—limudei	  ẖol—and	  
religious	  ones—limudei	  kodesh—in	  an	  attempt	  to	  articulate	  a	  new	  relationship	  
between	  Jewishness	  and	  modern	  political	  identity.	  As	  Yitzhak	  Holtzberg,	  the	  chief	  
inspector	  for	  Mizrachi	  schools,	  would	  later	  articulate	  it,	  “the	  ideal	  of	  religious	  
education	  is	  that	  serving	  God	  and	  defending	  the	  sanctity	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  people	  must	  
be	  the	  primary	  goal	  and	  must	  be	  emphasized	  in	  every	  lesson	  and	  in	  all	  studies,	  even	  
in	  learning	  physical	  exercise	  and	  drawing.”87	  Nor,	  as	  I	  shall	  show,	  was	  such	  an	  
approach	  limited	  to	  the	  religious	  Zionist	  sphere,	  but	  rather,	  in	  varying	  ways,	  
constituted	  the	  basic	  innovation	  of	  Zionist	  education	  as	  a	  whole.	  Not	  only	  does	  the	  
concept	  of	  the	  secular	  explain	  nothing	  in	  this	  case,	  it	  actually	  functions	  to	  obscure	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  Yitzhak	  Holtzberg,	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  ha-­‐dati	  k'ẖovat	  ha-­‐horim	  v'ha-­‐morim	  (Jerusalem:	  Mizrahi	  World	  
Center	  1948).	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the	  larger	  epistemic	  battles	  raging	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  modern	  Jewish	  identity	  and	  
the	  role	  of	  education	  in	  its	  production.	  
In	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  these	  dynamics,	  I	  will	  here	  examine	  a	  few	  artifacts	  of	  
Zionist	  education	  during	  this	  period	  and	  argue	  that	  they	  offer	  a	  stark	  conceptual	  
contrast	  to	  the	  “protestant”	  approach	  to	  Islamic	  religious	  education	  evident	  in	  the	  
government	  public	  schools.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  comparative	  ease,	  I	  will	  again	  focus	  my	  
analysis	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  sacred	  and	  secular	  history.	  It	  is	  hoped	  that	  
even	  this	  limited	  discussion	  will	  highlight	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  speaking	  of	  Zionist	  
education	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  “secular”	  and	  “religious”	  components	  serves	  to	  obfuscate	  
what	  was	  actually	  unusual	  about	  it,	  and	  what,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  brought	  it	  into	  conflict	  
with	  the	  Mandatory	  government.	  	  
At	  the	  most	  basic	  level,	  religious	  subjects88	  continued	  to	  occupy	  a	  central	  
place	  in	  the	  curriculum	  of	  every	  “stream”	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  Public	  System.	  The	  Va’ad	  
Leumi	  stressed	  that	  each	  school	  shared	  certain	  common	  ground,	  constituted	  by	  the	  
Hebrew	  Bible:	  	  
	  A	   bare	   description	   of	   the	   three	   types	   of	   schools	   may	   convey	   several	  
erroneous	   impressions:	   that	   the	   “General”	   and	   Labor	   schools	   are	   anti-­‐
religious;	  that	  only	  the	  Labor	  schools	  give	  instruction	  in	  practical	  activities;	  
that	   the	  system	  is	   tripartite	  with	  only	  an	  external,	  administrative	  unity.	  All	  
three	   assumptions	   are	   unwarranted.	   The	   Mizrachi,	   indeed,	   “consistently	  
hold	  the	  religious	  viewpoint	  in	  education;	  religious	  education	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  
of	  instruction	  in	  this	  or	  that	  subject,	  but	  implies	  an	  all-­‐pervading	  outlook	  on	  
life.’”	   But	   the	   “General”	   schools	   are	   by	   no	  manner	   of	  means	   anti-­‐religious.	  
They	  put	  the	  study	  of	  the	  Bible	  in	  a	  foremost	  place	  and	  do	  not	  omit	  the	  study	  
of	   the	   Rabbinical	   literature,	   and	   they	   observe	   the	   traditional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  The	  term	  “religious	  subjects”	  is	  admittedly	  unsatisfactory.	  In	  this	  discussion,	  its	  use	  is	  meant	  as	  
shorthand	  for	  the	  Hebrew	  Bible,	  Mishna,	  Talmud	  and	  associated	  works	  of	  commentary.	  It	  also	  
includes	  instruction	  in	  elements	  of	  ritual	  practice,	  usually	  indicated	  in	  syllabi	  as	  “tefilah,”	  (prayer),	  
“dinim”	  or	  “halacha”	  (law).	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customs…Likewise	   the	   Labor	   schools	   insist	   upon	   a	   good	   knowledge	   of	   the	  
Bible.	  At	  most	  it	  may	  be	  said	  that	  their	  spirit	  is	  non-­‐religious.89	  
	  
As	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  (maẖlakah	  ha-­‐ẖinuch)	  of	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  
articulated	  its	  position	  earlier	  in	  the	  period,	  “The	  goal	  of	  the	  curriculum	  is	  for	  the	  
student	  to	  be	  saturated	  in	  the	  Hebrew	  spirit	  though	  knowledge	  of	  language,	  Tanakh	  
(the	  Hebrew	  Bible)	  and	  Hebrew	  literature.”90	  	  
In	  academic	  circles,	  the	  centrality	  of	  Tanakh	  in	  the	  curriculum	  is	  often	  
explained	  by	  stressing	  that	  its	  subject	  matter	  was	  no	  longer	  connected	  to	  Jewish	  
theology	  as	  such,	  but	  rather	  constituted	  a	  source	  text	  for	  the	  development	  of	  
Hebrew	  nationalism,	  or	  in	  the	  above	  passage,	  the	  “Hebrew	  spirit.”	  Several	  accounts	  
of	  the	  period	  have	  suggested	  that	  Zionism	  re-­‐signified	  certain	  Jewish	  ritual	  practices	  
and	  incorporated	  them	  into	  a	  form	  of	  “civil	  religion”	  that	  “provides	  secularized	  
people	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  ultimate	  meaning	  approximating	  that	  provided	  by	  religion.”91	  	  
Similarly,	  scholars	  have	  argued	  that	  labor	  Zionism	  in	  particular	  adopted	  “numerous	  
symbols	  and	  practices	  from	  traditionalist	  Jewish	  religion	  but	  transformed	  and	  
complemented	  them	  with	  universalist,	  largely	  Socialist,	  values.”92	  It	  is	  my	  
contention	  that,	  despite	  its	  merits,	  the	  “civil	  religion”	  explanation—which	  suggests	  
an	  almost	  natural	  transition	  from	  religion	  to	  nationalism,	  parochialism	  to	  universal	  
values,	  theology	  to	  secularism—leaves	  many	  questions	  not	  merely	  unanswered,	  but	  
unasked.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  The	  Waad	  Leumi	  [sic]	  of	  Keneset	  Yisrael,	  The	  Jewish	  Public	  School	  System	  of	  Palestine	  (1932),	  12.	  
90	  Maẖlakah	  ha-­‐ẖinuch,	  “Sekirah	  al	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  be’eretz	  yisrael	  b’shnot	  1920-­‐1923.”	  CZA	  J17\8536.	  
91	  Shimoni,	  The	  Zionist	  Ideology:	  311.	  Other	  examples	  of	  work	  on	  Zionism	  that	  employ	  the	  concept	  of	  
civil	  religion	  include	  Oz	  Almog,	  The	  Sabra	  :	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  new	  Jew,	  The	  S.	  Mark	  Taper	  Foundation	  
imprint	  in	  Jewish	  studies	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2000);	  Saposnik,	  Becoming	  
Hebrew	  :	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Jewish	  national	  culture	  in	  Ottoman	  Palestine.	  	  
92	  Shimoni,	  The	  Zionist	  Ideology:	  311.	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It	  is	  therefore	  instructive	  to	  begin	  this	  analysis	  by	  interrogating	  our	  
terminology,	  and	  asking	  which	  of	  the	  following	  subjects,	  taken	  from	  the	  General	  
Zionist	  syllabus,	  should	  be	  considered	  “religious”	  in	  nature:	  Hebrew	  Bible,	  Hebrew	  
language,	  Mishnah,	  geography,	  nature,	  history,	  mathematics,	  singing,	  drawing,	  
gardening,	  exercise,	  English.	  Including	  only	  the	  obvious	  candidates—the	  Hebrew	  
Bible	  and	  Mishnah—a	  student	  in	  the	  seventh	  class	  would	  devote	  approximately	  
20%	  of	  her	  class	  time	  to	  religious	  subjects.	  However,	  read	  in	  light	  of	  the	  unstable	  
boundaries	  that	  separate	  the	  religious	  from	  the	  secular,	  parts	  of	  Hebrew	  language,	  
geography,	  nature,	  history	  and	  singing	  might	  well	  be	  considered	  “religious”	  in	  
nature,	  at	  which	  point	  such	  subjects	  would	  constitute	  approximately	  65%	  of	  our	  
student’s	  total	  classroom	  hours.93	  There	  is	  a	  need	  to	  probe	  some	  concrete	  examples	  
in	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  just	  how	  porous	  the	  boundaries	  between	  limudei	  ẖol	  and	  
limudei	  kodesh	  could	  be.	  	  	  	  
Let	  us	  begin	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  history	  curriculum	  developed	  for	  use	  in	  Zionist	  
schools.	  One	  prominent	  feature	  of	  this	  curriculum	  was	  the	  great	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  
inclusion	  of	  general	  historical	  events	  and	  personalities	  hinged	  on	  their	  relation	  to	  
the	  Jewish	  people	  and	  the	  Land	  of	  Israel.	  In	  describing	  this	  new	  course	  of	  study,	  the	  
Department	  of	  Education	  of	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  summarized	  its	  position	  as	  
follows:	  “In	  the	  study	  of	  geography,	  the	  homeland	  (moledet)	  stands	  at	  the	  center.	  
Special	  attention	  must	  be	  paid	  to	  adjacent	  lands	  and	  to	  those	  that	  are	  most	  
important	  to	  inhabitants	  of	  Eretz	  Yisrael.	  In	  [the	  study	  of]	  history,	  the	  syllabus	  
privileges	  knowledge	  of	  Jewish	  history	  and	  the	  teacher	  is	  restricted	  to	  only	  those	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Tokhnit	  batei-­‐ha-­‐sefer	  ha-­‐amamiyim	  ha-­‐ironiyim:	  3	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events	  in	  general	  history	  that	  are	  related	  to	  the	  history	  of	  our	  people.”94	  As	  Shmuel	  
Feiner	  has	  argued,	  this	  nationalist	  approach	  to	  the	  writing	  of	  history	  represented	  a	  
change	  in	  direction	  from	  that	  pioneered	  by	  European	  maskilim,	  for	  whom	  the	  
importance	  of	  history	  as	  a	  pedagogic	  tool	  was	  linked	  to	  its	  capacity	  to	  recount	  major	  
events	  from	  and	  historical	  shifts	  occurring	  within	  the	  non-­‐Jewish	  world.95	  In	  
contrast,	  this	  passage	  reflects	  a	  framework	  in	  which	  other	  lands,	  peoples	  and	  events	  
only	  become	  relevant	  through	  their	  contact	  with	  the	  Jewish	  people,	  cast	  here	  as	  the	  
epicenter	  around	  which	  historical	  time	  revolves.	  	  
In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  the	  geography	  curriculum	  began	  by	  surveying	  the	  Land	  of	  
Israel	  before	  moving	  outward	  to	  Mt.	  Sinai,	  “the	  road	  of	  the	  exodus	  from	  Egypt,”	  and	  
Babylonia,	  the	  first	  land	  of	  exile.	  	  In	  each	  instance,	  the	  place	  studied	  appears	  not	  
precisely	  as	  an	  entity	  of	  independent	  interest,	  but	  of	  historical	  importance	  to	  the	  
Jewish	  people.96	  Thus,	  when	  surveying	  Syria,	  the	  teacher	  is	  to	  stress	  “the	  economic	  
and	  cultural	  relationship	  between	  it	  and	  Eretz	  Yisrael”	  and	  to	  discuss	  the	  Jewish	  
communities	  of	  Damascus,	  Beirut	  and	  Aleppo.97	  For	  its	  part,	  the	  Mizrachi	  syllabus	  
added	  that	  the	  survey	  of	  lands	  surrounding	  Eretz	  Yisrael	  should	  be	  done	  “in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Maẖlakah	  ha-­‐ẖinuch,	  “Sekirah	  al	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  be’eretz	  yisrael	  b’shnot	  1920-­‐1923.”	  CZA	  J17\8536.	  
This	  document	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  submitted	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  
Palestine	  (stamped	  July	  17,	  1923).	  The	  report	  itself	  is	  unsigned;	  however	  the	  general	  tone	  and	  
detailed	  reporting	  give	  reason	  to	  believe	  it	  was	  written	  by	  the	  Education	  Department	  of	  the	  Zionist	  
Executive.	  	  
95	  Feiner,	  Haskalah	  and	  History:	  The	  Emergence	  of	  a	  Modern	  Jewish	  Historical	  Consciousness.	  
96	  For	  an	  alternate	  interpretation	  of	  the	  history	  curriculum,	  see	  Dan	  Porat,	  "Between	  nation	  and	  land	  
in	  Zionist	  teaching	  of	  Jewish	  history,	  1920-­‐1954	  "	  The	  Journal	  of	  Israeli	  History	  27,	  no.	  2	  (2008).	  Porat	  
argues	  that	  the	  syllabus	  adopted	  Dubnov’s	  idea	  of	  “shifting	  autonomous	  centers,”	  leading	  to	  subject	  
headings	  like	  “the	  Jews	  in	  Spain,”	  and	  “the	  Jews	  in	  Babylon”	  rather	  than	  a	  overwhelming	  focus	  on	  the	  
Land	  of	  Israel	  itself.	  	  
97	  Tokhnit	  batei-­‐ha-­‐sefer	  ha-­‐amamiyim	  ha-­‐ironiyim:	  29-­‐30.	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connection	  to	  what	  is	  taught	  about	  them	  in	  the	  Torah	  and	  the	  early	  prophets.”98	  In	  
the	  final	  year,	  students	  were	  to	  review	  “the	  value	  of	  Eretz	  Yisrael	  in	  our	  national	  and	  
religious	  life;	  the	  new	  and	  old	  settlements	  (yishuvim),	  the	  races	  [in	  the	  land],	  the	  
history	  of	  Eretz	  Yisrael	  from	  the	  Middle	  Ages	  until	  the	  days	  of	  the	  new	  yishuv,	  and	  
the	  [religious]	  commandments	  that	  are	  dependent	  on	  the	  land.”99	  	  	  
This	  narrative	  structure	  differed	  significantly	  from	  the	  curriculum	  developed	  
for	  use	  in	  the	  Arab	  Public	  System,	  in	  which	  substantial	  attention	  was	  paid	  to	  
European	  and	  American	  history	  while	  Palestine	  itself	  was	  presented	  in	  international	  
terms	  as	  an	  object	  of	  perpetual	  conquest.	  While	  the	  Zionist	  curriculum	  in	  this	  regard	  
may	  offer	  an	  example	  of	  what	  Jerome	  Farrell	  termed	  national	  chauvinism,	  it	  is	  
perhaps	  more	  complicated	  than	  that—and	  ultimately	  in	  my	  view,	  points	  to	  a	  sort	  of	  
theological	  residue	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  history	  as	  a	  national	  project.100	  In	  truth,	  this	  
structure	  of	  historical	  narration	  may	  find	  its	  closest	  corollary	  in	  the	  Hebrew	  Bible	  
itself,	  in	  which	  great	  Empires,	  rulers	  and	  peoples	  exist	  on	  the	  periphery	  of	  a	  story	  
whose	  central	  object	  is	  the	  genealogy	  of	  the	  Israelites.	  The	  student	  of	  Tanakh	  would	  
encounter,	  for	  instance,	  the	  ancient	  Egyptian	  or	  Persian	  kingdoms,	  and	  may	  glean	  
something	  of	  their	  military	  or	  intellectual	  power.	  However	  such	  Empires	  do	  not	  
stand	  as	  independent	  entities	  within	  the	  narrative	  structure	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  Bible,	  
but	  rather,	  are	  only	  significant	  as	  agents	  who	  affect	  the	  formation	  and	  destiny	  of	  
bnei	  yisrael.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  Maẖlakah	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  shel	  ha-­‐sokhnut	  ha-­‐yehudit	  l'eretz	  yisrael,	  tokhnit	  ha-­‐limudim	  ha-­‐nehugah	  
b'vatei	  ha-­‐sefer	  ha-­‐amamiyim	  shel	  ha-­‐mizraẖi	  (1933),	  19-­‐20.	  
99	  Ibid.,	  18-­‐19.	  
100	  That	  “secular”	  history	  often	  bears	  traces	  of	  a	  theological,	  specifically	  Christian,	  teleology	  is	  clear	  
enough	  from	  Lowith’s	  work.	  See,	  Lowith,	  Meaning	  in	  History.	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  
historiographical	  practices	  that	  emerged	  among	  European	  maskilim,	  see	  Feiner,	  Haskalah	  and	  
History:	  The	  Emergence	  of	  a	  Modern	  Jewish	  Historical	  Consciousness.	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As	  is	  evident	  in	  these	  examples,	  there	  was	  a	  tendency	  for	  biblical	  events	  to	  
migrate	  into	  the	  context	  of	  general	  history	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Indeed	  sacred	  and	  secular	  
history	  were	  not	  meant	  to	  exist	  as	  independent	  realms	  of	  study,	  but	  rather	  served	  as	  
complementary,	  mutually	  enforcing	  bodies	  of	  knowledge.	  This	  interpretation	  finds	  
further	  support	  in	  reviewing	  the	  justification	  given	  for	  the	  study	  of	  history	  itself,	  
namely	  “to	  awaken	  in	  the	  hearts	  of	  students	  an	  internal	  [sense	  of]	  participation	  in	  
the	  fate	  of	  our	  nation	  and	  in	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  great	  members	  of	  the	  generations	  who	  
have	  worked	  and	  suffered.”101	  Articulating	  the	  same	  sentiment	  in	  more	  overtly	  
theological	  terms,	  the	  Mizrachi	  syllabus	  states:	  
Teaching	  our	  history	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  general	  history	  of	  nations	  brings	  the	  
child	  to	  the	  realization	  that	  divine	  supervision	  uncovers	  historical	  paths	  for	  
us	   in	   a	   special	   manner.	   The	   continued	   existence	   of	   our	   small	   and	   poor	  
people	   in	   the	  midst	   of	   a	   great	  multitude	   of	   enormous	   nations,	   strong	   and	  
steadfast	   nations,	   that	   despite	   their	   political	   and	   cultural	   strength	   have	  
passed	  and	  gone,	   therefore	  creates	  an	  understanding	  of	   the	  strength	  of	   the	  
Torah	  of	   Israel	   and	   the	  divine	   supervision	   (hashgacha	  pratit)	   that	  protects	  
us.	   This	   realization	   is	  what	   creates	   a	   firm	   connection	  between	   the	   student	  
and	   the	  nation	  of	   Israel	  and	   to	  Eretz	  Yisrael,	   the	   land	  of	  our	  people’s	  birth	  
and	  the	  soil	  of	  the	  law,	  the	  prophets,	  and	  the	  sages	  (chazal).102	  
	  
In	  short,	  rather	  than	  existing	  in	  distinct	  ontological	  spheres	  separated	  either	  by	  time	  
(ancient/modern)	  or	  content	  (ethical-­‐universal/historical-­‐national),	  the	  history	  
curriculum	  developed	  in	  Zionist	  schools	  displayed	  two	  prominent	  features:	  First,	  it	  
resembled	  the	  structure	  of	  Biblical	  narrative	  in	  striking	  ways;	  and	  second,	  secular	  
history	  did	  not	  function	  outside	  of	  sacred	  history,	  but	  rather	  the	  two	  served	  to	  
animate	  and	  legitimize	  one	  another.	  We	  should	  also	  note	  that	  this	  sort	  of	  curricular	  
mingling	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  historical	  and	  theological.	  Hence	  the	  qualification	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  Maẖlakah	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  shel	  ha-­‐sokhnut	  ha-­‐yehudit	  l'eretz	  yisrael,	  Tokhnit	  batei-­‐ha-­‐sefer	  ha-­‐
amamiyim	  ha-­‐ironiyim:	  41.	  
102	  Maẖlakah	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  shel	  ha-­‐sokhnut	  ha-­‐yehudit	  l'eretz	  yisrael,	  tokhnit	  ha-­‐limudim	  ha-­‐nehugah	  
b'vatei	  ha-­‐sefer	  ha-­‐amamiyim	  shel	  ha-­‐mizraẖi	  20.	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that	  mathematical	  questions	  should	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  Torah	  and	  that	  Hebrew	  
language	  class	  should	  include	  the	  prayer	  cycles	  used	  in	  synagogues	  on	  the	  Sabbath	  
and	  holidays,	  even	  within	  General	  Zionist	  schools.	  	  
This	  mode	  of	  historiography	  was,	  in	  fact,	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  the	  new	  Jewish	  
history	  writing	  that	  emerged	  in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  
century.	  Shmuel	  Feiner	  has	  argued	  that	  this	  nationalist	  historiography	  “played	  a	  key	  
role	  in	  this	  process	  of	  transforming	  traditional	  terms	  and	  concepts,	  of	  secularizing,	  
spiritualizing,	  and	  nationalizing	  ‘Hebrew’,	  ‘Torah’,	  ‘religion’,	  and	  ‘commandments’,	  
which	  were	  appropriated	  and	  enshrined	  in	  the	  repertoire	  of	  national	  assets.”103	  
Intellectuals	  like	  Perez	  Smolenskin	  were	  likewise	  integral	  to	  articulating	  a	  new	  
relationship	  between	  the	  Hebrew	  Bible	  and	  Jewish	  identity,	  one	  that	  looked	  to	  the	  
texts	  as	  “a	  repository	  of	  memories	  that	  preserved	  Jewish	  historical	  roots.”104	  It	  is	  
therefore	  not	  surprising	  to	  find	  that,	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  National	  Home	  project,	  
this	  narrative	  structure	  took	  root	  in	  the	  Zionist	  educational	  system.	  What	  is	  
surprising	  is	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  it	  has	  been	  uncritically	  described	  as	  secular,	  as	  if	  
the	  processes	  of	  “secularizing,	  spiritualizing,	  and	  nationalizing”	  were	  self-­‐
explanatory.	  	  
To	  consider	  one	  final	  example	  of	  what	  I	  have	  labeled	  a	  reordering	  of	  religious	  
priorities,	  it	  is	  worth	  considering	  the	  sanctification	  of	  land	  settlement	  and	  
agricultural	  labor	  in	  Zionist	  schools.105	  Historians	  have	  noted	  Zionist	  attempts	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  Feiner,	  Haskalah	  and	  History:	  The	  Emergence	  of	  a	  Modern	  Jewish	  Historical	  Consciousness:	  320.	  
104	  Ibid.,	  319.	  
105	  Here	  I	  must	  disagree	  with	  Porat’s	  argument	  that	  General	  and	  Mizrachi	  schools	  did	  not	  emphasize	  
the	  Land	  of	  Israel	  in	  an	  ideological	  fashion	  and	  did	  not	  aim	  to	  indoctrinate	  students	  in	  any	  particular	  
political	  program.	  The	  absence	  of	  socialist	  ideas	  within	  the	  curricula	  did	  not	  render	  General	  or	  
Mizrachi	  Zionist	  schools	  apolitical;	  Zionism	  itself	  already	  involved	  a	  very	  precise	  form	  of	  politics	  that	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appropriate	  Jewish	  customs	  and	  holidays	  and	  reinvent	  them	  in	  ways	  that	  stressed	  
their	  relationship	  to	  the	  material	  life	  of	  Eretz	  Yisrael.	  This	  intellectual	  current	  
heavily	  influenced	  members	  of	  the	  Second	  Aliyah	  and	  found	  its	  purest	  voice	  in	  the	  
figure	  of	  A.D.	  Gordon,	  for	  whom	  “labor	  was	  not	  only	  a	  rational	  value	  for	  the	  
individual’s	  expansion	  of	  self	  and	  his	  social	  relations,”	  but	  also,	  “the	  key	  to	  a	  cosmic	  
religious	  experience	  that	  bonds	  man	  to	  nature.”106	  During	  the	  1920s,	  a	  new	  
generation	  of	  Hebrew	  poets	  such	  as	  Avraham	  Shlonsky	  continued	  to	  emphasize	  the	  
essential	  dignity	  of	  labor	  as	  a	  force	  of	  spiritual	  renewal,	  often	  by	  appropriating	  
Biblical	  language	  and	  ritual	  imagery	  only	  to	  overturn	  their	  classical	  meanings.	  107	  
For	  instance,	  in	  one	  of	  his	  most	  famous	  works,	  “Amal”	  (“Toil”),	  newly	  built	  homes	  
and	  roads	  are	  likened	  to	  phylacteries	  as	  the	  narrator	  is	  led	  to	  his	  morning	  labor	  in	  
lieu	  of—or	  rather,	  as	  a	  form	  of—prayer.	  At	  times,	  the	  glorification	  of	  land	  and	  labor	  
played	  dissonantly	  off	  of	  the	  existing	  corpus	  of	  Jewish	  ritual	  texts.	  For	  instance,	  in	  
“Metropolis”	  Shlonksy	  concludes	  the	  poem	  by	  blessing	  “he	  who	  weighs	  his	  yoke	  
upon	  us”	  (baruch	  machbid	  olo	  aleinu),	  offering	  a	  stark	  contrast	  with	  the	  customary	  
supplication,	  “May	  the	  compassionate	  one	  break	  the	  yoke	  from	  our	  necks.”108	  
Several	  of	  these	  discursive	  elements	  found	  their	  way	  into	  the	  Zionist	  
mainstream—even	  if	  their	  revolutionary	  nature	  may	  have	  not	  been	  fully	  
appreciated—through	  their	  incorporation	  into	  the	  educational	  programs	  of	  each	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
found	  expression	  in	  almost	  every	  element	  of	  the	  curricula	  (e.g.	  which	  Mishnayot	  were	  taught).	  See	  
Porat,	  "Between	  nation	  and	  land	  in	  Zionist	  teaching	  of	  Jewish	  history,	  1920-­‐1954	  "	  258-­‐61.	  	  
106	  Shimoni,	  The	  Zionist	  Ideology:	  209.	  	  
107	  For	  an	  excellent	  analysis	  of	  the	  reciprocal	  relationship	  between	  the	  “redemption”	  of	  the	  land	  and	  
the	  revival	  of	  the	  Jewish	  spirit,	  see	  Zakim,	  To	  Build	  and	  Be	  Built:	  landscape,	  literature,	  and	  the	  
construction	  of	  Zionist	  identity	  	  
108	  Avraham	  Shlonsky,	  “Metropolis,”	  part	  of	  the	  poem	  cycle,	  Masa.	  The	  latter	  quotation	  is	  taken	  from	  
birkat	  ha-­‐mazon,	  the	  traditional	  blessing	  recited	  after	  meals.	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party.	  In	  fact,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  so	  much	  ideological	  controversy,	  the	  sanctification	  of	  
land	  and	  labor	  represented	  a	  sort	  of	  common	  denominator:	  malleable	  enough	  that	  
each	  “trend”	  could	  offer	  its	  own	  interpretive	  directions,	  stable	  enough	  that	  the	  
symbolic	  fabric	  was	  not	  torn	  asunder.	  We	  could	  point	  to	  numerous	  examples	  of	  this	  
tendency;	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  discussion,	  I	  will	  highlight	  here	  only	  a	  few.	  
The	  first	  involves	  a	  shift	  in	  discursive	  privilege	  within	  the	  study	  of	  the	  Jewish	  
textual	  tradition.	  For	  instance,	  the	  upper	  two	  classes	  of	  General	  elementary	  schools	  
studied	  Mishnah,	  the	  redaction	  of	  the	  oral	  law.	  In	  the	  seventh	  class,	  students	  studied	  
five	  of	  the	  sixty-­‐three	  sections	  of	  the	  Mishnah.	  The	  first	  was	  Pirkei	  Avot	  (Ethics	  of	  the	  
Fathers),	  a	  compilation	  of	  ethical	  teachings	  and	  sayings	  that	  includes	  almost	  no	  legal	  
rulings.	  The	  other	  four	  tractates—Bikkurim,	  Pe’ah,	  Shevi’it,	  and	  Brachot—were	  all	  
selected	  from	  Mishnah	  Zera’im	  (“Seeds”).109	  Specifically,	  Bikkurim	  deals	  with	  
bringing	  the	  “first	  fruits”	  of	  the	  land	  as	  an	  offering	  at	  the	  Temple;	  Pe’ah	  discusses	  the	  
laws	  of	  charity	  related	  to	  the	  harvest;	  Shevi’it	  addresses	  the	  laws	  related	  to	  the	  
sabbatical	  year	  in	  which	  the	  land	  is	  allowed	  to	  rest;	  and	  Brachot	  offers	  guidelines	  
surrounding	  major	  ritual	  prayers	  and	  blessings.	  	  
Taken	  as	  a	  group,	  these	  selections	  reflect	  many	  of	  the	  ideological	  shifts	  
discussed	  thus	  far.	  Exposure	  to	  the	  major	  prayers	  and	  blessings	  was	  meant	  to	  
familiarize	  students	  with	  Jewish	  ritual	  practice,	  echoing	  the	  administrative	  directive	  
that	  prayers	  should	  be	  included	  in	  the	  Hebrew	  language	  curriculum	  “in	  order	  that	  
the	  student	  will	  know	  them	  and	  understand	  their	  ethical	  value.”110	  Similarly,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  Maẖlakah	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  shel	  ha-­‐hanhala	  ha-­‐tzioni	  b'eretz	  yisrael,	  Tokhnit	  batei-­‐ha-­‐sefer	  ha-­‐amamiyim	  
ha-­‐ironiyim:	  47.	  
110	  Ibid.,	  2.	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emphasis	  on	  Pirkei	  Avot	  fit	  well	  within	  the	  modern	  attempt	  to	  locate	  the	  ethical	  core	  
of	  “Judaism”	  as	  a	  singular	  entity.111	  Though	  the	  study	  of	  the	  text	  was	  not	  novel	  in	  
and	  of	  itself,	  its	  study	  in	  isolation	  from	  the	  other	  texts	  of	  halacha	  was	  a	  departure	  
from	  the	  customary	  order	  in	  which	  law,	  literature,	  ethics	  and	  practice	  constituted	  an	  
organic	  whole.	  	  
Yet	  it	  is	  the	  three	  tractates	  taken	  from	  the	  agricultural	  portions	  of	  the	  
Mishnah—which	  stressed	  the	  historic	  rootedness	  of	  the	  Jewish	  nation	  in	  the	  land	  of	  
Israel—that	  commanded	  the	  most	  attention.	  Privileging	  these	  texts	  also	  meant	  
leaving	  many	  others	  out,	  namely	  the	  central	  texts	  related	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  Sabbath,	  
the	  holidays	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  Rosh	  Hashana),	  family	  and	  ritual	  purity,	  civil	  
damages,	  the	  courts,	  marriage,	  divorce,	  idolatry,	  sacrifices	  and	  the	  Temple	  service.	  
For	  sake	  of	  comparison,	  Mizrahi	  schools,	  whose	  curriculum	  adhered	  more	  closely	  to	  
the	  customary	  selections	  of	  Mishnah	  studied	  among	  Ashkenazim,	  did	  not	  teach	  any	  
of	  these	  agricultural	  tractates.112	  	  
Certainly	  this	  shift	  in	  discursive	  focus	  is	  noteworthy,	  yet	  the	  privileging	  of	  
certain	  parts	  of	  the	  Jewish	  textual	  tradition	  need	  not	  be	  read	  as	  a	  shift	  from	  
“religious”	  to	  “secular”	  Judaism.	  Rather,	  I	  find	  interpreting	  incidents	  like	  these	  
through	  the	  lens	  of	  “civil	  religion”—in	  which	  all	  things	  religious	  can	  be	  naturally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Batnitzky,	  How	  Judaism	  Became	  a	  Religion.	  
112	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  Mizrachi	  schools	  did	  not	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  Eretz	  Yisrael	  and	  no	  
contemporary	  observer	  of	  religious	  Zionism	  in	  Israel	  would	  be	  surprised	  to	  find	  that	  the	  corpus	  of	  
Jewish	  texts	  offered	  no	  shortage	  of	  material	  that	  served	  this	  purpose.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Rabbi	  Yakov	  
Berman,	  who	  served	  as	  an	  inspector	  for	  Mizrachi	  schools	  from	  1924-­‐44,	  “The	  Hebrew	  Bible	  is	  the	  
center	  of	  our	  study,	  and	  if	  it	  does	  not	  unfold	  in	  relation	  to	  Eretz	  Yisrael,	  we	  are	  not	  properly	  
transmitting	  its	  content.”	  It’s	  noteworthy	  that	  Berman	  wrote	  these	  words	  in	  response	  to	  critics	  who	  
worried	  that	  Zionism	  was	  not	  being	  sufficiently	  emphasized	  in	  Mizrachi	  schools,	  and	  therefore	  called	  
for	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  new	  prayer	  to	  fill	  the	  alleged	  void.	  Berman’s	  response	  was	  telling,	  namely	  
that	  “our	  prayers	  are	  full	  of	  love	  of	  the	  land	  and	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  add	  a	  new,	  distinct	  prayer.”	  
Harza’ah	  ha-­‐Rav	  Y.	  Berman.”	  1923.	  CZA	  J1\7931.	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transformed	  into	  the	  basis	  of	  modern,	  secular	  identity—problematic	  for	  two	  
reasons.	  Just	  as	  the	  Jewish	  study	  of	  ethics	  was	  not	  a	  modern	  invention,	  but	  rather	  
existed	  historically	  as	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  study	  of	  law,	  we	  are	  not	  dealing	  with	  
the	  invention	  of	  traditions	  as	  much	  as	  the	  privileging	  of	  some	  over	  others.	  The	  
practice	  of	  making	  these	  choices	  is	  important	  and	  ultimately	  testifies	  to	  the	  
flexibility	  of	  the	  Jewish	  hermeneutic	  tradition;	  it	  need	  not,	  however,	  be	  conflated	  
with	  secularism.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  Zionist	  education	  was	  deeply	  invested	  in	  a	  
stressing	  certain	  forms	  of	  religiosity,	  or	  perhaps	  more	  accurately,	  of	  creating	  a	  form	  
of	  Jewish	  identity	  that	  confounded	  the	  modern	  notion	  of	  religion	  itself.	  
Secondly,	  as	  a	  theoretical	  concept	  embedded	  in	  a	  Christian	  discourse	  of	  
secularism,	  civil	  religion	  comes	  with	  substantial	  explanatory	  limits.	  We	  might	  
recall	  the	  term’s	  origins	  in	  the	  political	  writing	  of	  Jean-­‐Jacques	  Rousseau,	  who,	  in	  
On	  the	  Social	  Contract,	  praised	  the	  ancients	  for	  whom	  religion	  was	  “uniquely	  tied	  
to	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  state	  that	  prescribed	  it.”	  Thus,	  he	  tells	  us,	  “Mohammad	  had	  
very	  sound	  opinions.	  He	  tied	  his	  political	  system	  together	  very	  well,	  and	  as	  long	  
as	  the	  form	  of	  his	  government	  subsisted	  under	  his	  successors,	  the	  caliphs,	  this	  
government	  was	  utterly	  unified,	  and	  for	  that	  reason	  it	  was	  good.”	  However,	  as	  
“Christianity	  is	  a	  completely	  spiritual	  religion,	  concerned	  with	  things	  heavenly,”	  
Rousseau	  argued	  the	  state	  must	  develop	  a	  complementary	  form	  of	  civil	  religion	  
to	  compel	  the	  populace	  to	  care	  for	  public	  concerns.	  This	  was,	  Rousseau	  tells	  us,	  
because	  “the	  homeland	  of	  the	  Christian	  is	  not	  of	  this	  world.”113	  Given	  that	  the	  
Zionist	  homeland	  was	  very	  much	  of	  this	  world,	  of	  what	  use	  to	  the	  movement	  is	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113	  Jean-­‐Jacques	  Rousseau,	  "On	  the	  Social	  Contract,"	  in	  The	  Basic	  Policial	  Writings,	  Second	  Edition,	  ed.	  
Donald	  A.	  Cress	  (Indianapolis:	  Hackett	  Publishing	  Company,	  Inc.	  ,	  2011),	  246-­‐48.	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civil	  religion	  meant	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  otherworldly	  gaze	  of	  its	  true	  
believers?	  Why	  then	  civil	  religion?	  Why	  not	  just	  religion?	  Or,	  perhaps,	  given	  the	  
history	  of	  the	  latter	  term,114	  a	  new	  form	  of	  Jewishness?	  	  
In	  closing,	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  separate	  the	  religious	  and	  secular	  elements	  of	  
this	  curriculum?	  Perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  who	  is	  asking,	  and	  for	  what	  
purpose?	  The	  assumption	  that	  knowledge	  could	  be	  so	  divided—into	  history	  and	  
theology,	  politics	  and	  religion—is	  not	  a	  neutral	  proposition.	  Within	  the	  curricula	  
analyzed	  here,	  religious	  studies	  do	  not	  function	  primarily	  as	  vessels	  for	  
individual	  ethical	  formation	  but	  as	  a	  platform	  for	  communal	  identity.	  They	  
emphasize	  the	  particularity	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people	  and	  violate	  the	  Christian	  
principle—which	  has	  found	  expression	  from	  St.	  Paul	  to	  Ernest	  Renan—that	  
religions	  are	  not	  national.	  Departing	  then	  from	  the	  accepted	  wisdom	  that	  Zionist	  
education	  represented	  either	  a	  secularizing	  impulse	  or	  a	  form	  of	  “civil	  religion,”	  I	  
have	  suggested	  that	  both	  of	  these	  explanations	  obscure	  the	  genuine	  novelty	  of	  
the	  Zionist	  attempt	  to	  confound	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  secular	  and	  the	  
religious,	  an	  attempt	  that	  functions	  to	  highlight	  the	  historical	  contingency	  and	  
theoretical	  limitations	  of	  these	  very	  categories.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
Reviewing	  the	  curricula	  for	  history	  and	  geography	  illustrates	  how	  easily	  
theological	  meanings	  could	  co-­‐exist	  with,	  and	  even	  generate,	  historical	  narratives	  
regarding	  the	  eternal	  connection	  between	  the	  Jewish	  people	  and	  the	  land	  –	  with	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  “Secularism	  is	  a	  name	  Christianity	  gave	  itself	  when	  it	  invented	  religion,	  when	  it	  named	  its	  
other	  or	  others	  as	  religions.”	  Anidjar,	  "Secularism,"	  62.	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corresponding	  political	  implications.	  Yet,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  strong	  government	  
opposition	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	  “politics”	  in	  the	  classroom,	  there	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  
no	  serious	  attention	  paid	  to	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  Jewish	  “religious”	  studies	  could	  be	  
politicized.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  Director	  of	  Education	  repeatedly	  asserted	  that	  the	  
Zionist	  schools	  had	  fallen	  into	  a	  sort	  of	  “racial	  self-­‐worship”	  because	  they	  were	  not	  
adequately	  religious.115	  Clearly	  Jerome	  Farrell	  had	  a	  different	  form	  of	  Judaism	  in	  
mind.	  	  
This	  chapter	  has	  attempted	  to	  unravel	  the	  different	  threads	  that	  joined	  
together	  Zionist	  and	  colonial	  attempts	  to	  reform	  Jewish	  communal	  education.	  I	  have	  
highlighted	  numerous	  points	  of	  overlap	  that	  existed	  between	  them,	  though	  
suggested	  they	  nonetheless	  found	  themselves	  at	  odds	  over	  the	  nature	  and	  purpose	  
of	  religious	  education.	  The	  Department	  of	  Education	  repeatedly	  expressed	  concern	  
over	  the	  political	  nature	  and	  “anti-­‐religious”	  spirit	  of	  Zionist	  schools—and	  the	  
consequent	  alienation	  of	  Jews	  from	  common	  humanity—and	  attempted	  to	  rectify	  
these	  deficiencies	  in	  part	  by	  supporting	  Orthodox	  Jewish	  education	  in	  Palestine.	  Yet,	  
administrators	  found	  nothing	  particularly	  savory	  about	  these	  older	  forms	  of	  
communal	  schooling	  other	  than	  their	  perceived	  indifference	  to	  mass	  politics.	  In	  
launching	  reform	  efforts,	  therefore,	  the	  government	  implied	  that	  genuine	  religious	  
belief	  and	  practice	  could	  only	  be	  nurtured	  in	  educational	  settings	  that	  had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115	  In	  one	  of	  his	  many	  critiques	  directed	  to	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi,	  Farrell	  stated,	  “The	  goal	  of	  this	  
department	  is	  to	  support	  the	  study	  of	  religion	  as	  an	  integral	  (bilti	  nifrad)	  part	  of	  the	  basic	  curriculum,	  
that	  all	  students	  must	  participate	  in,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  those	  whose	  parents	  have	  expressed	  in	  
writing	  their	  desire	  to	  exempt	  their	  children.”	  He	  further	  implored	  the	  Va’ad	  Leumi	  to	  inform	  him	  
“what	  steps	  you	  recommend	  to	  implement	  in	  order	  to	  advance	  the	  study	  of	  religion	  in	  General	  and	  
Labor	  schools.	  Jerome	  Farrell	  to	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  of	  the	  Va’ad	  ha-­‐Leumi	  (in	  
Hebrew).	  July	  4,	  1940.	  CZA	  J17\4996.	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undergone	  a	  series	  of	  dramatic	  changes,	  at	  the	  physical,	  pedagogic	  and	  curricular	  
levels.	  	  
Yet,	  despite	  the	  government’s	  fevered	  warnings	  that	  Zionist	  education	  had	  
discarded	  nearly	  all	  traces	  of	  its	  “religious”	  past,	  this	  perception	  was	  far	  from	  
accurate.	  Conversely,	  based	  on	  a	  review	  of	  syllabi,	  inspection	  notes	  and	  
examinations	  used	  in	  the	  Hebrew	  Public	  System,	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  Zionist	  
education	  was	  deeply	  invested	  in	  a	  stressing	  certain	  forms	  of	  religiosity,	  or	  more	  
accurately,	  in	  reformulating	  the	  relationship	  between	  Jewishness	  and	  mass	  politics.	  
In	  doing	  so,	  the	  Zionist	  movement	  had	  to	  contend	  with	  the	  contradictions	  inherent	  
in	  British	  policymaking	  in	  Palestine—that	  on	  one	  hand,	  Jewishness	  should	  
constitute	  the	  basis	  of	  national	  rights,	  but	  that,	  as	  a	  religion,	  Judaism	  should	  rise	  
above	  the	  nationalist	  tumult.	  These	  reflections	  should	  invite	  us	  to	  think	  further	  
about	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  sectarian	  and	  the	  secular	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  
multi-­‐faceted	  relationship	  between	  Zionism	  and	  colonialism	  on	  the	  other.	  
In	  closing,	  we	  might	  ask	  whether	  the	  Zionist	  curricula	  described	  here	  represent	  a	  
form	  of	  resistance	  to	  the	  secularizing	  impulse	  of	  the	  British	  Mandatory	  state.	  Certainly	  
Zionist	  leaders	  perceived	  the	  British	  as	  a	  colonial	  force	  that	  sought	  to	  impose	  their	  own	  
standards	  on	  the	  Hebrew	  Public	  System,	  a	  view	  that	  some	  scholars	  have	  accepted.116	  Giving	  
voice	  to	  this	  view,	  one	  Labor	  educator	  lamented	  that	  the	  Director	  of	  Education	  wished	  “to	  
fit	  our	  varied	  lives	  into	  a	  framework	  that	  is	  foreign	  in	  its	  preparation	  –	  based	  on	  his	  
experience	  in	  other	  countries.”	  He	  further	  wondered	  “how	  any	  foreign	  man,	  an	  even	  an	  
educator	  from	  the	  government	  Department	  of	  Education,	  can	  dictate	  to	  us	  about	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  See,	  for	  example,	  Elboim-­‐Dror,	  "British	  Educational	  Policies	  in	  Palestine."	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structure	  of	  our	  schools?	  As	  if	  we	  were	  born	  yesterday?	  We	  know	  that	  the	  European	  
pedagogy	  is	  sophisticated,	  but	  we	  also	  have	  a	  pedagogy,	  we	  have	  methods	  of	  education	  and	  
instruction	  of	  our	  own.	  We	  have	  experience	  in	  our	  education,	  we	  have	  been	  engaged	  in	  the	  
education	  of	  our	  sons	  for	  thousands	  of	  years,	  and	  Europe,	  when	  did	  it	  begin	  this?”117	  	  	  
While	  an	  interpretation	  of	  Zionist	  education	  as	  a	  form	  of	  resistance	  to	  colonial	  
secularism	  may	  initially	  seem	  compelling,	  a	  closer	  look	  renders	  such	  an	  interpretation	  
more	  doubtful.	  Countless	  articulations	  about	  what	  the	  modern	  Jewish	  education	  program	  
in	  Palestine	  should	  entail	  bear	  the	  traces	  of	  those	  very	  distinctions—between	  the	  religious	  
and	  secular,	  the	  traditional	  and	  the	  practical,	  the	  spiritual	  and	  the	  material—that	  Zionist	  
education	  labored	  to	  obscure.	  Yet	  “from	  these	  distinctions,	  which	  were	  given	  their	  
hegemony	  by	  the	  culture,	  no	  one	  could	  be	  free.’”118	  For	  instance:	  “The	  Tachkemoni	  school	  
was	  founded…by	  parents	  that	  aspired	  to	  create	  an	  educational	  institution	  that	  would	  be	  
built	  on	  the	  foundations	  of	  tradition	  (ha-­‐masorah)	  and	  that	  would	  also	  be	  suitable	  for	  the	  
problems	  of	  a	  new	  age.”119	  Our	  capacity	  to	  speak	  of	  this	  education	  in	  terms	  of	  resistance	  to	  
secular	  modernity	  vanishes	  with	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  “and”	  that	  identifies	  what	  is	  useful	  
as	  something	  other	  than	  the	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  (we	  might	  reluctantly,	  anachronistically,	  
label	  them	  as	  “religious”)	  that	  had	  structured	  the	  order	  of	  Jewish	  life	  for	  centuries.	  	  	  
	  Thus	  while	  it	  may	  initially	  seem	  that	  the	  form	  of	  education	  developed	  under	  Zionist	  
auspices	  represented	  a	  totally	  different	  paradigm	  than	  the	  assimilationist	  one	  we	  began	  
with	  in	  examining	  Divrei	  shalom	  v’emet,	  in	  fact	  we	  are	  quite	  a	  bit	  closer	  to	  Wesseley	  than	  it	  
may	  appears.	  Both	  bear	  the	  mark	  of	  a	  world	  torn	  in	  two,	  either	  as	  a	  force	  to	  be	  celebrated	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  Moshe	  Aharon	  Bejel,	  untitled,	  undated	  memorandum	  (most	  likely	  1940-­‐1941).	  CZA	  J17\4996.	  
118	  Edward	  Said,	  The	  World,	  the	  Text,	  and	  the	  Critic	  	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press	  1983).	  
119	  Tazkir	  l’ẖaverei	  va’ad	  ha-­‐ẖinuch	  she	  al	  yadei	  he-­‐hanhalah	  ha-­‐tzionit	  b’eretz	  yisrael	  me’at	  ẖaver	  
morei	  beit	  ha-­‐sefer	  ha-­‐tachkemoni	  b’yerushaliyim.	  (undated).	  CZA	  J17\7140.	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as	  the	  key	  to	  Jewish	  emancipation,	  or	  one	  to	  be	  combatted	  in	  attempt	  to	  recreate	  a	  holistic	  
Jewish	  identity.	  This	  commonality	  reminds	  us	  that	  acts	  of	  colonial	  mimicry	  and	  those	  of	  
colonial	  resistance	  need	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  mutually	  exclusive,	  that	  even	  the	  most	  
concerted	  attempts	  to	  blur	  the	  boundaries	  between	  the	  sacred	  and	  secular	  betray	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  these	  categories	  had	  become,	  to	  reiterate,	  a	  force	  which	  no	  one	  could	  
escape.	  	  
Finally,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  use	  of	  “religious”	  and	  
“secular”	  as	  historical	  designations,	  particularly	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  lamentations	  
mourning	  the	  passing	  of	  secular	  Zionism	  and	  its	  “universal”	  values.	  Have	  we	  not	  
noticed	  that	  assertions	  of	  Zionism’s	  secular	  roots	  are	  often	  heard	  from	  those	  same	  
quarters	  that	  lament	  the	  “return”	  of	  religion	  in	  contemporary	  Israel	  and	  that	  ascribe	  
responsibility	  for	  the	  country’s	  prolonged	  conflicts	  to	  either	  religious	  settlers	  or	  the	  
growth	  of	  ultra-­‐Orthodoxy?	  These	  tend	  to	  be	  the	  same	  narratives	  that	  look	  
nostalgically	  to	  the	  pre-­‐1967	  years	  as	  Israel’s	  golden	  age,	  before	  the	  secular	  dream	  
was	  upended	  by	  messianic	  imperialism.120	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  a	  critical	  
examination	  of	  Zionist	  education	  complicates	  this	  reading	  of	  the	  past,	  and	  rather	  
suggests	  points	  of	  continuity	  between	  that	  past	  and	  Israel’s	  present.	  To	  shift	  
registers	  slightly,	  these	  reflections	  seem	  to	  substantiate	  Gershom	  Scholem’s	  
anxieties	  about	  the	  secularization	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  language,	  famously	  voiced	  in	  a	  
letter	  to	  Franz	  Rosenzweig.	  “That	  sacred	  language	  on	  which	  we	  nurture	  our	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  Anita	  Shapira,	  for	  instance,	  has	  argued	  that	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  Israelis	  not	  
connected	  to	  their	  socialist	  roots,	  Zionism	  became	  “more	  chauvinistic	  and	  lost	  its	  connection	  with	  the	  
universal.”	  See	  Anita	  Shapira,	  Land	  and	  Power	  	  (Redwood	  City,	  CA:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1992).	  
It	  is	  perhaps	  no	  coincidence	  that	  Shapira’s	  latest	  project	  is	  a	  nostalgic	  biography	  of	  David	  Ben-­‐Gurion.	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children,	  is	  it	  not	  an	  abyss	  that	  must	  open	  up	  one	  day?”121	  Perhaps	  Scholem’s	  words	  
resonate	  with	  us	  more	  than	  ever	  as	  we	  witness	  the	  proliferation	  of	  religious	  politics	  
in	  Israel	  and	  throughout	  the	  Middle	  East.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  they	  should	  compel	  us	  to	  
consider	  the	  lasting	  impact	  of	  colonial	  modernity	  not	  merely	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  
turmoil,	  but	  in	  the	  very	  categories	  of	  political	  action.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  From	  a	  letter	  to	  Franz	  Rosenzweig,	  quoted	  in	  David	  Ohana,	  Modernism	  and	  Zionism	  	  (Hampshire,	  




The	  Invisible	  Cross	  
	  
	  There	  was	  no	  way	  to	  teach	  a	  man	  to	  read	  the	  Bible…which	  did	  	  
not	  also	  enable	  him	  to	  read	  the	  radical	  press.1	  
	  
	  
Had	  the	  opinions	  about	  religious	  education	  that	  prevailed	  during	  the	  early	  
twentieth	  century	  materialized,	  a	  study	  like	  this	  would	  have	  been	  firmly	  rooted	  in	  a	  
past	  that	  was	  quickly	  fading	  from	  view.	  The	  eventual	  obsolescence	  of	  religious	  
observance	  was	  undoubtedly	  the	  basis	  of	  David	  Ben-­‐Gurion’s	  political	  calculus	  in	  
1947,	  when	  he	  made	  broad	  concessions	  to	  Agudat	  Israel	  in	  order	  to	  guarantee	  its	  
support	  for	  the	  Zionist	  project.2	  Similarly,	  intellectuals	  like	  ‘Izzat	  Darwaza	  and	  Taha	  
Hussein	  saw	  the	  advance	  of	  Islamic	  civilization	  marching	  side	  by	  side	  the	  juridical	  
retreat	  of	  shari‘a	  as	  an	  all-­‐encompassing	  legal	  code	  for	  regulating	  human	  behavior.	  
In	  more	  recent	  decades,	  modernization	  theory	  posited	  that	  societies	  would	  
naturally	  secularize	  en	  route	  to	  modernity.	  To	  these	  miscalculations	  we	  may	  add	  the	  
colonial	  one	  that	  sits	  at	  the	  center	  of	  this	  study,	  namely,	  that	  religious	  education	  
constituted	  a	  conservative	  force	  that	  would	  restrain	  social	  change	  rather	  than	  
propel	  it.	  	  	  	  	  
With	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  we	  can	  place	  the	  British	  approach	  to	  religious	  
education	  on	  a	  continuum	  that,	  for	  most	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  viewed	  religious	  
piety	  as	  an	  antidote	  to	  unsavory	  forms	  of	  mass	  politics.	  In	  this	  context,	  it	  is	  worth	  
recalling	  that	  Anwar	  Sadat’s	  assassination	  by	  members	  of	  Egyptian	  Islamic	  Jihad	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Raymond	  Williams,	  The	  Sociology	  of	  Culture	  	  (New	  York:	  Schocken	  Books	  1981),	  110.	  
2	  David	  Ben-­‐Gurion,	  "Status-­‐Quo	  Agreement"	  (June	  19,	  1947),	  in	  Israel	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  ed.	  Itamar	  
Rabinovich	  and	  Jehuda	  Reinharz	  (Waltham,	  MA:	  Brandeis	  University	  Press	  2007).	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came	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  his	  support	  for	  Islamic	  groups	  in	  universities	  as	  a	  
counterweight	  to	  leftist	  organizations.	  Similarly,	  as	  late	  as	  the	  1980’s,	  Israel’s	  
attempts	  to	  undermine	  Palestinian	  national	  claims	  took	  the	  form	  of	  direct	  aid	  to	  its	  
recent	  archenemy,	  Hamas.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  era	  of	  nationalism	  and	  mass	  
education	  gave	  rise	  to	  new	  social	  conditions	  wherein	  the	  relationship	  between	  
“religion”	  and	  political	  identity	  had	  to	  be	  formulated	  anew.	  That	  this	  could	  be	  done	  
in	  support	  of	  revolutionary	  change	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  name	  of	  mere	  continuity	  has	  
become,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  almost	  axiomatic.	  	  
This	  was	  clearly	  not	  the	  case	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  a	  
particular	  understanding	  of	  religion	  as	  a	  politically	  disinterested	  code	  of	  individual	  
ethics	  lay	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  sectarian	  policies	  that	  linked	  educational	  autonomy	  to	  the	  
religious	  community.	  It	  was,	  moreover,	  the	  Zionist	  movement	  that	  was	  able	  to	  best	  
capitalize	  on	  this	  administrative	  structure,	  though	  the	  designation	  of	  the	  Va’ad	  
Leumi	  as	  a	  “religious”	  body	  was	  shown	  to	  engender	  no	  shortage	  of	  contradictions.	  
Moving	  beyond	  Palestine’s	  legal	  order,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  Mandatory	  state	  
promoted	  a	  “new	  and	  improved”	  type	  of	  religious	  education	  within	  both	  Muslim	  and	  
Jewish	  communities	  as	  the	  paradoxical	  guarantor	  of	  the	  traditional	  order.	  Finally,	  I	  
have	  shown	  that	  while	  certain	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  educators	  also	  found	  communal	  
schools	  like	  the	  ẖeder	  and	  kuttāb	  woefully	  inadequate,	  they	  did	  not	  acquiesce	  to	  the	  
government’s	  view	  in	  toto,	  but	  rather,	  offered	  competing	  educational	  models	  in	  
which	  religious	  education	  was	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  political	  engagement.	  
Palestine	  under	  British	  rule	  has	  served	  as	  the	  immediate	  context	  in	  charting	  
the	  intersection	  of	  actors	  (colonial,	  Zionist,	  Arab-­‐Islamic)	  who	  sought	  to	  formulate	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the	  appropriate	  role	  of	  religious	  education	  in	  the	  era	  of	  mass	  politics.	  Yet	  taking	  
stock	  of	  this	  history	  has	  required	  a	  wider	  engagement	  with	  the	  transformation	  of	  
Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  education	  during	  the	  eighteenth	  and	  nineteenth	  centuries,	  
processes	  that,	  I	  have	  argued,	  were	  coterminous	  with	  the	  extension	  of	  colonial	  or	  
quasi-­‐colonial	  relationships	  over	  European	  Jews	  and	  Arab	  Muslims.	  With	  this	  
background	  in	  mind,	  we	  can	  better	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  numerous	  points	  of	  overlap	  
that	  joined	  British,	  Zionist	  and	  Palestinian	  Arab	  educators	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine.	  It	  
was,	  after	  all,	  during	  these	  decades	  that	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  education	  underwent	  a	  
wholesale	  transformation	  wherein	  the	  modernist	  innovations	  of	  the	  prior	  century	  
became	  standard	  operating	  procedure	  in	  most	  of	  the	  country’s	  schools.	  	  
Yet	  despite	  these	  similarities—ranging	  from	  opinions	  regarding	  school	  
hygiene	  to	  pedagogic	  approaches	  to	  sacred	  texts—education	  in	  Palestine	  remained	  
a	  contentious	  issue,	  particularly	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  role	  of	  religious	  knowledge.	  As	  
heirs	  to	  the	  modernist	  traditions	  that	  preceded	  them,	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  educators	  
were	  conscious	  of	  education’s	  revolutionary	  potential	  and	  explicitly	  viewed	  
schooling	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  preparing	  the	  next	  generation	  for	  their	  respective	  national	  
struggles.	  This	  entailed	  not	  merely	  the	  secularization	  of	  communal	  schooling	  to	  
include	  “practical”	  subjects,	  but	  the	  mobilization	  of	  Jewish	  and	  Islamic	  textual	  
traditions	  to	  highlight	  the	  sacred	  character	  of	  political	  activism.	  In	  this	  sense,	  we	  
might	  offer	  the	  following	  variation	  on	  the	  quote	  from	  Raymond	  Williams	  featured	  
above:	  there	  was	  no	  way	  to	  teach	  a	  man	  to	  read	  the	  Bible	  (or	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  
Qur’an)	  which	  did	  not	  also	  enable	  him	  to	  read	  it	  as	  a	  radical	  text.	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On	  the	  conceptual	  front,	  this	  project	  has	  tried	  to	  critically	  examine	  the	  
creation	  and	  negotiation	  of	  certain	  epistemic	  boundaries—between	  the	  religious	  
and	  secular,	  the	  universal	  and	  particular,	  the	  pedagogic	  and	  the	  political—and	  their	  
material	  consequences	  for	  education	  in	  Mandate	  Palestine.	  I	  have	  argued	  
throughout	  for	  an	  appreciation	  of	  modern	  education	  as	  an	  inherently	  political	  
practice,	  and	  that	  British	  efforts	  to	  deny	  this	  fact	  functioned	  within	  a	  matrix	  of	  
colonial	  power	  that	  held	  as	  self-­‐evident	  distinctions	  between	  pedagogic	  need	  and	  
social	  engineering,	  public	  service	  and	  mass	  politics,	  national	  pride	  and	  national	  
chauvinism,	  religious	  morals	  and	  politicized	  religion.	  Only	  by	  appreciating	  this	  
complex	  web	  of	  distinctions	  can	  we	  understand	  how	  British	  officials	  found	  nothing	  
contradictory	  about,	  for	  instance,	  stressing	  civic	  engagement	  while	  forbidding	  
“politics”	  in	  the	  classroom.	  Conversely,	  it	  was	  “native”	  movement	  across	  the	  
boundary	  that	  separated	  colonial	  practices	  from	  their	  corrupted	  forms	  that	  
represented	  the	  ultimate	  transgression.	  
Yet,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  border	  separating	  proper	  and	  improper	  educational	  
practices	  was	  not	  as	  impermeable	  as	  Humphrey	  Bowman	  or	  Jerome	  Farrell	  
imagined.	  Broadly	  speaking,	  the	  denial	  of	  this	  porousness	  was	  a	  defining	  feature	  of	  
British	  colonial	  rule	  in	  Palestine.	  It	  represented	  nothing	  less	  than	  the	  power	  to	  
render	  power	  invisible,	  and	  to	  express	  this	  power	  through	  policies	  that	  insisted	  they	  
had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  politics.	  We	  might	  term	  this	  a	  politics	  of	  denial,	  and	  suspect	  
that	  such	  acts	  gains	  their	  strength	  from	  the	  same	  spring	  that	  has,	  in	  more	  recent	  
times,	  rendered	  secularism	  a	  “universal”	  model	  of	  good	  behavior.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  
Mandatory	  Palestine,	  the	  clearest	  demonstration	  of	  this	  politics	  of	  denial	  came	  in	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the	  treatment	  of	  Christian	  schools	  as	  disinterested,	  neutral	  meeting	  grounds	  
wherein	  Jews	  and	  Arabs	  could	  escape	  the	  surrounding	  nationalist	  tensions.	  
The	  Palestine	  Royal	  Commission	  gave	  clearest	  voice	  to	  this	  view	  in	  its	  praise	  
for	  “mixed”	  (i.e.	  Christian)	  schools	  in	  Palestine.	  As	  J.S.	  Bennet	  from	  the	  Colonial	  
Office	  summarized	  the	  situation,	  “the	  Commission	  had	  received	  evidence	  that	  in	  
such	  schools	  as	  St.	  George’s,	  Jerusalem,	  or	  the	  Jerusalem	  Girls	  College,	  it	  had	  been	  
proved	  that	  Arabs	  and	  Jews	  could	  be	  successfully	  taught	  together,	  and	  not	  only	  work	  
and	  play	  together	  but	  also	  make	  lasting	  friendships.”3	  In	  its	  final	  report,	  the	  PRC	  
offered	  the	  following	  description	  of	  these	  schools:	  
In	   most,	   if	   not	   all	   of	   them,	   a	   high	   standard	   of	   educational	   efficiency	   is	  
maintained.	   Their	   curriculum	   is	   broader	   than	   that	   of	   the	   Jewish	   or	   Arab	  
schools;	   their	  educational	   ideals	  and	  methods	  are	  western;	  and,	   in	  most	  of	  
them,	   a	   specifically	   Christian	   type	   of	   character	   is	   aimed	   at.	   No	  
encouragement	  is	  given	  to	  either	  Jewish	  or	  Arab	  nationalism,	  not	  so	  much	  by	  
suppression	   of	   these	   aspirations	   as	   by	   diversion	   of	   interest	   into	   other	  
channels…they	  provide	  a	  fine	  example	  of	  what	  could	  have	  been	  achieved	  in	  
happier	  circumstances.4	  
	  
Within	  this	  passage,	  we	  can	  detect	  several	  key	  concepts	  that	  were	  continually	  
mobilized	  to	  facilitate	  the	  politics	  of	  denial:	  the	  particularism	  of	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  
education	  versus	  the	  “broader”	  horizons	  of	  mixed	  schools;	  the	  diversion	  of	  interest	  
away	  from	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  nationalism	  in	  favor	  of	  more	  productive	  channels;	  the	  
benefits	  gained	  from	  students’	  exposure	  to	  a	  (presumably	  apolitical)	  “Christian	  type	  
of	  character.”	  	  
	   Alas,	  happier	  circumstances	  were	  not	  to	  be	  had,	  though	  in	  another	  slight	  of	  
hand,	  the	  passage	  quoted	  above	  functions	  to	  elide	  the	  role	  of	  British	  policy-­‐making	  
in	  producing	  Palestine’s	  material	  reality.	  Rather,	  the	  tendency	  within	  colonial	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  J.S.	  Bennet	  minute,	  March	  4,	  1938.	  TNA,	  CO733/362/2.	  
4	  Palestine	  Royal	  Commission	  Report.	  (London:	  His	  Majesty’s	  Stationary	  Office,	  1937).	  254.	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administrative	  circles	  was	  to	  increasingly	  speak	  of	  Palestine	  in	  tragic	  terms	  as	  a	  
place	  whose	  conflicts	  were	  almost	  supernaturally	  propelled	  by	  a	  force	  beyond	  
anyone’s	  control.	  “Under	  a	  different	  form	  of	  Mandate	  a	  unitary	  Palestine	  state	  might	  
have	  been	  built	  up	  with	  children	  of	  both	  races	  educated	  together	  in	  common	  
schools.”5	  This,	  more	  than	  anything,	  may	  constitute	  the	  apex	  of	  colonial	  hubris.	  But	  
more	  concretely,	  it	  is	  the	  politics	  of	  denial	  taken	  to	  the	  utmost	  extreme	  as	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